Health Services Union NSW (obo Green) v Health Secretary in respect of NSW Ambulance [2025] NSWIRComm 1088

"Dear Registrar,

I write regarding the matter above mentioned.

The applicant is seeking leave from the Commission to:

-appear via AVL;

-not be subject to cross-examination;

Due to her currently health state and the impact that that may cause on her mental health. We have attached, to support the request, a letter from her psychologist explaining the clinical reasons why this would be detrimental to her health.

The Respondent is copied in and has already said they do not consent to the request.

We also take the opportunity to advise that we informed the Respondent we will require Ms Melanie Lawler for cross-examination."

1. For the purpose of today, I proceed on the basis the report is what it purports to be and what it, apparently, on its face, is, being a report by a registered psychologist. In its current form, it is unlikely to be much use at any substantive hearing. One, it is not in a proper form of a witness statement, which is the last of its problems. Two, it does not set out the writer's qualification to give the opinions in the statement. And three, the author is not available for cross-examination herself, more of a concern at any substantive hearing.
2. For the interlocutory purposes, I accepted the report to the extent that the applicant can rely on the contents to explain why Ms Green is not cross-examined. Without unnecessarily divulging Ms Green's medical issues, that amounts to the unreasonable stress, anxiety and trauma which would be visited upon Ms Green if she were to be cross-examined.
3. The consequence of this will be that any doubts raised by her evidence in her witness statement will remain unresolved, any gaps unfilled. I observe that the report appears to place beyond doubt that Ms Green resides in Tasmania.
4. For current purposes, it is not necessary to resolve, whichever way today's motion is resolved, how the applicant can proceed if Ms Green cannot give evidence.
5. The applicant filed a witness statement by Ms Green and an Applicant's Outline of Submission on 1 October 2025. Ms Green's statement set out the matters above as to the events leading to 26 September 2025, which the Commission understands is essentially uncontroversial to the level of detail set out above by the Commission. Ms Green's statement also set out events she said led to her submitting her resignation as follows:

"7. In June 2024, I sustained a shoulder injury whilst at work and was placed on alternative duties.

8. By September 2024, my mental health had severely declined and I knew I needed to take time away from work in an attempt to recover.

9. I reached out to Ms Melanie Lawler (Zone Manager), who told me that to access my full leave entitlements, I would need to lodge something called a notice of intention to resign, and she further expressed that any application I made for Leave Without Pay would be denied.

10. After 19 years of employment with NSW Ambulance, I knew resigning from my role is not what I wanted so I attempted to hold off before eventually accessing my Annual Leave entitlement in December 2024.

11. On 6 January 2025, after my mental health declined further during the holidays and whilst I was on leave, I submitted my notice of intention to resign effective 27 September 2025 as per my Zone Manager's instruction. The notice noted that I had submitted an application for all of my Long Service Leave entitlements. A copy of this notice is at annexure CG-01.

12. At the time of submitting this notice, and based on my Zone Manager's advice, I understood that it was the only way for me to access my leave entitlements. If I was aware of an alternative course of action, I would have taken it.

13. In March 2025, I was diagnosed with work-related Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and shortly after began receiving treatment and workers compensations payments. A copy of the Certificate of Capacity is at annexure CG-02.

14. On 8 July 2025, I tried to rescind my resignation through the StaffLink system which still allowed me to make a request to withdraw my resignation. This page states the request will be sent to my manager and we would need to agree before it is approved. A copy of this StaffLink page is at annexure CG-03.

15. Both Mr Matthew Bray (Manager) and Ms Patricia Kairouz (People and Culture Business Partner ) accepted the recission before Ms Lauren Mansell (Assistant Director of Clinical Operations) declined it with no explanation other than that she had conversations with relevant stakeholders. Evidence of this approval and the reasons I provided for the request, along with the ADCO email can be found at annexure CG-04."

1. The last two paragraphs described her attempts to have her resignation withdrawn.
2. Ms Green then set out her financial circumstances, the effect of which is:

(1) She lives alone;

(2) She is "a sole income earner";

(3) She set out her current fortnightly income on workers compensation and her expenses, which leaves her with about $127 a fortnight after what she called "bare necessities"; and

(4) If she was dismissed, she could apply to Centrelink but the most she would receive would cover less than half of her fortnightly expenses.

1. Ms Green also set out that she had a "flawless" employment record of nearly 20 years.
2. Ms Green did not give further oral evidence, as apparently she had intended, but did correct what she described as an error in the annexure to her statement. This correction made her evidence of her resignation letter the same as the respondent's evidence as to her letter of resignation.
3. The Commission did not allow further oral evidence from Ms Green, given that I accepted she would not be required to be available for cross-examination. To have allowed the further evidence orally, but not allow cross-examination would have unfairly prejudiced the respondent, who came prepared to address her written evidence.
4. The Commission allowed the correction to Ms Green's evidence, notwithstanding the ruling on oral evidence and cross-examination, because it appeared proper to have the evidence that Ms Green agreed was correct, rather than evidence not agreed by the person giving that evidence.
5. The respondent filed evidence from:

(1) Megan Smith, Associate Director of Recovery in NSW Ambulance;

(2) Ronald Gavin, whose connection to the proceedings is not set out in his witness statement;

(3) Lauren Mansell, Associate Director, Clinical Operations, Western Sector NSW Ambulance; and

(4) Melanie Lawler, Superintendent and Acting Zone Manager for Central West Zone 1.

1. The substance of Ms Smith's evidence relied on file notes of a subordinate of Ms Smith, who was a "recovery partner", who engaged with Ms Green for NSW Ambulance in respect of Ms Green's workers' compensation claims. Ms Smith's evidence was that the recovery partner was on leave at the time the respondent was preparing her evidence.
2. From the file notes, Ms Smith's evidence was that:

(1) Ms Green was open about her plans to cease working for NSW Ambulance;

(2) Ms Green did not wish to continue working for NSW Ambulance;

(3) On 20 February 2025, Ms Green had discussed her trip over Christmas/New Year 2024/2025 to Tasmania, including that Ms Green's new house in Tasmania was ready and that Ms Green said words to the effect:

"20/02/2025 - Claire advised that her trip to Tasmania (took extended leave over Xmas/ New Year period) was amazing and that the house that she built was ready. Claire advised that her decision to resign and relocate felt right and whilst she had no plans for what next, she was ok with this. Claire confirmed that she would finish work on 27/02/2025, would then take LSL, and then official resignation. Claire repeated that she was comfortable with her decision, with a private farewell scheduled for the following evening. Claire advised she was looking forward to this. Claire advised she had informed QBE of her plan."

(4) On 17 April, Ms Green said words to the effect:

"17/04/2025 - Claire reiterated that she had relocated to Tasmania and that she was having difficulty getting a GP and treatment providers to assist with NSW Workers Compensation. Claire added that as she had elected resignation, she was trying to find other roles that won't have the same physical demands of paramedicine_._"

1. Ms Smith pointed out Ms Green's workers compensation medical provider is in Tasmania and Ms Green's workers compensation form has an address in Tasmania listed for Ms Green.
2. Mr Gavin's evidence was that:

(1) He became aware in "2024", unspecified as to when, that Ms Green was planning to move to Tasmania. During "that year", she had told Mr Gavin about her plans to buy a block of land in Tasmania;

(2) Mr Gavin received a text from Ms Green on 6 January 2025, sent to a group including other NSW Ambulance staff. He annexed some text messages. It would be fair to describe Ms Green's text messages as positive about her future, although without expressly saying anything about the events causing her to resign; and

(3) He was asked in June 2025 to be a referee for Ms Green for employment outside NSW Ambulance; that he performed that task and that Ms Green later told him she had been successful in gaining that employment.

(1) She had no recollection of Ms Green raising mental health issues but that Ms Mansell was aware of Ms Green's physical injuries;

(2) On 6 January 2025, Ms Mansell received a letter of resignation from Ms Green. The next day Ms Mansell processed the resignation and approved the accompanying long service leave request for Ms Green;

(3) Relevantly, Ms Mansell annexed the letter of resignation she says she received. It contained a sentence not present in the resignation letter annexed to the witness statement of Ms Green as filed on 1 October. The letter in full, annexed by Ms Mansell, sets out:

"Dear Lauren,

I have submitted an application for all of my Long Service Leave entitlements.

I am relocating interstate from the 01/03/2025.

I would like to also submit my official notice of intent to resign from NSW Ambulance once all my leave has been exhausted. The official date of resignation that I would like to submit is 27/09/2025.

I am hoping that you are able to approve.

Many thanks

Warmest Regards

Claire Green"

The words "I am relocating interstate from the 01/03/2025" do not appear in the annexure to Ms Green's witness statement as filed. As set out above, Ms Green corrected this when her evidence was tendered this morning;

(4) After Ms Green's final day on the road, being 27 February 2025, Ms Green returned her uniform and completed a uniform accountable items checklist. Attached as annexure LM5 was a document that appeared, on its face, to support the return of uniform on 27 February 2025, apparently signed by Ms Green. The document on its face, covers resignation, termination, retirement, transfer. The document does not indicate which applied in this case;

(5) It was well known in Bathurst that Ms Green was relocating to Tasmania as Ms Green spoke about this in her workplace conversations frequently;

(6) Ms Green told Ms Mansell on or about 29 August 2024 that Ms Green's house in Tasmania was then nearly finished;

(7) Ms Mansell initiated processes to recruit to replace Ms Green and this accomplished from a merit list and was "filled several months ago";

(8) She gave evidence Bathurst Station is "over establishment", although also stating:

"However, Bathurst is a Category B station, which entitles it to six Intensive Care Paramedic (ICP) positions. At present, only two ICPs are stationed there. Should an ICP apply, they would be prioritised for consideration."

(9) As to Ms Green's request to rescind her resignation:

"21. On 8 July 2025, Claire sought to rescind her resignation.

22. Her request was addressed to Mr Matthew Bray, a Station Officer for the Respondent.

23. Under the Delegations Manual, the minimum level of approval for such a request is the Zone Manager. In this case, that is Ms Melanie Lawler. The Chief Executive holds the delegation for staff appointments.

24. I also hold the delegation to approve extended long service leave and also secondary employment requests. At no time did Claire lodge any secondary employment application with me.

25. Mr Bray was therefore not the appropriate person to receive or determine Claire's request. I became aware of the matter when Ms Lawler raised it with me on 17 July 2025, advising that Claire had contacted her regarding the rescission.

26. I had not previously dealt with a resignation rescission. As this was not a routine matter, I sought advice from my business partner, Ashima Ajmani, to determine whether there were any grounds to accept the request.

27. When the matter was referred to me, I was the Associate Director. I advised Claire that her request would be declined, as the necessary administrative and operational arrangements had already been finalised.

28. There was an email exchange between Claire and me from 30 July 2025 to 10 August 2025 regarding this matter. Annexed and marked LM6 is a copy of this correspondence.

29. In that exchange, I explained that her resignation could not be rescinded due to the finalisation of recruitment and operational planning.

30. Claire subsequently sent a further email, to which I did not respond, as she had by then engaged industrial avenues and the matter had been referred to our industrial team.

31. I understand that Claire also raised the matter with the Chief Executive."

(1) She had known Ms Green from 2013;

(2) She had professional and personal interactions with Ms Green, including visiting Ms Green's house and engagement with Ms Green on social media groups;

(3) Through social media, Ms Lawler saw Ms Green's regular updates on the construction of Ms Green's house in Tasmania and that Ms Green had told Ms Lawler that Ms Green planned to move to Tasmania;

(4) Ms Lawler understood Ms Green had moved to Tasmania in 2025, unspecified as to time, and that Ms Lawler had not seen Ms Green in Bathurst recently;

(5) Ms Lawler no longer had social media contact with Ms Green;

(6) Ms Lawler denied that Ms Green ever raised or disclosed mental health concerns with Ms Lawler;

(7) Ms Lawler set out:

"I have searched for any form of communication from Claire regarding paragraph [9] of the Green Statement but have not found anything. I did not advise Claire that she was required to resign in order to access Long Service Leave (LSL). Her formal LSL application was not submitted until January 2025"

1. In cross-examination, Ms Lawler denied recalling any conversation with Ms Green in August in 2024. She gave evidence that she was on leave for part of August 2024. She denied telling Ms Green that Ms Green would need to resign to get access to long service leave. And she denied preventing acceptance of Ms Green's attempted recission of her resignation because Ms Lawler "created the problem to begin with".

1. The applicant set out the test which the Commission should apply as:

"6 Section 89(7) of the IR Act empowers the Commission to make interlocutory orders restraining an employer from dismissing an employee where a claim under s 84 of the IR Act concerns a threatened dismissal. One of the off-cited authorities for this proposition is the decision of Boland J in Public Service Association and Professional Officers Association Amalgamated Union of New South Wales on behalf of Pearcey, Barnett and Woelfl v Department of Attorney General and Justice - Corrective Services NSW [2012] NSWIRComm 33.

7 Woefl confirms that the established approach for the adjudication of interlocutory relief more generally applies to s 89(7). The test for interlocutory relief under s 89(7) is whether:

a. there is a prima facie case, which does not require proof that success is more probable than not, but rather that there is a serious question to be tried.

b. whether the balance of convenience favours granting the relief in weighing the potential harm or inconvenience to the respondent if the order is made against the potential harm or inconvenience to the applicant if it is refused."

1. While it may be a difference without effective distinction, the Commission observes that his Honour Boland J used different words. His Honour set out:

"34. Thus, the two tests to be applied are: (i) whether there is a sufficient likelihood of success by the three officers to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the final hearing, status quo in this case being understood to be the suspension of the three officers on pay; (ii) whether the inconvenience or injury which the three officers would be likely to suffer if their interlocutory applications were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the respondent would suffer if the applications were granted. The second test may be referred to as the balance of convenience test."

1. This is the expression of the test used by the Senior Commissioner in Sarson v Health Secretary in respect of Nepean Blue Mountains Local Health District [2025] NSWIRComm 1084, at [6] and Commissioner Howell in Peat v Industrial Relations Secretary o/b Department of Communities and Justice (NSW Sheriff's Office) [ 2025] NSWIRComm 1067 at [15]. It is the expression of the test that I used in Westaway v Health Secretary on behalf of Northern Sydney Local Health District [2024] NSWIRComm 1021 at [11] and noted by Commissioner McDonald in Lahner v Health Secretary on behalf of Western Sydney Local Health District [2023] NSWIRComm 1060 at [25], both cited by the applicant. The Commission observes that in Lahner, Commissioner McDonald expressly rejected the submission that the decision was one that applied that test.
2. Not addressed by the applicant in their submissions was the process by which the Commission might conclude there is a sufficiently likelihood of success to justify preserving the status quo.
3. In oral submissions, Ms Lemos for the applicant used the phrase "prima facie case" and I took that as her submission as the test which should be used.
4. In Sarson, the Senior Commissioner approached this by effectively asking if, on each substantive issue, the applicant's evidence stood, would it be expected that the applicant would succeed at the substantive hearing, absent any other evidence. I think that is reasonably the level of a prima facie case proposed by Ms Lemos.
5. Consistent with the decision of Commissioner Howell in Peat, the Senior Commissioner held it was not appropriate to conduct a mini trial and balance the facts before the Commission now. As Commissioner Howell set out:

"17. It is well settled that when assessing prima facie case the Commission does not normally undertake a preliminary or 'mini' trial and give or withhold interlocutory relief upon a forecast as to the ultimate result of the case. It is generally sufficient that the applicant show a sufficient likelihood of success to justify, in the circumstances, the preservation of the status quo pending the hearing."

(Endnotes removed)

1. The respondent simply submitted as to the principles:

"6. There is no explicit power in the IR Act to support the orders sought, however such power has been held to impliedly exist. In any event, the Applicant's evidence fails satisfy the two limbs recognised as justifying the making of such orders; namely:

(a) there is insufficient likelihood of success, as she was not "dismissed"; and

(b) the balance of convenience favours the Respondent because she resigned."

1. The Commission took this agreeing with the analysis above as to the applicant's submissions on the legal test the Commission must answer. The respondent then set out, at a high level, some decisions of the Commission addressing what constitutes a dismissal:

"8. Whether an employee has been "dismissed" for the purposes of s 84 has been variously stated:

(a) in Smith v Director General of Education [1993] NSWIRComm 134; (1993) 51 IR 204 by Full Bench of the Industrial Court of NSW as having its 'ordinary meaning' where an employee is being 'sent away from employment' and 'the termination of services by the employer without the employee's consent';

(b) in Allison v Bega Valley Council [1995] NSWIRComm 175; (1995) 63 IR 68, where the Full Bench of the Commission confirmed that the real inquiry should involve an analysis of what has occurred and whether the employer behaved 'in such a way as to render the employer's conduct the real and effective initiator of the termination';

(c) in Moore v North Sydney Council [2018] NSWIRComm 1062 where Commissioner Constant (as she then was) found that 'the correct test is whether when considered objectively, the respondent's actions were the effective initiator of the termination of employment.' "

1. The respondent's submission as to "dismissal" is relevant to one of the key issues in this case. The citations for Alison and Moore appeared to the Commission particularly relevant in the current case.
2. The respondent then addressed the question of whether an employer is obliged to "accept a resignation" or "accept or reject a subsequent attempt to withdraw a resignation":

"9. The Full Bench of the Commission considered whether an employer had any obligation to accept a resignation or to accept or reject a subsequent attempt to withdraw a resignation in Lyne v Commissioner of Police [2022] NSWIRComm 1023. Referring to the common law position explained by the Court of Appeal in State of New South Wales v Paige [2002] NSWCA 235; (2002) 60 NSWLR 371, it found that:

(a) Although resignations are often spoken in a contractual context as being 'tendered' and 'accepted', these are 'merely linguistic courtesies'.

(b) Subject to any contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, resignation is a unilateral act that takes effect in accordance with its terms and does not depend upon acceptance by the person or body to whom the resignation is directed.

(c) Thus, unilateral withdrawal of a resignation or notice of termination is not possible.

(d) The purpose of providing a period of notice of termination is to enable the party receiving the notice to make other arrangements. An employer who receives notice of resignation needs time to arrange for a substitute employee. It would be harsh if arrangements so made during the running of the notice could be disrupted, and parties could be held to their contracts by unilateral withdrawal of the notice at the last minute.

(e) Such withdrawal, if possible, could lead to an employer being bound by contracts of employment with two employees, each being required to give notice to one or the other, or possibly to suffer the requirement to forfeit or pay wages for a period of time.

(f) Withdrawal of a notice of termination of a contract of employment can only be effected by consent of both parties.

10. The Respondent submits that there is no statutory or award modification of the common law position in the circumstances of this case.

11. Moreover, only the Chief Executive of the Ambulance Service of NSW, has the delegation to employ or dismiss. While regulation 24 of the Health Services Regulation 2018 (NSW) allows the Chief Executive to delegate these functions, those alleged to have consented to or to have approved the withdrawal of the Applicant's resignation (being Matthew Bray and Patricia Kairouz):

(a) did not hold any actual or ostensible delegation to do so; and

(b) could not lawfully consent or represent to reform the contract of employment in any binding or enforceable way (as if it had not already been notified at the initiative of the Applicant as coming to an end by her unilateral action on 2 January 2025)."

1. The Commission's task is, therefore, as set out in Woelfel, to determine if:

(1) There is a sufficient likelihood that the applicant's case will succeed to warrant the preservation of the status quo; and if so

(2) Determine the balance of convenience in making or not making the order.

1. The key paragraph of Ms Green's evidence is para 9:

"12. I reached out to Ms Melanie Lawler (Zone Manager), who told me that to access my full leave entitlements, I would need to lodge something called a notice of intention to resign, and she further expressed that any application I made for Leave Without Pay would be denied."

1. On its face, it alleges that Ms Green resigned because her employer left her no choice if she was to access her leave. In light of all the evidence before the Commission, it warrants further consideration. It does not set out a conversation. It does not even set out the words in the form of "words to the effect of". It does not say what Ms Green asked for, or even that she said why she wanted leave.
2. The paragraph says, "to access my full leave entitlements". That may, as expressed, be a reasonable answer, because if an employee resigns, from the day of the effect of their resignation, the employee is entitled to their full leave entitlements. If an employee remains employed, they can, with the agreement of their employer, access parts of their leave and only over time their "full leave entitlements".
3. Paragraph 12 of Ms Green's witness statement uses a different phrase, "leave entitlements". This may imply Ms Green could not get any leave. It is not clear. In the absence of further oral evidence or cross-examination, this remains unclear, as does the full conversation summarised at paragraph 9 of Ms Green's witness statement.
4. The key paragraph of Ms Lawler's evidence is paragraph 8:

"8. I have searched for any form of communication from Claire regarding paragraph [9] of the Green Statement but have not found anything. I did not advise Claire that she was required to resign in order to access Long Service Leave (LSL). Her formal LSL application was not submitted until January 2025"

1. The first sentence makes sense if Ms Lawler is being thorough. The Commission observes this because Ms Green never referred to an email or letter. That said, in paragraph 9 of Ms Green's witness statement equally she did not expressly refer to a phone call or other face-to-face discussion.
2. The Commission raises this because the rest of paragraph 8 of Ms Lawler's witness statement addresses only long service leave and not full leave entitlements. It does not address Ms Green's assertion that Ms Lawler told Ms Green any application for leave without pay would also be denied. In cross-examination, Ms Lawler effectively denied having any conversation at all.
3. I focus on these parts only of Ms Green's and Ms Lawler's evidence because these are the paragraphs that deal with the core of the application. If Ms Green was not told that her gaining access to her leave entitlements was conditional on her resigning and/or if she was not told leave without pay would not be granted, she almost certainly cannot succeed in the substantive claim.
4. As expressed, her evidence is vague. It is open to doubt as to the events it describes as it leaves gaps that are too big to accept that if her evidence was taken at its highest, and no other evidence admitted, that she would be expected to succeed at the substantive hearing.
5. To reach that standard, the Commission would need to read into Ms Green's evidence assumptions, including as to

(1) The question asked;

(2) What the phrase attributed to Ms Lawler for leave entitlement responded to;

(3) The context of the reference to leave without pay; and

(4) What, if any, reason was given by Ms Green for asking for leave.

1. In the absence of being satisfied as to the sufficiency of a likelihood of the applicant's success on its first limb, the second limb of the application, the refusal to rescind the resignation, appears weak. The second limb is relatively stronger if the first limb succeeds.
2. Without the employer having caused the resignation letter in the first place, and I need to analyse the second limb in that context, having concluded that the first limb does not reach the requisite level, the second limb is weak, as a stand alone basis. This is because the applicant has not set out why it would be harsh, unjust or unreasonable to refuse to rescind the resignation separate from the first limb.
3. In the absence of explaining that, there is no basis to understand how there is a sufficient likelihood of the application succeeding.
4. I record that I do not consider the bulk of the respondent's evidence of Ms Green's move to Tasmania relevant in respect of the question of likelihood to succeed. This is not because it may not be relevant to whether Ms Green's evidence will be believed as to the reason for resignation; it may be at a substantive hearing.
5. For present purposes, Ms Green's application could have succeeded in any event if her evidence as to the reason for resignation to access the leave had been to the requisite standard as the real cause of resignation.
6. I am reinforced in this being the correct outcome for reasons I consider important to set out.
7. Ms Green could have succeeded today and, despite being refused the order she now seeks, may ultimately succeed, notwithstanding her move to Tasmania. The Commission considers the way in which Ms Green's evidence has been filed and tendered lacked due candour. The application set out Ms Green's address as a street in West Bathurst, New South Wales. Her witness statement set out the same address. At no point did her witness statement refer to her move to Tasmania.
8. On the material before me, including the psychologist's report filed by the applicant, it appears clear that Ms Green lives in Tasmania. That is inconsistent with the application and her witness statement.
9. Her witness statement sets out her expenses and, in light of the foregoing few paragraphs, it is odd that it was not carefully set out in her witness statement that these apparently relate to her life in Tasmania. On examination of the annexures, it is clear that some do.
10. This lack of candour would have been a factor of some importance against the application if the first test for the motion had been answered in the applicant's favour. Both because in seeking an order of this kind, which by its nature is sought without the opportunity for a full version of the relevant facts and legal issues to be ventilated, but also because, by their very process, the disadvantage suffered by the respondent because of that lack of candour would have been a factor in balancing the convenience of the parties.
11. It is also doubtful, in the short time until a full hearing, with the motion not succeeding, the economic injury to Ms Green would have arisen, at least based on the psychologist's report. That report does not suggest that Ms Green will be fit for work and deprived of ongoing workers compensation payments in the next few weeks. There was no other medical evidence, if that can be medical evidence, before the Commission.
12. This was really the only issue put by the applicant as to the balance of convenience being in favour of the motion.
13. Against this is the relatively minor, although existent, inconvenience to the respondent of a further employee above already excess complement in the relevant station. While some inconvenience, it cannot be insurmountable for an organisation the size of NSW Ambulance.
14. In short, the balance of convenience would not have favoured the applicant.
15. The Commission is not satisfied that there is a sufficient likelihood of success by the applicant to justify the preservation of the status quo pending final hearing.
16. The Commission would have found the balance of convenience favouring not making the order, albeit it not overwhelming.