[2026] FWC 904
General information, not legal advice.
Fair Work Commission
2026-03-19
Original judgment source is linked above.
s.394 - Unfair dismissal
Application for an unfair dismissal remedy - minimum employment period - whether dismissed - application dismissed
[1] On 9 October 2025 Mr Hazal Bulut Senel (the Applicant) made an unfair dismissal application under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act) to the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) alleging he was unfairly dismissed by Swann Communications Pty Ltd (Swann or the Respondent). In seeking an unfair dismissal remedy Mr Senel alleges that he was dismissed on 18 September 2025 and it was unfair.
[3] Mr Senel submits that he was employed as a full-time graphic designer reporting to Mr Jeremy Stewart (Mr Stewart), from 16 October 2023 until his dismissal on 18 September 2025. He submits that the period between May and July of 2025 was a temporary pause to his employment due to budgetary constraints, but the period did not break continuity of employment. Mr Senel submits that while he provided invoices as a freelancer, the multifactorial test demonstrates that the engagement was one of employment and not an independent contractor.
[4] Neither party produced any evidence of either a written contract of employment or contractor agreement.
[5] Mr Senel gave sworn evidence and Mr Stewart, formerly the Vice President of Global Marketing gave sworn evidence for the Respondent.
[6] The Respondent was granted leave to be legally represented.
[18] The Applicant submits that he was employed as a graphic designer and was part of the internal marketing and design team.
[26] Mr Senel contends that he understood that he was employed and not engaged as a contractor and that the dismissal was unfair.
[30] The relevant provisions of the Act are sections 382 and 383. Section 382 provides:
"382 When a person is protected from unfair dismissal
A person is protected from unfair dismissal at a time if, at that time:
(a) the person is an employee who has completed a period of employment with his or her employer of at least the minimum employment period; and
(ii) an enterprise agreement applies to the person in relation to the employment;
(iii) the sum of the person's annual rate of earnings, and such other amounts (if any) worked out in relation to the person in accordance with the regulations, is less than the high income threshold."
[31] The minimum employment period required to have been served to comply with s.382(a) is found in s.383 of the Act.
(a) if the employer is not a small business employer - 6 months ending at the earlier of the following times:
(i) the time when the person is given notice of the dismissal;
(b) if the employer is a small business employer - one year ending at that time."
[34] Section 385(a) of the Act provides that a person is unfairly dismissed if the Commission is satisfied that the person has been dismissed. Therefore, a threshold issue to determine is whether Mr Senel was dismissed from his employment. Section 12 of the Act defines dismissed with a reference to s.386 of the Act. Relevantly, s.386 of the Act provides:
(a) the person's employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer's initiative; or
(b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer.
[35] Section 15 and 15AA of the Act define employee and employer. Relevantly, these provisions provide as follows:
"15 Ordinary meanings of employee and employer
A reference in this Act to an employee with its ordinary meaning:
(a) includes a reference to a person who is usually such an employee; and
(b) does not include a person on a vocational placement.
A reference in this Act to an employer with its ordinary meaning includes a reference to a person who is usually such an employer.
15AA Determining the ordinary meanings of employee and employer
(1) [Determining ordinary meanings of employee and employer]
For the purposes of this Act, whether an individual is an employee of a person within the ordinary meaning of that expression, or whether a person is an employer of an individual within the ordinary meaning of that expression, is to be determined by ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person.
(2) [Real substance, practical reality and true nature of relationship]
For the purposes of ascertaining the real substance, practical reality and true nature of the relationship between the individual and the person:
(a) the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person must be considered; and
(b) in considering the totality of the relationship between the individual and the person, regard must be had not only to the terms of the contract governing the relationship, but also to other factors relating to the totality of the relationship including, but not limited to, how the contract is performed in practice."
[36] The Applicant contends that application of the multifactorial test to the relationship demonstrates an employee/ employer relationship and therefore he is entitled to protection under the unfair dismissal provisions under Part 3-2 of the Act.
[37] The definition of employee and employer have their ordinary meanings, however, as it is contended that the Applicant was not an employee s.15AA requires the Commission to consider the real substance, practical reality and true relationship. In considering the totality of the relationship, regard must be had to the terms of the contract as well as other factors.
[38] Firstly, the contractual arrangement is not in writing, but both the Applicant and Mr Stewart gave sworn evidence about the discussions prior to commencement of the working relationship. While stating repeatedly that English is not his first language, I observed that Mr Senel demonstrated a strong grasp of English and effectively had shown that he understood the difference between employment, fixed term employment, working as a contractor and offering work as a freelancer. Having observed both witnesses, I prefer the evidence of Mr Sewart that the initial engagement and the second engagement was on the clear understanding that the Applicant was engaged as a freelancer and not an employee. The work offered was consistent with the services the Applicant publicly promoted as a freelancer on his website and consistent with the discussions with Mr Stewart given the immediate need to supplement the work of the Respondent's internal graphic design team. The evidence does not support the contention that the Applicant was part of the regular team; he was not employed under consistent terms and conditions, not worked alongside them in the office, nor attended the regular team meetings. The rate of pay far exceeded the most experienced graphic designer, on the basis that there were no other entitlements nor was tax deducted. The Applicant was sent design briefs, and he charged the number of hours taken to complete the digital content as specified. The hours taken to complete the work was itemised on an invoice which also identified his ABN. The Applicant was paid fortnightly as he requested.
[39] The evidence of attending a training session, a luncheon and one Christmas party is insufficient to evidence an employment relationship.
[40] It is not contested that the Applicant largely performed his work during business hours, this assisted with communication about availability to perform work and design amendments to the developed content. However, the Applicant also completed work at times that the internal design team did not work. I do accept that the parties discussed the hours that the Applicant would complete his work, but I do not accept that the Respondent approved the hours of work. I prefer the evidence of Mr Stewart in this regard. Mr Senel insisted that his hours had to be approved including his alleged request to vary his hours while he was cross examined but did not press this point when he questioned Mr Sewart.
[41] I am satisfied that the Applicant understood that his engagement ceased with no expectation of further work on 30 May 2025, the evidence of Mr Stewart was consistent and convincing while further supported by email evidence between the parties.
[42] The second engagement was on the same terms as the first but was for a short period of 7-8 weeks. I do not accept the contention of the Applicant that the second engagement was a continuation of the first, and furthermore, the evidence does not support a "pause" as he described. Rather the Applicant's email of 30 June 2025 was evident that his first engagement concluded, as this email queried whether the Respondent was in a position to offer any work on any basis until he could find a permanent job because the job market was quiet. The response on 3 July 2025 was that there were no opportunities at that time. Mr Stewart's sworn evidence was that when he returned to work some weeks later, he learnt of a staff member resigning and the offer then made to the Applicant on a short-term basis as a freelancer is credible and I accept this evidence.
[43] I am satisfied by the evidence that there was a verbal agreement to engage Mr Senel as a freelancer- an independent contractor and not as an employee.
[45] The indicia in the authorities include not only consideration of control in the relationship, but whether the person works for others, whether the person supplies their own tools, whether they can delegate work and how they are remunerated amongst other considerations. The indicia are now applied to the facts in this matter.
[46] In respect to control, the Applicant's times, days and place to work were not regulated even though he predominantly worked during business hours which assisted both parties with communication. The Applicant had a right to accept or reject a project. The Respondent required that digital content projects were completed in accordance with design briefs and branding requirements by the scheduled deadline. The Applicant regulated his own time and breaks and worked autonomously. The Respondent had no right to regulate how the hours were worked. At times Mr Stewart did check on progress or asked the Applicant to make changes to the content when he was not satisfied that the work met the design brief or where related entities or resellers or distributors required changes. The Applicant did not need to account for his hours of work, he simply invoiced the Respondent for the time taken to complete his work and he was not questioned on the time taken to complete each project, all that was required was that he meet a deadline and the specifications in the design brief. There was no control over how the work was done, he was not directly supervised, and the Applicant could reject the work if he chose. Having considered the real substance and practical reality of these considerations I am not satisfied that the Applicant was an employee and the changes sought by Mr Stewart to digital content was not sufficient to characterise an employment relationship.
[49] The reality of the relationship was that the Applicant charged for his services and was responsible for any expenditure in relation to that service. The Respondent did not reimburse the Applicant for any business-related expenses. Presumably the rate offered by the Applicant was intended to cover his tax and personal liabilities such as power and the like. The Respondent accepted the offered rate on the understanding there were no other expenses associated with the engagement, noting further that the rate exceeded any employee's hourly rate of pay.
[50] The Applicant did not delegate any work, but his business structure provided no means for delegation; the arrangement was that the Respondent referred work to the Applicant as a freelance graphic designer because of his personal skills which he publicly promoted on his website. In this matter delegation is an irrelevant consideration because the business relationship was between the Respondent and the freelancer direct.
[52] The Applicant raised the documents that he presented to the Respondent for signature to assist in his immigration application. These documents describe the Applicant as graphic design freelancer even though the attached job description used the word "employee' and may infer an employee position. However, I am not satisfied that the document practically changes the rights and obligations in the contract.
[54] The Applicant had no right to portray his engagement with Swann to any third party as a representative or employee of the Respondent.
[55] Following the hearing the Applicant contacted chambers to advise that he had only just become aware of a superannuation contribution. The Respondent replied noting that this was the case. I have considered this new evidence but am not satisfied that it changes the relationship. The Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992 (the SGC Act) requires the payment of superannuation contributions where an individual performs work that is wholly or principally for their labour regardless if they are an independent contractor. Section 12(3) provides an interpretation under the SGC Act of employee, employer. Despite this interpretation, it does not apply more broadly than the Superannuation Guarantee (Administration) Act 1992.
[56] For the above reasons I am satisfied that Mr Senel was an independent contractor and he understood that he was engaged as a freelance graphic designer on both engagements. Recharacterising the relationship at a later point despite the contractual agreement does not have the effect of changing an independent contractor into an employee.
[58] For the above reasons, I am satisfied that Mr Senel's application does not meet the requirement of being dismissed under ss. 382 and 386, nor met the minimum employment period if he was an employee within its ordinary meaning. However, I am satisfied that Mr Senel's engagement was not as an employee capable of being dismissed but rather a freelance graphic designer, that being an independent contractor. I have considered both ss. 15 and 15AA and I am satisfied that Part 2-3 of the Act does not apply to Mr Senel. Accordingly, the application is dismissed.
[1] Exhibit R1, Witness statement of Jeremy Francis Stewart, at [1] - [10].
[3] Consisting of Mr Sewart, Marketing Coordinator and Product Marketing Manager.
[4] Evidence of batch payments, Exhibit R1 annexure JS-9.
[5] Exhibit R1 annexures JS-12 and JS-13.
[7] No attendance of weekly team meetings, nor expected to follow the company policies (except the IT data security policy), not included in the team group chat except the AUS Marketing All MS Teams chat to coordinate workflow, and did not attend team events or lunches except one Christmas party as a gesture given the empty spot to fill and one luncheon team.
[8] Contractors were temporarily issued with equipment for the duration of their engagement.
[11] Exhibit R1 annexures JS-21 and JS-22.
[13] Ibid at [90] and witness evidence.
[14] Exhibit R1 at [91] and annexure JS-24.
[18] Exhibit A1, Applicant's statement of evidence, at [7].
[31] If the employer employs less than 15 employees.
[32] See Stephen's v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16 and Hollis v Vabu Pty Ltd [2001] HCA 44; (2001) 207 CLR 21, and more recently traversed in Jiang Shen Cai trading as French Accent v Do Rozario [2011] FWAFB 8307.
[33] Jiang Shen Cai trading as French Accent v Do Rozario [2011] FWAFC 8307.
[34] Exhibit R1 at [49] and oral evidence.
[35] He had a Master of Visual Communication Design and numerous software skills relevant for the project-based work offered by the Respondent.
[36] Exhibit R1 annexure JS-11 at section 10.
[37] The communication was clear and unambiguous, the Applicant invoiced for his work promptly and conveyed the end of the relationship and all IT equipment was returned.
Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer
Hazal Bulut Senel
Swann Communications Pty Ltd [2026] FWC 904
(1986) 160 CLR 16
(2001) 207 CLR 21