//
[2025] FedCFamC2F 898
General information, not legal advice.
Federal Circuit and Family Court (Div 2)
2025-07-02
Original judgment source is linked above.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.
IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
(a) Both the Husband and Wife were born in India and were married in India pursuant to the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 in 2016.
(b) The Wife came to Australia in early 2020 to do a 'crash course' in health care, before returning to India.
(c) The Wife re-entered Australia in early 2022, and the Husband and X followed several months later due to Covid-19 restrictions.
(d) The Wife said that she gave the Husband notice that the marriage was at an end in February 2023, and they remained living under the same roof until November 2023, when the Husband returned on his own to India. He has remained there since. In the Husband's Response to the Divorce application, he denied that the parties were separated.
(e) The Wife and X travelled to India in late 2023 for a family wedding and returned to Australia in late 2023. The Husband claimed she did so by stealth and without his consent.
(f) The Wife claimed that in late 2023, a Police Family Violence Order was taken out against the Husband by Tasmania Police, but that document is yet to be served.[2]
(g) Both the Wife and X were domiciled in Australia and/or were ordinary resident and were so resident for at least 12 months immediately preceding the filing of her applications.
(h) The Wife petitioned for divorce in India on grounds of cruelty in early 2024,[3] but the petition was not served. The petition was subsequently withdrawn.
(i) The Respondent filed Applications in the Indian Family Court in mid-2024 seeking, amongst other orders, restitution of conjugal rights and that the child live with him.[4] The Wife has joined the Husband's proceedings in India through her legal representative.[5]
(j) The Wife stated that the Husband has filed complaints with Indian police against her and believes she will be arrested if she returns to India, unless she has the protection of an order from this Court.
(k) The Wife lives in Australia pursuant to a temporary visa which expires in 2029. She intends to apply for permanent residency.
To pass a decree of restitution of conjugal right in favour of the Petitioner/ husband and against the Respondent/wife, thereby directing the Respondent/wife to join the matrimony of the Petitioner/husband and join the society of the Petitioner/ husband and fulfill/ perform the duties cast upon her as a wife.[6]
25.That the Petitioner/ husband therefore could not go to Australia and continues to be in a state of shock and has been trying to resolve the matter with the Respondent/ wife, since he loves her a lot and believes that she could not do such a thing. The Petitioner/ husband suspects that she is being brainwashed and influenced/ controlled by the said [Mr C] and other person(s), for some ulterior motives, known to them only. The said apprehension of the Petitioner/ husband has been confirmed by the family of the Respondent/ wife, who not only talk to Petitioner/ husband and empathize with him but also are trying to get the Respondent/ wife free from the clutches of [Mr C] and other person(s).
26.That to his further shock and surprise, the Petitioner/ husband has recently come to know that the Respondent/ wife under the undue influence and pressure of the said [Mr C] and other person(s), has also filed some cases against the Petitioner/ husband in Australia.
27.That the Respondent/ wife and the Petitioner/ husband had/ have been leading a very happy married life along with their son, until the said [Mr C] and other person(s), came into their lives. It is apparent that the Respondent/ wife and their son were illegally forced to return to Australia by these persons, in a secretive and planned manner. These persons have somehow blackmailed the Respondent/ wife to withdraw from Petitioner/ husband and his society, without any reason and justification. The Respondent/wife has been misled and influenced to initiate false proceedings against the Petitioner/ husband. However, the Petitioner/ husband is confident and believes that if he is allowed to meet and talk with the Respondent/ wife, without these persons, she ·will rejoin him. All these malafide acts are also causing a great adverse impact on the young child of the parties, who is also being brainwashed to hate the Petitioner/ husband.
28. That it would not be out of place to mention here that the Respondent/wife is also a patient of depression and at times she becomes very violent and starts throwing things and at times she becomes very naïve, not aware of what is happening with and around her. The Petitioner/ husband believes that using her such mental state, [Mr C] and other person(s), with malafide intentions have manipulated Respondent/ wife, by instigating her against him.[7]
26.That the son of the Petitioner is Indian by heart and will always remain an Indian. That the Petitioner believes that the son of the Petitioner does not have any future in Australia, and since the Respondent is not earning much so that she can support and take care of the son of the Petitioner solely. That at it is further humbly submitted that the Petitioner earns more than 1.5 times than the Respondent and the son will be more financially secure with the Petitioner rather than the Respondent in Australia. That without prejudice to the abovementioned it is further submitted that the Respondent does not have any, moral, emotional and financial support in Australia. That though the Respondent allows the child to speak to the Petitioner sometimes, but during the complete call, she remains with the child and tutors him to make sure that the Petitioner agrees to whatever demands she raises. She never lets the child talk to the Petitioner alone.[8]
It is denied that there is a pending divorce proceeding initiated by [Ms Sinha] against her husband [Mr Nandi]. The said petition has already been withdrawn by [Ms Sinha]. It is stated that [Ms Sinha]'s father has power of attorney in India which he invoked to file a divorce petition. As soon as [Ms Sinha] became aware of this [Mr Nandi]. she withdrew the petition and had this petition dismissed as withdrawn. The proof of this can be provided.[11]
(3) Proceedings for a divorce order may be instituted under this Act if, at the date on which the application for the order is filed in a court, either party to the marriage:
(a) is an Australian citizen;
(b) is domiciled in Australia; or
(c) is ordinarily resident in Australia and has been so resident for 1 year immediately preceding that date.
Australia is clearly the inappropriate forum for these issues to be determined, given:
i) The husband is an Indian citizen. The wife is an Indian citizen. The child is an Indian citizen. The husband lives in India. The wife and the child currently reside in Australia, but on temporary visas. The wife does not have a right to remain in Australia permanently, nor does the child.
ii) The parties were married pursuant to the Hindu Marriage Act 1955. Any order made in Australia which provides for the parties to be divorced, will not automatically be recognised in India, which will create a mischief of the parties being divorced in one jurisdiction, but remaining married in another.
iii) The child is an Indian citizen and has lived in India for the majority of his life. He does not have Australian citizenship or a permanent right to remain in the country. He was removed from India without the father's knowledge.
iv) The courts in India can provide complete relief in relation to both parenting and divorce.
v) The practicalities of the proceedings continuing in Australia would prejudice the husband. Both he and the wife speak Hindi. The husband is not fluent in English. Furthermore, the husband lives in India and therefore is unable to attend regular court hearings in person in Australia and would struggle to attend remote hearings given the time difference. Therefore, he would be at a disadvantage if the proceedings were to continue in Australia whereas both parties could fully participate in the proceedings in India.[13]
In relation to the Divorce application, there is no evidence or other material which suggests that the Applicant's application is unfairly burdensome, prejudicial, damaging or vexatious or that the Australian Court is a clearly inappropriate forum to determine the matter.[14]
The principles relating to a permanent stay of proceedings were conveniently summarised by Bell P in Moubarak by his tutor Coorey v Holt as follows:[16]
"(1) the onus of proving that a permanent stay of proceedings should be granted lies squarely on a defendant ...
(2) a permanent stay should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances ...
(3) a permanent stay should be granted when the interests of the administration of justice so demand ...
(4) the categories of cases in which a permanent stay may be ordered are not closed ...
(5) one category of case where a permanent stay may be ordered is where the proceedings or their continuance would be vexatious or oppressive ...
(6) the continuation of proceedings may be oppressive if that is their objective effect ...
(7) proceedings may be oppressive where their effect is 'seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging' ...
(8) proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would be manifestly unfair to a party ...; and
(9) proceedings may be stayed on a permanent basis where their continuation would bring the administration of justice into disrepute amongst right-thinking people ..."[15]
"In Voth, this Court adopted for Australia the test propounded by Deane J in Oceanic Sun, namely, that a stay should be granted if the local court is a clearly inappropriate forum, which will be the case if continuation of the proceedings in that court would be oppressive, in the sense of "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging", or, vexatious, in the sense of "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment". It was also held in Voth that, in determining whether the local court is a clearly inappropriate forum, "the discussion by Lord Goff in Spiliada of relevant 'connecting factors' and 'a legitimate personal or juridical advantage' provides valuable assistance". In this last regard, Lord Goff of Chieveley expressed the view that legitimate personal or juridical advantage is a relevant but not decisive consideration, the fundamental question being "where the case may be tried 'suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice." [16]
"Foreign proceedings usually fall for consideration in a context in which they involve the same or related factual issues as those involved in the local proceedings, but not the same legal issue and, perhaps, not the same parties. Even in cases of that kind it may sometimes be appropriate to grant a temporary stay of the local proceedings to allow the factual issues to be determined in the other jurisdiction. There are more compelling considerations in favour of a stay of the local proceedings if, as can happen, there are proceedings in another country which has jurisdiction to entertain those proceedings and the proceedings are between the same parties and with respect to the same issue or controversy.
Parallel proceedings in another country with respect to the same issue may be compared with multiple proceedings with respect to the same subject matter in different courts in Australia. In Union Steamship Co of New Zealand Ltd v The Caradale, Dixon J observed of that latter situation that "(t)he inconvenience and embarrassment of allowing two independent actions involving the same question of liability to proceed contemporaneously in different courts needs no elaboration." From the parties' point of view, there is no less - perhaps, considerably more - inconvenience and embarrassment if the same issue is to be fought in the courts of different countries according to different regimes, very likely permitting of entirely different outcomes.
It is prima facie vexatious and oppressive, in the strict sense of those terms, to commence a second or subsequent action in the courts of this country if an action is already pending with respect to the matter in issue. And although there are cases in which it has been held that it is not prima facie vexatious, in the strict sense of that word, to bring proceedings in different countries, the problems which arise if the identical issue or the same controversy is to be litigated in different countries which have jurisdiction with respect to the matter are such, in our view, that, prima facie, the continuation of one or the other should be seen as vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words.
It does not follow that, because one or other of the proceedings is prima facie vexatious or oppressive within the Voth sense of those words, the local proceedings should be stayed. However, it does follow that the fact that there are or, even, that there may be simultaneous proceedings in different countries with respect to the same controversy is highly relevant to the question whether the local proceedings are oppressive in the sense of "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging", or, vexatious, in the sense of "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment". And it also follows that courts should strive, to the extent that Voth permits, to avoid that situation.
Proceedings between Husband and Wife with respect to the marital relationship
If separate proceedings are commenced between Husband and Wife in different countries, differences in procedure, in available remedies and in the substantive law with respect to marriage and divorce will ordinarily ensure that the proceedings are different in significant respects. However, the proceedings will ordinarily be concerned with the same controversy. And that will be so even if the initiating party is not the same and even if the proceedings seek inconsistent remedies or outcomes. The marital relationship lies at the heart of all proceedings between Husband and Wife with respect to their marital status, especially proceedings for the dissolution of marriage. In such cases, it is the marital relationship itself which is the subject of controversy. And if the marriage is still subsisting, disputes with respect to property, maintenance and the custody of children will ordinarily be but aspects of an underlying controversy with respect to the marital relationship.
Although the appellant first brought proceedings against the respondent in Monaco for judicial separation and, only later, commenced proceedings for divorce, both proceedings were, in essence, proceedings with respect to their marital relationship. Clearly, it was the same marital relationship which was the subject of the divorce proceedings brought in Australia by the respondent. And although it may not be quite so clear, the property proceedings instituted by the respondent in the Family Court are but an aspect of his controversy with the appellant as to their marital relationship. It may have been otherwise if they were no longer married, but so long as their marriage subsists, their dispute with respect to property is a dispute as to the rights and obligations arising out of their marital relationship and those which should attend its dissolution. As such, it is properly to be seen as part of the controversy with respect to that relationship.
Considerations relevant to a stay of proceedings between Husband and Wife with respect to their marital relationship
Some of the matters properly to be taken into account in a case such as the present emerge from what has already been written. To start with, no question arises unless the courts of the respective countries have jurisdiction with respect to the parties and their marriage. And if there is a question as to the jurisdiction of the foreign court, it may be necessary to adjourn the local proceedings to enable the foreign court to determine that question. However, if both have jurisdiction, it will be relevant to consider whether each will recognise the other's orders and decrees. If the orders of the foreign court will not be recognised in Australia that will ordinarily dispose of any suggestion that the local proceedings should not continue. However, if the orders of the foreign court will be recognised in Australia, it will be relevant to consider whether any orders may need to be enforced in other countries and, if so, the relative ease with which that can be done. As well, it will be relevant to consider which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties' controversy.
Other considerations include the order in which the proceedings were instituted, the stage which they have reached and the costs that have been incurred. It will also be relevant to consider the connection of the parties and their marriage with each of the jurisdictions and to have regard to the issues on which relief might depend in those jurisdictions. Moreover, it will be relevant to consider whether, having regard to their resources and their understanding of language**, the parties are able to participate in the respective proceedings on an equal footing.** The list is not exhaustive. Rather, the question whether Australia is a clearly inappropriate forum is one that depends on the general circumstances of the case, taking into account the true nature and full extent of the issues involved."[17]
(Emphasis added)
"[o]ne legitimate purpose of comparing the law in each jurisdiction is to identify the existence of any juridical advantage to a party. Any juridical advantage so identified is one of the factors to be assessed. However it is not a legitimate purpose of such a comparison for a trial judge to thereby assess the comparative merits of the manner in which a case is determined as between the local and foreign tribunal. In this case the primary judge appears to give emphasis to his conclusions about the merits of Australian law in the manner in which property cases are determined, as compared to Singapore, rather than confining the consideration to one of effective dealing with the dispute arising from the breakdown of the parties' marriage involving divorce, parenting issues, spousal maintenance and child support. We consider that to be an error of principle in the approach taken."[18]
(Emphasis added)
"[t]he process is not one of weighing those factors that point towards a stay against those that point away from a stay, but rather of assessing whether there are enough factors indicating that the forum is clearly inappropriate, in which case a stay should be granted. If there are significant factors pointing to the conclusion that the chosen forum is appropriate, it is immaterial that there may be many factors suggesting that another forum might also be appropriate or even more appropriate."[19]
(Emphasis added)
Despite some earlier suggestion that the local court should engage in some analysis of the foreign litigation (for example Henry at 592-593; Navarro at [64]), it now appears settled that the focus is on the inappropriateness of the local court. The focus is not upon the appropriateness or comparative appropriateness of the foreign forum , but on assessing whether there are enough factors indicating that the local forum is clearly inappropriate, in which case a stay should be granted: Regie Nationale Des Usines Renault SA v Zhang [2002] HCA 10; (2002) 210 CLR 491; Navarro at [166] citing Martin Davies et al, Ngyh's Conflict of Laws in Australia (LexisNexis Butterworths, 8th edition, 2010) at [8.29] (repeated in the 10th edition). Australian courts should not concern themselves with an assessment of the comparative procedural or other claims of the foreign forum : Voth at 558; Henry at footnote 68; Navarro at [29]; Zhu & Xie [2021] FedCFamC1F 86 at [10]. As Deane J put it in Oceanic Sun Line at 242**, "the clear inappropriateness of the local forum may justify dismissal or a stay. The mere fact that some foreign tribunal would represent a 'more appropriate' forum will not**".[20]
(Emphasis added)
Is the Australian Court a Clearly Inappropriate Forum?
Whether each Court will Recognise the other's Orders and Decrees
[A]ny decision of any Court outside India, including Australia, will be without jurisdiction and thus will not be binding on the parties in India. Please refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the matter of "Y. Narasimha Rao and Ors. v. Y. Venkata Lakshmi and Anr." [1991 sec (3) 451].[29]
It is strongly stated that the Court in Australia does have the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate File no. LNC299/2024. The case instituted for No-Fault divorce by [Ms Sinha] is based on the causation of cruelty and violence committed by [Mr Nandi] towards [Ms Sinha]. As a result, it is going to be a binding decision upon the Courts in India. Moreover, it is not a case of ex-parte hearing, rather, it is a case where both parties re contesting the petition seeking divorce. [Mr Nandi] has engaged a counsel to represent him in the Court in Australia and has also field various documents/Affidavit to contest the case on Merit. The court in Australia dose have jurisdiction on the ground that part of the cause has occurred in Australia and not only in India-including issuance of DVO against [Mr Nandi]. [30]
"We turn then to the effect of her Honour's findings, which is that the Husband will be divorced in Australia but that the Wife will not be divorced in India. The primary judge described this as "an unfortunate outcome for the Wife" but considered that "it alone is not determinative of the matter" (at [66]).
In Navarro v Jurado [2010] FamCAFC 210; (2010) 44 Fam LR 310 ("Navarro") at 360, Ryan J took a different view. Her Honour said:
'The focus of the Husband's submission appeared to be upon the preliminary finding required before a divorce order in Costa Rica may issue. In my view, it is the complete effect of the application to which attention should be drawn. That is, an Australian divorce order would change the parties' status in Australia from married spouses to being divorced. Because the Australian divorce order would not be recognised in Costa Rica, the Wife would remain married to the Husband while he was, as he said he would, in all likelihood simultaneously to be married to his Australian Wife. This situation would continue until the Wife's application for divorce in Costa Rica was granted**. Such an outcome would be productive of serious mischief**. Even if the Husband chose not to remarry, that he would be divorced and the Wife remain married to him until her divorce application was granted is equally seriously mischievous. This was compelling evidence of injustice to the Wife in the Voth sense.'
In a separate judgment, Thackray J regarded this as a significant matter (at [85] and [86]).
Counsel for the Husband submitted that the finding of the primary judge was supported by authority and referred us to Dane & Kabrig [2013] FamCAFC 113 ("Dane"). In that case, Strickland J found that the fact that an Australian divorce would not be recognised in India was not sufficient to prevent the Australian divorce proceedings from continuing. However, the facts there were very different. The parties had arrived in Australia in 2004 as a couple. Both had become Australian citizens and neither had any plans to return to India.
In the present case, the Wife was living in, and would continue to live in, India. There was no prospect of her coming to live in Australia and no reason for her to do so. The lack of a divorce in India would have a significant and adverse impact on her life. That was not the position in Dane." [38]
(Emphasis added)
"The outcome of being divorced in Australia but not in India where the Wife lives is, in our opinion, such an inappropriate result when there are proceedings on foot in India which avoid that dichotomy. As a factor to be taken into account it supports a finding that the Australian proceedings are "productive of serious and unjustified trouble and harassment" and "seriously and unfairly burdensome, prejudicial or damaging". It cannot be dismissed as merely unfortunate."[39]
(Citations removed)
Which forum can provide more effectively for complete resolution of the matters involved in the parties' controversy
The Order in Which Proceedings Were Instituted
The Stage at Which Proceedings have Each Reached
The Costs that Have Been Incurred by the Parties
The Connection with the Parties and Their Marriage with Each of the Jurisdictions
[X] has made friends at school easily, mainly boys and has had numerous "play dates" with them at our house and also at his friends who include both of Australian and Indian backgrounds.[40]
[X] has been attending swimming classes on Saturdays during the last school term was participating in [sporting activities] Tuesdays after school and also [sport] on Thursdays after school. He has now told me that he would like to do something different this year, probably [sports]. [X] is very active with his friends, playing [sports] in the backyards.
...
[X] has an ongoing exposure to the Indian community and its culture in [City H] and also Melbourne on the occasions that we have visited. There are approximately [...] members of the Indian community in their families living in the [City H] area. We share religious days, party gatherings for festivals and many activities for children. These events usually occur every three or four months. [X] loves these activities as he gets to enjoy our Indian food and play with many friends. We also go to the local cinema to watch Indian films and also watches them on our home television along with YouTube clips.[41]
The Issues on Which Relief Might Depend in Each of the Jurisdictions
Divorce
(1) An application under this Act for a divorce order in relation to a marriage shall be based on the ground that the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), in a proceeding instituted by such an application, the ground shall be held to have been established, and the divorce order shall be made**, if, and only if, the court is satisfied that the parties separated and thereafter lived separately and apart for a continuous period of not less than 12 months immediately preceding the date of the filing of the application for the divorce order.**
(3) A divorce order shall not be made if the court is satisfied that there is a reasonable likelihood of cohabitation being resumed.
(Emphasis added)
6. Because of the threats and behaviour of [Mr Nandi] I decided that our marriage was at an end and told him this [in] February 2023 ("the separation date") [Mr Nandi] remained in our rented house from that date until finally leaving [in] November 2023.
7. From the separation date until he finally left the house, [Mr Nandi] and I lead separate lives, we had separate bedrooms, no sexual relationship existed, we each did our own washing and I only cooked for our son and I, [Mr Nandi] would cook his own or go out for tea. I can only recall on one occasion going out together and that was to take our son to an adventure playground. From the separation date.[42]
FAMILY LAW ACT 1975 - SECT 55A
Divorce order where children
(1) A divorce order in relation to a marriage does not take effect unless the court has, by order, declared that it is satisfied:
(a) that there are no children of the marriage who have not attained 18 years of age; or
(b) that the only children of the marriage who have not attained 18 years of age are the children specified in the order and that:
(i) proper arrangements in all the circumstances have been made for the care, welfare and development of those children; or
(ii) there are circumstances by reason of which the divorce order should take effect even though the court is not satisfied that such arrangements have been made.
"Proper" is a strong adjective, and as at present advised, I think the expression "proper arrangements" means something more than "adequate arrangements" (Cf.Bosch v. Perpetual Trustee1), or "satisfactory arrangements", or "the best practicable arrangements". Indeed, "proper", in the context, seems to have one of the meanings given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, namely, "in conformity with the demands of society". Although the words "proper" and "suitable" are not strictly synonymous, it may be that the only way in which the Court will be able effectively to perform the duty imposed on it by s 71 (1) (a) will be to treat "proper" as equivalent to "suitable".[45]
We are of the opinion that the word "arrangements" in this context should not be construed as limited to matters to which the court could properly give effect by appropriate orders...
...
In the matter before us there was no evidence before the court that proper arrangements had been made by the applicant husband in respect of the two children of the marriage and it is clear that he had not made, and indeed had no intention of making, any arrangements as regards his three stepchildren. He did not inform the court as to whether they were being properly cared for by the respondent wife or whether she had a sufficient income to maintain them. The court was left in ignorance of their health, their progress at school and of their happiness and indeed of any other matters relevant to them.[46]
(Emphasis added)
the court must be satisfied that "proper arrangements have been made" in respect of the children - not "likely to be made", "can be made", or "will be made". The court should not be left to hypothesize on the arrangements.[47]
(Emphasis added)
The Resources of the Parties and their Understanding of Language Enabling the Parties to Participate in the Respective Proceedings on an Equal Footing
19. As far as my ability to communicate effectively with my legal team and with the court in Australia, I say that it is very difficult for me effectively pursue the matter in Australia, since I am physically in India and it is not possible for me to come to Australia and defend the case personally. The difficulty is enhanced due to the huge time difference between India and Australia, because of which it takes at least 2 working days for documents to be drafted, discussed, finalized and filed in the matter.[53]
Moreover, holding proceedings in India will aid in practicality and support equity as the Respondent speaks English as a second language, which disadvantages him in Australian proceedings. Both the Applicant and Respondent speak Hindi as their native tongue and thus proceedings in Hindi will not unfairly advantage a particular party, allowing for more equitable means of considering this matter.[54]
2. The Father's ability to communicate in English :-
2.1 The Father, being an Indian national has as his birth language" Indian Hindi".
2.2 During the Father's schooling in India he also learned English as a second language.
2.3. In 1996 the Father graduated in India with [tertiary qualifications]. This course was conducted in English .
2.4 In about 2002 the Father completed [further studies] whilst in India , that course being governed by [an American university]. That course was also in English.
2.5 The Father then spent between 12 and 18 months in [City B] USA working [as an educator]. All of which were in English. ON completion of employment there, he returned to India.
2.6 The Father and I were married [in] 2016 in India , in accordance with the Hindu Marriage Act.
2.7 I believe that prior to our marriage and certainly thereafter, the Father was working at [City J] in India as a [professional]. I was working at the same [company] for a while as a [health worker]. During the Father's time there, he was required to speak both English and Hindi.
2.8 In about [early] 2016 the Father went to [Country K] as [a professional] [...] there. The staff there did not speak Hindi, English was therefore the language used to communicate with both staff and [...]. The Father was there for approximately 4 to 5 months before returning back to India.
2.9 In about [mid] 2018 the Father again returned to [Country K] and was there until about [early] 2018. During the whole of his time there, he had to speak English, particularly to staff
2.10 In 2022 the father came to Australia for the first time, staying with me in [City H]. The Father was able to easily communicate with our son's school teachers and staff, estate agents, both in conversation and by letters written by him in English. He was able to hold conversations in English with neighbours, friends and anyone else he needed talk with. He would go out with friends to parties, dinner and other social activities with myself and friends and speak English during the whole of those times without any restriction or misunderstanding whatever.
2.11 In about [mid] 2024 the Father obtained employment at the [L Centre] as an [community worker] and was there until returning to India in late [...] 2024. Whilst working there he was required to only speak English and did so without any difficulties whatsoever.
2.12 Emails that have passed between the Father and I since separation have always been in English. When he started harassing me by text messages, he only used English.
2.13 When talking to our son on the telephone they use a mixture of both Hindi and English. Some sentences are in Hindi and others in English.
2.14 I believe that because of all the above factors, the Father has a very strong command of both written and spoken English and the suggestion that he is not able to easily communicate with his lawyers in Australia is not true.[55]
(Original emphasis)
Many matters before this court can proceed via Microsoft Teams which further increases the ability of those residing outside the jurisdiction to participate in the proceedings.[56]
Any Others Factors Within the 'General Circumstances of the Case, Taking into Account the True Nature and Full Extent of the Issues Involved'
Conclusion - is Australia a clearly inappropriate forum to deal with the Wife's application for divorce?
1. That the Applicant Mother have sole parental responsibility for the child [X] ("the child").
2. The child live with the Mother.
3. That the child communicates with the Father by telephone or other electronic device at such times as shall be agreed from time to time.[57]
a. Grant the sole permanent custody of the minor son, Master [X], to the Petitioner;
b. Direct the Respondent to immediately return and deliver the minor son, Master [X], to the petitioner;
c. Grant temporary custody of the minor son, Master [X], to the Petitioner, till the pendency of the present petition
d. Direct the Respondent to produce the minor before the Court or any other cordial place outside so that the Petitioner can meet his minor son physically and spend time with him, during the pendency of the present petition;
e. Direct the Respondent bring the minor son of the parties to India during his next school vacation and allow the Petitioner to meet and stay with his son without the presence and any interference of the Respondent, during the pendency of the present petition
f. Direct the Respondent to allow the Petitioner to talk his son daily for at least 1 hour without the presence and any interference of the Respondent, during the pendency of the present petition;
g. Any other or further relief which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit, just and proper under the circumstances of the present case may also be granted in favour and for the welfare of the minor son.
1. The Court has to consider the child's best interests as referred to in ZP V PS (1994) 181 CLR 63 which confirms that the test to be applied in parenting (forum) cases, is the 'best interests' test.
2. Given this matter concerns both Divorce and Parenting proceedings, it would not be appropriate to apply the 'Voth' test as it is not applicable for parenting matters. As such, the Court should consider the Child's best interests per ZP v PS (1994) 181 CLR 63. The Respondent thus submits that the Court should decline jurisdiction given the Child's has a significant connection to and receives medical as well as emotional support from India.
3. Concerning the Child's significant connection to India, [X] was born in India on the [...] 2017 and is an Indian citizen, living there until March 2022. Whilst he is in Australia on a temporary visa, the Child's best interests are served by the Indian jurisdiction presiding over his Parenting matter. Not only do his extended family and father reside in India, but he was unilaterally removed from India and brought to Australia by his mother. The Respondent did not consent to this decision, and as such removing a child from the majority of his relatives and immediate family is contrary to his welfare. If Parenting proceedings are sought on foot in Australia, the orders sought by the Applicant are likely to have a devastating effect on the Child's wellbeing, further distancing him from father, extended family and home culture.
4. Regarding the Child's best interest in terms of his emotions, he has established a close bond with his father (who was at a point his primary carer), which would be weakened by continuing proceedings in Australia. Not only is the Respondent in India and thus physically distanced from the Child, but he has limited means of contacting him. Guardianship proceedings in India have instructed the Applicant to allow the Child better means of contacting the Respondent though these instructions have not been followed. As such, it is in the best interests of the Child to be able to contact his father, with avenues of contact strengthened if proceedings are carried out in India. The Child's current environment does not align with his best interests as he is attended to by [Mr N], alleged to be his Mother's extramarital affair partner and not approved by the Respondent. Given that [Mr N] runs a [...] business at the Child's place of residence, unknown people exit and enter the home frequently, contributing to an unsafe, unstable, and uncertain environment for the child.
5. In addition, the Child has continued to receive medical support for breathing issues in India. Medical issues in the past have been attended to by his General Practitioners and specialist doctors in India. Though the Child has received medical treatment in Australia, the Respondent was unaware of when this treatment occurred and has not received information about his medical records. In particular, the Child underwent surgery in 2024 - of which the Respondent was not informed prior - and was hospitalised twice in that year. The lack of sharing understanding between both parents concerning the Child's medical care is not to his best interests. The orders sought by the Applicant will amplify the lack of equal understanding, further limiting the the Respondent has regarding his Child's health, contrary to his best interests.[59]
31. The Applicant submits that this Court must determine what is in the best interests of the child and a full and comprehensive analysis of the provisions of section 60CC should occur. The High Court in ZP v PS (1994) HCA 29 held that "the doctrine of forum nonconveniens is not applicable to a custody case where the child is within the jurisdiction. Instead, in exercising the jurisdiction which has been conferred upon it, the family Court must determine what is in the best interests of the child.
32. The Court in that case also said that "when the Family Court is seized of jurisdiction in relation to the custody of a child, its duty is to exercise its jurisdiction."
33. The convenience and timing of any final hearing favours the proceedings being continued in Australia. The Respondent has not placed before the Court any information on the status of his proceeding in India nor a timeframe for the conclusion of those proceedings.
34. The Applicant and child reside in Australia along with the Applicant's parents and sister. The child's teachers and allied health professionals may also be required to give evidence at a final hearing. All reside within Australia.
35. Applicant also relies on the dicta of the Court in Voth v Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd 1990 HCA 55. As in that case, the Applicant commenced proceedings in Australia not out of not out of any vexatious, oppressive or prejudicial reasons. The inappropriate forum test as mentioned in that and other cases are not supported by the evidence provided to the court to date by the Respondent.
36. The Applicant submits that the Respondent has not made out a sufficient case showing that the Applicant has acted vexatiously or oppressively towards him or that he is seriously prejudiced by the proceedings continuing in Australia. Save for an unidentified time difference between India and Australia, the Respondent does not identify any financial or other difficulties he might have in travelling to Australia for a final hearing of the matter.[60]
49. The High Court of Australia ("the High Court") in Voth & Manildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55; (1990) 171 CLR 538 ("Voth") held that a party who has properly instituted proceedings in Australia has a prima facie right to have the proceedings determined by an Australian court unless Australia is the clearly inappropriate jurisdiction. That is, when an issue arises as to whether a foreign court, or an Australian court is the most convenient forum to determine a dispute, the Australian court ought hear the matter unless it is satisfied that it is a clearly inappropriate forum.
50. Accordingly, the appropriate test in most cases for determining whether this court should permanently stay proceedings before it, is whether Australia is a "clearly inappropriate forum". However, the case law suggests that there may be a different test to determine a forum dispute in relation to the issue of parenting only.
51. In ZP v PS [1994] HCA 29; (1994) 181 CLR 639 at [8] ("ZP") the High Court determined that the rule in Voth applied to all matrimonial proceedings except parenting matters. Their Honours Mason CJ, and Toohey and McHugh JJ held that:
It is now established that Pt VII has invested the Family Court with a welfare jurisdiction that is similar to the parens patriae jurisdiction exercised by the Court of Chancery but which is freed from the preliminary requirement of a wardship order. In the exercise of the parens patriae jurisdiction, the Court of Chancery has always been guided by the principle that the welfare of the minor is the first and paramount consideration.
In exercising the parens patriae jurisdiction or a statutory jurisdiction which makes the welfare of the minor the first and paramount consideration, that Court always makes an independent judgment on any question concerning the custody of a child and cannot blindly follow an order made by a foreign court. Because the welfare jurisdiction of the Family Court is similar to the parens patriae jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, the Family Court must also form an independent judgment as to what the welfare of the child requires notwithstanding the existence of any custody order made by a foreign court. Moreover, proceedings for custody or access are not disputes inter partes in the ordinary sense of that expression because the Court is not enforcing a parental right to custody or access. Its duty is to make such order as will "best promote and protect the interests of the child". It follows that, when a child is within the jurisdiction of the Family Court, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has no application to a dispute concerning the custody of the child. Injustice to one or other of the parties, expense, inconvenience and legitimate advantage, which are always relevant issues in a forum non conveniens case are not relevant issues in a custody application. In some cases, those matters may bear on issues which touch the welfare of the child but they are not themselves relevant issues when the question arises whether the welfare of the child requires the making of an order that the issue of custody be determined in a foreign forum. When the Family Court is seized of jurisdiction in relation to the custody of a child, its duty is to exercise its jurisdiction.
(Footnotes omitted)
...
54. The decision of ZP was followed by the Full Court of the Family Court in Pascarl & Oxley [2013] FamCAFC 47; (2013) FLC 93-536. In that case the Full Court said at [65] and [67]:
The question of which forum of two competing fora might be the appropriate place for the matter to be determined is subject to a number of now well-settled authorities.
...
The High Court had cause to consider whether the Voth 'clearly inappropriate forum' test had application in relation to proceedings in the Family Court of Australia on the question of whether a child residing in Australia should be returned to a foreign jurisdiction so that the foreign court could determine issues concerning custody of the child (ZP v PS [1994] HCA 29; (1994) 181 CLR 639). The High Court, comprising Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and McHugh JJ, held that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is not applicable to a custody case where the child is within the jurisdiction. Instead, in exercising the jurisdiction which has been conferred upon it, the Family Court must determine what is in the best interests of the child.
55. Their Honours went on to consider the authorities and said at [86]:
...the principles to be applied in parenting cases which involve a foreign element will be determined by the nature of the application before the court. Where an application is made under provisions of the [Family Law Act] which prescribe the best interests test, whether or not a child is within the jurisdiction, then it is that test, and not the test of forum conveniens, which will apply.
56. However, I note also the observations made by the Full Court in EJK & TSL [2006] FamCA 730; (2006) FLC 93-287 at [79] ("EJK"), in which their Honours said that a careful reading of ZP suggests the principles in that case appear to be more properly confined to circumstances in which a child is present in Australia and the court is being asked to consider making a summary order that the children return to another jurisdiction.
57. Their Honours said at [83]:
...We consider the following principles can be distilled from authority:
(i) where an Australian court's jurisdiction under the Act is properly invoked in respect of a family law matter, including an application for divorce, and an issue of competing fora arises, generally the principles to be applied in respect of an application for a stay or anti suit injunction are those applicable at common law;
(ii) in cases involving competing applications for differing types of relief arising from the breakdown of a marriage, or a de facto relationship (where the parties have children of that relationship), including some applications for parenting orders, it may be appropriate pursuant to the Court's inherent power to grant a stay or an anti suit injunction based on common law principles;
(iii) the granting of relief by way of a stay of proceedings is more likely to be appropriate in a case where the child or children, the subject matter of the litigation, are resident in the foreign forum, and there is no necessity to make any order other than a stay to determine the application before the Court;
(iv) in proceedings involving competing for a when the child is in Australia and the Court's jurisdiction is regularly invoked, and it is necessary to make a parenting order for interim residence or an aspect of parental responsibility to provide effective relief, the principles relevant to the granting of a stay or an anti suit injunction are not the appropriate principles to be applied, and the Court must make such orders as are necessary with the child's best interests as its paramount consideration (s 60CA);
(v) if an order sought in addition to, or ancillary to, a stay is a parenting order it must be instituted under Part VII of the [Family Law Act] and determined in accordance with s 60CA;
(vi) in some circumstances, such as an abduction from a non Hague Convention country it may be appropriate for the matter to be dealt with by way of a speedy summary hearing and an order for the return of the child to the foreign jurisdiction. In making such summary order the Court will have regard to the child's best interests as its paramount consideration;
(vii) in cases, such as in (ii) above, where the Act does not proscribe a "best interests" requirement, the child's best interests will often be a significant and weighty matter to be taken into account; and
(viii) that litigation involving children is not strictly inter partes litigation, and the child's best interests will almost inevitably be a significant matter.
58. More recently, the Full Court in Zanda & Zanda [2014] FamCAFC 173 at [114] has said that the appropriate test when determining a forum dispute regarding parenting is that of the child's best interests.
...
60. Relevantly, s 60CA of the Family Law Act provides:
In deciding whether to make a particular parenting order in relation to a child, a court must regard the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration.[61]
(Emphasis added)
(2) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(a), the court must consider the following matters:
(a) what arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of:
(i) the child; and
(ii) each person who has care of the child (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child);
(b) any views expressed by the child;
(c) the developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the child;
(d) the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs;
(e) the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so;
(f) anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the child.
(2A) In considering the matters set out in paragraph (2)(a), the court must include consideration of:
(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and
(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.
(Original Emphasis)
Section 60CC(2)(a)(i) and (ii): What arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of the child and each person who has care of the child (whether or not that a person has parental responsibility for the child)
c. During our relationship Father was very controlling, always want to know where I was and who I was seen, he would not allow other people in a rented home. He controlled our finances including my bankcard and initially would not let me get the learners drivers licence so I can gain some independence.
d. Whilst we are living together in Australia, the Father was physically violent towards me. When I disagree with him, he would get angry, he would punch me to the body, forced me against walls and threatened me with violence. The threats of violence were worse. These episodes usually occurred in the presence of or certainly the hearing of our son.
e. I can recall that [in] July 2023 when we were living together, we started arguing, the Father then started hitting me in the presence of our son and other family members. I can recall him punching me to the forehead and kicking me in my pubic area. Both my family and son implored him to stop and did only after stomping on my foot
f. [In early] 2023 when we are in India together for a holiday I can recall an incident when we argued about something, which I cannot recall. The Father started abusing both myself, parents and other family members. When I challenged his behaviour he started hitting into me. Our son was in the next room and would have heard all of what happened.
g. In [...] 2003 when we were both in [City O], the Father made continual demands on me to have sex with him, including in front of my family and son. I can recall him threatening to have me arrested and also slapping me on the face.[62]
8. That from the information and knowledge present, it is thus apparent that the environment, under which my minor son is currently living in Australia, is not only unsafe but is also adversely affecting his mental health.
9. My concern for the safety of my child in Australia, is also because , my wife has restricted his communication with me ; previously the child was having a mobile phone through which he used to talk to me freely and whenever he felt like, however, in order to force me to give into her illegal demands, my wife has taken away the phone of my child, stating that the phone has broken. She is not buying him even a new phone, despite my offer to pay for the new mobile phone. Also, previously, the minor child used to talk to me, as per his wishes, from the phone of the mother of the wife, who is in Australia , however now, the same has also stopped by my wife.[64]
[X] has been known to [M Organisation], Safe Kids Advice and Referral Line (SFSK ARL) since April 2023 following concerns that [Mr Nandi] was perpetrating physical abuse towards [Ms Sinha]. There have been five previous matters relating to [X] in relation to exposure to [Mr Nandi]'s use of family violence in the relationship with [Ms Sinha]. There is a current matter with SFSK ARL in relation to allegations that there are worries for [Ms Sinha]'s mental health and neglect. There is insufficient information to suggest claims of neglect. SFSK ARL do hold worries for [Mr Nandi]'s use of power and control in the relationship with [Ms Sinha] and how this may impact upon [X].[65]
Section 60CC(2)(b): Any views expressed by the children
The terms of s 60CC(3)(a) itself may be taken to recognise that, whilst a child's views ought to be given proper consideration, their importance in a given case may depend upon factors such as the child's age or maturity and level of understanding of what is involved in the choice they have expressed. Children may not, for example, appreciate the long term implications of separation from one parent or the child's siblings. Section 60CC requires that attention be given by the court to these matters.[66]
Section 60CC(2)(c): The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of the children
Apart from myself my mother [Ms P], my sister [Ms Q] 32 also live in the house with us. My father [Mr R] and mother came to Australia in [early] 2023 but my father returned back to India in [late] 2024 so he could manage his properties there. My sister came to Australia in [mid] 2022 but was studying [health care] in Melbourne between March 2023 in August 2024. She is now [a health care worker] working casually at [...] and is still on a student visa as she is studying [...].[69]
Section 60CC(2)(d): The capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the children to provide for the children's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs
Following separation the Father had been face timing [X], using my telephone initially numerous times each day. This has had a very detrimental effect on [X] who has been suffering from anxiety and what I believe are panic attacks. This is exacerbated by the Father's abuse and bad language directed towards myself whilst on the phone. As a consequence of unlimited calls to twice a week for a period of time. Following a hearing in India [in] [...] the presiding Judge after speaking to [X] directed the parties to continue communication " ... With assurance by both parties that the respondent (the Father ) and Mother will try to implore the child to have holistic communications with the non-custodial parent and that the petitioner (the father) was communication with the child are in tone and tenor of reflection above the father and not assertion of a right."[71]
My wife and her family members have used and are still using my son as a tool to blackmail me so that I give into their illegal demands. My son is being heavily tutored by my wife against me. During my conversation with my son, when I asked him, if and when he wants to come to India, he said that if he and his mother come to India then I will get them arrested. I was shocked to hear the same. While reassuring him that nothing of that sort will happen and that I can never even think of doing anything like that, I asked him who had told him the same. He said that my wife had told him that I have failed cases against them In India and if they come to India, I will get them arrested.
...
I say that I have never put any kind of stress on my son. All of this is a made up story and another attempt to make me give into her illegal demands. I have never made any derogatory remarks against my wife, what to talk of making the same in front of my son. Rather, the environment in which my son is being forced to live in Australia, with free and easy access of the house to illegal partner of my wife and his friends and associates, who are completely strangers - all of this can be confirmed by the mother of the wife, who is currently living there.[72]
Section 60CC(2)(e): The benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with the child's parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so
Section 60CC(2)(f): Anything else that is relevant to the particular circumstances of the children
I certify that the preceding one hundred and one (101) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Turnbull.
[1] Wife's Response to an Application in a Proceeding 21 November 2024, Part B ('Wife's Response').
[2] Affidavit of Ms Sinha filed 11 February 2025 ('Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025') [3.1b].
[3] Affidavit of Mr Nandi filed 15 November 2024 ('Husband's Affidavit 15 November 2024') [16].
[4] Wife's Case Outline 21 November 2024 ('Wife's Case Outline').
[5] Husband's Written Submissions 10 February 2025 ('Husband's Written Submissions').
[6] Husband's Affidavit filed 30 July 2024 ('Husband's Affidavit 30 July 2024'), Annexure MRN-1, 116.
[7] Husband's Affidavit 30 July 2024 (n 6), Annexure MRN-1, 112-113.
[9] Husband's Affidavit filed 4 March 2025 ('Husband's Affidavit 4 March 2025'), [11].
[10] Affidavit of Mr D filed 21 November 2024 ('Affidavit of Mr D') [5].
[12] Husband's Affidavit 15 November 2024 (n 3), Annexure MRN-1, 9.
[13] Husband's Case Outline 21 November 2024 ('Husband's Case Outline') Part D.
[15] Willmot v Queensland [2024] HCA 42 [15]
[16] Henry v Henry [1996] HCA 51; (1996) 185 CLR 571 ('Henry v Henry'), 586-587.
[20]Bakshi & Mahanta (No 2) [2022] FedCFamC1A 90, [51]
[22] Skinner & Alfonso-Skinner [2010] FamCA 329, [69] (Murphy J).
[23] Henry v Henry (n 16), 587; Spiliada Maritime Corpn v Cansulex Ltd (The Spiliada) [1986] UKHL 10; [1987] AC 460, [478] (Goff L). The majority in Henry notes that this factor is a "relevant but not decisive consideration, [with] the fundamental question being "where the case may be tried 'suitably for the interests of all the parties and for the ends of justice'"". The discussion of the "legitimate personal or juridical advantage" in The Spiliada goes to this question of the effectiveness of an Australian forum in hearing the matter. See also Navarro v Jurado [2010] FamCAFC 210; (2010) 247 FLR 374, 395 (O'Ryan J), in which the factor is framed as 'the significance to a plaintiff of losing any legitimate personal or juridical advantage available in the local forum'.
[24] Voth v Malildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd [1990] HCA 55; (1990) 171 CLR 538, 565 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ);
[27] Voth v Malildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (n 24), 565.
[28] Sections 104(4), (5) and section 8(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
[29] Affidavit of Mr E 15 November 2024 [9].
[31] Mehra & Bose (No 3) [2013] FCCA 2273, [54]-[64].
[32]The possibilities outlined above each create a distinct conflict which cannot be cured. Section 58 of the Act only allows a rescission of a divorce order where: If a divorce order has been made in proceedings but has not taken effect, the court by which the divorce order was made may, on the application of a party to the proceedings, or on the intervention of the Attorney-General, if it is satisfied that there has been a miscarriage of justice by reason of fraud, perjury, suppression of evidence or any other circumstance, rescind the divorce order and, if it thinks fit, order that the proceedings be re-heard.
[35] Harwood & Jade [2009] FamCA 912, [47] (Loughnan JR).
[36] Voth v Malildra Flour Mills Pty Ltd (n 24), 557.
[37] Talwar & Sarai [2018] FamCAFC 152 ('Talwar & Sarai'), [97]-[102] (Ainslie-Wallace, Ryan and Aldridge JJ).
[40] Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025 (n 2) [3.3(e)].
[42] Affidavit of Ms Sinha filed 4 April 2024 ('Wife's Affidavit 4 April 2024') [6]-[7].
[45] Wolley v Wolley (1961) 2 FLR 114, 116.
[46] The Marriage of Opperman [1978] HCA 53; (1978) 33 FLR 248, 258, 259.
[48] Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025 (n 2) [3.5(a)].
[52] Husband's Affidavit 27 January 2025, ('Husband's Affidavit 27 January 2025'), 30 [25], 30[26], [15].
[53] Husband's Affidavit 27 January 2025 (n 52) [19].
[54] Husband's Written Submissions (n 5), 4.
[55] Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025 (n 2) [2].
[56] Bhasin & Bhasin [2023] FedCFamC1F 96, ('Bhasin & Bhasin')[68].
[57] Wife's Application for Final Orders 5 April 2024, 4.
[58] Section 69E Family law Act 1975 (Cth).
[59] Husband's Written Submissions (n 5) [1]-[5].
[60] Wife's Written Submissions 3 March 2025 ('Wife's Written Submissions') [31]-[36].
[61] Bhasin & Bhasin (n 56) [48]-[60].
[62] Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025 (n 2) [3].
[63] Husband's Affidavit 4 March 2025 (n 9) [4],[5].
[64] Husband's Affidavit 27 January 2025 (n 52) [8]-[9].
[65] Notice of Risk Response from Child Safety Services Tasmania 20 December 2024, 2.
[66] Bondelmonte & Bondelmonte [2017] HCA 8; (2017) 259 CLR 662, 673-674.
[67] Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025 (n 2) [3.2a].
[70] Husband's Affidavit 15 November 2024 (n 3) [47].
[71] Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025 (n 2) [3.5a].
[72] Husband's Affidavit 4 March 2025 (n 9) [8], [13].
[73] Section 67ZBE Family law Act 1975 (Cth).
[74] Husband's Affidavit 4 March 2025 (n 9) [8].
[75]Wife's Affidavit 11 February 2025 (n 2) [3.5e]-[3.5f].
[76] For example, in Bhasin & Bhasin (n 56), Carter J made an order that "The husband immediately withdraw and/or discontinue all proceedings issued by him through petition filed in the Family Court, H City District, H City, Country J with file number ... insofar as those proceedings are in relation to X born 2013 and thereafter be restrained by injunction personally, by his servants and/or agents from issuing and/or causing the commencement of any proceedings pertaining to parenting, in any jurisdiction other than Australia, including in Country J."
[77] Husband's Affidavit 4 March 2025 (n 9) [15].
Henry
Henry
(2017) 259 CLR 662
(1996) 185 CLR 571
(2010) 247 FLR 374
(2021) 62 Fam LR 397
(2020) 61 Fam LR 541
(1978) 33 FLR 248
(1990) 171 CLR 538
(1961) 2 FLR 114
(2002) 210 CLR 491
(2010) 44 Fam LR 310
(1994) 181 CLR 63
(1994) 181 CLR 639