HCH v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2026] NSWCATAD 42;

On the 14 May 1981 I was walking to my local shops. When I came out of the shops on my way home I was approache[d] by a man who touched me inappropriately in the genital area. The time was appro[ximately] 11:00am in the morning. I was 12 years old. He asked me [for] directions. The man walked away. I did not say any words. I did not know the [offender] at all.

1. In support of the application, the Applicant relied upon a Sexual Assault Reporting Option (SARO) report dated 21 August 2024 to the NSW Police Force and a Certificate of Injury (COI) dated 28 October 2024.
2. On 14 January 2025, an Assessor dismissed the application for victims support on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support the finding that the Applicant was a primary victim of an act of violence.
3. The Applicant applied for internal review of this decision. In support of this application, the Applicant provided an updated SARO report and a second COI that updates information provided in the first COI.
4. On 7 May 2025, a Senior Assessor dismissed the application for victim support. The Senior Assessor found there was insufficient evidence to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was the primary victim of an act of violence. The Senior Assessor stated:

The available evidence is insufficient to establish that the incident described in the application form, the police report, and the Certificate of injury amounts to an act of violence within the meaning of the act

The evidence states that the Applicant was approached by a man who touched her on the genitals. However, the description is very brief and does not provide sufficient details or particularisation of these actions. For example, from the brief description provided I am unable to discern whether the actions were accidental or the specific part of [the applicant's] body the name offender touched. While it may be uncomfortable for [the Applicant] to provide this sort of information, it is necessary for me to know to establish whether it amounts to an act of violence.

...

I emphasise [to the Applicant] that by dismissing this claim, I am in no way suggesting that I do not believe her. Rather, the Act requires that sufficient evidence be provided to establish that the applicant is a victim of an act of violence and I do not consider the requirement has been met.

1. On 3 June 2025, the Applicant applied for administrative review of the Respondent's decision with respect to her application for a recognition payment. Section 51(1) of the Act provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine an application to the Tribunal for administrative review of a decision made by the Commissioner following an internal review of a decision with respect to a recognition payment.
2. The Tribunal's powers in relation to an application for administrative review are governed by s 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW) ('ADR Act'), which provides that in determining an application for administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision under the ADR Act, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is, having regard to the applicable law and the material before it: s 63(1) of the ADR Act.
3. In determining this application for administrative review, the Tribunal may decide to affirm the decision under review, vary the decision under review, set the decision under review aside and make a decision in substitution or set the decision under review aside and remit for reconsideration by the administrator with directions or recommendations: s 63(3) of the ADR Act.

1. The issue for determination is whether the available evidence is sufficient to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was a primary victim of an act of violence for the purpose of section 19 and section 20 of the Act. To access victim support in the form of a recognition payment, the Tribunal must also be satisfied that the documentary requirements in s 39(2)(b) of the Act are met.

1. The Act sets out eligibility criteria for victims of violent crime to receive different types of support and assistance. This review concerns a recognition payment. A recognition payment is a payment made in recognition of the trauma suffered by a victim of an act of violence: s 34 of the Act.
2. Section 5 of the Act provides:

5 Meaning of "victim of crime"

(1) For this Act, a victim of crime is a person who suffers harm as a direct result of an act committed, or apparently committed, by another person in the course of -

(a) a criminal offence, including a criminal offence involving a motor vehicle, or

(b) conduct of a kind referred to in the Modern Slavery Act 2018, section 5(1), definition of modern slavery, paragraph (b).

(2) A person suffers harm if, as a result of such an act -

(a) the person suffers actual physical bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm, or

...

1. Section 17 provides that the object of Part 4 of the Act is to provide support for victims of acts of violence.
2. Section 19 of the Act defines 'act of violence' as follows:

19 Meaning of "act of violence"

(1) In this Act, act of violence means an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons -

(a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and

(b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and

(c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more of those persons.

...

(3) For the purposes of this section, violent conduct extends to sexual assault and domestic violence.

...

1. Section 19(8) of the Act provides:

(8) In this Act -

sexual assault and domestic violence means any of the following -

(a) sexual intercourse (within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900) with a person without his or her consent or with consent obtained by means of a non-violent threat,

(b) sexual intercourse (within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 ) with a child under the age of 16 years or with a person having a cognitive impairment (within the meaning of that Division),

(c) self-manipulation (within the meaning of section 80A of the Crimes Act 1900) which a person is compelled to engage in because of a threat (within the meaning of that section),

(d) sexual touching (within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900) of a person without his or her consent or sexual touching of a child under the age of 16 years or the carrying out of a sexual act (within the meaning of that Division) with or towards a child under the age of 16 years,

(e) participation with a child under the age of 18 years in an act of child prostitution (within the meaning of section 91C of the Crimes Act 1900) or the use of a child under the age of 18 years for the production of child abuse material (within the meaning of section 91FB of the Crimes Act 1900),

(f) any other act resulting in injury that occurred in the commission of a personal violence offence (within the meaning of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007) against any of the following persons -

...[omitted]

1. Section 20(1) of the Act provides that '[a] primary victim of an act of violence is a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of that act'.
2. Section 18 of the Act defines injury as follows: 'injury means actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm but does not include injury arising from loss or damage to property'.
3. Section 23(1) of the Act provides that a primary victim of an act of violence is eligible for the support under the scheme described in s 26 of the Act. A primary victim of an act of violence, or somebody acting on their behalf, may apply for a recognition payment in recognition of the trauma suffered: s 38 of the Act.
4. To access a recognition payment, the applicant must submit documentary evidence as required by s 39 of the Act. Section 39 provides:

(1) An application for victims support is to be accompanied by such documentary evidence as may be required by the approved form.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the documentary evidence to be required:

...

(b) for an application for financial assistance for economic loss under section 26 or 27 or for a recognition payment - is:

(i) a police report, or a report by a Government agency or any other agency that provides support services to victims of crime, sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant's claim to be a victim of an act of violence or act of modern slavery, and

(ii) a medical, dental or counselling report verifying that the applicant or child who is the primary victim concerned has actually been injured as a result of an act of violence or act of modern slavery.

1. The category of recognition payment payable depends on the nature of the act of violence and the injury that results. Section 34 provides that for the purpose of Division 5 'sexual assault' has the meaning it has in section 19(8)(a), (b), (c) and 'series of related acts' has the same meaning as in section 19(4) of the Act.
2. Section 35 of the Act provides for the following categories of recognition payment, which relevantly include:

(4) A category D recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery involving any of the following -

(a) sexual touching or sexual act,

...

1. Section 36 (1) of the Act provides for the payment of recognition payments, including relevantly:

...

(e) a category D recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to a primary victim who suffered injury as a result of an act of violence or act of modern slavery described in section 35 (4).

1. Section 40 of the Act provides for the time for making applications. There is no time limit on making an application for a recognition payment for a person who is a primary victim of an act of violence that occurs in the course of the commission of a sexual offence against the person when the person is under 18 years of age: section 40(7) of the Act.

1. On 3 June 2025, the Applicant made an application for administrative review of the decision of the Respondent on 7 May 2025 in respect of a recognition payment.
2. On 4 July 2025, the matter came before the Tribunal for directions, and the Tribunal made directions for the parties to file evidence and submissions.
3. On 9 July 2025, the Respondent filed a bundle of documents under s 58 of the ADR Act. The bundle of documents includes: the application for victim support filed by the Applicant on 27 August 2024; the notice of the Assessor, dated 23 January 2025, the application for internal review;; the notice of the decision on internal review dated 7 May 2025; the COI dated 11 October 2024 and the updated COI dated 10 March 2025; and the SARO report dated 21 August 2024 and updated on 4 April 2025.
4. The Applicant did not file further evidence or submissions by the due date or before the hearing.
5. On 12 September 2025, the Respondent filed legal submissions.
6. The Applicant and the Respondent appeared before the Tribunal at the hearing on 24 October 2025. The Applicant confirmed that she did not have additional material to file in support of her application. The Applicant made submissions and gave evidence. The Respondent made oral submissions and questioned the Applicant.

1. The Applicant relies on her application for review and the evidence that was before the Senior Assessor on internal review. The documentary evidence relied on by the Applicant comprises of the SARO report dated 21 August 2024, the updated SARO report dated 4 April 2025, and the COI dated 10 October 2024, and the updated COI dated 10 March 2025.
2. The first SARO report made by the Applicant on 21 August 2024 is set out below:

The date would have been the 14th May 1981. The time would have been 11:00am in the morning. The shops were just down the street from where I lived. I would have been 12 years old. I bought some products form the local store as I was walking out of the shops on the way home. I was approached by a man who asked me directions as he proceeded to touch my genital area. I didn't say anything afterwards. The man then walked away. I did not know the offender.

The victim in this matter does not want any direct contact with the police.

1. On 4 April 2025, the Applicant submitted an update to the SARO report as follows:

This is an updated SARO report, I travelled to the neighbour residents told that after doing door knocking asking about a men of the description going back to 1981. They said his name was [redacted] ...

1. The Applicant has provided two Certificates of Injury completed by D Hooper, a Registered Psychologist, dated 10 October 2024 and 10 March 2025. The certificates provide similar descriptions of the incident to those provided in the application and the SARO reports. The second COI states the applicant 'is confident the man is [named offender] and 'fearful of the world' is included as an additional presenting symptom. The author makes a provisional diagnosis of anxiety and trauma disorder.
2. In oral submissions, the Applicant strongly objected to the Respondent's submission that the touching may have been accidental. The Applicant submitted that while the incident was a long time ago, she remembered the incident, and the act was intentional. The Applicant submitted that she had applications for victim support approved by Victim Services that were proven with witnesses and accessed counselling services. The Applicant gave evidence she had been the victim of an act of violence on multiple occasions. The Applicant referred to a matter in which her application was not successful but stated this was because of a legal issue and Tribunal member acknowledged she was a victim of an act of violence. With leave, she handed up the decision of the Tribunal in FTQ v Commissioner of Victims Rights 2023/00115702. The Tribunal notes that, consistent with the Applicant's oral evidence, the decision record shows the application was dismissed because it was lodged outside of the time limits prescribed by section 40 of the Act.
3. The Applicant gave oral evidence she first reported the act of violence that is the subject of the current application in 2024. With respect to the timing of this report, the Applicant gave evidence she tried to repress the memory; she didn't talk about those things when she was growing up, it was a different era. After she reported the incident, she went back to her old neighbourhood to find out the person's name. While the incident occurred a long time ago when she was twelve years ago, she still remembered the incident, and it still affected her.
4. In oral evidence, the Applicant said she never said she was 'fearful of the world' - if anything, she would describe herself as 'fearless of the world.' Her evidence was that the symptom of 'fearful of the world' recorded on the COI dated 25 March 2025 was recorded by the author in error as it would be accurate to say she was fearless of the world. Her evidence was the anxiety, and flashbacks were related to Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Questioned about the flashbacks, her evidence was '99 per cent of time' they were related to the incident in 1991.
5. The Applicant's evidence was that she had been the victim of other acts of violence, including a traumatic incident where she was held hostage at bank. The Applicant gave evidence she knew that the injuries identified in the COI were related to the incident in 1981, because every event has a different trauma and the PTSD accumulates. With respect to her evidence about the flashbacks, she submitted that a psychologist would be able to explain why her mind returns to this particular incident in 1981 and if Mr Hooper (the author of the COI) was at the hearing, he would be able to explain, but she was not a psychologist. The Applicant acknowledged that the other acts of violence were traumatic. In oral submissions, she maintained that she suffered injury as a result of the act of violence in 1981.

1. The Respondent's position is that the correct and preferable decision is to affirm the decision under review because the available evidence is insufficient to support a finding of an act of violence for the purpose of section 19 or that the documentary requirements in section 39(2)(b) of the Act are met.
2. The Respondent submits that the supporting documentation (the SARO and the updated SARO and the two COIs) are based on self-reports made by the Applicant in 2024, some 43 years after the alleged act of violence. The Respondent notes that in dismissing the application on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to establish an act of violence, the Assessor referred to a delay in reporting with reference to earlier applications for victim support. The Respondent submits that no information has been provided in relation to the delay in reporting, or whether there were any previous reports of the act of violence in circumstances where the Applicant first engaged with Victim services in relation to a child sexual assault in 2019.
3. The Respondent annexed a summary of the claims made by the Applicant for victim support to the submissions filed on 12 September 2025. The information in Annexure A includes the following: case number, the date of the act of violence, the type of violence, the offender's name (if identified), and the date the application for victims support was submitted. Annexure A shows that, in addition to the current application, the Applicant has made the following applications for victim support:

(1) An application made on 11 January 2000 in relation to adult sexual assault that occurred on a date February 1998.

(2) An application made on 17 December 2019 in relation to a child sexual assault that occurred between March 1976 and November 1988.

(3) An application on 27 January 2023 in relation to an act of violence involving child sexual assault occurring on dates between March 1977 and November 1977.

(4) An application made on 18 November 2021 in relation to a robbery that occurred on a date in October 2021.

(5) An application made on 21 October 2021 in relation to a child sexual assault that occurred between February 1976 and December 1979.

(6) An application made on 30 March 2022 in relation to adult sexual assault that occurred on a date on March 1992.

(7) An application made on 26 August 2022 in relation to an assault that occurred on 26 May 2021.

1. The Respondent's position is that on the evidence before the Tribunal and in absence of contemporaneous records or medical evidence before 2024, there is insufficient evidence to substantiate that the act of violence occurred as the Applicant recalls the event.
2. With respect to the COIs relied on by the Applicant, the Respondent submits that there are at least seven other intervening incidents through which she had experienced trauma. The Respondent submits there is no particularisation of the injury suffered as a result of the act of violence in 1981. The Respondent further submits that, because the Applicant has reported seven other acts of violence between 1977 and 2021, there is insufficient evidence that the injury identified in the COI is the direct result of the alleged act of violence in 1981.
3. The Respondent submits that to establish an act of violence, the Tribunal must be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the act apparently occurred in the commission of offence, which entails consideration of whether the Tribunal can be satisfied that the alleged touching was intentional, not accidental. The Respondent notes that the offence of 'sexual touching' was first introduced in 2018, but that similar considerations were applicable in considering an indecent assault pursuant to s 76 of the Crimes Act 1900(NSW) as it was in force in 1981. The Respondent submits without further context the evidence is insufficient to substantiate the act of violence occurred as the Applicant recalls, and that it is not apparent from the available evidence that the relevant act was intentional. In support of this argument, the Respondent referred to the Tribunal's decisions in FRF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [NSWCATAD 195 and GBK v Commissioner of Rights [2024] NSWCATD 51 ('GBK'), noting that in GBK the Tribunal found [at 38] that 'it was difficult to see' how the mental elements of the offence were made out on the available evidence.
4. The Respondent submits that to establish that she was a victim of an act of violence, the Applicant must establish that she was injured as a direct result of the act of violence. With reference to the documentary requirements for recognition payment in s 39(2)(b) of the Act, the Respondent made oral submissions that the medial reports were insufficient to verify, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant had actually been injured as a result of the act of violence. The Respondent submits that the medical evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion that the injury was a direct result of an alleged act of violence in 1981 circumstances where the Applicant has reported seven other acts of violence to Victim Service that would also have resulted in trauma. In oral submissions, the Respondent also noted that the information in the updated COI that the Applicant was fearful of the world was contradicted by the Applicant's oral evidence.

1. The onus is on the Applicant to establish that she was, on the balance of probabilities, the victim of an act of violence: To reach the requisite state of satisfaction that the act of violence did, on the balance of probabilities occur, the Tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of the existence of that fact: Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246 at [44]- [55] ('Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes'); see also FXJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 8 at [48]- [49]. In Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes the Court of Appeal (McDougall J, Bell & McColl JJA agreeing) stated at [44]-48], relevantly:

Discharge of the burden of proof: the relevant principles

44 A number of cases, of high authority, insist that for a tribunal of fact to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, of the existence of a fact, it must feel an actual persuasion of the existence of that fact. See Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336. His Honour's statement was approved by the majority (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) in Helton v Allen [1940] HCA 20; (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 712.

45 Dixon CJ put the matter in different words, although to similar effect, in Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 305 where his Honour said that "[t]he facts proved must form a reasonable basis for a definite conclusion affirmatively drawn of the truth of which the tribunal of fact may reasonably be satisfied". Although his Honour dissented in the outcome of that case, the words that I have quoted were cited with approval by the majority (Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ) in West v Government Insurance Office of NSW [1981] HCA 38; (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 66. See also Stephen J in Girlock (Sales) Pty Limited v Hurrell [1982] HCA 15; (1982) 149 CLR 155 at 161 - 162, and Mason J (with whom Brennan J agreed) in the same case at 168.

46 It is clear, in particular from West and Girlock, that the requirement for actual satisfaction as to the occurrence or existence of a fact is one of general application, and not limited to cases where the fact in question, if found, might reflect adversely on the character of a party or witness.

47 In Malec v JC Hutton Pty Limited [1990] HCA 20; (1990) 169 CLR 638 Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said at 642-643:

A common law court determines on the balance of probabilities whether an event has occurred. If the probability of the event having occurred is greater than it not having occurred, the occurrence of the event is treated as certain; if the probability of it having occurred is less than it not having occurred, it is treated as not having occurred.

48 On analysis, I think, what their Honours said is not inconsistent with the requirement that the tribunal of fact be actually persuaded of the occurrence or existence of the fact before it can be found. On their Honours' approach, what is required is a determination of the respective probabilities of the event's having occurred or not occurred. There is nothing in that analysis to suggest that the determination in favour of probability of occurrence should not require some sense of actual persuasion.

...

1. After reviewing the authorities, the Court of Appeal (McDougall J, Bell & McColl JJA agreeing) summarised the position at [55], stating:

(1) A finding that a fact exists (or existed) requires that the evidence induce, in the mind of the fact-finder, an actual persuasion that the fact does (or at the relevant time did) exist;

(2) Where on the whole of the evidence such a feeling of actual persuasion is induced, so that the fact-finder finds that the probabilities of the fact's existence are greater than the possibilities of its non-existence, the burden of proof on the balance of probabilities may be satisfied;

(3) Where circumstantial evidence is relied upon, it is not in general necessary that all reasonable hypotheses consistent with the non-existence of a fact, or inconsistent with its existence, be excluded before the fact can be found; and

(4) A rational choice between competing hypotheses, informed by a sense of actual persuasion in favour of the choice made, will support a finding, on the balance of probabilities, as to the existence of the fact in issue.

1. This application is based upon a single incident of sexual touching which is said to have occurred 43 years ago. Having considered the evidence the Applicant filed in support of her application for victims support as well as her oral submissions and evidence, the Tribunal accepts that she believes she was sexually touched in an incident that occurred in 1981. The Tribunal notes that, in oral evidence, the Applicant was adamant that the contact the alleged offender made with her genitals was intentional, not accidental.
2. The Tribunal acknowledges that the passage of time may erode memory: details may be imprecise or sparse, and a witness can only say what they remember of an event that occurred many years ago and did not previously require examination: Hartnett v Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of Wilcannia-Forbes (No 7) [2025] NSWSC 128 at [203] see also [185]-[188]. However, while the Respondent has referred CDK v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2016] NSWCATAD 301, the Tribunal notes that the alleged acts of violence in CDK occurred when CDK was aged between 3 and 7 whereas in the present case the Applicant was over ten years of age at the relevant time.
3. The difficulty for the Applicant is that the evidence before the Tribunal about the alleged act of violence is limited. The Applicant's description of the event is brief, and there is no contemporaneous evidence of the event. At the hearing, the Applicant gave evidence is that she first reported the incident in 2024, over 43 years after the alleged event. In oral submissions, the Applicant acknowledged she had made successful applications for victims support in relation to other incidents, including an application in relation to child sexual abuse in 2019, and that she had access to counselling. With respect to why she did not raise the alleged act of violence in circumstances where she first engaged with Victims Services in relation to alleged childhood abuse in 2019, the Applicant stated it was not possible to disclose everything at once and that she had repressed the memories of the 1981 incident.
4. Importantly, even if the Tribunal accepts that the act occurred as the Applicant described and that the particularisation of the act of violence is sufficient to support the conclusion that it apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and involved violent conduct against the Applicant, the Tribunal must also be satisfied that the act resulted in injury to the Applicant for the purpose of s 19(1)(c). In addition, the documents relied upon by the Applicant must meet the requirements of s 39(2)(b) of the Act.
5. The Tribunal acknowledges the Applicant's oral evidence was that she has been the victim of other acts of violence. In oral evidence she referred to being a hostage in bank robbery. The evidence before the Tribunal, which is not in dispute, is that she has made seven other applications for victim support, including in relation to instances of child sexual assault, adult sexual assault, robbery, and assault. In this context, the Tribunal considers questions arise about whether the injury - in the form of psychological or psychiatric harm -- identified in the COIs is a direct result of the alleged act of violence in 1981. In oral evidence, the Applicant stated she had trauma counselling for many years from different counsellors at Victim Services and she had first reported the act of violence that is the subject of this application in 2024.
6. The only medical evidence before the Tribunal with respect to the injury the Applicant claims resulted from the act of violence are the two COIs.
7. The first COI states that the Applicant presented with 'anxiety and flashbacks' and provides a provisional diagnosis of 'anxiety, trauma disorder.' The stated cause of injury is 'sexual assault (child) and the incident is briefly described as follows: '[the applicant] was walking to the local shops and she was approached by a man who touched her genitals. He then asked for directions and walked away.' In response to the question 'pre-existing factors or condition aggravated by the incident,' the author of the COI ticked 'N/A.' The updated COI adds the Applicant is confident the offender is a person named in the COI and adds the presenting symptom 'fearful of world.'
8. While the Tribunal acknowledges that the Act is beneficial legislation and must be interpreted accordingly, there must be evidence sufficient to make the findings sought by a party to the requisite standard of proof, which is the balance of probabilities. With respect to the two COIs, the Tribunal is not satisfied that these reports contain sufficient particulars to support the conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, that the injury identified in these documents arose as a direct result of an act of violence that occurred in 1981.
9. Firstly, there is a significant passage of time (43 years) between the incident in 1981 and provisional diagnosis in the COI, and the information contained in the COIs is extremely brief. While the evidence before the Tribunal indicates the Applicant has a significant history of trauma, in response to the question pre-existing factors or condition aggravated by the incident, the author of the COI has ticked N/A. The information contained in the COIs does not provide any insight into what impact, if any, intervening traumas (noting the applicant has made 7 other applications for victims support, including in respect of unrelated child sexual assaults in the period 1976-1988) may have had on the Applicant's presentation. Nor do the COI and the updated COI provide any insight into how the author reached the conclusion that the injury was consistent with the incident as described or particularise the connection between the symptoms, provisional diagnosis, and the alleged act of violence in 1981.
10. Secondly, there is a discrepancy between the information contained in the COI and the oral evidence of the Applicant. In oral evidence, the Applicant stated it was incorrect to describe her as 'fearful of the world' as she is in fact 'fearless of the world'. The Applicant stated the author of the COI had made an error when this symptom was recorded on the updated COI. While this may be the case, the Tribunal considers the discrepancy between the COI and the Applicant's account of her symptoms call into question the reliability of the information recorded in the COI. For completeness, the Tribunal does not consider other minor variations between the information in the COIs and the SARO reports (the first letter of the last name of the alleged offender and whether the applicant was on her way to or from the shops when the incident occurred) to be of any significance. However, given the brevity of the information contained in the COI the inconsistency between the updated COI and the Applicant's evidence about her symptoms reinforces the Tribunal's concerns that the medical evidence lacks detail about the causal connection between the incident in 1981 and the provisional diagnosis of anxiety and trauma disorder in the COIs.
11. The Applicant had the opportunity to file further evidence but has sought to rely on the documentary evidence that was before the Senior Assessor. In oral submissions at the hearing the Applicant stated that if the author of the COIs was at the hearing he would have been able to explain the impact of the act of violence. However, the Applicant did not provide a more detailed report from the author of the COIs or seek to call the author as a witness. As discussed with the Applicant at the hearing, the Tribunal can only consider the evidence before it.
12. As explained above, the Tribunal considers the COIs are very brief and unparticularised. The COIs do not provide any detail, for example, that would assist the Tribunal to understand on what basis the author was satisfied that the flashbacks were the result of the incident in 1981 given the Applicant's evidence indicates that she has experienced significant traumas as a result of unrelated acts of violence. There are also inconsistencies between the symptoms described in the COIs and the Applicant's oral evidence: the COI reports the Applicant is fearful of the world whereas her oral evidence was that this was recorded in error. While the Tribunal has considered the Applicant's oral evidence about the flashbacks, the COIs lack detail about the connection between the Applicant's presenting symptoms and the incident in 1981 and are also silent on the impact of trauma experienced by the Applicant as a result of unrelated acts of violence on the Applicant's presentation.
13. Having considered all the available evidence, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the injury identified in the COI is a direct result of the act of violence that occurred in 1981 as required by section 19(c) and section 20 of the Act. The Tribunal is mindful that the Act does not require the Applicant prove that the act of violence is the sole cause of her injury, provided that the evidence establishes that the injury directly resulted from the act of violence: CRT v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2017] NSWCATAD 174 at [31]. However, given the passage of time and the potential impact of other traumas on the Applicant, the Tribunal does not feel a sense of actual persuasion that the Applicant was injured as a direct result of the alleged act of violence in 1981. The Tribunal is not satisfied that the evidence establishes, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant has been injured as a direct result of the incident in 1981.
14. On the limited evidence before it, the Tribunal is unable to reach the requisite state of satisfaction to make a finding that the Applicant satisfies s 19 and s 20 of the Act. Having considered the totality of the available evidence, the Tribunal is not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was the victim of an act of violence in accordance with section 19 (1) or that the requirements of s 39(2)(b)(ii) of the Act are met.
15. On the available evidence before it, the Tribunal is unable to reach the requisite state of satisfaction that the Applicant was, on the balance of probabilities, the primary victim of an act of violence within the meaning of s 19 and s 20 of the Act.

1. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal has decided to affirm the decision of the Respondent.

(1) The decision of the Respondent on 7 May 2025 is affirmed.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.