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[2020] QCAT 461
respondent. Reprimand (s 107(3)(a)), cancellation of registration (s 107(3)(e)), disqualification from applying for registration for 3 years (s 107(4)(a)), orders 2 and 3 to take effect 25 December 2020 (s...
QCAT found that Dr Moosawi engaged in sexual relations with a patient (initiated during a consultation and continuing at an assignation) and later attempted to influence that patient as a witness in an OHO investigation. The Tribunal held this amounted to professional misconduct, reprimanded him, cancelled his registration, disqualified him from applying for registration for three years (orders effective 25 December 2020), and ordered him to pay the Health Ombudsman's costs as agreed. Cancellation was chosen because the misconduct was an egregious departure from standards, and the respondent showed no remorse or insight.
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1,715 words · generated 16/06/2026
The Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (Judge Allen QC, Deputy President, assisted by members) determined that the respondent, Dr Ali Al Moosawi, committed professional misconduct. The Tribunal’s factual findings were that the respondent initiated sexual contact with a patient during a consultation on 29 October 2014, the contact continued later that evening at a domestic unit attached to the practice, and the boundary violation extended to communications in November and December 2014, some of which constituted attempts to interfere with the patient as a witness in an Office of the Health Ombudsman (OHO) investigation ([2]–[4], [26]–[27]). The respondent denied the allegations and accused the patient of fabrication; he did not admit unprofessional or professional misconduct and the Tribunal found no evidence of remorse or insight ([4], [32]).
No linked legislation citations have been extracted yet.
On sanction the Health Ombudsman sought reprimand, cancellation and a three‑year bar on applying for registration; the respondent sought reprimand and a three‑year suspension. The Tribunal concluded that cancellation, not suspension, was required because the misconduct involved an egregious departure from professional standards, included deliberate attempts to interfere with the OHO investigation, and because the respondent’s denial and lack of remorse meant the Tribunal could not be confident he would be fit to practise after suspension; the Tribunal therefore reprimanded the respondent, cancelled his registration, imposed a three‑year disqualification from applying for registration, ordered those orders to take effect 25 December 2020, and ordered the respondent to pay the applicant’s costs as agreed ([11]–[15], [21], [26]–[36], Orders at [42]).
There are three interlocking strands to the Tribunal’s reasoning.
Findings of professional misconduct: The Tribunal characterised the conduct as professional misconduct because it involved a breach of the professional boundary with a patient, including sexual relations, and interference with a witness in a regulatory investigation. Those findings were factual and legal: the Tribunal accepted the patient’s account and concluded that the respondent’s communications in December 2014 amounted to interference with a witness ([2], [3], [26]–[27], [32]).
Purposes of sanction and protective primacy: The Tribunal reiterated that the paramount purpose of the regulatory scheme is protection of the health and safety of the public, and that sanctions are primarily protective rather than punitive. It enumerated the familiar purposes: preventing unfit practitioners from practising, maintaining standards, assuring the public and profession that standards are upheld, denunciation and deterrence (both specific and general), and restricting practice to protect the public ([21]). Those purposes frame selection of an appropriate sanction.
Application of sanction principles to facts: The Tribunal applied those purposes to the factual matrix. It accepted that while the sexual contact occurred on a single day, the breach was serious because it exploited a vulnerable patient and left her feeling used. More critically, the respondent engaged in a deliberate course to influence the patient during the investigation, which the Tribunal characterised as evidence of poor character and readiness to deceive or to obfuscate regulatory inquiry (drawing on Wakelin) ([26]–[31]). The respondent’s denial and lack of remorse or insight increased concern about present and future fitness. The Tribunal concluded a suspension would not adequately denounce the conduct nor sufficiently protect the public or achieve deterrence; it therefore ordered cancellation and a three‑year disqualification ([31]–[35]).
The Tribunal also accepted the applicant’s submissions on costs and the respondent did not seek to resist a costs order; it therefore ordered costs as agreed under the QCAT Act’s interests‑of‑justice power ([37]–[41]).
Before this decision, Australian tribunals and courts had repeatedly held that sexual relationships with patients and deceitful conduct in investigations are serious regulatory matters that can attract severe sanctions. The Tribunal followed that line of authority and brought it to bear on its factual findings. It cited Craig for general sanction purposes ([21]), Gilliland as an example where suspension (not cancellation) was imposed in sexual boundary cases ([17], [25]), and Wakelin for the proposition that deceit in investigations is an aggravating feature that can justify more severe sanctioning ([28]–[29]).
This decision does not alter legal principles; it applies them. The “after” state is a reaffirmation that:
Thus Health Ombudsman v Moosawi (No 2) primarily reinforces established sanctioning principles and clarifies their application to a case combining single‑day sexual boundary breach and subsequent interference with a witness.
“The Tribunal has decided that the respondent has behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct by: (a) breaching the professional boundary ... and (b) interfering with the patient ... as a witness in an investigation by the OHO” ([2]).
“In considering the matter of sanction, the Tribunal must be mindful of the paramount guiding principle that the health and the safety of the public are paramount” ([21]).
“The respondent's professional misconduct involves an egregious departure from professional standards and demonstrates his present unfitness to practise” ([31]).
“The seriousness ... is such that a suspension, rather than cancellation, ... would be insufficient to express denunciation ... and address ... deterrence” ([33]).
“The parties both submit that the respondent's preclusion from practice should commence on and from 25 December 2020 and the Tribunal will order accordingly” ([36]).
This decision is most directly engaged where a combination of elements exists:
When these elements co‑exist, the Tribunal’s reasoning indicates that cancellation is likely where the Tribunal cannot be satisfied suspension would protect the public or adequately denounce the conduct. By contrast, where sexual boundary breaches are longer‑running but unaccompanied by deceit or interference and where the practitioner has insight or remorse and a clear record since, suspension may be appropriate (as Gilliland shows), but that is fact‑sensitive ([17], [25], [26]–[35]).
At the time of this decision the Tribunal referred to other decisions such as Gilliland, Wakelin, McCarthy, Isgrove and Azam. The Tribunal treated Gilliland as supportive of suspension in some cases but observed it is not binding; Gilliland was considered analogous yet distinguishable because of differences in subsequent behaviour and insight ([17], [25]). Wakelin’s observations on deceit and deterrence were expressly applied to OHO investigatory conduct and used to underpin the view that interference with investigations aggravates sanction ([28]–[30]).
Practitioners and counsel should expect that tribunals will continue to treat evidence of interference with investigations and lack of remorse as powerful aggravating factors that may tip sanctioning from suspension to cancellation. This decision therefore functions as persuasive authority within Queensland administrative/disciplinary practice for that proposition.
Degree of single‑incident weight: The Tribunal accepted that a single‑day sexual contact may still be an egregious departure, particularly if combined with exploitation and interference. How tribunals will weigh a one‑day incident without interference or lack of remorse remains fact dependent. The decision emphasises context over a simple single‑incident/sustained conduct dichotomy ([26], [31]).
Remorse and insight thresholds: The Tribunal relied heavily on absence of remorse/insight to refuse suspension. What evidence will reliably demonstrate sufficient remorse or rehabilitation prospects to secure suspension rather than cancellation remains a practical question for practitioners and regulators; specifics about what rehabilitation measures or evidence would suffice are not prescribed ([32], [34]).
Interference vs mere advocacy: The Tribunal characterised certain December 2014 phone calls as interference with a witness. Future cases may need to draw clearer lines between permissible advocacy, expressions of apology or concern for privacy, and unlawful or improper attempts to influence witness evidence. The judgment highlights deliberate attempts to play on privacy and reputation to influence, but further jurisprudence will refine the boundary ([27], [29]).
Timing and proportionality of commencement of orders: The parties agreed that orders take effect 25 December 2020 and the Tribunal ordered accordingly ([36], Orders). The case leaves open how tribunals should approach commencement dates where parties disagree or where immediate public protection considerations suggest different timings.
Comparative weight of precedent: The Tribunal treated Gilliland as persuasive but not binding. The precise comparative weight to give to other tribunal decisions remains an area for iterative development, especially where factual patterns are close and competing policies (rehabilitation v protection) pull in different directions ([25]).
Conclusion Health Ombudsman v Moosawi (No 2) is a clear application of settled principles: sexual relations with a patient and interference with a regulatory investigation are serious professional misconduct, and where combined with denial and absence of insight they justify cancellation rather than suspension to protect the public and achieve denunciation and deterrence. Practitioners facing similar facts should expect rigorous scrutiny of conduct during regulation and limited tolerance for interference or lack of contrition. Counsel and regulators should focus on evidencing remorse, insight and rehabilitation where suspension rather than cancellation is sought.
PROFESSIONS AND TRADES - HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS - MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS - DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS - where the respondent medical practitioner denied allegations of professional misconduct - where the Tribunal decided that the respondent medical practitioner had behaved in a way that constitutes professional misconduct - where the professional misconduct involved boundary violations with a patient, including sexual relations and interfering with the patient as a witness in an investigation by the Office of the Health Ombudsman into his conduct - what sanction should be imposed for professional misconduct - whether the respondent's registration as a health practitioner should be cancelled or suspended.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS - QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL - where the parties agree that the respondent should pay the applicant's costs as agreed - whether the interests of justice require the tribunal to order that the respondent pay the costs of the applicant
Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld), s 4, s 107
Craig v Medical Board of South Australia [2001] SASC 169; [2001] 79 SASR 545 Health Ombudsman v Moosawi [2020] QCAT 391 Medical Board of Australia v Azam (No 2) [2017] QCAT 206 Medical Board of Australia v Gilliland (No 2) [2014] QCAT 699 Medical Board of Australia v Gilliland (No 3) [2014] QCAT 700
Medical Board of Australia v McCarthy [2020] WASAT 12
Medical Board of Australia v Stephens [2018] WASAT 13
Nursing and Midwifery Board of Australia v Isgrove [2015] QCAT 522
Psychology Board of Australia v Wakelin [2014] QCAT 516
M Nicolson instructed by the Office of the Health Ombudsman
(a) breaching the professional boundary between himself and a patient, including having sexual relations with the patient; and
(b) interfering with the patient in her capacity as a witness in an investigation by the Office of The Health Ombudsman (OHO) into his conduct.
Physicians from 2015 to 2018.
(a) preventing practitioners who are unfit to practise from practising;
(b) securing maintenance of professional standards;
(c) assuring members of the public and the profession that appropriate standards are being maintained and that professional misconduct will not be tolerated;
(d) bringing home to the practitioner the seriousness of their conduct;
(e) deterring the practitioner from any future departures from appropriate standards;
(f) deterring other members of the profession that might be minded to act in a similar way; and
(g) imposing restrictions on the practitioner's right to practise so as to ensure that the public is protected.
The respondent's dishonest responses to AHPRA in the course of the investigation is in some respects an even more serious reflection on her character and the sexual transgression. The character revealed by a practitioner's actions is obviously a matter with which any disciplinary body must be concerned. She was prepared to misrepresent the truth to the professional body, and made unsuccessful attempts to cover up her actions.
The importance of deterrence of practitioners from any form of deceit in their dealings with their Professional Board deserves emphasis. The Board has limited resources and needs to be able to trust the response of practitioners who have a duty to deal with their professional association in good faith. Practitioners must know that serious consequences will follow if they flout that duty and that sanctions for such conduct may well exceed that which will be imposed in this particular case.
(a) the public interest in a respondent contributing to the costs of a successful prosecution by the applicant of their misconduct;
(b) the seriousness of the allegations made referral to the Tribunal appropriate;
(c) it was an appropriate case for legal representation of both parties;
(d) the proceedings were prolonged by the respondent's denials of the misconduct; and
[1] Health Ombudsman v Moosawi [2020] QCAT 391 at [120].
[2] Medical Board of Australia v Stephens [2018] WASAT 13 at [70].
[8] Health Ombudsman Act 2013 (Qld), s 4.
[9] [2001] SASC 169; [2001] 79 SASR 545 at 553-555.
[10] [2014] QCAT 516 at [21].
Health Ombudsman
Moosawi
Reprimand (s 107(3)(a)), cancellation of registration (s 107(3)(e)), disqualification from applying for registration for 3 years (s 107(4)(a)), orders 2 and 3 to take effect 25 December 2020 (s 127(b)), respondent to pay applicant's costs as agreed (s 102(1)) (see Orders and [42]).