Applicant's written submissions at commencement of the hearing
Introduction
1. The Complaint relates to a breach of conditions imposed on a registered nurse's practice (See Tab 1 HCCC documents).
2. Ms Benju Dulal ("the Respondent") is a nurse registered under the Health Practitioner Regulation National Law (NSW) (the "National Law"). The Respondent was first registered as a nurse in New South Wales on 11 February 2015. The Respondent's registration was suspended on 11 June 2020 following section 150 proceedings (Tab 26).
3. The Respondent is prosecuted pursuant to section 90B(1) of the Health Care Complaints Act 1993 alleging that she has been guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct within the meaning of section 139B(1)(l) and/or professional misconduct within the meaning of section 139E of the National Law.
4. The Respondent has admitted the Complaint in full and in writing in her Reply dated 7 April 2021. Accordingly, pursuant to s 165H of the National Law the Commission submits that the Tribunal does not need to conduct an inquiry into the Complaint and the proceedings can be focused on the Stage 2 protective orders.
5. The Commission seeks the following Orders:
a) An order under s 149C(1)(b) of the National Law cancelling the practitioner's registration
b) An order under s 149C(7) of the National Law that an application for review of the cancellation order may not be made until after 12 months from the date of the decision
c) An order under Clause 13, Schedule 5D of the National Law that the practitioner pay the Commission's costs as agreed or assessed.
The Relevant Principals
Disciplinary Proceedings under the National Law
6. Part 8 of the National Law deals with complaints concerning health practitioners. The relevant principles include:
a) The protection of public safety and health is paramount (s 3A of the National Law);
b) The Tribunal must consider the maintenance of standards of the profession, preservation of public confidence in the profession and, more broadly, the protection of the community (Prakash v Health Care Complaints Commission [2006] NSWCA 153 at [91]);
c) Public protection is achieved by ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practice in a competent and ethical manner are registered (s 3(2)(a) of the National Law);
d) Deterring others from engaging in similar conduct is a necessary part of maintaining the standards of the profession and thereby ensuring public safety and faith in the profession (Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 637);
e) Protecting the health and safety of the public is not confined to protecting current or potential patients but includes protecting the public from similar misconduct of others and upholding public confidence in the standards of the profession (HCCC v Do [2014] NSWCA 307 at [35]);
f) The Tribunal's jurisdiction is primarily protective, not punitive (Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630 at 637);
Burden of Proof
7. These proceedings before the Tribunal are referred to as an inquiry by the National Law (See s 165(2), 165C, 1651-1, 1651, 165J and s 165M of the National Law and clauses 11, 12, 13 of Schedule 5D of the National Law.)
8. The burden of proof rests with the Commission and is the Briginshaw test, requiring reasonable satisfaction on the balance of probabilities, while having regard to (a) the gravity and importance of issues to be determined, and (b) the possible consequences of a finding of guilt. (See Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336, 360-363; Rejfek v McElroy (1965) 112 CLR 517, 521; [1965] HCA 46; Bannister v Walton (1993) 30 NSWLR 699, 711-712; Lindsay v Health Cam Complaints Commission [2005] NSWCA 356; HCCC v Sunda [2013] NSWDT 1 at [43].)
9. A number of appellate courts have cautioned against the tendency to consider this test as including a requirement that the Tribunal must be 'comfortably satisfied', which implies a higher standard than the balance of probabilities. (See Gianoutsos v Glykis (2006) 65 NSWLR 539, 548-549 (McLennan CJ at CL); In re Dr Suman Sood [2006] NSWMT 1 at [10]; Re Sophie [2008] NSWCA 250 at [68]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr McKenzie [2011] NSWMT at [26].)
Evidence
10. The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence (section 38(2) Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW) and Clause 2 of Schedule 5D of the National Law). However, the Tribunal remains subject to the rules of procedural fairness (Sudath v HCCC [2012] NSWCA 171 at [75]).
11. The Commission relies upon one volume of documents for proof of the Complaint as well as the admissions made by the Respondent.
Unsatisfactory Professional Conduct - Contravening a Condition
12. Complaint One alleges that the Respondent is guilty of unsatisfactory professional conduct under s 139B(1)(c) and/or s 139B(1)(l) of the National Law.
13. The Respondent admits Complaint One.
14. In relation to ss 139B(1)(c) of the National Law, The Commission submits that:
a) it is a well-established principle that conditions of registration for medical practitioners must be "scrupulously observed" (Re Dr Than Le [2001] NSWMT, 20 September 2001 at [95] followed in many subsequent cases including: Health Care Complaints Commission v Dr Saeid Saedlounia [2013] NSWMT 13 at [45]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Karalasingham [2019] NSWCATOD 23 at [31]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Reid [2018] NSWCATOD 162 at [74]);
b) that principle has been confirmed by the Court of Appeal (Prakash v Health Care Complaints Commission [2006] NSWCA at [74]);
c) that principle also applies to nursing (Health Care Complaints Commission v Lopez (No 2) [2014] NSWCATOD 15 at [52]; Health Care Complaints Commission v Perceval [2014] NSWCATOD 38 at [168]);
d) when a nurse breaches a condition of registration it is of a very serious nature because it demonstrates a lack of insight into the need to act scrupulously with regard to professional obligations and to show proper respect to the requirements of the Council and because it is essential to the smooth operation of the system of regulation and discipline that practitioners comply with conditions placed on their registration (Health Care Complaints Commission v Harvey [2017] NSWCATOD 175 at [107]).
Unsatisfactory Professional Conduct - Improper or Unethical
15. The words "improper" or "unethical" are not defined in the National Law. Assistance in determining what is meant by "improper" can be gained from what the High Court of Australia said of the word "impropriety" in R v Byrnes (1995) 183 CLR 501 at 514-515; see HCCC v Phung (No. 1) [2012] NSWDT at [68]. That is, if conduct, is not in conformity with standards of professional conduct and practice it can be seen as improper.
16. The words 'unethical conduct' bear no special or technical meaning but are to be understood in their ordinary meaning. The construction of a statutory provision will usually involve a consideration of words in their context and the adoption of a construction that promotes the purpose underlying the statute, which usually involves a question of law. The protective nature of the National Law relevantly bears on an interpretation of what is meant by 'unethical'.
17. Unethical conduct could be characterised as a more serious matter than improper conduct, however the National Law does not offer any guidance in that respect and it is unclear whether it ought have that characteristic. "Unethical" is defined in the Macquarie Dictionary as meaning immoral or contrary to moral precepts and, secondly, as relating to a contravention of a professional code of conduct. In Health Care Complaints Commission v MacGregor [2016] NSWCATOD 86 at [41] the Tribunal held that there is no reason to suppose that the words should be given a different meaning in the National Law. See also Slezak, Dr Peter [2011] NSWMPSC 10 at [80] and [83] and [87], suggesting that the assessment of what constitutes improper or unethical conduct is also made by reference to the views of reasonable members of the profession.
18. In Health Care Complaints Commission v Kesserwani [2020] NSWCATOD 65 at [26] the Tribunal held that conduct may be unethical if it is constituted by a deliberate flouting of significant professional standards.
19. The Commission submits that the Respondent's conduct was both improper and unethical, however, it is not necessary for the Commission to establish that the conduct was both improper and unethical; either is sufficient to establish Complaint One.
20. The Commission submits that it is both improper and unethical for a registered nurse to breach conditions on her registration.
Complaint Two - Professional Misconduct
21. Complaint Three [sic] is that the Respondent is guilty of professional misconduct under section 139E of the National Law as she has engaged in unsatisfactory professional conduct of a sufficiently serious nature to justify suspension or cancellation of her registration or engaged in more than one instance of unsatisfactory professional conduct that, when considered together, amount to conduct of a sufficiently serious nature to justify suspension or cancellation.
22. The Commission relies on Complaint One and the particulars thereof cumulatively.
23. The Respondent admits Complaint Two.
24. The Court of Appeal has outlined how any category of unsatisfactory professional conduct may amount to professional misconduct. See Basten JA in Chen v Health Care Complaints Commission [2017] NSWCA 186 at [18]‑[21]:
There is no category of unsatisfactory professional conduct which is not capable, depending on the circumstances, of giving rise to professional misconduct and hence engaging the power of either suspension or cancellation of registration. The only requirement is that it be "sufficiently serious" to justify such an order, a characterisation which must depend upon an evaluative judgment made by the Tribunal. Some, perhaps all, categories include conduct which may reveal a defect of character as to which the Tribunal may conclude that the person should not be allowed to practise his or her profession unless at some future date the practitioner is able to satisfy the Tribunal that the defect has been overcome. Incompetence or inadequate care may in some circumstances be remediable by specific steps; in other circumstances the Tribunal may be concerned that the carelessness, for example, is such as to cast doubt on the suitability of the person to practise medicine. Each of the criteria for cancellation or suspension may be analysed in this way. Each case will depend upon an evaluative judgment to be made by the Tribunal as to the nature and seriousness of the conduct.
Protective Orders
Governing Principals
25. The Tribunal's jurisdiction is primarily protective in nature, rather than punitive (Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield (1997) 41 NSWLR 630, 637). To put it more precisely, "the specific purpose for which orders are made is protective in the public interest and is not punitive with respect to the individual", although an order may be punitive in effect: Director-General, Dept of Ageing, Disability and Home Care v Lambert [2009] NSWCA 102 at [83] per Basten JA ("Lambert"); see also Lee v Health Care Complaints Commission [2012] NSWCA 80 at pars [20] and [31].
26. Further, "the fact that there are such punitive effects may remind the Court that a protective order should be limited to that which is reasonably necessary to provide the required level of public protection" (per Basten JA at [83], citing Prakash v Health Care Complaints Commission [2006] NSWCA 153 at [101]; see also NSW Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340 at [113].
27. In NSW Bar Association v Meakes [2006] NSWCA 340 (per Basten JA) it was said that the protective purpose operated first to either remove the practitioner from membership of the profession, or provided a deterrent against repetition of the conduct by way of reprimand or fine. Second, it reminded other members of the profession of the importance of maintaining high professional standards. Third, it gave emphasis to the unacceptability of the conduct involved. Fourth, it sought to maintain public confidence in the standards of the profession.
28. Those statements of principle were further refined by Meagher JA in the context of the National Law in Health Care Complaints Commission v Do [2014] NSWCA 307 at [35]: the objective extends to protecting the public from not only the practitioner's misconduct but also similar misconduct or incompetence of other practitioners and upholding public confidence in the standards of the profession, "by setting and maintaining standards and, where appropriate, cancelling the registration of practitioners who are not competent or otherwise not fit to practise, including those who have been guilty of serious misconduct. Denouncing such misconduct operates both as a deterrent to the individual concerned, as well as to the general body of practitioners. It also maintains public confidence by signalling that those whose conduct does not meet the required standards will not be permitted to practise".
29. Section 3A of the National Law affirms that the protection of public safety and health is the paramount consideration. Public protection is achieved via registration, "ensuring that only health practitioners who are suitably trained and qualified to practice in a competent and ethical manner" are registered.
30. Having consideration for the authorities, the Tribunal should consider the following matters bearing on protection:
a) Any need to protect the general public against further misconduct by the practitioner;
b) The need to protect the public through general deterrence of other practitioners;
c) The need to protect the public by reinforcing high professional standards and denouncing transgressions;
d) The maintenance of public confidence in the profession; and
e) The desirability of making available to the public any special skills possessed by the practitioner.
31. In these proceedings, the Commission submits that the first four factors above are relevant in considering the protective orders sought by the Commission.
Cancellation
32. Upon a finding of professional misconduct, the Tribunal can make an order to suspend or cancel a registered health practitioner's registration under s 149C(1)(b) of the National Law.
33. Whether the professional misconduct is sufficiently serious to warrant cancellation is a matter of degree and judgment (Sabag v Health Care Complaints Commission [2001] NSWCA 411 at [82]). This requires an assessment of the gravity of the professional misconduct found proved and the consideration of remorse and insight, if any, shown by the practitioner (HCCC v King [2013] NSWMT 9). The gravity of professional misconduct is not to be measured by reference to the worst cases, but by the extent to which it departs from the proper standards (Health Care Complaints Commission v Litchfield [1997] 41 NSWLR at 638).
34. The Commission submits that cancellation is appropriate because:
a) the respondent breached a number of her conditions on her registration over a six month period ‑ a not insignificant time;
b) the respondent was aware of the conditions on her registration, having signed an acknowledgement on 7 November 2018;
c) conditions on the respondent's registration are not appropriate given the previous breaches and the reasoning for the breaches;
d) although the respondent appears to accept that it was her responsibility to ensure she was complying with conditions, the Tribunal cannot be satisfied that the respondent would not suffer the same embarrassment if conditions were to be imposed on her registration;
e) there is not enough evidence before the Tribunal that the respondent has sufficiently remedied the underlying issues that led to the imposition of conditions on her registration.
Non-Review Period
35. The Commission submits that a 12 month non-review period is needed to allow sufficient time for the respondent to attempt to work further on the professional deficiencies that led to the imposition of her conditions, as well as the personal deficiencies that led to the respondent not speaking up about the conditions on her registration.