1. The principal registrar is to refer the file to the Head of Division for any further case management directions for hearing and determination of Hepburn Shire Council's application for contempt prosecution against the respondent, Maureen Coward.
2. The applicant's costs of this jurisdictional hearing are reserved.

1. This preliminary hearing has been held to resolve a jurisdictional challenge made by Maureen Coward to the Tribunal's authority to hear and determine an application for contempt of the Tribunal.
2. The contempt application is being prosecuted against Maureen Coward under the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 1998 (Vic) ('VCAT Act') by the responsible authority, Hepburn Shire Council.
3. The background to the charges[2] of contempt relates to Enforcement Orders made by the Tribunal in connection with a planning permit for land owned by Maureen Coward in Wrigleys Road, Broomfield. The subject land lies within the Shire Council area.
4. Permit PlnPA002701 was issued by order of the Tribunal in proceeding P1566/2020 and allows for:

Use of the land for materials recycling (automotive recycling) and associated development of a shed generally in accordance with the endorsed plans.

1. The permit contains various conditions, including a condition in relation to the number of cars that may be stored on the land at any time and another requiring her to provide necessary plans to the Council.
2. On 5 June 2024 the Tribunal issued an Enforcement Order in relation to the land and permit, reported in proceeding Hepburn SC v Coward [2024] VCAT 517.
3. Barry Coward and Maureen Coward were the named respondents to that Enforcement Order as registered owners of the land at that time.
4. On application made by the Council, on 15 November 2024 the Tribunal amended the Enforcement Order to remove Barry Coward as a respondent based on information received that not long after the Tribunal issued the Enforcement Order, Mr Barry Coward sadly passed away. This is reported in Hepburn SC v Coward (Corrected) [2024] VCAT 1086.
5. The Tribunal acknowledges Maureen Coward's loss of her husband. As the presiding member at this jurisdictional hearing, I extend my condolences to her and her family.
6. At that time, and because of the circumstances, the Council did not oppose extending the dates by which Maureen Coward must comply with the requirements of the Enforcement Order.[3]
7. Following the amendment and extension of time of the Enforcement Order, the Council alleges Maureen Coward again did not comply with it within the time required by the Enforcement Order and has brought an application for contempt under s 137(1) of the VCAT Act to enforce compliance with the Tribunal's orders.

1. That is background to the jurisdictional application before me which was listed for Preliminary Hearing by Order dated 10 July 2025.
2. As stated in that Order:

Purpose of preliminary hearing

The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to consider whether VCAT has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application for contempt against Maureen Coward.

1. Both parties were directed to file and serve written submissions, which they both did.[4]
2. Two hours was allowed for the hearing and the time for each party's oral submissions was limited to 45 minutes. During the hearing, I allowed Maureen Coward substantially more time.
3. The actual charges of contempt to be brought against Maureen Coward and the facts on which it is alleged by the Shire that she has committed a contempt are not before me. The only issue before me is the question of whether VCAT has jurisdiction to hear and determine a prosecution for contempt against Maureen Coward.
4. Maureen Coward alleges that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction over her to hear and determine a prosecution for contempt because:
   1. She contends that the State of Victoria, VCAT and the Hepburn Shire Council are the incorrect jurisdictions - see her submissions para 219 - 223;
   2. She submits that she has the right to correct due process and jurisdiction - see her submissions para 224 - 225;
   3. She submits that correct due process and jurisdiction - over what she calls 'subjects of the Imperial crown' accused of a crime - is governed by Imperial Law including all Imperial Acts, including the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution and Bill of Rights 1688 - see her submissions para 229 - 238; and
   4. She submits that the Authority of Australian Governments is subject to the right to self-determination of whom she calls 'the people' who, she says, are 'known in the title of the United Kingdom of Australia' represented in title by the 'Australian Privy Council' and in title by the 'Most Noble Order of the Desert Flame'[5] - see her submissions para 116 - 210.
5. In her oral submissions she and her son Chris Coward, addressed the Tribunal on each of these points and in response to the Council's submissions.
6. In short, Maureen Coward submits she is not an Australian subject, that Victorian law does not apply (or that it does not apply to her), and that the State of Victoria, the Tribunal and the Shire have no jurisdiction over her for various reasons.
7. Maureen Coward also asserts that 'all courts, police and government departments of every state who are now incorporated under ABN numbers' are somehow invalid. She also asserts that their 'acts statutes rules and regulations are governed by the Australia Act 1986' which she says is somehow invalid. She also asserts she is being 'coerced to joinder into a contract with the Hepburn Shire Council' which she alleges has an ABN and she says is trying to extort who she calls 'the people' on trespass without following the 'proper line of authority against we the people'. She says she does not wish to partake in or against her ancestors' lineage, or she says 'take part in the foreign occupied administration government the State of Victoria' which she alleges (along with the Treasury Corporation of Victoria) are both registered to the US SEC and that she does not have any contracts with what she calls these 'entity corporations'.
8. Maureen Coward, in an email to the Tribunal dated 17 May 2024, stated that the proceeding should be taken to a 'higher court either county court or the high court'.
9. In its submissions the Council submits:
   1. VCAT's jurisdiction is conferred by the enactment that establishes the Tribunal and confers jurisdiction on it under enabling enactments such as Victorian planning legislation - the VCAT Act;
   2. Section 137 of the VCAT Act confers statutory jurisdiction and authority on the Tribunal to hear and determine applications for contempt of the Tribunal. It defines the acts that constitute contempt and provides VCAT with the necessary powers to enforce its authority and uphold its integrity, including by the imposition of penalties. The Tribunal's contempt powers have recently been upheld and endorsed by the Court of Appeal.[6]
   3. The Tribunal's contempt powers under the VCAT Act are not inconsistent with any Commonwealth laws.[7]

1. I remind the parties that the legal issue for determination at this Preliminary Hearing is whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application for contempt of the Tribunal.[8]
2. It clearly does.
3. Mrs Coward's written and oral submissions are incorrect and misguided and have no foundation in law. She candidly states in her written submissions that she is 'a little familiar with the legal world'. If her submissions have been prepared by her, she is legally mistaken.
4. Section 137 of the VCAT Act confers statutory jurisdiction on VCAT to hear and determine a prosecution for contempt of the Tribunal. That jurisdiction is well established by law.
5. It is also well established that the categories of contempt include where there has been non-compliance with an order made by VCAT: see s 137(1)(ea).
6. The Court of Appeal has expressly held that VCAT has the jurisdiction under s 137 of the VCAT Act to deal with contempt in accordance with that statutory provision.[9] The power to deal with contempt extends to punishing the disobedience of an order of the Tribunal and to enforce compliance with it, including by issuing a fine or imposing a sentence of imprisonment.[10]
7. Accordingly, Maureen Coward - being the person against whom the Tribunal has made its Enforcement Orders - is bound by those orders and the Tribunal has undoubted contempt jurisdiction over her.
8. Maureen Coward's arguments are what have been categorised in decisions of superior courts in Australia and overseas as belonging to a collection of erroneous beliefs or arguments sometimes called 'pseudo-legal commercial arguments'.[11] Such arguments have been rejected in common law courts and legal systems around the world as having no legal foundation.
9. Maureen Coward referred to various irrelevant Australian court decisions in support of her arguments and an out-of-context discussion in a transcript of hearing from a case before another court in another Australian state.
10. There is no legal basis for any contention in this case for Mrs Coward to assert that the laws of the Victorian Parliament do not apply to her and bind her. I also accept the Council's submission that there is no inconsistency between s 137 of the VCAT Act and any Commonwealth law.
11. Maureen Coward is a person who, like all ordinary human beings, in accordance with the rule of law is amenable to and answerable to the laws applicable to ordinary persons.
12. She is equal under the law, not exceptional.
13. Maureen Coward's assertion of some citizen or other status giving her immunity from the law is legally flawed. The rights, freedoms and privileges people enjoy with others in society also carry responsibility to adhere to its laws, and the legal obligations they place on people, whether or not a person believes they do. Society's laws apply to people who may or may not be citizens and apply with equal effect whether or not a person believes they are a citizen or subject to the law.
14. Maureen Coward's assertions of invalidity about Victorian law, and her assertions about orders of the Tribunal or actions of the Shire Council in seeking to enforce the Enforcement Order against her as somehow being invalid or somehow not applying to her, are also erroneous and have no legal foundation.
15. Her arguments amount to legal nonsense and are incapable of coherent legal argument.
16. There is nothing that warrants referral of this matter to the County Court of Victoria or any other jurisdiction within Victoria. There is no basis in law for the Tribunal to refer this proceeding to the High Court of Australia.[12] Maureen Coward has already had explained to her that the planning laws affecting the land of which she is registered on title within Victoria is an issue for the State of Victoria as an Australian State and an issue within State jurisdiction.
17. Maureen Coward's jurisdictional application is dismissed.

1. It will be a matter for the Tribunal hearing the Council's application for contempt to determine whether it proves the statement of charges of contempt that are brought against Maureen Coward under s 137 of the VCAT Act.
2. Again, I extend my condolences to her and her family for the recent loss of her husband.

[1] The submissions and evidence of the parties, any supporting exhibits given at the hearing, and the statements filed have all been considered in the determination of this jurisdictional ruling. In accordance with the practice of the Tribunal, not all of this material will be cited or referred to in these reasons.

[2] A draft charge sheet identifies Charges 1 - 4, each brought under s 137(1)(ea) of the VCAT Act.

[3] Maureen Coward and her son, Chris Coward, attended at the practice day hearing before the Tribunal that day having filed a statement of grounds on 13 November 2024 described by them as a 'testament'.

[4] Towards the end of the hearing Maureen Coward said she had not received the Council's written submissions which its Counsel had addressed. Accordingly the Tribunal emailed the written submissions again to Maureen Coward and put them on the Zoom share screen giving her ample opportunity to read each of their 24 paragraphs and also provided a copy of the written submissions to her in the 'chat' function. She and her son then made additional oral submissions about them.

[5] Evidence about which organisation holding beliefs that are commonly referred to as the sovereign citizen movement were recorded in State of New South Wales v Kiskonen (Preliminary) [2021] NSWSC 915 (27 July 2021) at 19 and following.

[6] Melbourne CC v 160 Leicester Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] VCAT 1255 upheld in 160 Leicester Pty Ltd v Melbourne CC [2021] VSCA 250 (Victorian Court of Appeal).

[7] This submission addressed an earlier submission that had been made by Maureen Coward and her son at an earlier hearing.

[8] The High Court has confirmed that State legal tribunals such as VCAT have the authority to form an opinion about their own jurisdiction: see Citta Hobart Pty Ltd v Cawthorn [2022] HCA 16; (2022) 276 CLR 216 applied in Thurin v Krongold Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd [2022] VSCA 226 at [128]. See also Federated Engine-Drivers and Firemen's Association of Australasia v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1911] HCA 31; (1911) 12 CLR 398, 415 (Griffith CJ); Re Boulton: ex parte Construction, Forestry, Mining & Engineering Union (1998) 73 ALJR 129, 133 [21] (Kirby J); Old UGC Inc v Industrial Relations Commission (NSW) [2006] HCA 24; (2006) 225 CLR 274 at 290 [51]; Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Tomaras [2018] HCA 62; (2018) 265 CLR 434 at 477 [132]; Citta Hobart at [62] (Edelman J).

[9] R v Perkins [2002] VSCA 132 at [16]- [18] noting that the power it has with respect to contempt is conferred by s 137 rather than under any inherent jurisdiction that a court may have and holding that:

'The Tribunal has been given under s 137, the jurisdiction to deal with alleged or perceived acts of contempt.'

Once before the Tribunal, the individual must be informed of the contempt with which they are charged. Thereafter the Tribunal may adopt any procedure that it thinks fit, consistent, of course, with its obligation to accord natural justice to the person charged.

[10] Bradford v Dimopolous [2007] VCAT 1409; Melbourne CC v 160 Leicester Pty Ltd [2020] VCAT 1255; Melbourne CC v 160 Leicester Pty Ltd (No 2) [2020] VCAT 1435.

[11] Meads v Meads [2012] ABQB 571; Meenken v Family Court at Masterton [2017] NZHC 2103; Ennis v Credit Union Australia [2016] FCCA 1705; Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd v Grahame [2020] VSC 86; Grahame v Bendigo and Adelaide Bank Ltd [2021] VSCA 222; K Sheridan v Colin Biggers & Paisley [2019] NSWSC 528.

[12] Plunkett v Portier Pacific Pty Ltd [2024] VCAT 205 sets out some criteria that may justify a transfer of a proceeding to another jurisdiction under s 77 of the VCAT Act where the Tribunal is not the appropriate forum. The Tribunal as a has no power under that section of the VCAT Act to refer proceedings to the federal system of courts in Australia (nor to the court of another state). The jurisdiction over contempt of the Tribunal rests solely with VCAT under s 137 of the VCAT Act.