In relation to the first decision, the applicant argued that the timeframe given to remove her belongings from the property was unreasonable, given the volume and size of the items she needed to relocate. Regarding the second decision, the applicant submitted that the refusal to accept her registration of interest for public housing was incorrect. She contended that the exclusion period had been miscalculated and, alternatively, that the respondent should have exercised its discretion to waive the exclusion period in light of her homelessness, disabilities, and overall vulnerability.

In relation to the first decision, the respondent contended that the applicant had been given ample time to remove her possessions from the property and had also been offered the option of nominating a storage room for her belongings. The respondent further noted that the applicant had been repeatedly referred to their relevant abandoned property and goods policy. As to the second decision, the respondent contended that the exclusion period, which was imposed due to the applicant's conduct towards the respondent's staff, was still in effect at the time she lodged her registration of interest.

The Tribunal's decision includes a discussion of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to review decisions made by the respondent, including relevant principles of statutory interpretation, and a discussion of the powers of the Tribunal when conducting proceedings in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction and the special responsibility of respondents in those proceedings to assist the Tribunal to reach the correct or preferable decision.

Held, affirming the first decision and setting aside and substituting the second decision:

• The Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had already been afforded a substantial period of time, both before and after her eviction, to remove her belongings from the premises. This included a significant period during which she remained in possession of the property prior to eviction.
• The Tribunal found the applicant's proposal that the respondent store her belongings at the premises or elsewhere for an extended period, until she was rehoused at an unspecified future time, to be unreasonable.
• Having regard to all the circumstances, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant had been given more than adequate time to remove her possessions before her access to the premises was finally ceased by the respondent.
• The Tribunal was also satisfied that the applicant had been clearly informed by the respondent of the consequences of failing to remove her belongings, including that the respondent would apply its policy concerning abandoned property and goods.
• The Tribunal had no evidence before it that the applicant was subject to a service exclusion; had engaged in unreasonable conduct toward the respondent's staff; or had acted in an antisocial manner toward neighbours.
• The Tribunal determined that the applicant's tenancy had been terminated solely due to her breach of the tenancy agreement, specifically being her failure to maintain the premises in good tenantable condition.
• The Tribunal found that, even if the applicant had behaved unreasonably toward staff, the respondent was unable to identify any statutory or policy authority permitting it to refuse a registration of interest on that basis.
• The Tribunal concluded that there was no factual or policy justification for the respondent to refuse the applicant's registration of interest. Under the respondent's own housing eligibility and allocation policies, the registration ought to have been accepted.
• The Tribunal was satisfied that the correct or preferable outcome was to set aside the respondent's decision regarding the applicant's registration of interest and to substitute it with a decision that the registration of interest is to be taken as having been accepted on the date it was initially lodged.

Administrative Review - South Australian Housing Trust Act 1995 - Review of a decision of South Australian Housing Trust - Refusal to accept a registration of interest - Refusal to provide more time to access goods

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 ss 3, 8, 34, 35, 37, 39, 43, 56, 66

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Regulations 2015 reg 5

South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 rules 7, 56

South Australian Housing Trust Act 1995 ss 5, 32A, 32C, 32D

South Australian Housing Trust Regulations 2025 regs 8, 11

Aldridge v Johnston [2020] SASCFC 31

Australian Postal Corporation v Forgie [2003] FCAFC 223

Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) [1913] HCA 60; (1913) 17 CLR 370

Enkhbat v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 308

GKZ v Department for Child Protection [2022] SACAT 29

GM v Department of Human Services [2025] SASCA 68

Henderson v South Australian Housing Trust [2023] SACAT 46

South Australian Housing Trust v Henderson (unreported decision 2021/SH002988, 24 March 2023)

Henderson v South Australian Housing Trust [2024] SASCA 55

Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634

Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139

The applicant attended in person with Ms Sproull, RentRightSA, and Ms Nettle, Toward Home Alliance

Mr C Pager and Ms B Cianciosi, Crown Solicitor's Office, appeared in person for the respondent

Made under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 s 37

1. Ms Henderson has applied to the Tribunal for review of two decisions made by the South Australian Housing Trust (SAHT) on 25 October 2024.
2. The application is made pursuant to s 32D of the South Australian Housing Trust Act 1995 (SAHT Act) and s 34 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (SACAT Act).
3. A full hearing was held in this matter on 2 December 2025. SAHT was represented by two solicitors from the Crown Solicitor's Office. Ms Henderson was represented during the hearing by an advocate from Rent Right SA (RRSA advocate).[1] Ms Henderson was also supported during the hearing by Ms Nettle of Toward Home. The Tribunal is aware that Toward Home is an alliance of agencies providing homelessness support services. Ms Henderson's friend Ms Patitsas also attended the hearing and later made an unsworn statement in support of Ms Henderson without objection by counsel for SAHT.
4. This is the statement of reasons of decisions I made during the hearing:
   1. to dismiss SAHT's application to strike out these proceedings; and
   2. to set aside and substitute one of the two decisions under review (referred to in these reasons as the ROI decision).
5. I reserved my decision on the second of the two decisions under review (referred to in these reasons as the Adequacy of Time decision). This is also the record of my decision affirming the Adequacy of Time decision.

1. It is not in dispute that Ms Henderson was a tenant of SAHT at premises located in Pope Court, Adelaide since 19 October 2019.
2. Ms Henderson lives with multiple physical and mental health challenges, including post-traumatic stress disorder, major depression, a panic anxiety disorder with agoraphobia and a hoarding disorder.[2] It is not in dispute that she is currently homeless.
3. In 2021, SAHT commenced proceedings in the Tribunal for vacant possession of the Pope Court premises on account of the poor condition of the premises, a breach of Ms Henderson's tenancy agreement with SAHT.[3] In issue was the excessive volume of goods kept by Ms Henderson throughout the premises, including a substantial research library. On 16 March 2023, on the eighth Tribunal hearing over nearly two years in the vacant possession proceedings, a Senior Member of the Tribunal made orders for Ms Henderson to move out of the premises on 14 June 2023. The Senior Member noted that there had been very little progress with the condition of the premises across two years and that she was not satisfied that there was a reasonable prospect that Ms Henderson would be able to address the condition of the premises within a reasonable period of time.
4. The Senior Member's decision was affirmed on 8 June 2023 in an internal review under the SACAT Act conducted by the President of the Tribunal.[4]
5. An appeal to the Court of Appeal by Ms Henderson against the President's decision was dismissed on 9 May 2024.[5] The Court of Appeal stayed the order for vacant possession for a period of two months, i.e. until 5.00 pm on 9 July 2024.[6]
6. Ms Henderson did not voluntarily vacate the Pope Court premises and was evicted from the premises by the Tribunal bailiff on 11 July 2024.
7. On 15 July 2024, Ms Henderson unsuccessfully attempted to lodge, at SAHT's Adelaide Office, a Registration of Interest (ROI) form. SAHT staff declined to accept the form. Further details of this are provided below.
8. On about 24 July 2024, Ms Henderson lodged an appeal to SAHT in respect of the following matters:

(a) the time I have been given to vacate my premises is inadequate; > > (b) the refusal to accept my application/registration for public housing....[7]

9. In respect of issue (a), Ms Henderson noted in her appeal form that the time she had been given was "totally inadequate ... given the number of possessions and size of containers needed to move the material".
10. Between about July 2024 and mid-November 2024, SAHT made arrangements with Ms Henderson for her to access the Pope Court premises to remove the belongings that had remained after her eviction. Further details of this are also provided below.
11. On 25 October 2024, SAHT (through a Peer Reviewer) issued its reasons on the appeal lodged by Ms Henderson on 24 July 2024.[8] The appeal was interpreted by the Peer Reviewer to be against SAHT's decisions not to "provide access to remove belongings after the Appellant got evicted from the property and not accepting a new application for Public Housing". I consider that is a reasonable interpretation by the Peer Reviewer of the appeal application. The Peer Reviewer indicated in the decision record that they had applied SAHT's abandoned property and goods policy version 3.[9]
12. The Peer Reviewer's decisions are brief. They are set out in later in these reasons.
13. On 17 January 2025, Ms Henderson lodged an application for review in the Tribunal, although it seems at least some of it was written on her behalf. Ms Henderson did not supply a copy of the decision she wished the Tribunal to review. The application includes the following remarks [sic]:

Time given to vacate premises is inadequate and denying access to retrieve goods. > > Applicant has lodged an appeal with the housing trust in July 2024. The housing trust have refused to receive and process the application. > > Denying me reasonable disability adjustments. > > Appeal lodged to be reviewed and backdated. Seeking to get housing allocation. > > Stop removal of goods in the property and stop touching the belongings in the property. > > SAHT failed to take into account the severe disabilities of tenant prior written notice in 2004 and 2018 that the tenant needed public housing or was at risk of a cycle of homelessness and deterioration of applicants conditions. > > In September 2024 the applicant was assessed for Autism. 14/01 2025 applicant was first able to read detailed diagnosis report, fully meets all assessment criteria and the highest level of severity, level 3 'Requiring Very Substancial support'

14. Also on about 17 January 2025, Ms Henderson lodged a fresh ROI with SAHT.[10] It is not entirely clear what progress there has been with that ROI, save that SAHT asked Ms Henderson to provide proof of her identity in a letter to her on 21 January 2025.[11] However, there is some suggestion this ROI was later cancelled by the "system" because Ms Henderson had failed to provide her ID.[12]
15. For completeness, I add that on about 9 July 2024, Ms Henderson lodged an appeal with SAHT against two decisions, namely a decision to deny her "transfer or exchange to a safe suitable Housing Trust accommodation with consent for necessary disability adjustments or such that meets disability needs/requirements" and a decision to deny her "disability adjustments pursuant to the Disability Discrimination Act & to continue to seek vacant possession due to a situation orchestrated or created by SAHA negligence causing wilful harm & additional disability to myself". A SAHT Peer Reviewer made a decision on this appeal on 3 April 2025 affirming the decisions appealed against. For reasons explained below, this matter is not reviewable by the Tribunal in these proceedings.

Reviews conducted by the Tribunal - general comments

1. Relevant to this matter are the provisions of ss 34 to 38 inclusive of the SACAT Act, which apply to decisions that fall within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.
2. By reason of s 34(1) of the SACAT Act, a review conducted under s 32D of the SAHT Act is a review that falls within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction and it therefore attracts ss 34 to 38 of the SACAT Act.
3. Section 34(1) of the SACAT Act states:

If the matter that a relevant Act gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to deal with is a matter that expressly or necessarily involves a review of a decision (a reviewable decision), the matter comes within the Tribunal's review jurisdiction.

4. The SAHT Act is a "relevant Act"[13] and a decision made under s 32C of the SAHT Act is a "reviewable decision".[14]
5. The Tribunal conducts its reviews as an independent body. The Tribunal will, in exercising its review jurisdiction, examine the decision of the decision-maker by way of rehearing. On a rehearing, the Tribunal must reach the correct or preferable decision but in doing so must have regard to, and give appropriate weight to, the decision of the original decision-maker.
6. The procedure on a rehearing will include an examination of the evidence or material before the decision-maker and consideration of any further evidence or material that the Tribunal decides, in the circumstances of the particular case, to admit for the purposes of rehearing the matter.
7. Any factual findings made by the Tribunal must be established on the balance of probabilities.
8. The review conducted by the Tribunal is on a basis resembling a de novo hearing, where the Tribunal Member conducting the review effectively stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker in determining the correct or preferable decision.[15]
9. After conducting a review, the orders that may be made by the Tribunal are those contained in s 37 of the SACAT Act. The Tribunal can affirm or vary the decision under review or the Tribunal can set the decision aside and either substitute its own decision or send the matter back to the decision-maker for reconsideration. The Tribunal may also make any order the Tribunal considers appropriate.
10. A review by the Tribunal serves not only to provide justice in individual cases, the Tribunal also has an educative role. As Judge McCabe said recently in the Federal Court:

While the Tribunal is importantly a means for ensuring individual justice, it is also a tool of good government that is intended to improve the quality of government decision-making. The Tribunal goes about that mission by modelling good (in particular, objective) decision-making behaviour. To put it another way, Tribunal decision-making establishes norms and provides guidance to decisionmakers on how to proceed in the particular case, and in relevantly similar cases in the future.[16]

The Tribunal's jurisdiction to review SAHT decisions

1. The Tribunal is aware that Ms Henderson has a number of grievances about SAHT's treatment of her, not only those contained in her application for review to the Tribunal.
2. However, the Tribunal does not have the power to review every decision made by SAHT. The Tribunal also does not have power to address general grievances held about a government agency. A person with such grievances must raise them with an appropriate body and would be wise to first obtain advice about which body could address grievances that cannot be dealt with by the Tribunal. This might include the Ombudsman, for example.
3. While the Tribunal has a limited power under the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 to deal with landlord/tenant disputes between SAHT and its tenants, the only review power exercisable by the Tribunal is that contained in Part 3A of the SAHT Act. Part 3A provides (my underlining):

32A - Interpretation > > (1) In this Part - > > reviewable decision means a decision of SAHT - > > (a) on an application to SAHT -

(i) for housing assistance; or

(ii) for priority housing; or

(iii) for rent assistance, or other forms of concessions with respect to rent, or in relation to a bond; or

(iv) with respect to a matter arising under a tenancy agreement where SAHT is landlord; or

(b) with respect to any other matter that may -

(i) involve an assessment or decision by SAHT with respect to a person's housing needs or position; or

(ii) affect a tenant of SAHT; or

(c) with respect to any other matter brought within the ambit of this definition by the regulations, but does not include a decision where a complaint against the decision would fall within the ambit of subsection (2);

tenant includes a former tenant;

Tribunal means the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal established under the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

(2) The following matters are excluded from the operation of this Part:

(a) a complaint about a policy of the Government, the Department or SAHT (as compared to a complaint about whether or not such a policy has been complied with or implemented in accordance with the terms of the policy);

(b) a complaint about the manner in which a member of the staff of the Department has acted or behaved (as compared to a complaint about a decision that has been made by a member of the staff of the Department);

(c) a complaint about a matter that is the subject of proceedings before the Tribunal exercising its jurisdiction conferred under another Act, or proceedings before a court or another tribunal constituted by law;

(d) a complaint about a matter that is attributable to a dispute between neighbours;

(e) a complaint about a matter prescribed by the regulations for the purposes of this subsection.

32C - Internal reviews

(1) The Chief Executive must establish a review system within the Department so that a person who is directly affected by a reviewable decision may, at first instance, apply for an internal departmental review of the decision.

(2) The system established under subsection (1) must include a process under which a person who has applied for a review of a reviewable decision will, at the conclusion of that process, be furnished with a written statement setting out -

(a) the outcome of the review; and

(b) unless the application has been decided in favour of the applicant - the reasons for the decision made on the review.

32D - Reviews

(1) Subject to this section, a person who is dissatisfied with the outcome of a review under section 32C may apply to the Tribunal for review of the decision that applies at the conclusion of the review.

(2) The application must be made within -

(a) the prescribed period after the day on which a written statement setting out the outcome of the relevant review is furnished under section 32C; or

(b) such longer period as the Tribunal may allow.

(6) The Tribunal must ensure that the applicant and SAHT are provided with a written statement setting out the Tribunal's decision and the reasons for the decision.

(7) The operation of a decision that is the subject of an application under this section will be stayed pending the outcome of the proceedings unless -

(a) the Tribunal, on its own initiative or on application by SAHT, determines that the decision may take effect or apply despite the application (and related proceedings) under this section; or

(b) the decision is within the ambit of a regulation that prescribes a class or classes of decisions that will take effect or apply despite an application (and related proceedings) under this section.

(8) A decision on a matter that has been the subject of a review under section 32C which constitutes an administrative act within the meaning of the Ombudsman Act 1972 may be investigated by the Ombudsman under that Act despite the fact that this section provides a right of review (and section 13(3) of the Act will not apply in such a case).

(9) Section 71 of the South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 does not apply to or in relation to a decision of the Tribunal under this section.

1. The effect of s 32D of the SAHT Act is that a person who disagrees with a decision made by SAHT must first appeal[17] that decision to SAHT under s 32C of the SAHT Act and wait for SAHT to make a decision on the appeal before they then have the right to ask the Tribunal to review that decision under s 32D of the SAHT Act.
2. It follows from this that the Tribunal does not have the power to review a decision that has not been appealed to SAHT at all. And a person does not have the right to ask the Tribunal to review a decision that has been appealed to SAHT but where SAHT has not yet made its decision on the appeal. The person must wait for SAHT to make its decision before they can ask the Tribunal to review that decision.
3. I must take into account that a person making a review application to the Tribunal will not usually make their application in the terms that a lawyer might express review grounds. It is necessary for the Tribunal to parse the review applicant's intentions from what they have written in their application or had written on their behalf. The benefit of the doubt should be afforded them so that they do not inadvertently deny themselves the benefit of their review rights by inelegant or ambiguous phrasing.
4. With that in mind, I am satisfied that the only decisions of SAHT that have been brought to the Tribunal's attention by either party that:
   1. have been appealed to SAHT by Ms Henderson under s 32C of the SAHT Act; and
   2. where SAHT had made a decision on the appeal by January 2025 when this review application to the Tribunal was lodged by Ms Henderson; and
   3. which broadly answer to the description in that review application of the decisions that Ms Henderson would like the Tribunal to review,

are the decisions made by SAHT on 25 October 2024 to refuse Ms Henderson's appeal relating to two earlier decisions.

1. The first of those decisions of 25 October 2024 is the decision not to give Ms Henderson additional time to remove her belongings from the SAHT premises where she was living before she was evicted (the Adequacy of Time decision). The second such decision is the decision not to accept the ROI for housing lodged by Ms Henderson in July 2024 (the ROI decision).
2. On 3 April 2025, SAHT finalised its decisions on the appeals that Ms Henderson had made under s 32C of the SAHT Act about decisions not to grant her a transfer or exchange of housing and not to make disability adjustments to her home. As noted earlier, Ms Henderson had referred to those grievances against SAHT in her January 2025 review application to the Tribunal. However, under s 32D of the SAHT Act, the Tribunal cannot review those appeal decisions in these proceedings because those decisions had not been made by SAHT before January 2025 when these proceedings were commenced by Ms Henderson.
3. The limits of the Tribunal's review jurisdiction in these proceedings were explicitly brought to the parties' attention by me at the directions hearing of 29 May 2025 (at that time SAHT was not legally represented) and confirmed in the written directions I issued later that day.
4. As I informed the parties at that directions hearing and in the written directions issued after that hearing, if Ms Henderson would like the Tribunal to review the decisions made on 3 April 2025 she must make a separate application to the Tribunal. As at the date of the hearing in this matter, no such separate application had been made by Ms Henderson for review of the 3 April 2025 decisions.
5. These same matters were raised by me at length at the full hearing on 2 December 2025. Neither of the parties wished to make any submissions to me on my interpretation of the source of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to conduct reviews of SAHT decisions and the limits of its powers in these proceedings.

1. To ensure that these proceedings remained fair while not being unduly extended, it became necessary in the months before the full hearing, and during the full hearing itself, that I take certain steps in the conduct of the proceedings. I outline this below.
2. This was primarily due to Ms Henderson being unrepresented by legal counsel in these proceedings and because she seriously misconceived the Tribunal's jurisdiction and the permissible scope of the proceedings and orders that might be made by the Tribunal.
3. The Tribunal's duty to an unrepresented litigant is clear. The Tribunal must:

afford assistance to unrepresented litigants to minimise their forensic disadvantages, including by explaining their substantive and procedural rights. The degree of such assistance that needs to be afforded will depend very much on the particular litigant ... Impartiality, and the appearance thereof, must be maintained and the interests of the represented party must be balanced against those of the unrepresented party to ensure a fair trial for both parties.[18]

ensure that the litigant's lack of legal representation does not compromise the fairness of the hearing by providing appropriate assistance where necessary - particularly in order to ensure the proceeding is kept free from error or misunderstanding.[19]

5. However, the Tribunal also did not receive the level of assistance from SAHT that the SACAT Act indicates should have been given to the Tribunal, including that SAHT did not comply in full with the Tribunal's directions made at the directions hearing on 29 May 2025 to file a complete Book of Documents.
6. It is useful to make some initial comments about the powers of the Tribunal when conducting review proceedings and the special responsibility respondents have in those proceedings.

Powers of the Tribunal when conducting review proceedings

1. The objects of the Tribunal are found in s 8(1) of the SACAT Act, which states:

The main objectives of the Tribunal in dealing with matters within its jurisdiction are -

(a) in the exercise of its jurisdiction, to promote the best principles of public administration, including -

(i) independence in decision‑making; and

(ii) natural justice and procedural fairness; and

(iii) high‑quality, consistent decision‑making; and

(iv) transparency and accountability in the exercise of statutory functions, powers and duties; and

(b) to be accessible by being easy to find and easy to access, and to be responsive to parties, especially people with special needs; and

(c) to ensure that applications are processed and resolved as quickly as possible while achieving a just outcome, including by resolving disputes through high‑quality processes and the use of mediation and alternative dispute resolution procedures wherever appropriate; and

(d) to keep costs to parties involved in proceedings before the Tribunal to a minimum insofar as is just and appropriate; and

(e) to use straightforward language and procedures (including, insofar as is reasonably practicable and appropriate, by using simple and standardised forms); and

(f) to act with as little formality and technicality as possible, including by informing itself in such manner as the Tribunal thinks fit; and

(g) to be flexible in the way in which the Tribunal conducts its business and to adjust its procedures to best fit the circumstances of a particular case or a particular jurisdiction.

1. Parliament has made certain provisions in the SACAT Act to support the attainment of the Tribunal's objectives. They must be read as subject always to the Tribunal affording the parties procedural fairness and ensuring a fair hearing and a just outcome.
2. These provisions include, in s 39(1) of the SACAT Act, that on the hearing of any proceedings the procedure of the Tribunal is to be conducted with a minimum of formality; the Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence, may adopt, as in its discretion it considers appropriate, any findings, decision or judgment of a court or other tribunal (insofar as may be relevant to the proceedings before the Tribunal) and may otherwise inform itself as it thinks fit; and the Tribunal must act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case without regard to legal technicalities and forms.
3. Other important provisions are contained in s 43 of the SACAT Act but are too numerous to set out here.

Responsibilities of a respondent in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction

1. Proceedings in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction are not adversarial inter partes proceedings. They are administrative merits review proceedings where the Tribunal has a positive obligation to arrive at the correct or preferable decision. In aid of that, a respondent in review proceedings has a special responsibility imposed by s 35 of the SACAT Act.
2. Under s 35 of the SACAT Act, the respondent must use its best endeavours to help the Tribunal so that it can make its decision on the review. The role of the respondent "is not simply to seek to uphold or defend the existing decision" but must positively assist the Tribunal to arrive at the correct or preferable decision.[20]
3. A respondent's responsibilities include ensuring that any lawyer it instructs to represent it during proceedings has been armed with adequate instructions so that the respondent can fulfil its s 35 responsibilities.
4. In particular, a respondent must provide the Tribunal a written statement of reasons for the decision and any document or thing in its possession or control that may be relevant to the Tribunal's review of the decision, including the documents or things that were taken into account in making the relevant decision.[21] This is generally referred to as the "Section 35 Book of Documents" (Book of Documents).
5. The obligations under s 35 of the SACAT Act apply to SAHT when SAHT is a respondent in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction, as in the present case.
6. The obligation under s 35 of the SACAT Act is an ongoing obligation.

1. Directions were made on 29 May 2025 for SAHT to file its Book of Documents under s 35 of the SACAT Act, including explicitly that it provide "relevant policies". This is a common form of directions in review proceedings involving SAHT.
2. SAHT filed an initial Book of Documents and then, late on the day before the hearing on 2 December 2025, SAHT filed an 86-page Supplementary Book of Documents in connection with its strike out application (see below).
3. However, SAHT did not provide, either in its initial Book of Documents or its Supplementary Book of Documents, all the "relevant policies" referred to in the directions of 29 May 2025.
4. The Tribunal has considerable experience with SAHT as a litigant in the Tribunal, either as a landlord in the Tribunal's original jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Act 1995 or as a respondent in the Tribunal's review jurisdiction. The Tribunal is aware that there is a policy basis underlying many of SAHT's decisions and is aware from experience that those policies are available to the public on SAHT's website.
5. Accordingly, it became necessary for the me to seek out the (apparently) "relevant policies" from SAHT's website and raise the question of their applicability with counsel for SAHT during the full hearing. It appeared that SAHT had not adequately, or at all, instructed its legal representatives about the existence of these apparently relevant policies.
6. The relevant policies that I am referring to are SAHT's:

a) Eligibility for housing policy (v2, 1 March 2021);

b) Housing registration and allocation policy (v2, 1 March 2021); and

1. These are the policies that appeared to me to relate to the ROI decision. Mr Pager did not raise any objection to their applicability at the full hearing.
2. The failure of SAHT to include these policies in its initial Book of Documents and Supplementary Book of Documents prior to the hearing was a significant omission.

1. In September 2025, Ms Henderson filed an expansive set of submissions in these proceedings.
2. While Ms Henderson's submissions address the Adequacy of Time decision and the ROI decision, her submissions far exceed the scope of the review proceedings identified in the Tribunal's directions of 29 May 2025. This is despite the Tribunal clearly identifying at that directions hearing, and the written directions that followed, that the scope of these review proceedings was confined to the Adequacy of Time decision and the ROI decision.
3. For example, Ms Henderson's submissions raised issues concerning her desire to be transferred to Category 1 in about 2020 or 2021 and SAHT's alleged failure to accommodate her disabilities. Her submissions challenge the Peer Reviewer's decision of 3 April 2025. Also, Ms Henderson's desired remedies exceed what the Tribunal may order in these review proceedings. For example, Ms Henderson sought that the Tribunal order SAHT to place her in Category 1; to place her into emergency accommodation; and to pay her compensation.
4. When I became aware of this, I issued directions to the parties on 14 November 2025 restating the limits of the Tribunal's jurisdiction in these review proceedings. This was done as a matter of fairness to the parties and for the efficient management of the imminent hearing. The parties were informed in those directions that the Tribunal would have no regard to any matters that exceeded the scope of the review application as identified in the directions of 29 May 2025, and would not take into account nor make any decision about those extraneous matters.
5. I invited Ms Henderson to file fresh submissions by 28 November 2025 limited to the scope of the review proceedings identified in the directions of 29 May 2025 and which specifically address the Tribunal's powers in review proceedings. Liberty to apply was given to extend this date and, if necessary to seek an adjournment of the full hearing.
6. Ms Henderson did not file any additional submissions prior to the hearing.

SAHT's Second Supplementary Book of Documents

1. On 8 December 2025, some days after the conclusion of the full hearing when my decision on the Adequacy of Time issue was reserved, SAHT filed an eight-document Second Supplementary Book of Documents.
2. SAHT's Second Supplementary Book of Documents contains material that SAHT was under an ongoing legal obligation to file in the Tribunal under s 35 of the SACAT Act. It should have been filed at an early stage in the proceedings. However, I considered that, under s 35 of the SACAT Act, the Tribunal ought to accept that material despite its lateness, and was probably required to do so.
3. I do not consider that Ms Henderson is prejudiced by the late filing by SAHT of the Second Supplementary Book of Documents.
4. Documents 1 to 4 inclusive relate to the Adequacy of Time decision that I reserved at the conclusion of the hearing on 2 December 2025. These documents are predominantly (i.e. documents 1, 2 and 4) copies of email and other correspondence between Ms Nettle and officers of the respondent, so would be within the knowledge of Ms Henderson and those supporting her. Document 3 is of no particular assistance to the Tribunal.
5. Documents 5 to 8 inclusive are the policy documents that relate to the decision that I made during the hearing on 2 December 2025 (the review of the ROI decision). These policy documents were largely already taken into account by me in making that decision.
6. At my direction, the Tribunal Registry notified the parties on 9 December 2025 that I would not accept any additional evidentiary material or submissions from either party.

1. On 27 November, 1 December and 2 December 2025, and twice again during the full hearing itself, Ms Henderson (through those supporting her) made a total of five applications to adjourn the full hearing.
2. The grounds for the applications were broadly speaking that Ms Henderson needed more time to obtain legal advice from the Legal Services Commission; that Ms Henderson might wish to summons witnesses; and on account of Ms Henderson's physical and mental health.
3. All applications were declined by me for the same reasons. Following the adjournment application made on 1 December 2025, I excused Ms Henderson from attending the hearing if her ill health prevented her from doing so.
4. My reasons for declining all adjournment applications were that Ms Henderson had ample time to obtain legal advice and ample time to prepare her case, including the filing of any additional evidentiary material and the making of any procedural applications. In my directions of 29 May 2025, I had indicated to Ms Henderson that she could request the issue of a summons if she considered that there were relevant documents she needed for her case. I noted also that Ms Henderson has had substantial supports aiding her in this matter and would have had adequate time to inform them of her position on the limited scope of the matters to be determined by the Tribunal (of which she had been aware since the directions hearing on 29 May 2025).
5. I note also the flexibility that had previously been afforded to Ms Henderson, including that the Tribunal extended the time for her to submit her submissions to 5 September 2025. The Tribunal also relisted the hearing date from 31 October 2025 to 2 December 2025 to accommodate Ms Henderson's wish to consult with her general practitioner on the day before and the day after the full hearing.
6. Ms Henderson's grounds for adjourning the hearing also exceeded the reasonable scope of the liberty to apply granted to Ms Henderson in the Tribunal's directions of 14 November 2025.
7. I am well satisfied that the Tribunal has dealt with Ms Henderson fairly in its directions and listings, and has taken into account her physical and mental conditions and practical difficulties accessing support services and legal advice. The flexibility to be afforded to an unrepresented, vulnerable litigant is not unlimited. Ultimately, there is an onus on every litigant before the Tribunal to actively, promptly and efficiently prosecute their applications.
8. It is necessary to make an observation about the circumstances surrounding Ms Henderson's fifth and final adjournment application. Although Ms Henderson had been excused by me from attendance at the full hearing, Ms Henderson attended the hearing and entered the hearing room at the commencement of the hearing.
9. Shortly prior to the commencement of the hearing, the Tribunal had been informed that Ms Henderson had caused a disturbance in the ground floor foyer of the building housing the Tribunal and needed to be physically subdued by one of the Tribunal guards. The Tribunal was also informed that an ambulance had been called for Ms Henderson at her request, although the expected arrival time was unknown.
10. The hearing commenced with Ms Henderson in attendance. Ms Henderson left the hearing room after the ambulance arrived some minutes later. Her conduct at that point suddenly became very heightened (she raised her voice to extreme levels) and she was escorted out of the hearing room by the Tribunal guard and her supporters. At this point, I told the RRSA advocate that I would not permit Ms Henderson to be in the hearing room if she behaved in that manner again.
11. From outside the hearing room, Ms Henderson instructed the RRSA advocate to inform the Tribunal of the results of the ambulance officers' examination of her (essentially, Ms Henderson's vital signs) and the ambulance officers' advice to her to go to hospital as she was at risk of a stroke or heart attack.
12. Ms Henderson instructed the RRSA advocate to inform the Tribunal that if she were not granted an adjournment, she would not go to hospital. Ms Henderson's fifth and final application for adjournment was essentially declined for the same reasons as the earlier applications. However, Ms Henderson's attempt to pressure or manipulate the Tribunal into granting her an adjournment (i.e. she would go to hospital only if an adjournment were granted) was improper and amounts to an abuse of process.
13. At this point, given Ms Henderson's failure to comport herself appropriately prior to and during the hearing and her apparently imminent need for medical attention and/or transportation, I informed the RRSA advocate that I would not be allowing Ms Henderson to return to the hearing room. I had formed the view that it was improbable that the hearing would be able to be conducted in an efficient and effective manner with Ms Henderson in attendance.

1. In the late afternoon of the day preceding the full hearing,[22] SAHT through its solicitors filed an Outline of Argument seeking that the Tribunal dismiss Ms Henderson's review application.
2. Although SAHT's Outline of Argument was not accompanied by a formal Interlocutory Application for dismissal, in accordance with the Tribunal's objectives of flexibility and in light of the imminent full hearing, I decided to accept the Outline of Argument as SAHT's application for dismissal as well as its written submissions on the matter.
3. In brief, SAHT submitted that the decisions under review are not reviewable decisions under s 32A of the SAHT Act and that the application for review is misconceived or lacking in substance and seeks to challenge matters outside the Tribunal's statutory remit and thus constitutes an abuse of process.
4. It was submitted in respect of the Adequacy of Time decision that:
   1. regulation 11(1)(a) of the South Australian Housing Trust Regulations 2025 (the Regulations) prescribes a mandatory minimum waiting period of two days before SAHT may dispose of certain goods left on premises after the end of a tenancy. The language of the provision is prescriptive and unequivocal. It states that SAHT may act "when at least two days have passed after taking possession of the premises," and contains no qualifying words such as "subject to extension" or "unless otherwise ordered." This makes the two-day period a fixed statutory requirement;
   2. the Tribunal's jurisdiction is confined to powers conferred by statute or regulation. Regulation 11 does not confer any power on the Tribunal to vary, extend, or shorten the two-day timeframe. The Tribunal cannot read into the Regulations a discretion that does not exist. Any attempt to do so would be ultra vires;
   3. the extensions granted by SAHT for the tenant to access the premises were not extensions of the statutory period under reg 11. They were pre-regulation 11 measures - effectively delaying the commencement of the abandoned goods process. Once SAHT initiates its powers under reg 11 by taking possession and commencing the process, the two-day period is fixed and cannot be extended by SAHT or the Tribunal. The additional time provided by SAHT was an exercise of its discretion not to trigger reg 11 immediately, not an alteration of the statutory timeframe. Accordingly, the Tribunal cannot review or override a statutory timeframe that is absolute. The two-day period is a legislative requirement, not an administrative decision. Any attempt to extend it would be beyond the Tribunal's jurisdiction.
5. It was submitted in respect of the ROI decision that:
   1. the "purported decision" not to accept the applicant's application for public housing is not a reviewable decision because no discretionary refusal decision was made; rather, the outcome was the mechanical operation of SAHT policy settings and lodgement requirements that applied to the applicant following termination of her tenancy and during a period of service exclusion;
   2. file notes show the applicant refused to allow copying of her ID and declined online verification; the ROI was therefore deferred and later cancelled for lack of identification. These entries confirm there was no merits refusal of a complete application - only administrative non-progression because the applicant did not meet lodgement preconditions. Properly characterised, the applicant's complaint challenges policy and process settings (service exclusion and ROI evidentiary prerequisites), not a decision on an application for housing assistance made after considering the merits. The SAHT Act expressly excludes complaints about policy from the definition of "reviewable decision". Accordingly, this aspect does not enliven the Tribunal's review jurisdiction;
   3. in the alternative, even if framed as a decision, it is misconceived or lacking in substance because the materials show the applicant did not supply the mandatory proof of identity/income and was under a service exclusion at relevant times, so there was no decision capable of review on the merits. In any event, the applicant's service period has ended and she has since the expiry of the exclusion period been advised to make an application.
6. I dealt with the matter at the commencement of the full hearing. Mr Pager indicated that SAHT relied on its written submissions and did not seek to supplement them with oral submissions. I had closely considered SAHT's written submissions prior to the hearing and felt that I would not be aided by any additional submissions on the matter. I informed the parties that SAHT's application to strike out for want of jurisdiction was dismissed and that I would issue my reasons shortly. These are those reasons.
7. Prior to my hearing from Mr Pager on SAHT's strike out application, the RRSA advocate quite reasonably objected to the late filing by SAHT of this material. That objection was ultimately not pressed after I had indicated the strike out application was dismissed.

Relevant principles of statutory interpretation

1. A long-standing principle of statutory interpretation is that beneficial provisions in legislation are to be interpreted liberally.[23]
2. His Honour Justice Isaacs said in the Bull case:

This means ... not that the true signification of the provision should be strained or exceeded, but that it should be construed so as to give the fullest relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow.[24]

3. An example of a beneficial provision is a provision that confers a right of review on a person.
4. In Australian Postal Corporation v Forgie, the Full Court of the Federal Court said:

the beneficial nature of merits review is such that when provisions are made for it within a legislative scheme, it is unlikely that the legislature would have intended that they should be construed in a narrow or technical way since to do so would be inconsistent with the generally beneficial nature of merits review.[25]

5. This is the approach that should be taken in determining what is a reviewable decision for the purposes of Part 3A of the SAHT Act.
6. What is also notable about the terms of Part 3A is that it does not confine the decisions that might be reviewed to decisions made under any particular statutory powers nor under any particular policy framework. This supports the proposition that Parliament intended that the review rights afforded under the SAHT Act be interpreted and applied liberally.
7. The only thing that is required is that there be a "decision of SAHT" that falls into one or more of the categories set out in s 32A(1)(a) to (c) of the SAHT Act.
8. An additional interpretative aid in construing the breadth of "reviewable decision" is the terms of s 32A(2) of the SAHT Act. Section 32A(2) has the effect of narrowing what can be dealt with on an appeal to SAHT or a review by the Tribunal. In my view, s 32A(2) of the SAHT Act strongly supports the proposition that the term "reviewable decision" was intended by Parliament to be given a broad application albeit that it needed the setting of some boundaries to what would otherwise be an expansive appeal and review right.

Whether the Adequacy of Time decision is a reviewable decision

1. The manner in which SAHT is to treat belongings of a former tenant left at the tenanted premises is dealt with under the Regulations and SAHT's Abandoned property and goods policy and the related Abandoned goods procedures.[26]
2. Regulation 11 of the Regulations makes provision for goods left on premises.[27] It states:

11 - Goods left on premises > > (1) The following provisions apply if goods are left on residential premises after the end of a tenancy where SAHT is the landlord:

(a) SAHT may, when at least 2 days have passed after taking possession of the premises, remove, and destroy or dispose of, the goods if -

(i) they are perishable foodstuffs; or

(ii) they are left on residential premises that have been left in an insanitary or hazardous condition; or

(iii) their value is less than a fair estimate of the cost of their removal, storage and sale;

(b) SAHT must store the goods in a safe place and manner for at least 60 days if the goods are not liable to destruction or disposal under paragraph (a).

(2) SAHT must, within 7 days after storing goods or having goods stored under this regulation -

(a) give notice of the storage of the goods to -

(i) if the tenant has left a forwarding address - the tenant; and

(ii) if another person has, to the knowledge of SAHT, an interest in the goods and the person's name and address are known to, or reasonably ascertainable by, SAHT - that person; and

(b) publish notice of the storage of the goods in a newspaper circulating generally throughout the State.

(3) A notice must be in the form approved by the Minister for the purposes of this regulation.

(4) A person who is entitled to possession of goods stored under this regulation may reclaim the goods after paying to SAHT -

(a) the reasonable costs of their removal and storage; and

(b) the reasonable costs of giving notice under subregulation (2)(b); and

(c) any other reasonable costs incurred by SAHT as a result of the goods being left on the premises.

(5) Unless SAHT is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for storing the goods for a period longer than 60 days, SAHT must, if the goods are not reclaimed within that period, have the goods sold by public auction as soon as practicable after the end of that period.

(6) On the sale of the goods by public auction, SAHT -

(a) may retain out of the proceeds of sale -

(i) the reasonable costs of removing, storing and selling the goods; and

(ii) the reasonable costs of giving notice under subregulation (2)(b); and

(iii) any other reasonable costs incurred by SAHT as a result of the goods being left on the premises; and

(iv) any amounts owed to SAHT under a tenancy agreement relating to the premises; and

(b) must pay the balance (if any) to the owner or, if the identity and address of the owner are not known to or reasonably ascertainable by SAHT, to the credit of the Consolidated Account.

(7) If goods are sold by public auction under this regulation, the purchaser acquires a good title to the goods which defeats -

(a) the tenant's interest in the goods; and

(b) the interests of others (apart from the tenant) unless the purchaser has actual notice of the interest before purchasing the goods.

(8) In this regulation, residential premises are in an insanitary or hazardous condition if -

(a) the condition of the premises gives rise to a risk to health or safety; or

(b) the premises are so filthy or neglected that there is a risk of infestation by rodents or other pests; or

(c) offensive or hazardous material or odours are emitted from the premises; or

(d) in the opinion of SAHT - the premises are for some other reason in an insanitary or hazardous condition

1. I am satisfied that SAHT's Abandoned property and goods policy and its Abandoned goods procedures are broadly consistent with reg 11.
2. As a matter of statutory construction, there is nothing in reg 11 that prevents SAHT from allowing a former tenant access to reclaim their belongings in the period when the belongings are still at the tenanted premises or have been placed in storage under reg 11(1)(b).
3. However, it may be arguable that, once the former tenant's belongings are in storage and up until the time they are sold by public auction, SAHT should decline to allow the former tenant to reclaim their belongings until the former tenant has paid for the costs referred to in reg 11(4). It seems that the public interest in recovering public monies expended on storing a former tenant's belongings might outweigh the interest of the former tenant to reclaim those belongings. Of course, after the belongings are sold by public auction, they become the property of the purchaser, not the former tenant who will then no longer have any rights to them (reg 11(7)).
4. The evidence is clear that SAHT made a number of individual decisions allowing Ms Henderson to have access to the Pope Court premises after her eviction to remove her belongings.
5. Ms Henderson's grievance is not strictly against any particular decision or decisions but the cumulative effect of them, i.e. that she had not been afforded adequate time to remove her belongings from the Pope Court premises.
6. I am therefore satisfied that those decisions, individually and cumulatively, were a "decision of SAHT ... with respect to [a] matter that may ... affect a [former] tenant of SAHT".
7. The Tribunal was informed by Mr Pager that SAHT has placed some of Ms Henderson's belongings into storage and some still remain at the Pope Court premises. Mr Pager said that a valuer has been engaged to value the belongings and this has contributed to the delay.
8. As some of Ms Henderson's belongings remain at the Pope Court premises and some are presumably in storage under reg 11(1)(b), a review by the Tribunal of the Adequacy of Time decision is not lacking in utility.

Whether the ROI decision is a reviewable decision

1. For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the decision made on 15 July 2024 not to accept Ms Henderson's ROI, and the subsequent affirming of that decision by the Peer Reviewer, are both a "decision of SAHT ... on an application to SAHT ... for housing assistance". Hence, the ROI decision is a reviewable decision for the purposes of s 32D of the SAHT Act.[28]
2. An "application" is simply a request.[29]
3. There is no definition of "housing assistance" in the SAHT Act. It is necessary to give that expression its ordinary meaning, taking into account also the liberal approach to interpretation referred to in the above extracts from the Bull and Forgie decisions.
4. Relevantly, in the present context, I consider that a reference to an application for housing assistance includes a request made by a person to SAHT for the person to be housed.[30]
5. There is no statutory process in the SAHT Act or its regulations for a person to apply to SAHT to be allocated housing.
6. The application process appears intended to be predominantly dealt with by SAHT's policies, in particular the Housing registration and allocation policy.[31] This policy explains how SAHT:

1. Relevantly, and in brief terms, this policy states that persons eligible under SAHT's Eligibility for housing policy[32] can register their interest in public housing. Registrations are prioritised and placed in a category (1, 2, 3 or 4, in descending order of need) based on the registrant's need for housing and the urgency of their situation. SAHT considers a number of factors when assessing a registrant's need for housing, including their accommodation history, the housing options available to them, and their individual need. ROIs are placed on the register based on either the date the registrant was approved for category 1 or 2, the date they registered their interest, or a "benefit date" approved by SAHT in certain circumstances. A registrant who is still eligible for housing may be offered housing appropriate to their circumstances. If the offer is accepted, and proof of income and identity is provided, the housing is allocated to them and a lease agreement is signed.
2. It is clear from SAHT's policies that an ROI is an application or a request to SAHT for a person to be housed. An ROI is the gateway process for a person to be allocated housing by SAHT. It is an application for "housing assistance".
3. SAHT declined to accept Ms Henderson's application for housing assistance. This was affirmed by the Peer Reviewer on 25 October 2024. Constructively, her application for housing assistance was rejected.
4. Therefore, SAHT made a "decision". It was a decision on Ms Henderson's application for housing assistance. This is sufficient to invoke the Tribunal's review jurisdiction under s 32D of the SAHT Act.
5. There is no clear indication before the Tribunal whether Ms Henderson has since been successful in having an ROI accepted by SAHT. However, even if she has, the review of the ROI decision is not a moot point for Ms Henderson. The Housing registration and allocation policy is clear that the date a person lodges an ROI can influence the order in which they are offered and allocated housing. In other words, Ms Henderson may be better off by having an earlier ROI accepted by SAHT.

Conclusion on the matter of the Tribunal's jurisdiction

1. For these reasons, I am satisfied that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to review the Adequacy of Time decision and the ROI decision.
2. SAHT's application to strike out these proceedings is misconceived and must be dismissed.

1. It did not become apparent until the preparation of these reasons that Ms Henderson's review application was not made within the statutory period of 30 days provided for under the SAHT Act.[33]
2. The application ought to have been made by about 25 November 2024. However, it was not formally made until 29 January 2025, some two months late.[34]
3. This is a jurisdictional point.
4. I turned my mind to whether I should invite the parties to make submissions to me on whether I should extend time for the making of the application for review.[35] However, I have determined to proceed on my own initiative and without hearing from the parties on the matter.
5. I have determined to extend time. In doing so, I have taken into account the relatively brief period of the delay and that SAHT has at no stage raised the issue of the lateness of the application or it being prejudiced by the lateness of the application, including in the period when it was legally represented and was challenging on other grounds the Tribunal's jurisdiction to deal with the application. In this regard, I note that SAHT has been legally represented in these proceedings since July 2025.

1. I now turn to considering the merits of the two decisions under review.
2. In conducting this review, I remind myself of the following principles.
3. The Tribunal's decision must be lawful and reasonable, must be procedurally fair, must not rigidly apply policy without due regard to the individual circumstances of a particular case and must take into account only relevant considerations.
4. Also, it is well established that when the Tribunal conducts a review on a matter about which there are policy guidelines, the Tribunal cannot (deliberately or inadvertently) ignore those policy guidelines. Justice Brennan said when President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal:

When the Tribunal is reviewing the exercise of a discretionary power reposed in a Minister, and the Minister has adopted a general policy to guide him in the exercise of the power, the Tribunal will ordinarily apply that policy in reviewing the decision, unless the policy is unlawful or unless its application tends to produce an unjust decision in the circumstances of the particular case. Where the policy would ordinarily be applied, an argument against the policy itself or against its application in the particular case will be considered, but cogent reasons will have to be shown against its application ...[36]

5. In my view, what applies to a reviewing Tribunal must also apply to a Peer Reviewer and, axiomatically, to the primary decision-maker.

1. In her written submissions, Ms Henderson asserted that she "was not provided adequate notice or reasonable access to retrieve my belongings, which remain at risk".
2. She also asserted (without evidence) that SAHT failed to secure the premises after her eviction and multiple break-ins and thefts have occurred. She submitted that it would be "procedurally unfair for SAHT to rely on the abandoned goods process when its own failures directly exposed my belongings to theft and destruction". I do not find any logic in this submission and cannot accept it.
3. The Peer Reviewer relevantly said in respect of the Adequacy of Time decision [sic]:

The Appellant was provided access on 22 July 2024, 24 July 2024, 26 July 2024 to remove all belongings from the property in presence of the Senior Manager from Towards Home > > The Appellant was incarcerated between 26 July 2024 to 15 August 2024. > > The Appellant was provided access on 27 August 2024, 28 August 2024, 29 August 2024 and 2 September 2024. ... > > The Appellant has been provided reasonable time to remove her belongings for the property she has been evicted from and any goods left behind are being managed in line with the policy.

4. It is well established that, in conducting this review, I should take into account the facts that exist at the time I conduct the review.
5. I am satisfied on the evidence in SAHT's various Books of Documents that:

1. as a matter of practical reality, Ms Henderson had two months to remove her belongings from the Pope Court premises from the time that the Court of Appeal delivered its decision on 9 May 2024 until the time of the expiry of the stay order at 5.00 pm on 9 July 2024. During this period Ms Henderson still had possession of the premises; 2. following Ms Henderson's eviction from the Pope Court premises, SAHT afforded Ms Henderson access to remove her belongings: 1. on 24, 26 and 29 July 2024;[37] 2. on 27 and 29 August and 2 September 2024;[38] 3. for a two-week period from 25 September 2024 (with the keys to the premises being given by SAHT to Ms Nettle);[39] 4. from 24 October 2024[40] to 1 November 2024 (later extended to 15 November 2024);[41]

1. on 29 November 2024, SAHT invited Ms Henderson to nominate a storage unit where her belongings could be delivered and informed her that if she did not do so by 4 December 2024 (later extended to 24 December 2024 and again to 20 January 2025), SAHT would then proceed to give effect to its abandoned property and goods policy;[42] and

1. on each of the occasions that SAHT wrote to Ms Henderson, Ms Henderson was provided an online link to SAHT's abandoned property and goods policy.
2. Ms Henderson asserts in her written submissions that she had at most "two or three six-hour supervised slots to remove over eleven storage units' worth of belongings". However, there is the contrary suggestion in email correspondence between Ms Nettle and SAHT that Ms Henderson accessed the premises on eleven full or part days during the above period, and that she had spent considerable time visiting her father in Port Augusta and having major dental surgery.[43] I note also that, in her written submissions, Ms Henderson asserted that she could not access the premises on 24 July 2024 (as the rear gate was padlocked and she could not enter) and 26 July 2024 (as she had been arrested and was incarcerated until 15 August 2024).
3. I am satisfied from SAHT's correspondence with Ms Henderson that SAHT had not yet invoked its abandoned property and goods policy while it was affording Ms Henderson the opportunity to remove her belongings from the premises. As late as 17 January 2025, SAHT was indicating to Ms Henderson that it had not yet commenced to invoke its policy but would do so if she had not provided details of her nominated storage unit by 20 January 2025.
4. I accept that, as a vulnerable homeless person, Ms Henderson would likely have found it logistically difficult to organise the removal of the considerable volume of belongings remaining at the Pope Court premises. I accept also that Ms Henderson's research library, in particular, is considered by her to be an integral part of her identity and that the loss of her belongings by destruction, disposal or sale would be personally devastating to her.[44] I further accept that Ms Henderson would find it financially onerous, and perhaps impossible, to pay what would be necessary under reg 11(4) to reclaim her belongings from SAHT.
5. These are the types of factors that a reasonable decision-maker must take into account in affording a person an opportunity to remove their belongings from premises before invoking the statutory abandoned goods process.
6. However, it is also necessary to take into account that SAHT exists to provide public housing to vulnerable or disadvantaged persons.[45] The time that SAHT should reasonably allow a former tenant to remove their belongings ought to be balanced against the need for SAHT to make premises available to new tenants without undue delay.
7. The access to premises to be afforded by SAHT must be meaningful (not tokenistic) access that is adapted to the particular circumstances of the individual. However, once afforded meaningful access by SAHT, it is up to the former tenant to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded to them in a timely manner.
8. I am satisfied that SAHT treated Ms Henderson reasonably and fairly in allowing her an extended period to remove her belongings from the Pope Court premises.
9. In her written submissions, Ms Henderson sought that the Tribunal order that SAHT:

provide safe access to my belongings forthwith, with a reasonable disability adjustments, to sort and retrieve essential belongings, until a minimum of 90 days following the date of my being allocated secure, safe, suitable, low density, long-term accommodation, or in the alternative, require SAHT to arrange and fund and provide access to secure accessible storage within the City of Adelaide, on the same terms, and until 90 days following the date of my being allocated secure, safe, suitable, low density, long term public housing.

14. Ms Henderson has had ample time in these proceedings to identify any plan or arrangements she might have put in place to remove her remaining belongings from the Pope Court premises. She has not done so. Therefore, there is no factual basis before me to find that, if Ms Henderson were given any additional time by the Tribunal, she would be able to remove her remaining belongings within a reasonable timeframe. On the contrary, the history of the matter indicates that there is a real risk that, if Ms Henderson were afforded more time to remove her belongings, it would become a lengthy and protracted process. Any additional delay in making the premises available to a new tenant would not be in the public interest.
15. Ms Henderson has already had the benefit of six months from the Court of Appeal's decision in May 2024 to remove her belongings, including a two month period before her eviction when she remained in actual possession of the premises. Her proposal that SAHT store her belongings at the Pope Court premises or elsewhere for at least 90 days after she is rehoused at some undetermined future time is unreasonable and must be rejected.
16. Taking all these considerations into account, the factual evidence before me well satisfies me that Ms Henderson has been afforded more than adequate time before and after her eviction from the Pope Court premises to remove her belongings, before that access was finally ceased on 15 November 2024. I am satisfied also that Ms Henderson was made aware by SAHT of the consequences if she did not complete the removal of her belongings, including that SAHT would invoke its Abandoned property and goods policy.
17. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the Adequacy of Time decision is the correct or preferable decision and that it should be affirmed.
18. While it does not change the final outcome, I would note that it would have also been reasonable for SAHT to also take into account the time that had been given to Ms Henderson to address the condition of the property during the two year period in which the vacant possession application was before the Senior Member. It is clear from the Tribunal record of those proceedings that Ms Henderson had supports available to her at that time, including "100 hours of support that was to be provided to her by the Exceptional Needs Unit to address the condition of the property".[46] It would similarly have been reasonable for SAHT to form the view that Ms Henderson also had available to her the time in which the internal review and Court of Appeal proceedings were running. It would have been reasonable for SAHT to take the view that Ms Henderson could have utilised that extended period and the support services available to her to reduce the quantity of her belongings at the Pope Court premises in anticipation of the prospect that she may ultimately be unsuccessful and would have to vacate the premises. However, I have not needed to take this additional matter into account in making my decision and have not done so.

1. Ms Henderson submitted (without evidence) that "SAHT wrongly caused the destruction of parts of my belongings, after appeal processed commencement" and that "SAHT unlawfully destroyed belongings from the front and rear yards, selling and dumping property, including parts of my research library".
2. In view of my ultimate decision on the Adequacy of Time decision, I have not needed to consider whether the operation of that decision was stayed by virtue of s 32D(7) of the SAHT Act when these proceedings were lodged by Ms Henderson. It is clear that SAHT did not regard it as having been stayed upon the commencement of these proceedings as it started to remove Ms Henderson's belongings into storage.
3. The correctness or otherwise of SAHT's position can be left for a matter when it is critical to the outcome of the review proceedings. In the present proceedings, Ms Henderson has not been prejudiced by any failure of SAHT to observe s 32D(7) of the SAHT Act given that I have found she had been afforded more than adequate time to remove her belongings.

1. In her written submissions, Ms Henderson asserted that "SAHT wrongly refused to accept and process my July 2024 housing application". She submitted that the exclusion period was wrongly calculated as her lease had already been terminated on 27 April 2022 [sic] so the six month exclusion period expired on 27 October 2022. She submitted that, in any event, SAHT should have exercised the discretion to waive the exclusion period given her homelessness, disabilities and vulnerability.
2. As will become evident, Ms Henderson's submissions are of no assistance to me. However, I would observe that Ms Henderson's submission that a tenant could effectively serve out an exclusion period while they are still residing in a SAHT tenancy is wrong-headed and must be rejected.
3. SAHT's Connect database contains the following entry dated 15 July 2024 [sic]:

[Customer] walks into [Adelaide] office, [team leader] talked to [customer]. [Team leader] was at the [front counter] when the ex tenant came. Customer handed over Registration form and a support letter from a GP and asked a copy to be stamped and given to her. [Team leader] looked the form and advised the customer that ROI cannot be accepted as there is a service exclusion in place. Customer said now you have the forms in your hand and accepted and left the office.[47]

4. There is no copy of the ROI of 15 July 2024 in any of SAHT's Books of Documents. Its absence could not be explained to me at the full hearing.
5. In respect of the ROI decision, the Peer Reviewer said [sic - my underlining]:

The Appellant attended the Adelaide Office and submitted the Registration of Interest in Public Housing Form. The Team Leader spoke to the Appellant and advised that the Appellant has a Service Exclusion in place until 9 January 2025 and the Trust cannot accept the Registration Form. > > The Appellant said the form was in the Team Leader's hands, so it was now considered accepted and left the office without providing the Proof of Income and Proof Identification. > > Once the Service Exclusion has been lifted, the Appellant will still need to provide Proof of Income and Proof of Identification to be registered for Public and Community Housing. ... > > The Appellant's Service Exclusion due to unreasonable behaviour to staff, is in place until 9 January 2025, after which time her housing registration form can be lodged and processed.

6. The Tribunal understands that SAHT policy is to apply "service exclusions" to persons in certain circumstances disentitling them for a certain period to receive housing assistance, rent assistance or bond assistance from SAHT.
7. For example, SAHT's Eligibility for housing policy states (my underlining):

Former public or Aboriginal housing tenants who had a lease agreement ended by the SA Housing Trust for reasons other than antisocial behaviour can register but can't be housed in public and Aboriginal housing for 6 months from the date their lease agreement ended. The SA Housing Trust can choose to waive this if there are exceptional circumstances. > > Former tenants and other occupants of public, Aboriginal housing or housing in Aboriginal communities may be excluded from registering or being re-housed in public and Aboriginal housing for 12 months in line with the Antisocial behaviour policy.

8. This is reflected in SAHT's Housing registration and allocation policy which states that SAHT "won't accept a registration of interest from someone who's excluded from SA Housing Trust services in line with the Antisocial behaviour policy".
9. The Tribunal is aware that the reference to SAHT's Antisocial behaviour policy (now known as the Good neighbour policy) refers to the conduct of a tenant towards their neighbours.
10. Also, the Supplementary Book of Documents indicates that, on 13 May 2024, Mr Pager wrote to Ms Henderson's counsel after the Court of Appeal proceedings to inform her that:

As the tenancy agreement has terminated, my client has instructed that in accordance with the Eligibility for housing policy, your client is able to register for ... public housing but she cannot be housed in public housing for 6 months from the date of vacant possession.[48]

11. Yet as recently as 29 July 2025, SAHT wrote to Ms Henderson stating [sic]:

The Trust notes that at the time that you made your application for registration of interest for public housing, you were the subject to a service exclusion period of six (6) months, which expired on 9 January 2025. Given that your exclusion period has ended, it is open to you to make an application to register your interest with the Trust for consideration.[49]

12. There is no evidence before the Tribunal in these proceedings that Ms Henderson:

b. was involved in unreasonable conduct towards SAHT staff; or

c. was involved in any antisocial behaviour towards her neighbours.

1. It is clear that Ms Henderson's tenancy was terminated on account of her breach of clause 6(c) of the tenancy agreement in relation to the condition of the Pope Court premises and her failure to maintain them in good tenantable condition.
2. Even if Ms Henderson was involved in unreasonable conduct towards SAHT staff, Mr Pager was unable to identify to me any statutory or policy basis for SAHT refusing to accept an ROI on account of a service exclusion by reason of a person's conduct towards SAHT staff. He conceded at the hearing that there was no such basis and that the reliance on that reason to reject the ROI was wrong.
3. I conclude that there was no factual or policy basis for either the primary decision-maker or the Peer Reviewer to find that Ms Henderson could not lodge her ROI on 15 July 2024. On SAHT's own Eligibility for housing policy and Housing registration and allocation policy, SAHT should have accepted Ms Henderson's ROI on 15 July 2024.
4. However, Mr Pager submitted that Ms Henderson's ROI of 15 July 2024 should not be accepted in any event because it was not accompanied by proof of her identity and proof of her income.
5. I do not accept that submission.
6. In respect of the "proof of identity" point, it is abundantly clear to me that counter staff at SAHT's Adelaide Office on 15 July 2024 well knew that they were dealing with Ms Henderson. They made an entry about her on that day in SAHT's Connect database records. It is somewhat disingenuous for SAHT to assert that its staff did not know who Ms Henderson was when she attempted to lodge her ROI on 15 July 2024.
7. In any event, SAHT conceded at the full hearing that it is satisfied as to Ms Henderson's identity. As noted earlier, it is well established that the Tribunal should take into account the facts applying at the time that it conducts its review. It would be wrong for the Tribunal to affirm the ROI decision when SAHT now has no issue with Ms Henderson's identity.
8. On the proof of income point, I note that, at the time Ms Henderson sought to lodge her ROI on 15 July 2024, she had been a SAHT tenant of many years. It is not credible that SAHT did not already possess information about Ms Henderson's income as that would have been the basis for assessing her rent at the Pope Court premises. Refusing to accept Ms Henderson's ROI simply because she did not provide proof of her income would be unreasonable and would run foul of the principle that a decision-maker must not rigidly apply policy without due regard to the individual circumstances of a particular case.
9. In any event, there is no factual basis before the Tribunal to support any proposition that SAHT has current concerns about Ms Henderson's income. In SAHT's letter to her of 21 January 2025, SAHT sought only proof of her identity.
10. For all these reasons, I am satisfied that the correct or preferable decision is to set aside the ROI decision and substitute it with a decision that the ROI is to be taken as having been accepted on 15 July 2024. I indicated to the parties at the hearing that this would be my decision on the ROI decision and I would publish my reasons later.
11. The apparent absence of the ROI of 15 July 2024 is no obstacle to finding that the ROI should have been accepted on that date. If SAHT does not have that ROI, it is reasonable to assume that the information contained in the subsequent ROI lodged by Ms Henderson about six months later on 17 January 2025 would be similar to what she would have included in her earlier ROI.
12. In making this decision, I have not placed any weight on the decision under review, as I would otherwise ordinarily be required to do under s 34 of the SACAT Act. Instead, I have made the decision afresh. It is well-established that, in an application for review under s 34 of the SACAT Act, the Tribunal stands in the shoes of the original decision-maker (here the Peer Reviewer) and makes a decision afresh. That is the approach I have taken in this matter.
13. The task of the Peer Reviewer when undertaking an internal review under the SAHT Act is to be objective, rigorous and analytically critical of the decision they are reviewing. In the present case, the Peer Reviewer ought to have turned their mind to whether the original decision not to accept the ROI was the right decision pursuant to the provisions of SAHT's relevant policies and all relevant facts.
14. After having examined the Peer Reviewer's decision and the available evidence, I consider that the Peer Reviewer based their decision on an uncritical acceptance of incorrect information in SAHT's Connect database recorded on 15 July 2024. I am not satisfied that the Peer Reviewer could have had proper regard to the relevant policies applicable when a person seeks to lodge a ROI.
15. For these reasons, I concluded that the internal review process undertaken by the Peer Reviewer was not procedurally fair to Ms Henderson and that I should place no weight on their decision.

1. The Tribunal grants an extension of time for the making of this review application.
2. The respondent's application to strike out the review proceedings is dismissed.
3. The Tribunal affirms the decision referred to in these reasons as the Adequacy of Time decision.
4. The Tribunal sets aside the ROI decision and substitutes that decision with the following decision:
   1. The applicant's Registration of Interest is accepted as at 15 July 2024.

[1] Permission was given under s 56 of the SACAT Act.

[2] See Henderson v South Australian Housing Trust [2024] SASCA 55 at [5].

[3] 2021/SH002988. The relevant breach was of clause 6(c) of the tenancy agreement which provides that a tenant must "keep the premises and any surrounding area clean and in good tenantable condition, free from vermin and clear of refuse".

[4] Henderson v South Australian Housing Trust [2023] SACAT 46. The internal review decision of the President sets out a brief narrative and an account of the orders made by the Senior Member in the eight hearings before her. It is not necessary to repeat that information here.

[5] Henderson v South Australian Housing Trust [2024] SASCA 55.

[6] Respondent's Supplementary Book of Documents, p 64 (Transcript of Court of Appeal proceedings).

[7] Respondent's Book of Documents, pp 1 - 3.

[8] Respondent's Book of Documents, pp 4 - 6.

[9] Respondent's Book of Documents, pp 8 - 11.

[10] Respondent's Book of Documents, pp 25 - 37.

[11] Respondent's Book of Documents, p 24.

[12] Respondent's Book of Documents, p 44.

[14] Section 34(2) of the SACAT Act; regulation 5 of the SACAT Regulations 2015. SAHT is an instrumentality of the Crown. See for example, ss 8, 9, 11 and 22 of the SAHT Act.

[15] GM v Department of Human Services [2025] SASCA 68 at [140].

[16] Enkhbat v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2025] FedCFamC2G 308 at [25].

[17] Strictly, it is an internal review. However, the s 32C process is referred to as an appeal within SAHT. Nothing turns on this. To avoid confusion, I will continue to refer to it as an "appeal".

[18] Aldridge v Johnston [2020] SASCFC 31 at [129].

[19] Wilson v City of Onkaparinga [2024] SASC 139 at 88.

[20] GKZ v Department for Child Protection [2022] SACAT 29 at [111] to [118].

[21] Additional provisions relating to this material are included in the Tribunal's Rules, including rule 56.

[23] See the discussion on this point by the learned Emeritus Professor Dennis Pearce in Statutory Interpretation in Australia (10th edition, 2024) at chapter 9.

[24] Bull v Attorney-General (NSW) [1913] HCA 60; (1913) 17 CLR 370 at 384.

[25] [2003] FCAFC 223 at [66].

[26] Respondent's Book of Documents, pp 8 - 19.

[27] These Regulations did not commence until 31 July 2025. However, regulation 11 of the ceased South Australian Housing Trust Regulations 2010 was in identical form to the present regulation 11.

[28] There may be other parts of the definition of "reviewable decision" in s 32A of the SAHT Act that apply to the ROI decision but it is not necessary to consider them here.

[29] Macquarie Dictionary (revised 3rd ed) pp 85, 86.

[30] There may be other parts of the definition of "reviewable decision" in s 32A of the SAHT Act that apply to the ROI decision but it is not necessary to consider them here.

[31] Respondent's Second Supplementary Book of Documents, document 7.

[32] Respondent's Second Supplementary Book of Documents, document 8.

[33] See s 32D(2) of the SAHT Act and regulation 8(b) of the South Australian Housing Trust Regulations 2010.

[34] Although the application itself was lodged on 17 January 2025, the application fee was not paid until 29 January 2025 and that is when the application is taken to have been made. Under the Tribunal's rules the date of the application is the later of the lodgement and fee payment (or fee waiver) date.

[35] Section 66 SACAT Act; rule 7 South Australian Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014.

[36] Re Drake and Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (No 2) (1979) 2 ALD 634 at [645].

[37] Respondent's Book of Documents, p 42.

[38] Respondent's Second Supplementary Book of Documents, p 3.

[39] Respondent's Book of Documents, p 46.

[41] Respondent's Book of Documents, pp 41, 43.

[42] Respondent's Book of Documents, pp 38, 39, 40.

[43] Respondent's Second Supplementary Book of Documents, p 1.

[44] During the hearing, Ms Henderson's friend Ms Patitsas made an unsworn statement to the Tribunal on these and related matters.

[46] SAHT v Henderson (unreported decision 2021/SH002988, 24 March 2023) at [5].

[47] Respondent's Book of Documents, p 46.

[48] Respondent's Supplementary Book of Documents, p 65.

[49] Respondent's Supplementary Book of Documents, p 86.