Hays & Hays (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2F 1420 (9 October 2025)

1. Within fourteen (14) days of the date of these orders, the applicant ("wife") and the respondent ("husband") do all necessary acts and things and sign all documents required to list for sale the real property situated at Property B, Suburb C in the State of Western Australia, more particularly described as Lot ... on Plan ... ("Property B") on the following terms and conditions:

(a) The real estate agent for the sale of Property B be forthwith appointed by the wife ("the agent");

(b) The lawyer appointed to act on the sale of Property B be nominated by the wife ("the conveyancing lawyer");

(c) Each of the wife and the husband do all things and sign all documents required by the agent to be done or signed to enable the sale of Property B;

(d) Property B be listed for sale and sold at a price and in a manner determined by the wife;

(e) If the wife determines to auction Property B, each of the wife and husband do all acts and things and execute all documents necessary for the sale of Property B by auction and in particular:

(i) Place Property B with an auctioneer nominated by the wife ("the auctioneer") for sale by auction;

(ii) Execute all documents requested by the auctioneer for the sale of Property B by auction;

(iii) Pay to the auctioneer and the agent any sums requested for advertising expenses in relation to the auction, in equal shares; and

(iv) The wife may attend at the auction sale of Property B and negotiate with the highest bidder if the reserve price is not reached; and

(f) Each of the husband and the wife do all acts and things and execute all documents necessary for the sale of Property B, including but not limited to:

(i) Execute the contract for sale;

(ii) Co-operate in every way with the agent and any auctioneer including:

1. Making a key available;
2. Allowing inspection of Property B at all times as requested by the agent;
   1. Ensuring Property B is in a neat and clean condition at the time of inspection by prospective purchasers;

(iii) Disposing of rubbish prior to the date of settlement; and

(iv) The wife removing the contents of Property B she is to retain pursuant to these orders.

1. Pending the settlement of the sale of Property B each of the wife and the husband are restrained by injunction from seeking to obtain credit against or increasing or re‑drawing any funds from any loan facility secured against Property B without the prior written consent of the other party save that the wife is permitted to use Property B as security for her legal fees and loan for legal fees provided that liability does not exceed her entitlement from the anticipated sale proceeds.
2. At settlement of the contract for the sale of Property B, the wife cause the removal of any caveat lodged against Property B as security for payment of her legal fees and loan for legal fees, at her expense, and the proceeds of sale be applied as follows:

(a) In payment of the agent's commission and auction expenses due on the sale;

(b) In payment of any amount required to discharge the mortgage registered on the title of Property B;

(c) In payment of any outstanding local authority rates;

(d) In payment of the conveyancing lawyer's tax invoice associated with the sale;

(e) In payment of outstanding school fees payable as at the date of these orders to:

(i) G School; and

(ii) H School; and

(f) The balance then remaining ("the net sale proceeds") be paid to Divorce Hub Legal Law Practice Trust Account and applied as follows:

(i) To the wife, the dollar equivalent of "X" in the following equation:

X = [70% of C + W + H] - W

Where:

"C" is the net proceeds remaining from the sale of Property B after the payments made pursuant to orders 7(a) to (e);

"W" is the net value of other property and superannuation received or retained by the wife pursuant to these orders, fixed in the sum of $623,186;

"H" is the known net value of other property and superannuation received or retained by the husband pursuant to these orders, fixed in the sum of $639,596,

plus any component of the costs payable by the husband pursuant to order 5(d)(iii) if unpaid by the husband and paid by the wife on his behalf in the first instance; and

1. A base amount $481,878 is allocated, as required by s 90XT(4) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), to the applicant wife, Ms Hays ("the wife"), out of the interest of the respondent husband, Mr Hays (born in 1973) ("the husband"), in Super Fund 1 ("the Fund").
2. In accordance with paragraph 90XT(1)(a) of the Act whenever a splittable payment becomes payable out of the interest held by the husband in the Fund, the Trustee of the Fund, J Limited ("the Trustee"):

(a) Pay to the wife, or her heirs, executors, administrators, or nominees, to the extent permitted by law, the entitlements calculated in accordance with Part 7 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025; and

(b) Make the corresponding reduction in the entitlement the husband would have had in the Fund but for this order.

1. The Trustee do all acts and things and sign all documents necessary so that, in accordance with the obligations set out in the Act and Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025, the Trustee can calculate the entitlement of, and make payment to the applicant wife in accordance with this order.
2. Having been accorded procedural fairness this order binds the Trustee of the Fund and has effect from the operative time.
3. The operative time in relation to this order is deemed to be four days after the date upon which a certified copy of this order is served upon the Trustee.
4. Upon becoming entitled to receive a splittable payment from the fund, the husband must elect to take the maximum available lump sum.
5. If the trust deed permits, then the parties do all acts and things and sign all documents reasonably necessary to request the Trustee to either pay to the applicant wife or to roll over an interest in the Fund (equivalent to the proportion that the applicant wife is entitled to be paid calculated in accordance with the regulations) into a separate fund to be nominated by the applicant wife.
6. Pending payment to the applicant wife pursuant to order 9(a) or the rolling over of the applicant wife's entitlement pursuant to order 14 of these orders:

(a) The husband is restrained from dealing with, charging, encumbering or disposing of any entitlements he has under the superannuation fund other than in accordance with the terms of these orders or with the consent of the applicant wife, and that consent is not to be capriciously or arbitrarily withheld; and

(b) The husband immediately revoke any binding nomination of beneficiary and is restrained hereafter from making any binding nomination in favour of a child described in regulation 17 of the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025 or any other nomination where the effect of the nomination would be to render that payment a non-splittable payment and/or extinguish or reduce the entitlement of the applicant wife under these orders.

1. These orders are binding upon the husband, his heirs, executors, administrators and legal personal representatives.
2. Within 30 days of the date of these orders the parties do all things and sign all documents necessary to transfer to the wife the camper trailer (registration number ...).
3. Except as otherwise specified in these orders the wife is entitled to sole possession and legal and equitable title to the following:

(a) Motor Vehicle 1 currently in her possession;

(b) Bank accounts in her sole name;

(c) Her entitlements to superannuation;

(d) Furniture, watches, jewellery and effects currently in her possession;

(e) The contents of Property B; and

(f) All other assets in the possession or control of the wife as at the date of these orders.

1. Except as otherwise specified in these orders the husband is entitled to sole possession and legal and equitable title to the following:

(a) His interest in the property located at Property D, Suburb E, Victoria;

(b) His Motor Vehicle 2 and Motor Vehicle 3 and any other motor vehicle currently in his possession;

(c) Bank accounts in his sole name;

(d) His entitlements to superannuation;

(e) Furniture, watches, jewellery and effects currently in his possession; and

(f) All other assets in the possession or control of the husband as at the date of these orders.

1. Unless otherwise specified in these orders and except for the purposes of enforcing any payments due under these orders or any subsequent agreement or order required to give effect to these orders:

(a) Money standing to the credit of the parties in any joint bank account be divided equally between the parties and the account closed;

(b) The parties are restrained from pledging the credit of the other;

(c) Insurance policies become and remain the sole property of the owner named in the policy;

(d) Each party is solely liable for, and indemnifies the other against, any liability in their name and encumbering any item of property (including choses in action) to which that party is entitled according to these orders; and

(e) Any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is expressly severed.

1. Each party sign all documents and do all things reasonably required to give effect to these orders.
2. Where an asset is to be transferred to a party according to these orders, the transferee be responsible for the preparation of all documents necessary to effect the transfer, and any costs, including stamp duty, associated with the transfer.
3. In the event the husband or the wife refuses to or neglects to sign a deed or instrument in compliance with these orders, within seven days of the service of a request in writing by the other party, a Registrar of this court, be appointed pursuant to section 106A of the Act to execute all deeds and/or instruments in the name of the husband or the wife as required and to do all acts and things necessary to give validity to the operation to the deed or instrument and for the purpose of this order:

(a) Evidence of refusal or neglect can be by an affidavit of one of the parties' lawyers; and

(b) The requesting party be at liberty to apply for costs when submitting the affidavit to the Registrar.

1. All extant applications be dismissed, save for in respect of costs.

1. By no later than 4.00 pm on 30 October 2025, the wife file and serve an affidavit and written submissions:

(a) In support of her application for costs of these proceedings including in respect of any costs reserved ("the costs application"); and

(b) In relation to the court's consideration of an order prohibiting the husband from instituting proceedings under the Act without the leave of the court under section 102QAG ("harmful proceedings order"), including the terms of such an order if made.

1. Should the wife fail to file documents in accordance with order 25(a) within the required timeframe, the costs application will stand dismissed.
2. By no later than 4.00 pm on 20 November 2025, the husband file and serve any affidavit and/or written submissions he seeks to rely upon:

(a) In response to the costs application; and

(b) In relation to the court's consideration of a harmful proceedings order, including the terms of such an order if made.

1. The costs application and consideration of a harmful proceedings order be listed for hearing at 9:30 am on 15 December 2025 to be conducted electronically via Webex.
2. Each party's affidavit is to be limited to seven pages, with no more than five annexures.
3. Each party's written submissions are to be limited to seven pages.
4. If documents are filed exceeding the specified page limit or number of annexures without leave of the court, the additional pages or annexures be disregarded.

1. Pursuant to section 81 of the Act it is intended these orders shall, as far as practicable, finally determine the financial relationships between the parties and avoid further proceedings between them.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Before the court is an application for parenting orders in relation to the parties' child Y (aged 14) and an application for the alteration of property interests pursuant to section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
2. I will refer to the applicant as "the husband" and the respondent as "the wife" in my reasons for the sake of convenience notwithstanding they are now divorced and this is also a parenting matter. I do so without intending any disrespect to either of them.
3. The parties lived together for 23 years, including approximately one year separately and apart under the one roof. They were married for more than 22 years. Y has two older siblings - X who is now aged 19 and Z, who was 17 at the time of the final hearing and turned 18 in 2025. Neither now come within the jurisdiction of the court to make parenting orders.
4. The wife contends the husband has very serious mental health issues which involved psychotic episodes in 2010 and 2013. She asserts the husband has subjected the children to abuse and family violence and has perpetrated family violence towards her (including in the presence of the children), throughout their relationship and after separation. She further asserts there is no evidence in respect of the husband's current mental health status, treatment and support or that he has addressed his family violence behaviour. In those circumstances she submits Y would be exposed to an unacceptable risk of harm by spending time with him. Accordingly, the wife seeks orders for Y to live with her and that Y spend time with the husband only upon the wife's invitation and in accordance with any conditions she specifies. The wife further submits it would likely not be possible to make joint decisions with the husband in relation to Y. She therefore seeks she have sole decision-making responsibility for Y and that she not be required to consult with the husband before making decisions about Y or inform him of decisions she makes. The wife also seeks injunctions restraining the husband from coming within proximity of any place she, Y or Y's siblings live, work or study and of her parents' home.
5. The husband is self-represented. He does not have a trial affidavit or any expert medical or psychological evidence before the court. He nevertheless submits he does not have the mental illnesses the wife claims he has. He says the events of 2010 and 2013 described by the wife as psychotic episodes were triggered by sleep deprivation, medication withdrawal and stress whilst working. He denies subjecting the children or the wife to abuse or family violence and submits the wife has sought to "take [his] scalp" via a false claim of family violence.
6. The husband's amended Response to Initiating Application filed on 7 November 2024 ("husband's response") does not set out orders in a form the court can make. He sought orders in relation to X, notwithstanding she is an adult, and Z notwithstanding he was then nearly 18, although he acknowledged in his response "Y [...] is the only child likely to be compelled by parenting orders." During the course of the final hearing, it became apparent the husband seeks an order for joint decision-making responsibility or, in the alternative, that he have sole decision-making responsibility for Y. He also seeks orders for Y to live with him and to spend time with the wife, proposing a number of alternate scenarios in order of his preference, ranging from him having "100% parenting" to having Y live with him five nights each week. He in effect seeks the wife be restrained from contacting Y while in his care, save for in the case of a medical emergency, claiming her communication results in "raised anxiety". He also seeks orders in relation to communication and consultation between the parties and for "shuttle-run" mediation with K Centre in the event of disputes which cannot be resolved by written communication.
7. In relation to property matters, the wife seeks a superannuation split to equalise the parties' superannuation interests. She then seeks the jointly owned former family home be sold, outstanding school fees be paid, and the net sale proceeds be divided between the parties to achieve an alteration of property interests whereby she receives assets (including superannuation as apportioned between them) equivalent to 70% of the combined net value of the parties' assets and superannuation. She submits her contributions were made more arduous by the family violence she alleges was perpetrated by the husband such that her contributions should be assessed at 65% and the husband's at 35%. She then seeks an adjustment of 5% pursuant to section 75(2) of the Act including due to her ongoing care of Y, the husband's non-disclosure, and his legal interest in a real property held as joint proprietor with his two brothers at Property D, Suburb E ("Property D"), which has not been valued.
8. The husband seeks each party retain their existing superannuation interests, which would see him retain approximately 88% of the combined value of the parties' superannuation. He seeks to retain the former family home and that he receive assets equivalent to 80% of the value of the parties' assets and the wife receive 20%. He claims this reflects that he earned 80% of the income during the parties' relationship (as well as contributing to parenting responsibilities) and his decision to make "wise financial choices" and invest in superannuation. The husband maintained this position even after being provided with copies of section 79 and 75(2) of the Act and a selection of authorities setting out the court's approach to the assessment of contributions.[1]
9. For the reasons that follow, I will make orders providing for Y to live with the wife and for the wife to have sole decision-making responsibility for her. I will make an order for the sale of the former family home, for the equalisation of the parties' superannuation and for the wife to receive equivalent to 70% of the value of the parties' known assets, save for the husband's interest in Property D.

1. The matter was before me for two days. The wife was represented by counsel and an instructing solicitor. Her legal representatives had both travelled from Queensland for the hearing. The wife participated from a safe room at court.
2. The husband appeared on his own behalf. He did so notwithstanding orders and notations made on 8 November 2024 and 31 January 2025 recording the parties were prohibited from cross-examining one another personally at the final hearing,[2] and directing the husband to access legal representation through the Commonwealth Family Violence and Cross-Examination of Parties Scheme ("the Scheme").
3. The husband had not filed trial documents in accordance with trial directions made at a compliance and readiness hearing on 8 November 2024. I was informed by counsel for the wife he had filed documents which had been removed from the court portal as they were not in proper form.
4. The matter was stood down for the whole of the first morning of the hearing to provide the husband with an opportunity to speak with a duty lawyer but he was unable to seek advice due to limited services available. I assisted the husband by providing him with information about the way in which the final hearing would be conducted and providing him with copies of key provisions of the Act relating to the determination of parenting and property matters (including sections 60B, 60CA, 60CC, 61CA, 61D, 61DAA and 61AB and sections 79 and 75). I informed the husband of applications that were available to him, including an application for an adjournment or an application for leave to rely on a late-filed or previously filed affidavit and financial statement. I also directed him to the website of Victoria Legal Aid to resources for parties conducting their own family law case.
5. Both parties were offered assistance from the Family Advocacy and Support Service.

1. At my invitation, the husband made an oral application to rely on previously filed court documents. He sought leave to rely on an affidavit filed on 8 November 2024. Leave was refused to rely on that affidavit which contained only 12 paragraphs, largely consisting of submissions of little relevance to the issues in dispute, and annexed some 260 pages of documents including further submissions. The husband was also refused leave to rely on a financial statement filed on 8 November 2024, which he said was not reflective of his current circumstances and perhaps only 90% accurate and where he did not provide any explanation from the bar table as to why he had not filed an updated financial statement as directed.
2. Via her counsel, the wife made an oral application to proceed with her application for final orders on an undefended basis. That application was refused and the husband was permitted to participate in the hearing, tender documents, cross-examine witnesses other than the wife, and make submissions.
3. I then dealt with the husband's Application in a Proceeding filed on 17 April 2025, in effect seeking the family report by panel family consultant Ms L ("family consultant") dated 2 April 2025 ("family report") be excluded as evidence in the proceeding. In respect of that application, the husband relied on an affidavit filed on 17 April 2025 which consisted largely of submissions. The wife relied on her Response to an Application in a Proceeding filed on 22 May 2025 and a supporting affidavit filed the same day. After hearing submissions from and/or on behalf of both parties, I refused the husband's application, providing oral reasons for my decision. In short, I found the family report had been properly prepared relying on material permitted by orders of the court (including documents produced to the court pursuant to information sharing provisions of the Act), the husband had not adduced evidence to challenge the information relied upon by the family consultant, and it was open to him to arrange for the family consultant's attendance at court for cross-examination to challenge her evidence.

1. At the outset of the hearing, I discussed with the husband and with counsel for the wife the issues in dispute. A small number of issues resolved during the course of the hearing leaving the following issues requiring determination:

(a) How should decision-making responsibility for Y be allocated? This requires particular consideration of the capacity of the parties to communicate safely and effectively, to the extent required to consult with one another and make joint decisions in a timely manner;

(b) Should Y live with the wife or the husband? And, in either case, what time should she spend with the other parent? This requires an assessment of:

(i) Y's safety, including her emotional safety, in the care of the husband;

(ii) If Y would be unsafe spending time with the husband, what (if any) measures can be implemented to adequately ameliorate the risks to her safety; and

(iii) The capacity of each parent to provide for Y's needs, including her psychological and emotional needs;

(c) Determination of the above two issues requires an assessment of the wife's allegations of abuse and family violence and consideration of the husband's mental health;

(d) Can the court make the injunctions sought by the wife given the provisions of section 114AB of the Act? If so, are the injunctions appropriate for Y's welfare?

(e) What other orders sought by the parties (if any), including for consultation and communication as proposed by the husband, are in Y's best interests?

(f) In respect of the assets and liabilities to be included on what I will refer to as the balance sheet, representing the assets and liabilities for division between the parties:

(i) What value should be attributed to the former family home at Property B, Suburb C, Western Australia ("Property B")?

(ii) Should the interest the husband has on title in Property D be included on the balance sheet? If so, what value should be attributed to that interest in the absence of an expert valuation?

(iii) How should those assets of the husband, the value of which are unknown, be treated, where it is asserted by the wife he has not made full and frank disclosure of his financial position?

(g) How should the parties' contributions be assessed in the context of a marriage with approximately 23 years of cohabitation, three children and approximately 2.5 years of separation? This requires consideration in particular of the wife's allegations of family violence and her contention that the family violence she was subjected to significantly impacted her contributions, making them more arduous than they otherwise would have been;

(h) What, if any, adjustment should be made to the contribution-based assessment pursuant to section 75(2) of the Act?

(i) Should an order be made requiring the sale of Property B or should the husband first have the opportunity to retain that property and make an adjusting payment to the wife?

(j) If Property B is sold:

(i) Should the wife have control of the sale as she seeks?

(ii) Should outstanding school fees and rates be paid from the sale proceeds before division between the parties?

(k) Are the terms of orders sought by the wife otherwise appropriate?

(a) Further, further amended Initiating Application filed on 28 April 2025 ("wife's application");

(b) Updated financial statement filed on 28 April 2025;

(c) Affidavit filed on 28 April 2025 (sealed on 29 April 2025), with leave where it was filed one day later than required;

(d) The family report;

(e) Outline of case document (final hearing) ("case outline") filed on 22 May 2025; and

(f) Minute of superannuation splitting orders sought, submitted by email on 27 May 2025 ("wife's minute"),[3] which counsel advised includes an updated reference to amended superannuation regulations but otherwise reflects the superannuation splitting orders in the wife's application.

1. The husband relied upon his response.
2. Each of the parties relied on tendered documents which were marked as exhibits. Tables and graphs prepared by the husband, including from data he submitted was taken from the parties' tax returns was not admitted, where I was not satisfied the requirements of section 50 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ("Evidence Act") were met in respect of those summaries. The husband was instead invited to tender the taxation documents from which he had taken that data and he did that.
3. The parties helpfully tendered a joint balance sheet on the second day of the hearing, having reached agreement on a number of items on the balance sheet.[4]
4. Pursuant to an order made on 8 November 2024, the husband submitted a lengthy list of authorities intended to be referred to at the hearing but none of those cases were ultimately referenced by him.

1. Section 69ZT of the Act provides certain rules of evidence do not apply to the child-related aspect of this proceeding (the court not having been asked to decide otherwise), with evidence admitted as a consequence of that provision to be given such weight as the court thinks fit. Section 69ZT does not apply to property proceedings and there is no dispensation of the rules of evidence in relation to that aspect of the case.
2. Section 140 of the Evidence Act provides as follows:

(1) In a civil proceeding, the court must find the case of a party proved if it is satisfied that the case has been proved on the balance of probabilities.

(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account:

(a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and

(b) the nature of the subject‑matter of the proceeding; and

(c) the gravity of the matters alleged.

1. In assessing the evidence, I have applied the balance of probabilities as the standard of proof. I have taken into account in particular, the gravity of the allegations of abuse and family violence made by the wife and of the orders sought by her which would see aspects of the husband's parental responsibility removed and may result in Y not spending time or communicating with the husband.
2. I have read and carefully considered all of the evidence before the court. Statements of fact in my reasons reflect findings of fact. If I have not mentioned a piece of evidence or an argument presented at the hearing that does not mean I have not considered it. As the High Court said in Whisprun Pty Ltd v Dixon:[5]

A judge's reasons are not required to mention every fact or argument relied on by the losing party as relevant to an issue. Judgments of trial judges would soon become longer than they already are if a judge's failure to mention such facts and arguments would be evidence that he or she had not properly considered the losing party's case.

1. The husband did not file a trial affidavit in admissible form to contradict the evidence of the wife. Whilst the wife's evidence was not challenged by cross-examination, I am mindful the husband was precluded from cross-examining the wife by the operation of section 102NA of the Act. That being said, he had ample opportunity to engage legal representation under the Scheme and did not do so. The wife's evidence was detailed, plausible, supported by the accounts provided by the family to the family report writer and generally consistent with tendered documents. I therefore accept her evidence.
2. The husband did not adduce evidence to contradict the information relied upon by the family consultant. He did not avail himself of the opportunity to call the family consultant to attend the final hearing to be cross-examined. The family consultant's expertise and evidence is therefore unchallenged. I have considered the family consultant's evidence carefully, along with all other evidence. I accept and have been assisted by the family consultant's account of Y's reported experiences and views, along with those of her siblings, and I put significant weight on those accounts and the family consultant's unchallenged expert opinions.

1. The wife has provided a detailed account of the parties' relationship, including their financial relationship and her allegations of family violence, and what has transpired after separation. Her trial affidavit is lengthy, running to 96 pages, excluding annexures. I will not recount that background in detail.
2. The parties began living together in around March 2000, initially renting before moving into Property B upon the purchase of that property. They married in 2003 and separated on 4 April 2022. A divorce order was made shortly prior to the final hearing, in early 2025.
3. X was born in 2005 and is 19. Z was born in 2007 and has recently turned 18. Y was born in 2011 and is 14.
4. I accept the wife was primarily responsible for the children's care during the parties' relationship, with the husband taking on a greater role in the children's care than he had previously done after he was retrenched in 2016 from a long-standing position of employment.
5. In early 2022, the family relocated from Perth to Melbourne, moving into a rental property in Suburb M ("Suburb M").

1. On 4 April 2022, the parties separated but remained living under the same roof. In March 2023, the wife moved out of Suburb M with the children. The wife gave evidence that when she informed the husband on that day that she was moving out, he became angry, started grabbing her belongings and throwing them into the driveway, before locking the doors and preventing her from taking any further belongings. She applied for an intervention order and an interim order was made in March 2023.

1. The children have lived with the wife since March 2023.
2. Y has not spent time with the husband since September 2023. What transpired on this day is described by the wife in her trial affidavit, by the parties and the children to the family report writer, in documents tendered by the husband,[6] including Y's police statement and in police records tendered by the wife.[7] Y described there was a verbal argument between the husband and Z while she and Z were spending time with the husband at his home. She said the argument was about the husband's "controlling parenting style". Y reported Z said he wanted to leave and the husband then yelled at Z, including to "get out" and to wait for the wife outside. Z phoned the wife and she and X drove to collect him and Y. Z left the husband's home. Y attempted to follow him. The husband grabbed the backpack Y was wearing and forcefully pulled her back, causing her to stumble. The husband yelled at Y that she could not leave. The husband locked all gates and doors at his home, preventing Y from leaving. The wife deposed that while she and X spoke with Y over the phone during this incident, Y was crying and said she felt unsafe. They heard her say loudly "Don't touch him Dad!" (referring to Z) and then in a loud, distressed, high pitched voice, "No! No! Don't touch me". The wife phoned the police. When the police attended, the husband initially refused to open the door or let the police speak to Y. After five minutes he opened the front door but not a locked flyscreen door. When asked by police, Y said she wanted to leave the house and speak with police. The husband did not allow Y to leave the house for more than 20 minutes after the police arrived. Following this incident Y wrote in her police statement "I am in fear of my Dad and I don't want to go and stay with him anymore". I accept Y was fearful. She explained her fear to the family consultant in the following terms:

[Y] said the incident when her father pulled her by her backpack and detained her in his house was the first time that he has directly hurt her. [Y] described her father aggressively arguing with [Z] who called their mother to collect him, it was at least two hours from the argument starting to her being able to leave, her father did not care she was scared, panicking or crying, her father yelled at police they did not have a warrant and he would not allow [Y] to leave, she was worried her father would go to jail and was scared for him and she was uncertain if she fell when her father was pulling her by her backpack into the house. [Y] appeared very distressed recalling this incident.

1. Y's account was supported by Z's account provided to the family consultant and was consistent with the other evidence I have already mentioned. I accept Y has provided an honest account of what she experienced to the family report writer.
2. Following this incident, the husband was served with a family violence notice. Police investigated a potential charge of unlawful assault but prosecution was not authorised. The police applied for an intervention order on behalf of the wife, X, Z and Y. The wife deposed that application resulted in the current (final) intervention orders being made to protect the wife and all three children.

1. On 21 September 2023, the wife commenced this proceeding, by filing an Initiating Application seeking property orders. It is not clear why she filed her application in the Brisbane registry given the parties and children live in Melbourne. The husband attended some but not all court events. He did not file court documents in accordance with the court rules or numerous orders of the court. Numerous notations refer to documents inappropriately filed by the husband, provided him with guidance and encouraged him to seek legal advice, including information about where he might seek free legal services. Orders were made in contemplation of the matter proceeding on an undefended basis but ultimately the husband was provided with further opportunities to file documents and participate in the proceeding.
2. The matter was transferred to the Melbourne registry by way of order made on 7 June 2024. It was not until 16 September 2024 that the husband filed a Response to Initiating Application, after the proceedings had been on foot for almost a year. His Response introduced an application for parenting orders. That application (for parenting orders) was initially dismissed by way of an order made on 23 October 2024. A further application for final parenting orders was made by the husband's Amended Response.
3. On 8 November 2024, at a compliance and readiness hearing, orders and directions were made listing the matter for final hearing commencing on 26 May 2025 and providing for the preparation of a family report. Both parties and all three of their children attended interviews for the purpose of that report, from 25 to 27 February 2025.
4. An order made on 8 November 2024 confirmed the mandatory prohibition on the parties cross-examining one another personally pursuant to section 102NA(1)(c)(ii) of the Act and required the husband to do all things necessary to make an application to Victoria Legal Aid for funding under the Scheme to enable him to be represented at the final hearing on 26 May 2025. Notations made to those orders set out the potential consequences of non-compliance with the orders and trial directions made that day, including that the proceedings may be directed to proceed undefended.
5. On 19 December 2024, the husband filed an Application in a Proceeding seeking interim parenting orders. That application was dismissed on 31 January 2025 when the husband failed to attend the hearing. There are no interim parenting orders in place.

1. The wife is employed as an educator at H School. She lives with Y, Z and X in a rented two-bedroom unit in Suburb N. She has not re-partnered.
2. The family consultant reported the husband informed her he is unemployed, previously lived in a rented house in Suburb M and has not re-partnered. Little is otherwise known of the husband's current circumstances.
3. Y is completing year 9 at G School. She is reported to be in good health, doing well socially and achieving well academically.
4. Z turned 18 after the final hearing. He is currently completing year 12 at H School. He has a part-time job and is otherwise supported financially by the wife.
5. X is now an adult. She is engaged in full-time study at university, undertaking studies and performing well. She undertakes some part-time work as a retail assistant and as an intern. The wife continues to provide X with housing, use of her car, financial and emotional support.

1. Part VII of the Act contains the statutory provisions applying to the making of parenting orders.

Objects of Part VII of the Act, relating to children

1. The objects of Part VII, as amended by the Family Law Amendment Act 2023 (Cth), are set out in section 60B of the Act, as follows:

(a) to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety; and

(b) to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989.

1. Those objects provide context and assist with interpretation of Part VII, and I have had regard to them. In particular, I have regard to Parliament's intention when amending Part VII[8], that "safety is a fundamental consideration when considering the best interests of the child".

1. Section 65D(1) of the Act provides that, subject to some other provisions, the court may make such parenting order as it thinks proper. Section 60CA makes clear that in deciding whether to make a particular parenting order, a court must regard the best interests of a child as the paramount consideration. In determining the best interests of a child, section 60CC(1)(a) provides the court must consider the matters set out in section 60CC(2), under the heading General considerations.
2. Section 43(1)(ca) of the Act requires the court to have regard to the need to ensure protection from family violence. Section 60CG(1) provides that in considering what order to make, the court must, to the extent that it is possible to do so consistently with the child's best interests being the paramount consideration, ensure the order is consistent with any family violence order and does not expose a person to an unacceptable risk of family violence.
3. In making my decision in relation to Y, I have considered these and all other relevant sections of the Act. My consideration of those matters in section 60CC(2) follows.

What arrangements would promote the safety (including safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm) of Y and each person who has care of her (whether or not a person has parental responsibility for her): section 60CC(2)(a)

1. When considering those matters in section 60CC(2)(a), the court is required to consider the matters set out in section 60CC(2A) as follows:

(a) any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving the child or a person caring for the child (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for the child); and

(b) any family violence order that applies or has applied to the child or a member of the child's family.

Any history of family violence, abuse or neglect involving Y or a person caring for her (whether or not the person had parental responsibility for Y): section 60CC(2A)(a)

1. Family violence" is defined in section 4AB(1) of the Act as follows:

(1) For the purposes of this Act, family violence means violent, threatening or other behaviour by a person that coerces or controls a member of the person's family (the family member), or causes the family member to be fearful.

A non-exhaustive list of examples of behaviour that may constitute family violence are set out in section 4AB(2).

1. Section 4AB(3) provides that a child is exposed to family violence, as defined, if the child sees or hears family violence or otherwise experiences the effects of family violence.
2. Relevant to this matter, "abuse" in relation to a child is defined in section 4(1) as follows:

(a) an assault [...] of the child; or

(b) [...]

(c) causing the child to suffer serious psychological harm, including (but not limited to) when that harm is caused by the child being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence; or

(d) [...]

1. To the family consultant, each of X, Z and Y referred to the husband subjecting them to physical family violence, which I find constitutes abuse. They each described being fearful of him. For example, the family consultant reported:

[X] described her father as a "harsh", "strict" and "intense parent" who "pressured" them "a lot" and they were "scared to do the wrong thing". [X] said her father would "shout" and "hit" her and [Z], he "often hit and smacked" her and [Z] with an open hand, leaving "red marks" and her father hit much harder than would be considered discipline. [X] remembers occasions she had to attend school late waiting for the red marks to fade. [X] recalled "strict chores" and being "hit" frequently in year eight and nine. [X] said she was hit by her father on her "legs, arms and back", the "pain was seven or eight out of ten", "it really hurt", she lived in "fear of being hit" and her father did not say "sorry" he believes he is "justified".

[Z] said he remembers his father pushing and holding him against the wall when he was aged 15 and 16, his father has pushed, shouldered and shoved him, yelled and shouted, grabbed him around the shoulders by his shirt and did not hit him. [Z] appeared to retract saying he was uncertain and maybe his father had hit him. [Z] said his father behaved like this when any of the children did not meet expectations.

(c) In respect of Y, I have already described the fear she reported following the incident in September 2023 when the husband prevented her from leaving his home with Z. The family consultant also reported:

[Y] remembers her father smashing her mother's phone when he was angry. [Y] said her father scares her, her mother and her siblings, that his behaviour and anger has become worse over time. [Y] described incidents of yelling, threatening, pushing and property damage.

[Y] said it was not great growing up seeing her father hurt [X] and [Z] and he hurt her siblings more than he hurt her and she appeared reluctant to provide details. [Y] said she was obedient and did not argue or fight back, she was obedient out of persistent fear and she was aware she could be hurt by her father.

[Y] intermittently cried, trembled, picked her fingers, turned away from the writer and she appeared generally anxious. [Y] said talking to the writer hurts and remembering her father's behaviour is scary.

1. The wife provided detailed evidence on affidavit in respect of her allegations the husband has subjected her to family violence, including in the presence of the children, and that he has subjected the children to family violence, including family violence constituting abuse.
2. The wife's evidence spanned many pages and provided detailed accounts of conduct she was subjected to by the husband which I find constitutes family violence, including: physical and sexual assaults (including as described later in my reasons); physical intimidation (including standing over her and shouting in her face); repeated derogatory taunts (including calling her "obese" and an "idiot" and criticising her appearance and her parenting); threats (including in 2022, "You are a problem, you have to go" and "It will be better when you are out of the picture"); property damage (including swiping items off the table when angry and smashing Z's phone in a rage); throwing the wife's belongings into the driveway when she was vacating the former family home; financially controlling behaviour constituting economic abuse (including telling the wife she could not have a gym membership while purchasing leisure items for himself, locking the wife out of the home so she could not return to collect her belongings after informing him she was moving out, and preventing her access to items now held in storage); coercive behaviour (including threatening to call the police, and withholding the children from accompanying the wife when she left the family home then reporting the children as kidnapped when she returned to collect them); and isolating the wife from her family and friends (including by insisting on accompanying her to social events and then behaving rudely to her friends). I have provided only a handful of examples. The wife's trial affidavit is replete with others.
3. I will not recount the wife's evidence of the husband's violent and coercive and controlling behaviour in detail. I have already referred to the incident involving Y in September 2023. I will provide two earlier examples, to indicate the severity of the family violence the wife was subjected to and the children were exposed to. That these incidents occurred in 2010 and 2013 provides the context of fear in which the subsequent abuse and family violence reported by the wife and children must be viewed. That these incidents of family violence occurred in the context of the husband experiencing poor mental health is also significant.
4. Tendered police records[9] record that in 2010, at a time the wife was pregnant with Y, the wife reported the husband undressed X and Z and brought them into the parties' bedroom, told the wife they were going to have a "naked night" and removed her clothing. At that time X was aged four and Z aged two. The wife deposed the husband initiated sex with her in their bedroom and she said no. She said he taunted her, then became aggressive and physically pinned her down. The wife wrestled herself free, ran away from the husband and phoned 000, informing responders the husband was having a psychotic or mental health episode and asking for assistance. She ran outside, naked. The husband attacked her in the backyard. Z was standing at the gate, calling "Mum". The husband forced a lemon into the wife's mouth. She gave evidence she was struggling to breathe and thought she was going to die. She ran back inside. The husband pursued her into their bedroom. He forced the wife's mobile phone into her vagina. The husband forced his penis into the wife's mouth. The police arrived and restrained the husband. Tendered police records[10] describe the police arriving to find both parties naked in the bedroom, kneeling on the bed, and the husband holding the wife in a headlock. Police records record Z was also in the room when they arrived and that police observed blood coming from his nose, and that both X and Z were reported to have witnessed, at least in part, the sexual assaults perpetrated by the husband against the wife. Police were required to force the husband to release his grip on the wife and reported the husband resisting violently, including trying to punch, kick and spit on police. Police described the husband's strength was "immense" and that it took four police to restrain and handcuff him. The husband was sedated and the wife was told he was taken to a high security mental health hospital facility. The wife deposed there is much she cannot remember about this night, including how she became naked (although her account of that was reflected in subpoenaed police records). I acknowledge her incomplete memory may be a result of the trauma she experienced and I do not find it impacts the reliability of her other evidence. The wife has a strong memory in respect of other aspects of what occurred and her evidence is supported by what the police observed when they arrived. The husband was charged with criminal offences as a result of his violent behaviour on this occasion. I accept the wife felt pressure from the husband's family to withdraw her support for the charges and to allow him to return to the family home after his mental health treatment as she deposed. However, the wife did not give evidence of the outcome of those proceedings. It is unclear if she did succumb to pressure to withdraw her support for the proceedings and if the husband was convicted of any offence in relation to this or any other incident of family violence involving the wife and children.
5. In October 2013, the husband's parents visited the parties and children. They travelled together for a family camping holiday. The children were at this time aged seven, six and two. The wife deposed to increasingly aggressive behaviour by the husband during this time. She gave evidence that while driving with the wife and children in the car as passengers, and with his parents following in another car, the husband began driving slowly and put the car in reverse, driving into oncoming traffic. The wife grabbed the steering wheel and steered the car off the road. She unlocked the doors and X helped Y out of the car. While getting out, Z said, "Dad's going to rip my jumper", from which I infer the husband was trying to restrain Z and prevent him from leaving the vehicle. The wife deposed the husband's parents had pulled over and the wife told the children to go to their car. The husband's parents came to the car. The husband's father pleaded with the husband to stop and then left, driving the children to safety. The wife deposed the husband's mother stayed to try and help her, as by this time the husband was physically holding the wife in the car and wouldn't allow her to leave. Tendered police records[11] record the police being called and being informed the husband was having a nervous breakdown, and the caller being concerned for the wife's safety. The wife recalls the husband put her in the boot of the car and the husband's mother helped her to escape. The wife and the husband's mother ran away from the husband, down the road. They did not have phones with them. They waved down a passing motorist who took them to the local police station, which was closed. A passerby saw their distress and stopped to assist. He happened to be an off-duty police officer. The tendered police records describe emergency services attended to assist the husband and had to break windows to get him out of the car, and that he was then taken by ambulance to hospital and then transferred to a psychiatric hospital.
6. In relation to those incidents in 2010 and 2013, the husband made the following submissions:

So the significant [...] events are 2010, 2013, and both of them have the same precursor attributes, sleep deprivation, stress, and rapid changes in medication, and the period getting to having no medication was by taking very small steps in - downward steps in medication and managing sleep levels and the rest of it

The 2010 event was not violent to anyone. It was probably - possibly traumatic but it's not violent.

So given that we were in a 20-year relationship, a isolated event in 2010, a non-violent event in 2013, so not violent to any particular person, aside from me getting dragged out of the car, and that's traumatic for the kids to look at. And similarly, [X] and [Z] were in the car that day, and that's a traumatic event to them, to witness their dad getting dragged out of the car. And then when [the police] are in the house, waking me out of bed - you know, I would envisage that their anxiety levels are raised incredibly high by that illegal entry on the house.

1. These submissions displayed an extraordinary lack of insight by the husband into the nature and impact of his violent and abusive behaviour on the wife and children as did the following admissions and submissions made by him at the final hearing:

(a) He admitted putting the wife in a headlock, although sought to distinguish this from her allegation of choking, submitting "A headlock is not a chokehold", "A chokehold is strangulation. A headlock is restraint. Police use it all the time";

(b) He denied "frequently" hitting the children but admitted, "I gave [X] a smack on the leg because she was offensively rude"; and

(c) He admitted throwing the wife's clothes on to the lawn on the day she vacated the parties' rented home, submitting, "They had to go be somewhere. I don't want the risk of - you know, it is a risky venture to have [the wife] in my vicinity. I don't particularly want it" and "If I put your stuff on the lawn or in the driveway for you to collect, that means you and your colleagues and I don't have a conflict. You can collect your stuff from there, and you can go".

Notwithstanding these admissions, the husband told the family consultant there was no family violence during the parties' relationship, alleging the wife was making "retrospective claims and allegations".

1. When I asked the husband about the distinction in his mind between a headlock and a chokehold, suggesting this submission might be viewed as seeking to minimise and not take responsibility for something that was a very serious form of family violence against the wife, he responded:

I think in that [...] police report says that [the wife] had no bruises or cuts on her that day. So that's a statement [...] of restraint of that event.

I don't see the "lethal force" that the court reporter has claimed in her report. I don't share that point of view. I think that's incorrect. I think [...] that is the tail wagging the dog.

1. When asked if he was suggesting that because the wife was not injured this was not a serious event, the husband responded (in part):

I am suggesting the interpretation that a headlock is fatal is not necessarily true. There was more restraint than what has been interpreted in that report.

1. In relation to his behaviour towards the children, the husband submitted "I did a lot of the stern parenting. So 'stern' would be the [...] more accurate word. I don't think it would be 'violent'". The family consultant reported the husband admitted shouting at the children. She said he explained he considered this was effective parenting, and his views that "shouting is what gets [Z] to school" and that shouting and his parenting style was "correlative" and "causative" on Z's increased attendance and achievement at school.
2. In respect of the family consultant's assessment of the incident in September 2023, the husband made the following submission, seeming to categorise the incident as a product of parental conflict rather than acknowledging he engaged in family violence (including by pulling Y by the backpack, and restraining her from leaving his home, causing her fear):

[...] the backpack incident. That's - that is that there are strong elements here. That's interpretation and incorrect, and that is - introduces bias and introduces a perception on how you make your decisions, and in the absence of myself, the conflict of separating parents has gone, and that is not family violence, in itself. That's two parents - two people separating, and that's stressful for the kids. So to say "stress without Dad" is probably one-half, at least, of not having the conflict of their former parents. So I'm surprised that this report is written at that level.

1. In relation to the children's accounts and views as reported by the family consultant, including their fear of spending time with the husband, I accept this reflects their lived experience of being subjected to the husband's authoritarian parenting approach, abuse and family violence and from being exposed to the family violence perpetrated by him against the wife. I do not accept the husband's submission that this is an "environmental thing" or a product of "engineering", from which I infer he means the children's views have been influenced by the wife.
2. In relation to the impact of the husband's abuse and family violence on the children, the family consultant provided the following assessment:

It appears life has been tumultuous for the children; they have had numerous experiences throughout their lives that could be considered adverse childhood experiences (ACEs). Adverse childhood experiences are stressful or traumatic events such as child abuse, parental separation, parental illness or family violence that occur during childhood that can have a lasting impact on a child's development and wellbeing and are linked to poorer outcomes in adulthood such as unemployment, poor academic achievement, substance misuse, difficulty with meaningful relationships and poor health. The children have highly likely lived through the family violence reported by their mother, endured their father's mental health instability and endured his unpredictable and abusive behaviour. The children have watched their father physically and sexually assault their mother, they have been physically, verbally and emotionally abused by their father, [Y] was seemingly fearful for her life when detained by her father requiring police intervention and the children have been forced into academic study and behavioural standards beyond reasonable expectation by their father. It is apparent the children learned in their early formative years to create safety for themselves and their mother by appeasing and accommodating their father, this is a common trauma response for children designed as a self- preservation to mitigate the future risks of being abused. None of the children could recall a happy or safe memory of their father, they expressed fearfulness and preparedness to continue with actions of appeasement. The children expressed being happier and safer without the presence of [the husband] in their lives, they are reportedly achieving well academically and socially since they ceased spending time and they each have positive aspirations for their lives.

1. The family consultant provided the following assessment in respect of the wife's allegations of family violence:

[The wife] provides a consistent narrative regarding family violence persistent throughout the relationship; it is of significant concern that high risk factors for lethal family violence such as choking (headlock), physical assault during pregnancy and sexual assault have been reported. Coercive control is a form of family violence characterised by a pattern perpetrator behaviour that can isolate, intimidate, embarrass and undermine the victim. Coercive control can be inconspicuous outside of the relationship and can include gaslighting, name calling, weaponising children, impeding health care and treatment, derisive criticism and disempowerment through financial control. [The wife's] reporting of family violence appears indicative of coercive control and there appears a pattern of [the husband] controlling [the wife] and the children through psychologically coercive and physically abusive behaviour.

1. Having considered all of the evidence, I am satisfied the husband subjected the children to abuse and family violence, including in the form of physical and emotional abuse and coercive and controlling parenting behaviour. I am also satisfied he subjected the wife to family violence in the various forms she described, as summarised earlier in my reasons, including coercive and controlling behaviour, and that the children were exposed to that violence. It is evident his violent and coercive behaviour has had a significant impact on each of the wife and children, as described by the family consultant. I accept they are genuinely fearful of him.
2. In respect of the husband's denial of family violence, the family consultant expressed concern and alarm, including as follows:

[The husband's] denial considering the collateral information is concerning and his determination to right what he perceives as injustices against him is alarming, his Freedom of Information application to obtain victim statements is highly concerning and raises questions of rumination on injustice and systems abuse

1. In relation to the wife's allegation of systems abuse, I accept the husband has engaged in conduct to coerce the wife in the context of the intervention order proceedings initiated against him by the police, which I will refer to shortly.
2. In a broader context, I note the family report writer's concern in relation to a freedom of information request made by the husband, but that application was not the subject of evidence from or tendered by the wife. I also note the wife's evidence the husband misrepresented to Child Support he had 50% care of the children, after the intervention orders were made and the children were not spending time with him, but the child support records were not adduced. In respect of the husband's conduct in this proceeding, whilst the wife made submissions about that in her affidavit, she did not adduce evidence of the correspondence from the husband and court documents filed by him which she referred to. That may be because she is intending to rely on that material in support of her application for costs rather than in support of her substantive application. Nevertheless, on the evidence before me, I am not persuaded the husband has engaged in conduct constituting coercive and controlling behaviour in the form of systems abuse beyond the context of the intervention order proceedings.

Any family violence order that applies or has applied to Y or a member of her family: section 60CC(2A)(b)

1. I have referred to the police application for an intervention order to protect the wife and children from family violence by the husband following the incident in September 2023. Final intervention orders were made against the husband in early 2024, naming each of the wife and the parties' children as protected persons ("final intervention orders").[12] Those orders were made following a contested hearing, and will be in place for a period of 10 years, expiring in early 2034. From the duration of the orders, I infer the presiding Magistrate assessed the wife and children were at high risk of being subjected to family violence by the husband in the future.
2. The wife deposed the husband made an application for an intervention order in retaliation to the police application which was dismissed when he failed to attend at court. He subsequently brought another application which was heard and dismissed in late 2024. In the absence of evidence adduced by the husband to the contrary, I accept the wife's evidence the presiding Magistrate referred to the claims as "vexatious, an embarrassing abuse of process, without merit and with no evidence".
3. As mentioned, there was an earlier interim intervention order made upon the wife's application following the parties' separation. She deposed that proceeding was resolved by her accepting an undertaking given by the husband which remained in place until mid-2024.
4. The husband is particularly aggrieved by the final intervention orders. He informed the family consultant and the court he will not spend time with the children unless the final intervention orders are revoked. He reported from the bar table that there is an application before the Magistrates Court seeking to vary and revoke the orders but counsel for the wife said that application had not been served or disclosed and the husband did not adduce evidence of it. He also asked this court to revoke the intervention orders protecting the children. Whilst this court can make orders that have the effect of varying a state family violence order,[13] such an order is not required in this matter even if I determine it is in Y's best interests to spend time or communicate with the husband, because the intervention order naming her as a protected person permits the husband to do anything that is permitted by a Family Law Act order.

1. The wife's evidence, and police and other records tendered by the wife raise very serious concerns about the husband's mental health and his behaviour while experiencing poor mental health.
2. The wife deposed to the husband receiving mental health treatment during their relationship, particularly after the violent incidents I have recounted, in 2010 and 2013. She gave evidence that a psychiatrist she attended upon in late 2022, accompanied at one session by the husband, wrote to her general practitioner expressing an opinion the husband had possible schizoaffective disorder with bipolar. To the family consultant, the wife reported the husband had experienced mental health issues or symptoms including paranoia, "intense cyclical conversations", "hyper fixation", inflexibility, fixation on himself, aggressive behaviour and agitation.
3. Tendered police records relating to an attendance at the family home in November 2022[14] record the following impression of attending police (the "resp" being identified as the husband):

IT IS CLEAR THE RESP SUFFERS FROM SOME MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES. RESP WAS ARGUMENTATIVE AND UNCOOPERATIVE WITH POLICE AND DISPLAYED SIGNS OF MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES. RESP IS IN STRONG DENIAL OF ANY MENTAL HEALTH ISSUES AND BECAME AGGRESSIVE WHEN OFFERED E REFERRAL FOR MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES.

1. Those records also documented that each of the wife and children (interviewed separately from their parents) reported noticing a decline in the husband's mental health at this time.
2. The husband's own account to the family consultant, although contradictory, acknowledges historical mental health concerns and an apparent lack of treatment, at least currently but likely for some time. The family consultant reported the husband said the following to her in respect of his mental health:

[The husband] said "historically" he "possibly" had mental health concerns, when prompted he denied any diagnosis and appeared verbose and evasive. [The husband] said, "fifteen or ten years ago" he had a "brief psychotic episode" and parroted questions back at the writer. [The husband] said he was prescribed "antipsychotics for six months" with the "dose increasing over time", that the "agreement" was medication for six months and despite the "doctor" not agreeing he ceased the antipsychotic medication after six months. When prompted about his symptoms and behaviour during that time, [the husband] replied "I'm not telling you, you're not a psychiatrist". When prompted again, he said [the wife] "made" him see a doctor and that he had "no psychotic behaviour", that he "agreed to medication" to "help with diagnosis".

When prompted again about a diagnosis, [the husband] said "no" and then "effectively" and when prompted what effectively meant he said, "can I finish my story". [The husband] said he was admitted to a psychiatric hospital for around one week when he ceased the antipsychotic medication as he was experiencing "work and family stress" such as [the wife] waking him when she got up in the night to "breastfeed". [The husband] said he was a "voluntary patient" in the community. [The husband] said, "it's a misnomer to say this was mental health treatment". He appeared sarcastic, denied any diagnosis, when prompted did not answer and he had to be asked three times to stop what appeared a tangential explanation of the chemical functioning of antipsychotic medication rather than state how the medication assisted him.

[The husband] said information about the "[Hospital F]" and the police "welfare check" is inaccurate, there are "no records" that he had a "mental health episode" and he questioned if police "lie". [The husband] said, "I have not been in the care of a mental health professional" and he has not taken "medication for eight years or so".

1. There is no expert psychiatric or psychological evidence before the court in relation to the husband's mental health, in the form of a single expert assessment. The husband has not adduced any evidence from treating professionals. This means I cannot assess the current state of the husband's mental health, including his capacity to safely care for Y.
2. In relation to the relationship between the husband's mental health and the abuse and family violence he has perpetrated, the family consultant provided the following expert opinion:

[The husband's] mental health appears both a precipitating and perpetuating factor in his use of violence. Whilst a diagnosis may aid in understanding [the husband's] behaviour and guide treatment and risk mitigation, it does not explain nor excuse his perpetration of child abuse nor his perpetration of family violence.

1. I accept that expert evidence. I acknowledge the wife's evidence that she also now has an understanding that the husband's mental health does not explain or excuse his violent and controlling behaviour, having gained a better understanding of family violence herself.

Consideration of section 60CC(2)(a) - arrangements that would promote the safety of the Y and each person who has care of her (assessment of risk)

1. Given my findings in respect of abuse and family violence perpetrated by the husband and the evidence in relation to his mental health, it is necessary to undertake an assessment of the potential risk of harm to Y if she was to spend time with the husband and determine if it is an unacceptable risk.
2. The test of "unacceptable risk" was explained by the High Court in M v M.[15] In short, the court is required to balance the risk of detriment to a child from the harm of abuse and the possibility of benefit to the child of living with or spending time with a parent.[16] It is now well established that this assessment applies to allegations of children being at risk of physical and emotional harm for reasons other than abuse.[17]
3. The approach to be taken by the court to considering if there is an unacceptable risk of harm to children was clarified in Isles & Nelissen. The Full Court explained the distinction between fact finding, applying the civil standard of proof, on the balance of probabilities, and the assessment of risk which is not required to be proven on the balance of probabilities but is to be "postulated from known historical facts and present circumstance".[18] The evidence-based finding made about the existence of any unacceptable risk of harm is then just one consideration to be taken into account when the court exercises its overall discretionary judgment to make orders in the children's best interests, influenced by the various considerations required by section 60CC.[19]
4. The husband has engaged in very serious forms of family violence, including violence the family consultant reported is associated with a high risk of lethality, being choking. I find this occurred twice during the series of abuses perpetrated by him against the wife in 2010. First, in the form of inserting a lemon in the wife's mouth, with the effect of restricting her ability to breathe; and second, by placing her in a headlock. He has hit the children. He restrained Y and prevented her from leaving his home in September 2023, causing her to be afraid.
5. I find the magnitude of harm that may be caused to Y if she was to be subjected to or exposed to such family violence is extremely high. This risk includes Y being subjected to physical family violence and abuse. It also includes the risk of the wife being subjected to further physical violence, including being seriously injured or killed, which I find would cause Y devastating psychological and emotional harm. In conjunction with those risks, I find there is a risk of psychological and emotional harm to Y, if she was required to spend time with the husband given her past experiences of being subjected to and exposed to family violence by the husband and her fear of him.
6. In his interview with the family consultant, the husband showed no insight into his behaviour constituting family violence or of the impact of his behaviour on the wife and children, including as I have already outlined and as encapsulated by the following comments reported by the family consultant:

[The husband] said he "expects" the writer "will see staged" behaviour by [the wife] and the children, it will be a "playbook" of "anxious" during the "two year hiatus" of not spending time. [The husband] said this is due to "cops and women's groups" writing the family violence legislation and [the wife] influencing the children to "say" what she "says" about "family violence" and "Family Court Orders". [The husband] said he could not see evidence to support the Intervention Order based on the allegations.

1. The husband did not demonstrate any change in those attitudes at the final hearing as is evident from his proposals and his submissions already referred to. He has not adduced any evidence he has meaningfully engaged in a men's behaviour change program, notwithstanding the wife says (which I accept) this was a recommendation made in the family violence proceedings and the family report writer suggested it may be beneficial for him. The husband has not adduced evidence he has sought any other form of professional assistance in respect of his violent, abusive and coercive behaviour. In those circumstances, where the husband does not acknowledge his behaviour and there is no evidence before me that he has sought to gain an understanding of his behaviour and to address it, I find there remains a high risk of the husband again engaging in violent behaviour towards the wife or towards Y.
2. The family consultant "strongly suggested" that prior to the children spending any time with the husband, he be:

[...] assessed by a psychologist with forensic expertise regarding risk of child abuse and risk of family violence; to determine the risk he poses to [the wife] and the children with recommendations for risk mitigation strategies also to assess his mental health with a view to diagnostic clarity and treatment recommendations. It is possible that following a psychological evaluation, [the husband] will require review by a psychiatrist and it is suggested that psychiatric review occurs prior to him spending any time with the children

1. Those recommended assessments have not occurred, meaning I cannot be satisfied the husband does not pose a risk to Y as a result of untreated mental health difficulties, including by exposing her to confusing, erratic, violent, abusive, or other forms of unsafe behaviour.
2. The family consultant provided the following assessment of risk in respect of the husband:

It appears that [the husband] poses a severe and dynamic risk regarding his mental health, his perpetration of child abuse and his perpetration of family violence with almost two decades of chronicity. He presents with a lack of child focus and to be using coercive control to revoke the Intervention Order by refusing to spend time.

1. I accept that expert evidence and agree with the family consultant's assessment of the husband's presentation.
2. Where I have found there is a high risk of the wife or Y being subjected (or Y being exposed to) to family violence and/or abuse by the husband, causing harm of a great magnitude, and that this risk is magnified by the uncertainty relating to the husband's mental health, I find the risk of Y spending time with the husband is unacceptable.
3. I find Y communicating with the husband, even without physically spending time with him, would also expose her to a risk of emotional harm, including trauma as described by the family consultant. I find this is a particularly high risk where the husband does not acknowledge his past family violence, challenges the children's experiences of his behaviour, does not accept they are genuinely fearful of him, and maintains his authoritarian parenting approach is appropriate. I find the husband's authoritarian parenting style alone would be challenging and frightening for Y, given her experience of his parenting and of the family violence he has perpetrated against her and other members of her family. I also expect Y would find it confusing and frightening and may experience emotional harm, if the husband communicated to her in the manner he spoke to the family consultant and to the court, particularly if he spoke in a manner critical and condescending of the wife or of Y's siblings.

1. Where a court finds a parent poses an unacceptable risk of harm to a child in a parenting proceeding, the court is also required to consider the means which might be adequate to sufficiently mitigate the risk to an acceptable risk.[20]
2. In Chiles & Petrenko,[21] Tree J determining an appeal as a single judge, neatly explained the purpose of conditions to mitigate identified risks of harm to children as follows:

The purpose of ameliorative conditions is to mitigate a risk of harm from unacceptable to acceptable, such that when the risk analysis is repeated with the ameliorative condition in place, the relevant risk is assessed as acceptable.

1. The Full Court explained the relationship between the assessment of risk and consideration of ameliorating measures in Blinko & Blinko:[22]

A consideration of risk, and factors which impact upon or ameliorate the risk, will in most cases be inextricably linked. That is because "[t]he object of safeguards is to convert an unacceptable situation to an acceptable one where that is feasible and is of 'benefit to the child'".

1. I am not satisfied the identified risks posed to Y can be adequately ameliorated, even by supervised time, to make it safe for her to spend time or to communicate with the husband. I do not have confidence even a professional supervisor could adequately safeguard Y from being subjected to or exposed to abuse or family violence by the husband, to his authoritarian parenting approach or exposed to harmful or distressing statements or behaviour by him, as a result of poor mental health or otherwise.
2. My assessment is fortified by that of the family consultant who provided the following expert opinion in respect of supervision:

[The wife], [X] and [Z] were present when [the husband] detained [Y] in his home refusing to allow her to leave and it appears their presence is of limited value in terms of safety. [The husband] appears strongly wedded to his own opinions and intentions, he seemingly does not follow advice or requests from the children, [the wife], health professionals or police and as such it appears unlikely a suitable person to supervise time can be nominated. [The husband] is currently refusing to spend time with the children unless the Intervention Order is revoked, a revocation is not supported and there appears to no safe option for the children to spend time.

1. Tendered police records[23] confirm that in September 2023 the husband refused to open the door to police from approximately 4.15 pm until 4.40 pm, to enable them to speak with Y notwithstanding she was observed to be physically upset in the front room of his home. This gives me no confidence the husband would adhere to instructions from a professional supervisor. In relation to the risk of physical violence, tendered police records report it required four police officers to subdue the husband during the incident in 2010, and that he resisted violently when he was forced to release the wife from his restraint, including punching kicking and spitting on police. Professional supervision could not adequately safeguard the wife and Y from violence of that degree.
2. Given my assessment of risk and these findings, Y's safety must be prioritised and the other considerations in section 60CC(2) are of less significance. I therefore refer to them only briefly.

1. The family consultant reported Y has clear views that maintaining a connection with the husband must be in accordance with her wishes. At the time she was interviewed for the family report, Y was willing to spend infrequent supervised time with the husband, expressing her views to the family consultant in the following terms:

[Y] said she would like flexibility to see her father without a formal schedule as a schedule will be enforced and controlled by her father. [Y] suggested that seeing her father with all the paternal family present at Christmas for a meal could be an option and she expressed concern her father missed out on Christmas dinner with his family as she and her siblings were present. [Y] said she would need an adult with her when she spends time with her father, she would need a public space as a buffer as her father in less likely to hurt her in public, the time would need to be brief such as a coffee or brunch, she must be allowed to call her mother or authorities for help is needed and whilst the paternal family partially understand the risks with her father they do not realise the severity or that he needs help.

1. In relation to Y's preparedness to see the husband (and Z's views), the family consultant provided the following expert opinion:

Whilst the children present with the cognitive capacity to share their views and are of an age where consideration of their views is reasonable, it is suggested the Court places minimal consideration on the children's preparedness to spend time with [the husband]. Trauma can be difficult to observe and it is possible the children shield their mother from the traumatic consequences caused to them by their father's abuse. Trauma can create implicit and explicit memories that are often fragmented, confusing and frightening, trauma can be intrusive and cause maladaptive behaviours to mitigate real and perceived risks, and without treatment trauma can have serious consequences to long term mental health stability.

1. I accept this evidence and therefore put little weight on Y's preparedness to spend time with the husband.

The developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs of Y: section 60CC(2)(c)

1. The family consultant reported Y appeared a shy, engaging, well-mannered and caring adolescent. The wife reported to the family consultant that Y's "confidence [has] exploded" over the last year and she has a "great group of friends". I nevertheless find Y to be a vulnerable child, accepting the family consultant's evidence about the likely impact of numerous adverse childhood experiences and trauma she has experienced as described by the family consultant.
2. Neither party identified cultural needs of importance to Y or other members of her family.

The capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for Y to provide for her developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs: section 60CC(2)(d)

1. I refer to my earlier finding that the husband lacks capacity to safely care for Y. Aside from the risks I have already identified, I am not persuaded the husband has the required capacity to support Y's psychological and emotional needs, if she was to spend time or communicate with him. His continued denial of engaging in family violence and his application for Y to live with him demonstrates a complete lack of insight into Y's psychological and emotional needs. This is illustrated by his closing submission:

They are the objectives that I want. Long blocks of time with the children, they settle in, anxiety dissipates, and the risk of anxiety to anyone is lowered in that environment.

1. In respect of the wife's parenting capacity, I accept the expert opinion conveyed by the family consultant in the following terms:

[The wife's] parenting capacity and decision making appears both proactive and protective, her engagement of the children into school, sports and social activities combined with her inclusion of extended maternal and paternal family highly likely gives them a stable foundation that ameliorates some of the risk and trauma associated with their father and creates a space for trauma recovery.

1. I accept the wife sought to promote a positive relationship between the children and the husband until September 2023. She expressed regret in her trial affidavit for remaining in a relationship with the husband for as long as she did and for not acting sooner to protect the children from his behaviour. She deposed to the way in which she has developed a better understanding of his behaviour as family violence and of the need to protect the children from his conduct. I can see that having developed that understanding the wife has acted proactively and protectively, including by promptly calling the police in September 2023, supporting the police application for an intervention order to protect her and the children, and prosecuting this proceeding. I am satisfied she now has the required understanding and capacity to act protectively in respect of the risk the husband poses to Y.
2. To the family consultant, the husband asserted the wife lacks the capability to manage the children's education. I am satisfied the wife has the required capacity to provide for the children's educational needs. She is an educator and it is evident the children have done well under her care. X reported to the family consultant she is at university and going well academically. Z is reportedly performing better this year at school. This claim made by the husband in my view reflects his rigid views about the children's education, his authoritarian parenting approach and his incapacity to balance the children's views, needs and interests with his own expectations.
3. I am satisfied the wife has the required capacity to provide for all other aspects of the children's needs.

The benefit to Y of being able to have a relationship with her parents, and other people who are significant to her, where it is safe to do so: section 60CC(2)(e)

1. I find the benefit to Y of having a relationship with the husband is outweighed by the need to protect her safety, including her emotional safety.
2. I accept the wife's evidence that she has continued to facilitate the children's relationship with their paternal grandparents notwithstanding their failure to acknowledge the harm the husband has caused to the wife and children. I am confident she will continue to maintain that relationship for Y in a way that is emotionally safe for her.

1. For the reasons I have outlined, I find it is in Y's best interests that she live with the wife and there be no order providing for her to spend time or communicate with the husband, save at the invitation of the wife on conditions she considers appropriate. I am satisfied the wife will prioritise Y's safety when considering the terms on which Y might spend time or communicate with the husband in future if she expresses a desire to do so.

1. The provisions of Part VII of the Act relevant to my determination of this issue, include:

(a) In the absence of a court order, each of the parents of a child has parental responsibility for the child.[24] This is the case despite any changes in the parents' relationship, including their separation;[25]

(b) Parental responsibility is defined to mean all of the duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which, by law, parents have in relation to children;[26]

(c) Subject to any court orders, parents of a child are encouraged, where it is safe to do so, to consult each other about major long-term issues in relation to a child;[27]

(d) The power of the court to make parenting orders, includes the power to make an order that deals with the allocation of parental responsibility,[28] and specifically, the allocation of responsibility for making major long-term issues in relation to a child;[29]

(e) There is no longer any presumption in relation to the allocation of parental responsibility by the court and the court's focus is to be on the needs and best interests of the individual child;

(f) If a parenting order deals with the allocation of responsibility for making decisions about major long-term issues in relation to a child, that order may provide for joint or sole decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues;[30]

(g) Major long-term issues in relation to a child are defined as follows:[31]

major long-term issues, in relation to a child, means issues about the care, welfare and development of the child of a long-term nature and includes (but is not limited to) issues of that nature about:

(a) the child's education (both current and future); and

(b) the child's religious and cultural upbringing; and

(c) the child's health; and

(d) the child's name; and

(e) changes to the child's living arrangements that make it significantly more difficult for the child to spend time with a parent.

(h) If a parenting order provides for joint decision-making in relation to all or specified major long-term issues in relation to a child, then, except to the extent the order otherwise specifies, the order is taken to require each of the persons with decision-making responsibility to consult with one another in relation to each such decision and to make a genuine effort to come to a joint decision;[32] and

(i) The court can make an order dealing with the form of consultation parties are to have with one another about decisions made in exercise of their parental responsibility.[33]

1. I find it is in Y's best interests for the wife to have sole decision-making responsibility for her. I further find it is in Y's best interests that the wife not be required to consult with the husband in respect of decisions she makes about Y or to keep him informed about such decisions. I do so putting significant weight on:

(a) Protecting the wife, as the person responsible for Y's care and support, from being subjected to or exposed to family violence by the husband, including ongoing coercive and controlling behaviour. I find even the husband's proposal to attend "shuttle-run" family dispute resolution in the event of disagreements about decisions to be made for the children (now only Y), will provide an avenue for him to continue to subject the wife to family violence and controlling behaviour;

(b) Evidence of the husband's authoritarian parenting approach, including the pressure he has brought to bear on X and Z in relation to their schooling such as pressuring them to undertake subjects at a higher academic level than they perceived they could manage and pressuring Z to repeat year 11. To the family consultant, Z described the husband's expectations as unreasonable, and both he and X described the conflict and stress these expectations caused. It is apparent the husband continues to hold different views in respect of the children's education to the wife. For example, conveying to the family consultant that the children need more time with him during the academic year as the wife lacks capability to manage their education, as mentioned earlier in my reasons. This leads me to find the parties are unlikely to be able to reach agreement in relation to decisions about major long-term issues relating to Y's current and future education;

(c) My finding it is unlikely the parties could reach agreements on decisions about Y more broadly, given the husband's rigid views, apparent disordered thinking and argumentative presentation, which were apparent from his filed court documents and submissions made in court. My assessment of the husband's presentation was consistent with the family consultant's observations of his presentation as "argumentative, rigid, vague, verbose, hyper focused to detail" of "terse tone" and "speaking tangentially", with a "long standing and strong sense of injury and injustice to himself" and "dismissive of information incongruent with [his] opinion";

(d) Protecting the wife's emotional safety, finding it would be emotionally difficult for her to consult with the husband given her experience of being subjected to family violence by him, and in particular to receive communications in the form and tone the husband has presented to the court;

(e) My acceptance of the expert opinion of the family consultant, provided in the following terms:

[The wife] has made sole day to day and major decisions for the children for the last two years and seemingly has made good decisions the entirety of the children's lives and should be able to continue to make such decisions. The available information indicates [the wife] has made child focussed decisions in difficult and dangerous circumstances. [The husband] has not been able to contribute to decisions due to the family violence and child abuse with his capacity likely impaired through mental health instability, the available information indicates he does not make child focused decisions and will force harmful decisions onto the children. It is suggested that [the wife] is not required to consult nor inform [the husband] about day to day or major decisions and she retains decision making for major life decisions.

(f) Y is in year 9, attending a school the parties agreed on. She is in good health. There do not appear to be any significant major-long term issues requiring decisions in the foreseeable future, save as to potentially facilitating psychological support for Y and any other medical issues that may arise. There is no evidence the wife has not made sound decisions in respect of such matters previously or that she will not do so in the future.

1. For the same reasons, including my assessment of Y's safety and the wife's safety, as the person primarily responsible for her care, I am not persuaded it is in Y's best interests for there to be orders providing for consultation and communication between the parties in respect of Y as sought by the husband.

1. The wife seeks an injunction restraining the husband from entering, approaching or remaining within 500 metres of attending her and the children's home, the children's schools, or her or any of the children's places of work or employment.
2. Section 114AB of the Act prohibits the making of an injunction pursuant to section 68B where a party has instituted a proceeding or taken any other action in respect of a matter in respect of which they would, but for subsection 114AB(2), be entitled to institute a proceeding under section 68B. The final intervention orders currently applying to protect the children and the wife until 2034 prohibit the husband from going to or remaining within 200 metres of any other place where a protected person lives, works or attends school / childcare, among other restraints. However, it appears from the wife's trial affidavit that the final intervention orders were made upon the application of the police. As a result, section 114AB does not prohibit the making of the proposed injunction, because the wife has not "instituted a proceeding" in respect of the final intervention orders or "taken any other action" to the extent required to enliven section 114AB.[34]
3. I nevertheless decline to make the injunctions the wife seeks, finding it is unnecessary for Y's welfare where there are already intervention orders in place until after she turns 18 and finding it in her best interests for there to be a single set of restraints enforceable by police, rather than potentially overlapping or contradictory orders with different consequences for contravention. With the existing intervention orders in mind, I will make it clear the orders I make do not permit the husband to contact the wife for any reason, save for responding to any invitation she may extend to him for Y to spend time or communicate with him if she assesses that to be appropriate, and that Y is only to spend time or communicate with him at the invitation of the wife in writing.

1. Significant amendments to Part VIII of the Act, made by the Family Law Amendment Act 2024 (Cth) ("Amendment Act"), commenced operation on 10 June 2025. Those amendments do not apply to the determination of this proceeding, being a proceeding instituted before 10 June 2025, in respect of which a final hearing commenced before 10 June 2025.[35] All references to provisions of Part VIII of the Act are references to those provisions in effect at the time of the final hearing.
2. Before making any order altering the interests of the parties to a marriage in property, section 79(2) requires that I must be satisfied, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to do so.[36] If I am so satisfied, I then have power under the Act to make such order as I consider appropriate, after considering the matters set out in sections 79(4) and section 75(2), insofar as they are relevant.
3. To consider if it is just and equitable to make an order, I must first identify the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in property according to common law and equitable principles.

Existing legal and equitable interests in property

1. The parties agreed they had the following legal and equitable interests in property at the time of the final hearing:[37]

(husband asserts cost of improvements to be deducted)

Litigation funding loan: $420,280 as at 28 April 2025

Interest as registered proprietor of Property D along with his two brothers

1. The parties also have the following interests in superannuation:

Disputed and disregarded assets and liabilities

1. Property B has not been valued. On the joint balance sheet, the wife puts the value of Property B at $1,775,000. Her case outline records she has adopted this value, being the value attributed to the property by a market appraisal provided by the husband and also by a "desktop" valuation provided by T Company on 5 March 2024. However, she seeks Property B be sold. On the joint balance sheet, the husband ascribes a value to Property B of "$1,775,000 less improvements". It is unclear if he seeks to take into account costs already expended on improvements or of proposed improvements to Property B. He did not adduce evidence in support of either position. The wife relied on a letter sent by her lawyers to the husband dated 22 April 2025,[38] asking him to confirm his agreement to adopt a value of $1.8 million for the property at Property B and otherwise proposing a single expert valuation by T Company. The husband did not cooperate for a single expert valuation to be undertaken.
2. For reasons I will return to, I will make an order providing for the sale of Property B, so it is unnecessary for me to determine the value of that property. I have used the estimate of $1,775,000 provided by the parties in the joint balance sheet for the purposes of assessing the justice and equity of the orders I make but I will utilise a formula as proposed by the wife, to divide the proceeds of sale between the parties to achieve a settlement according with the percentage division I determine just and equitable.
3. The parties have not lived in Property B since January 2022. It has subsequently been tenanted. The parties have not adduced evidence in respect of capital gains tax payable upon the sale of Property B. Where the property is jointly owned, if there is capital gains tax payable on the sale they will each be taxed referable to their taxable income. Pursuant to section 75(2)(o), I take into account the wife may be responsible for a greater proportion of any tax payable upon the sale of Property B by virtue of her higher taxable income, although it is not certain and cannot be quantified.

1. The husband does not dispute he is the registered proprietor of Property D, as joint proprietor along with his two siblings[39] but he submits his beneficial interest in the property is "undefined".
2. The wife deposed the husband had told her during their relationship, that Property D had been gifted to him and his brothers by his parents. The husband asserts he holds that property as trustee along with his sibling but did not adduce any evidence in support of that submission. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, I find the husband's beneficial interest in Property D reflects his interest on title.
3. In her trial affidavit, the wife deposed she does not know how much Property D is worth. In her case outline she asserted a value of $333,333 for the husband's one-third interest in Property D but acknowledges the value of the property is unknown. In her case outline the wife explains her estimate is based only on the median price for a property in that area. In the joint balance sheet, the wife puts the value of the husband's interest in Property D at $300,000. However, she did not explain the basis for asserting that value. She did not seek to adduce evidence from an expert, even on a "kerbside" basis, without inspection of the property.
4. Where there is no evidence as to value before me, I do not include Property D on the balance sheet. Instead, I take into account pursuant to section 75(2)(o) that the husband has an interest as joint proprietor with his two brothers in Property D of unknown value and that he acquired that interest prior to the parties' relationship, in 1998.[40]

1. The wife has an outstanding litigation funding loan. At the time of making her financial statement (as at 28 April 2025), that liability stood at $420,280. Her case outline (filed on 22 May 2025) recorded the litigation loan will require repayment of $509,502.96.
2. The parties have agreed this liability be excluded from the balance sheet and disregarded from my assessment. I find that appropriate, according with the well-established principle confirmed by the Full Court in Chorn & Hopkins[41] that "...where funds have been borrowed to pay legal fees, and such liability is still outstanding, neither the payment of the fees nor the liability should be taken into account".

1. The wife gave evidence she contacted the husband after separation asking to retain her engagement and wedding rings in their property settlement. She said he advised her by email they had been stolen. The parties have agreed to attribute a value to the rings of $4,000. Where the husband has not adduced evidence of the theft of the rings, on affidavit or in the form of a police statement or insurance claim or otherwise, I will include them on the balance sheet as property retained by him.

1. Pursuant to Part 6.1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) ("the Rules") both parties are required to make full and frank disclosure of their financial circumstances.
2. I am satisfied the husband has not fulfilled his obligations to make full and frank disclosure in this proceeding. He has not filed an updated financial statement as directed. He did not tender documents at the final hearing to contradict the allegation of non-disclosure made by the wife, supported by correspondence tendered on her behalf.
3. Having made this finding, Full Court authority supports that I can take a robust approach and should not be "unduly cautious" about making findings in favour of the wife[42] and can draw such adverse inferences from the non-disclosure as can be supported by the evidence before me.[43] The duty of disclosure is absolute and even accidental non-disclosure may warrant the erring of generosity to a party who might be otherwise seen to be disadvantaged by the lack of complete candour.[44] In Mayhew & Fairweather[45] the Full Court confirmed the "usual way" in which defective disclosure is taken into account is either by adding a sum to the pool, reflective of an estimate of the value of undisclosed property or under section 75(2)(o) of the Act. In this case, where there is insufficient evidence for me to make findings in respect of the husband's financial position and to include a value for non-disclosed assets on the balance sheet, I instead take into account the husband's non-disclosure pursuant to section 75(2)(o).

1. It is evident from correspondence tendered by the wife,[46] she has sought disclosure in relation to two companies of which the husband is sole director and shareholder, R Pty Ltd and S Pty Ltd. The husband did not adduce any evidence he had complied with the requests for disclosure made in respect of those companies and he did not adduce himself any evidence in relation to those companies, save that:

(a) His tendered individual tax returns show he received salary or wage payments from S Pty Ltd in FYE 2023;[47] and

(b) He purported to issue a tax invoice from S Pty Ltd to the wife's solicitors in the amount of $10,000 for his time, calculated at $2,000 per hour.[48]

1. The companies may have been set up as vehicles for consulting work but in the absence of disclosure by the husband I am unable to ascertain the nature and operation of the companies or attribute a value to them. This is a matter I take into account pursuant to section 75(2)(o), although it is not a matter I give significant weight in the absence of evidence indicating the companies engage in significant business activity or hold property.

1. Given these findings, there is no change to the assets, liabilities and superannuation set out in paragraphs 133 and 134 of my reasons.
2. The combined value of the parties' known assets and superannuation is therefore $2,935,642.

1. In this case, the most valuable of the parties' assets is Property B, which was the parties' former family home and is registered in the parties' joint names. The breakdown of the parties' relationship brought to an end their common use of property. Both parties seek orders altering the parties' interests in property. On this basis, I find the requirements of section 79(2) are satisfied and it is, in all the circumstances, just and equitable for there to be an alteration of property interests between the parties.

1. The wife proposed a single-pool or global approach be taken, considering the parties' superannuation alongside their other assets. The husband proposes each party retain their own superannuation, reflecting their direct employer and member contributions, and that their non-superannuation assets be dealt with separately.
2. The parties are the same age (both 52) and a significant proportion of their wealth, accumulated over a long relationship, is held in the form of the husband's superannuation. The husband has not adduced evidence of significant superannuation contributions made before or after separation. I will therefore adopt the single-pool approach advocated by the wife and consider the parties' contributions (direct and indirect) and those relevant matters in section 75(2) of the Act to their superannuation assets in conjunction with their non-superannuation assets. I will then consider the apportionment of superannuation along with the other assets of the parties, to achieve a just and equitable outcome.

1. In exercising my discretion to make an order that is in all the circumstances just and equitable, sub-sections 79(4)(a), (b) and (c) of the Act, being the provisions relevant to this case, require me to consider the following matters:

(a) the financial contribution made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and

(b) the contribution (other than a financial contribution) made directly or indirectly by or on behalf of a party to the marriage or a child of the marriage to the acquisition, conservation or improvement of any of the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them, or otherwise in relation to any of that last-mentioned property, whether or not that last-mentioned property has, since the making of the contribution, ceased to be the property of the parties to the marriage or either of them; and

(c) the contribution made by a party to the marriage to the welfare of the family constituted by the parties to the marriage and any children of the marriage, including any contribution made in the capacity of homemaker or parent;

1. The classification of contributions by reference to terms such as "initial contributions", "contributions during the relationship", and "post-separation contributions" can be helpful when undertaking this task. However, in determining what orders are to be made, I am required to approach the assessment of contributions holistically, by analysing the nature, form and characteristics of those contributions with reference to the particular circumstances of this particular relationship.[49] This process involves the exercise of a wide discretion, not the performance of a mathematical or accounting exercise[50] and should be undertaken without over-zealous attention to the ascertainment of contributions.[51] All contributions are to be weighed collectively, not compartmentalised with some contributions weighed against others.[52]

1. When the parties began living together in 2000, the wife was working full-time as a professional and completing her studies via a paid scholarship. She recalls her income was approximately $45,000 per annum. The husband was working in technology. The wife does not know what his income was at that time.
2. I accept the wife's evidence that neither party had any significant assets at the time, save for the husband's interest in Property D. I accept she owned a motor vehicle and minimal superannuation. She acknowledged the husband had some savings and superannuation but deposed she could not recall the amount and submitted disclosure has not been provided to verify the value of those contributions. Where the husband did not adduce evidence to the contrary, I am not persuaded he had assets of significant value at the time the parties began living together, at least not assets of a significantly greater value than those held by the wife such as should be given weight following the breakdown of such a lengthy relationship.
3. I accept the wife's evidence both parties had HECS liabilities when they began living together. Evidence was not adduced to show there was a significant disparity in those liabilities.

1. In 2000, the husband took on a position at U Company, where he progressed from a role in technology to a scientist.
2. Shortly after cohabitation, the parties purchased Property B. The wife deposed the husband paid the deposit and the purchase was otherwise funded by a loan secured by mortgage. However, she did not give evidence about the purchase price or the amount of the deposit and the husband did not adduce any evidence about that. Property B was the parties' home from 2000 to 2022, save for a period of 12 months from 2010 to 2011 when they lived in rental accommodation and demolished the existing house at Property B and constructed a new home. I accept the wife's evidence they funded the build by increasing their borrowings secured against Property B.
3. I accept that after X was born in 2005, the wife took on the role of her primary carer and ultimately all three children, which continued throughout the parties' relationship. She also undertook some part-time work when she could, two days a week, as a professional. She deposed X and Z attended childcare on the days she worked.
4. In 2015, the wife completed a graduate diploma in education. I accept she did so with the intention of taking up some part-time work during school hours and this was a reasonable decision for her to make as the parent primarily responsible for the care of the parties' three children.
5. In 2016, the husband was retrenched from his position at U Company. He received a redundancy payment in an amount unknown to the wife, which she said was largely contributed to the home loan secured against Property B. I note the husband's employment with U Company related entirely to the period of the parties' relationship and the wife therefore made an indirect contribution to that redundancy, including by her contributions to the welfare of the family and particularly her care for the children from 2005, enabling the husband to pursue his employment and advance his career.
6. Before he was retrenched, the husband was earning a significant income. His tendered tax returns[53] recorded gross salary payments as a scientist of $276,871 for financial year ended ("FYE") 2013, $238,554 for FYE 2014, $257,352 for FYE 2015 and $169,824 in FYE 2016, being the year he was retrenched. The wife deposed the husband undertook some contract work from 2017 to 2020 and completed his qualifications, but he did not return to stable employment. Her evidence is supported by the husband's tendered tax returns which record only a modest income from employment or contracting after FYE 2016.
7. The wife deposed she took up a full-time educator position after the husband was made redundant, and that she has worked full-time as an educator since that time. She deposed to earning between $68,543 and $97,134 per annum from 2016 to 2021.
8. In her case outline, the wife acknowledged that from 2016 there were times when the husband was unemployed and took on the homemaking and parenting role. However, I accept her evidence that she remained primarily responsible for the care of the children, even after the husband ceased paid employment. I accept the wife also continued to undertake homemaker responsibilities during this time, but that the husband was attending to some household tasks including shopping, cooking and lawn mowing.
9. I note the husband's attitude in respect of the wife's part-time work and re-training and his unemployment, conveyed in his submissions at the final hearing in the following terms:

[The wife] was retraining in 2015 as to become [an educator]- and a one-year [course]. That was a year where there was a high component of childcare. Something like 22 grand of childcare that year - including government payments, I think - went to the after school care. Throughout that period between 2005 and 2015, I think each of the kids had two days a week at childcare. They had three-year-old or four-year-old kindy [...]. [The wife] had plenty of time to herself beyond - and so I wouldn't say nine years - it's nine years inclusive of childcare.

So if you were to subtract those days and all that free time that she had, it is very comparable to the years where I was made redundant, from January 2016 until the children were more or less effectively removed from my care in September 2023.

1. I do not accept this submission. I am satisfied the wife made very significant and valuable contributions throughout the parties' relationship, caring for the children from 2005 to 2015 and putting her employment on hold, re-training and caring for the children in 2015 and working in paid employment and caring for the children thereafter, as well as making valuable homemaker contributions throughout that time.
2. The wife did not hold a bank account in her sole name until after the parties separated. Her income was paid into a joint account throughout the parties' relationship and applied from there. I therefore infer she contributed directly to the household and family expenditure and the acquisition, conservation and improvement of the parties' assets through her income.
3. The wife deposed both her parents and the husband's parents assisted with the care of the children at various points of the relationship, including that her parents assisted during school holidays when both of the parties were working. This is not a matter I take into account when evaluating the parties' contributions given section 79(4)(c) does not contemplate contributions made by third parties to the welfare of the family, including in the capacity as homemaker or caring for children. Nor is it a matter I consider requires weight pursuant to section 75(2)(o)[54] to achieve a just and equitable outcome given both parties' parents provided assistance with the care of the children and insufficient evidence was adduced for me to evaluate the extent of that assistance.
4. In April 2018, the husband's company, R Pty Ltd was registered, with the husband as the only director and shareholder.
5. In January 2022, the parties relocated from Property B (Western Australia) to Melbourne (Victoria). They stayed with the husband's parents, in their home in Melbourne, for a few weeks and then moved into the Suburb M rental property. The wife commenced a new role as an educator at H School in Victoria.

1. The parties separated a short time later, in April 2022. They initially lived under the one roof for a period of time in Suburb M. The wife obtained a loan of $3,000 from P Organisation to enable her to move into independent accommodation with the children. I accept the wife's evidence it has subsequently been difficult for her and the parties' three children, living in a two-bedroom unit.
2. The wife has continued working fulltime as an educator. She deposed she was recently promoted and is now paid an annual salary of $114,655.90.
3. The children have lived with the wife since separation, being a period now of some 3.5 years. X turned 18 in 2023 and Z turned 18 in 2025. The wife continues to care for Y. She has supported the children financially during that time. She deposed the husband was assessed to pay child support of $286.67 per month at the time her trial affidavit was filed, on 28 April 2025, and he then owed child support arrears of $1,848.40.
4. As set out earlier in my reasons when identifying the parties' assets and liabilities, the parties have accrued arrears of school fees as the wife has been unable to meet that expense after separation, without contribution from the husband. Both Z's school (H School) and Y's school (G School) have provided respite from payment on compassionate grounds, pending a property settlement between the parties. It is clear from the husband's response and submissions that he supported the children's attendance at private schools. For example, he submitted in his response that the children's education was a priority for him more than for the wife. He did not dispute the parties' joint liability for the costs as invoiced. I will therefore provide for the outstanding school fees to be paid from the proceeds from the sale of Property B before division between the parties. Whilst the husband seeks in his response an "equitable or just share of the children's ongoing and future school fees" there is no child support application before me.
5. The wife deposed the husband received all of the rental income from Property B from 3 March 2023 to 26 October 2023, notwithstanding her objection to him doing so. She deposed that as the property is held jointly, she was required to declare the rent in her tax return as a co-owner and whilst he was receiving all of the rent, he failed to attend to required repairs to the home at Property B himself and refused to authorise necessary repairs to be undertaken by contractors. She detailed problems arising at Property B owing to gutters not being cleaned, including extensive carpet damage and mould. The tenants issued the parties with a breach notice and ultimately broke the lease early and commenced litigation. I accept the parties incurred significant costs as a result of the husband's delayed action and inadequate responses to the concerns raised by the tenants and managing agents, although I am unable to quantify those costs on the evidence before me. I accept the wife's evidence the husband did not inform her insurance premiums for Property B had not been paid due to insufficient funds available in the credit card account from which they were ordinarily debited and the policy was cancelled. I infer from this evidence the parties were unable to make a claim for the water damage to Property B.
6. Repairs were undertaken and Property B was re-let. The rental income from Property B was then shared equally between the parties at the wife's insistence. The wife deposed the lease in place at time of the final hearing was due to end in June 2025. Property B is unencumbered. The wife deposed insurance and rates are now paid via the rental income and she meets any shortfall. She did not provide details as to when this has been required, or how much she has had to pay.
7. The wife deposed to being solely responsible for land tax for Property B since separation but did not quantify the amounts she has paid. She seeks any arrears of rates be paid from the proceeds from the sale of Property B which I consider appropriate if rates are not adjusted at settlement between the vendor and purchaser in the ordinary course.
8. The wife has sought a final order for the sale of Property B since commencing this proceeding in September 2023. She has proposed the sale on an interim basis, via correspondence from her solicitors, since at least October 2023.[55] The husband has resisted the sale, notwithstanding he has not provided to the wife (or put before the court) any evidence he is in a financial position to retain it. Among his reasons for resisting the sale, the husband filed the following submission on 24 March 2025, attached to a document purporting to be a costs notice ("husband's costs notice"), [56] none of which present as legitimate reasons for resisting the sale:

The Respondent, [...] requests that the Federal Family Court stay the sale of [Property B] and any Property Settlement until the matter of Costs and their disbursement to [the husband] for the recovery of Costs incurred by [the wife's solicitors] for and by the Applicant for,

1. Enforced "Gardening Leave of [the husband]" and,

2. Preparation of Data for Disclosure of Public Domain Data for [wife's solicitors]

3. [Wife's solicitors] non-compliance with Data Disclosure requests.

4. The condoning of the neglect of the children of [the parties], as predicted in December 2024 Mention.

5. Resolution and understanding of the loan agreement and the decision making capability or mental capacity of the Applicant wife, [...], to [her litigation lender] and any contributions to the agreement by [wife's solicitors].

1. In October 2023, the husband was evicted from the parties' rented former family home. The wife deposed the rental deposit was not refunded due to the poor state in which the husband left the property and accrued rental arrears. She did not quantify the amount of the bond withheld.
2. The wife deposed the husband has not made disclosure in respect of his income after separation. Tax returns tendered by the husband[57] record income from the sale of shares in FYE 30 June 2022, income from dividends in 2022, 2023 and 2024 (albeit nominal in 2024) and interest from a Q Company cash management account in FYE 2022 (again, in a nominal sum). Later tax returns show only modest dividends and the FYE 2024 tax return does not record interest income, suggesting most shares have now been sold and he no longer has savings generating interest.
3. The tax returns tendered by the husband[58] record:

(a) No salary or wages paid to the husband in FYE 2022 and a taxable income of $58,320 derived from interest, dividends, rent from Property B and the sale of shares.

(b) His main salary and wage occupation for FYE 2023 and 2024 as a tradesman's labourer;

(c) Gross salary or wages paid by S Pty Ltd in FYE 2023 of $6,418 and a taxable income of $25,817 including dividends and rent from Property B; and

(d) Gross salary or wages in FYE 2024 of $33,059 and a total taxable income of $32,680.

1. The wife has continued to contribute to superannuation via her employment. The husband has not made any indirect contribution of note in respect of the wife's superannuation contributions after separation - for example, by caring for the children to enable her to work.
2. There is no evidence of the quantum of superannuation contributions made by the husband after separation. Given his modest income from employment after separation I find it unlikely any significant contributions were made to his superannuation referable to his employment after separation.
3. The husband registered the company, S Pty Ltd, on 10 April 2023. He is the sole director and shareholder of that company. As noted earlier in my reasons, the husband has not made full and frank disclosure in respect of that company or in respect of R Pty Ltd.

1. The wife contends her contributions were made significantly more difficult as a result of the husband's family violence and extreme behaviours and seeks this be taken into account in my assessment of the parties' contributions, by way of "an adjustment of 5% on account of this" in her favour. The Full Court in Benson & Drury confirmed the approach to a Kennon argument and that where a party's contributions have been made significantly more arduous due to the impact of family violence in the manner contemplated by Kennon an "adjustment" or uplift is not appropriate. Rather, where family violence has such an impact, it is to be considered as part of the court's holistic assessment of all contributions.[59] This is the approach I have taken.
2. The husband made the following submissions in relation to the Kennon argument put on behalf of the wife:

So going to that Kennon threshold of family violence having an influence [...] on the settlement and parenting orders of divorce - that the Kennon case itself - I probably don't need to remind you - is one where he had two proven assaults and possibly - possibly another five more. There are no proven assaults. There are no proven assaults, and the acts of family violence are questionable [...]

The descriptions of family violence are distorted. It's unproven. It doesn't meet the threshold of proven violence as in Kennon.

So I'm contending that it is well beneath the bar set by Kennon and the - you know, there are - it is seeking to paint a picture from very tenuous information.

1. As already recorded in my reasons, I am satisfied the husband perpetrated family violence against the wife from at least 2010, including physical assaults, sexual assaults, physical intimidation, repeated derogatory taunts, threats, property damage, financially controlling behaviour constituting economic abuse, and other forms of coercive and controlling behaviour. His coercive and controlling behaviour has continued after separation.
2. The wife did not adduce expert evidence in support of her Kennon submission. However, such evidence is not necessary. The Full Court confirmed in Benson & Drury that the required nexus between proven family violence and the significant adverse effect upon the contributions of the victim is capable of being inferred from the lay evidence of the parties[60] but there must be sufficient evidence to enable the court to reasonably draw the inference from the primary facts.[61] I have looked closely at the wife's evidence and accept her contributions have been made significantly more arduous by the husband's family violence as described by her, including, but not limited to:

(a) During the parties' relationship:

(i) As articulated by the wife in her trial affidavit, "work[ing] tirelessly to sustain [the] family's wellbeing [...] whilst pretending to the outside world that everything was fine" and being hypervigilant to the husband's moods and behaviour and the children's safety, requiring a great deal of mental strain, causing her to be overwhelmed and exhausted. I accept this wife's evidence of experiencing strain, overwhelm and exhaustion as a result of the husband's abuse and family violence. I find undertaking parenting and household duties and employment in this state made those tasks significantly more difficult for the wife than they would otherwise have been;

(ii) On a practical level, having to make alternate arrangements for the care of X and Z after she was physically and sexually abused by the husband in 2010, to give her space to deal with what happened;

(iii) Removing the children from the house when the husband became abusive;

(iv) I accept the wife's evidence the husband's behaviour made it challenging for her to parent the children. I accept the children required significantly more care and attention from her as a result of the harm they suffered from his abuse and witnessing his violence against her;

(v) I accept the children required significant additional support from the wife because of the pressure they were placed under by the husband's authoritarian, coercive and controlling parenting including particularly X and Z in respect of their academic pursuits. I accept this included the wife being required to attend meetings with teachers that would not otherwise have been required;

(vi) Undertaking her employment while impacted by the husband's family violence, including being tired as a result of the husband's abusive behaviour, and having him phoning her employer aggressively on multiple occasions while she was at work. I accept this made the wife's contributions via her employment more arduous than they otherwise would have been;

(vii) Taking leave from work to seek psychological support; and

(viii) Going out of her way to keep the husband happy and avoid conflict. As she described it, "It was always me having to bend over backwards to try and make him happy". I accept this required significant effort, making the wife's contributions to the welfare of the family significantly more onerous; and

(b) After separation:

(i) Living in a two-bedroom unit with the parties' three children since March 2023, after being required to leave the rented family home due to the husband's family violence. I accept the wife's evidence these living arrangements have placed her and the children under significant stress and infer it has made her contributions caring for the children significantly more difficult than they otherwise would have been;

(ii) Having to procure gifts of furniture and other items or to source free household items online to accommodate herself and the children, where the husband retained most of the family's household items in their rented home and refused her access to items in storage;

(iii) Having to provide additional emotional support to the children given their experience of being subjected to abuse and family violence by the husband, including following the incident in September 2023;

(iv) Having to pursue family violence intervention orders to protect herself and the children, where those proceedings were contested by the husband and resisting unmeritorious intervention order applications filed by him, requiring time to prepare court documents and attend at court; and

(v) Having to deal with the husband's subsequent refusal to spend time with the children unless the intervention orders protecting them are revoked, which I find was to coerce the wife to support the revocation of those orders.

1. It matters not that the husband's behaviour towards the wife may have been impacted by his poor mental health. Poor mental health does not explain or excuse his behaviour. It is the effect of the husband's family violence on the wife's contributions that I am required to consider.

1. The wife submits the parties' contributions should be assessed at 65% in her favour and 35% to the husband. She acknowledges the initial contribution made by the husband in respect of his ownership of Property D. That is a matter I disregard given I have been unable to attribute a value to the husband's interest on the balance sheet and will instead take that unquantified interest into account pursuant to section 75(2)(o) of the Act.
2. The husband submits he has "brought 80 per cent of the income, in dollar terms, into the household, including that of redundancy payment and a share scheme" and on this basis he should receive 80% of the parties' non-superannuation assets. He proposes each party retain their own superannuation, submitting in his oral submissions that "superannuation was going to be [his] retirement strategy", the wife is "not a woman who is tied to the sink in the 50s or whatever it is", and it was "a squandered opportunity on her behalf not to make use of tax-efficient strategies". In his response the husband submitted his proposal reflected "his prior contribution and ongoing financial contribution, his investment approach of maximising contributions to the tax efficient threshold and his earnings capability going forward" and the wife's approach of "not maximising her contributions to the tax efficient threshold". I reject those submissions which fail to give due recognition to the myriad of financial and non-financial contributions made by the wife throughout the parties' relationship, which supported the husband's employment and therefore his capacity to earn income and accumulate superannuation s during the parties' relationship. This submission also fails to take into account the very significant contributions made by the wife after separation, including by her care of Y and of X and Z until they turned 18.
3. Whilst I have set out my consideration of the parties' evidence in respect of their contributions in categories for convenience (referring to contributions during various stages of their relationship and the wife's Kennon argument for example), my assessment of their contributions is a holistic one. I have weighed and assessed the contributions of all kinds and from all sources made by each of the parties throughout the period of cohabitation, as the Full Court in Wallis & Manning made clear is the task of a trial judge.[62] My holistic assessment of the parties' contributions has extended to the period after separation.
4. Having undertaken this assessment, I evaluate the parties' contributions, in percentage terms, to be 65% to the wife and 35% to the husband: a differential of 30%. I do so putting significant weight on the wife's post-separation contributions, including her care of the children, her contributions to superannuation, and finding her contributions made during the parties' relationship and after separation were made significantly more arduous than they otherwise would have been by the very serious family violence perpetrated against her by the husband.
5. Where I have found the total net value of the parties' assets including superannuation to be approximately $2,935,642, applying those percentages would see the wife receive assets including superannuation with a net value equivalent to approximately $1,908,167 and the husband approximately $1,027,475. The difference between the value of property to be retained by the parties on this assessment would be approximately $880,692.

1. Section 79(4)(d) of the Act requires me to consider the effect of any proposed order upon the earning capacity of either party to the marriage. The sale of Property B will reduce both parties' income, as they will no longer receive rental income from that property.

1. In considering what order should be made under section 79, subsection 79(4)(e) requires me to take into account the matters referred to in section 75(2) so far as they are relevant.
2. The wife is aged 52 at the time of this judgment. She is in good health. She has not re-partnered.
3. The wife has qualifications in science and education. She continues to work as an educator and earns income from her employment of approximately $114,656 per annum. I accept the wife's submission that her career in science was impacted by her care of the parties' children and that her decision to undertake further study and work as an educator was to secure employment compatible with her care of the children. I am satisfied her income earning capacity was impacted as a result of her caring responsibilities for the children and the need for her to take on employment compatible with that role. I accept it would be difficult for the wife to return to a career in science without further training and it is reasonable for her to continue in a role that accommodates her caring responsibilities for Y.
4. The wife will continue to be solely responsible for Y's care pursuant to the final orders I make. This is a matter to be given significant weight pursuant to section 75(2)(c).
5. The husband is assessed to pay child support but was in arrears at the time of the final hearing as I mentioned. The husband's obligation to provide child support for Z will conclude on the last day of his secondary schooling, at the latest.[63]
6. The husband is also aged 52.
7. The husband has not made full and frank disclosure in respect of his employment and income after separation. I have only the limited evidence I have referred to, from the husband's tendered tax returns and assessments.
8. The wife submits the husband is unemployed "seemingly by choice". She refers to his purported "costs notice"[64] in which he states he is currently on "gardening leave" and claims costs of his involvement in these proceedings at $1,600 per day, described as his daily consultant day rate as a senior scientist. However, notwithstanding the absence of medical evidence, given the wife's evidence in relation to the husband's mental health, supported by the family consultant's observations and reported police observations, the way in which the husband's court documents were prepared and his presentation in court, I find his mental health likely impacts his capacity to engage in employment and earn the income he was earning during the parties' relationship. This weighs in his favour pursuant to section 75(2)(b).
9. A countervailing consideration is that if the husband continues to derive such a low income as it appears he will in the absence of evidence of mental health treatment, it is unlikely he will be making any meaningful contribution to Y's financial support by way of child support and this weighs in the wife's favour pursuant to section 75(2)(na).
10. Pursuant to section 75(2)(b) and (n) I take into account the wife will be retaining assets of a significantly greater value than the husband pursuant to my contribution-based assessment.
11. I take into account pursuant to section 75(2)(o) that the husband has an interest as joint proprietor with his two siblings in Property D, of an unknown value, acquired prior to the parties' commencing their relationship. In the absence of full and frank disclosure it is not possible to ascertain if any contribution has been made by the parties to the conservation and maintenance of that property during their relationship.
12. I also take into account pursuant to section 75(2)(o) that the husband has not made full and frank disclosure of his financial position meaning his current financial circumstances are largely unknown. Whilst there is insufficient evidence for me to make a finding the husband holds undisclosed assets or that the assets he does hold (such as the companies) are of any significant value, the husband's non-disclosure supports me erring on the side of generosity to the wife.
13. Balancing all considerations relevant pursuant to section 75(2) and particularly those I have just outlined, I find there should be an "adjustment"[65] to my contribution-based assessment of 5% in favour of the wife to achieve a justice and equitable outcome.

1. Pursuant to the above assessment, I am satisfied it is just and equitable for the parties' interests in property to be altered such that the parties' assets and superannuation are divided in the proportions of approximately 70% to the wife and 30% to the husband.
2. To achieve the above outcome, the wife is to receive assets and superannuation with a net value of approximately $2,054,949 and the husband approximately $880,693. The differential between their positions will be approximately $1,174,256. The husband will also retain his interest in Property D.
3. In terms of the composition of their respective entitlements, I am satisfied it is just and equitable for there to be an equalisation of the parties' superannuation as the wife proposes. To achieve this outcome, using the agreed superannuation values in the joint balance sheet, a base amount of $481,878 will be set for the purpose of the superannuation splitting order. I am satisfied an order may be made binding the trustee of Super Fund 1 where the trustee has been afforded procedural fairness in respect of the form of orders proposed by the wife.[66]
4. To make up the wife's entitlement, she will receive/retain:

Assets & liabilities (excluding net proceeds from sale of Property B)

Total assets & superannuation (excluding share of sale proceeds)

Plus share of net proceeds from the sale of Property B after payment of outstanding school fees (based on parties' estimate of value and not allowing for sale costs)

Assets & liabilities (excluding net proceeds from sale of Property B)

Interest as registered proprietor of Property D along with his two brothers

Plus share of net proceeds from the sale of Property B after payment of outstanding school fees (based on parties' estimate of value and not allowing for sale costs)

+ assets of unknown value, including interest in Property D

1. I consider this to be a just and equitable outcome, in percentage and actual terms, consistent with my holistic assessment and weighing of the parties' respective contributions and those matters relevant pursuant to section 75(2) in the context of a marriage with approximately 23 years of cohabitation, raising three children, and a separation of approximately 3.5 years, where the wife's contributions were made significantly more difficult by the family violence she was subjected to by the husband. I am satisfied the configuration of the proposed settlement, in terms of the particular assets and superannuation each party is to retain, is appropriate.

1. I will make an order providing for the sale of Property B where there is no admissible evidence as to the value of the property (only an agreed estimate), the wife seeks the sale and the husband has not adduced evidence he is in a financial position to make a payment to the wife in order for him to retain the property.
2. The husband did not tender a form of proposed orders in the event his application to retain Property B was unsuccessful. I am satisfied it is appropriate for the wife to be given control of the sale of Property B. Given the husband's opposition to the sale, his attitude towards the wife and his prior conduct (both in respect of the repairs previously required to Property B and in respect of this proceeding), I have no confidence he will cooperate with the sale. I find requiring the wife to liaise with the husband in respect of the sale will also expose her to a risk of being subjected to further family violence by him, including in the form of coercive and controlling behaviour (including for example, by delaying the sale and causing the wife to incur further legal costs). I will therefore make an order pursuant to section 106A of the Act as proposed by the wife, although adopting the language from that provision in the terms of the order. I accept the wife will be motivated to sell the property for the best possible price and to do so efficiently, given she will be receiving a significant proportion of the proceeds and is reliant on those monies to repay her litigation funding loan.
3. I will make the order sought by the wife restraining the parties from further encumbering Property B pending its sale, save for the wife being permitted to use Property B as security for her legal fees and loan for legal fees. I will add a condition that she be permitted to do so only provided that liability does not exceed her entitlement from the anticipated sale proceeds, to protect the husband's entitlements.
4. I will make an order requiring the wife to cause the removal of any caveat registered on the title of Property B securing the payment of legal costs and/or her litigation funding loan, at settlement, at her expense.
5. I will also make an order providing for the wife to be reimbursed from the husband's share of the net sale proceeds in the event he does not pay his share of advertising fees and the wife pays those costs on behalf of both of them in the first instance, given there is little evidence of his current financial circumstances and I find there is a prospect he may not cooperate to pay those fees promptly even if required by court order.
6. The wife seeks conflicting orders in relation to the contents of Property B. She seeks both an order that the parties remove all of their belongings from Property B prior to settlement of the sale of that property and an order that she retain the contents of Property B. Property B has been tenanted and the wife did not give evidence as to what contents remain in that property. She gave evidence items from the parties' former rented home have been put into storage and the husband has obstructed her gaining access to those items. The husband seeks an order that each of the parties retain those household items in their possession. He did not seek an order specifically in relation to the contents of Property B. I will therefore make an order providing for the wife to retain the contents of Property B given that was not opposed by the husband and for her to remove those items from the property prior to settlement of the sale. The balance of the parties' former household contents will fall within the order proposed by the wife and agreed by the husband, that they each retain the furniture and effects currently in their possession.
7. Neither party made submissions in respect of the form of order sought by the wife. Aside from those changes I have specifically mentioned, I will make orders largely in the terms she seeks, making some minor changes to ensure the parties' obligations are clear, re-casting the proposed formula effecting division of the proceeds from the sale of Property B to reflect my determination, to reflect the wording of the Act, to reference the updated Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2025, and to avoid duplication of provisions (for example, in relation to the parties' responsibility for liabilities).
8. I will not include in the orders I make, a reference to future changes in superannuation legislation as sought by the wife, relying on the relevant statutory provisions currently in force.

1. The wife seeks an order for costs, on an indemnity basis. She gave evidence in support of that application in her trial affidavit. I find it is premature to consider the wife's application for costs, pending the making of final orders and delivery of my reasons. I note the wife refers to offers to settle which she seeks to adduce once judgment has been delivered.
2. Accordingly, I will dismiss all applications save for the wife's application for costs and I will make directions for the filing of costs submissions, including in respect of any costs reserved. I will set limits on the volume of material to be filed, to ensure the costs application is dealt with efficiently and cost effectively. I will set a hearing date in respect of that application, to take place electronically.

1. The wife submits the husband has engaged in systems abuse as a form of family violence, including by his conduct in this proceeding and in intervention order proceedings involving the parties. The family consultant also identified systems abuse as a concern, writing in the family report:

[The husband's] determination to right what he perceives as injustices against him is alarming, his Freedom of Information application to obtain victim statements is highly concerning and raises questions of rumination on injustice and systems abuse. The protracted dispute regarding parenting arrangements and property settlement appears to be respectively causing the parents frustration and to be reviving trauma experiences for [the wife] and the children, it appears that [the husband] is not cognisant of this.

1. The husband reported from the bar table he has filed a further application in respect of the intervention orders made to protect the wife and parties' children.
2. I refer to my findings in relation to the wife's claim of systems abuse earlier in my reasons.
3. Section 102QAC(1) of the Act provides the court may make an order (a harmful proceedings order) prohibiting the husband from instituting proceedings under the Act without leave of the court if satisfied there are reasonable grounds to believe the wife, or Y, would suffer harm if the husband instituted further proceedings against the wife. For the purpose of this provision, subsection 102QAC(2) sets out that "harm" may include psychological harm or oppression, major mental distress, a detrimental effect on the other party's capacity to care for a child, or financial harm.
4. Brasch J explained the operation of harmful proceedings orders in Carey & Prescott (No 2)[67] as follows:

Harmful proceedings orders do not shut a party out of the court. Rather, if such an order is made, the relevant party [...] cannot bring further proceedings without the leave of the court under s 102QAG. The sections seek to balance a party's right to institute proceedings on one hand, against such proceedings causing harm to the other party and/or the child on the other. If a harmful proceedings order is made, then a subsequent court is in essence the gatekeeper in balancing the former and the latter.

1. The wife has not applied for a harmful proceedings order. However, subsection 102QAC(4) provides the court may make a harmful proceedings order in relation to a person of its own initiative provided the person is given an opportunity to be heard.
2. I intend to consider making a harmful proceedings order, prohibiting the husband from instituting further proceedings under the Act without leave of the court under section 102QAG. Before doing so, I will afford the parties the opportunity to file written submissions and be heard in respect of the making of such an order, including the form of order they propose be made if the court determines to make such an order. I will provide for those submissions to be filed within the same timetable as submissions in relation to costs and for the hearing of any costs application and oral submissions in relation to my consideration of a harmful proceedings order to be conducted at the same time.

1. For all of the reasons outlined, I make the orders in the terms set out at the commencement of this judgment, finding the parenting orders to be in Y's best interests and the property orders appropriate and just and equitable in the circumstances.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and thirty-five (235) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge A. Humphreys.

[1] Including Jabour & Jabour (2019) FLC 93-898 ("Jabour"), Hurst & Hurst [2018] FamCAFC 146; (2018) FLC 93-851 and Barnell & Barnell [2020] FamCAFC 102; (2020) FLC 93-961 and in respect of the court's consideration of the wife's Kennon v Kennon [1997] FamCA 27; (1997) FLC 92-757 argument ("Kennon"), Benson & Drury [2020] FamCAFC 303 ("Benson & Drury") and Giunta & Giunta (No. 3) [2021] FamCA 272.

[2] Due to a final family violence order in place for a period of 10 years, naming the husband as a respondent and the wife as a protected person.

[5] [2003] HCA 48; (2003) 77 ALJR 1598 at [62] per Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ

[8] As expressed at paragraph 17 of the explanatory memorandum to the Family Law Amendment Bill 2023.

[15] (1988) 166 CLR 69.

[17] Isles & Nelissen (2022) FLC 94-092 ("Isles & Nelissen") at [56], citing with approval A v A (1998) FLC 92-800 at [3.14]-[3.15] and [3.24].

[20] Pacotto & Galvin [2025] FedCFamC1A 27 ("Pacotto & Galvin") at [60], citing Bielen & Kozma [2022] FedCFamC1A 221; (2022) FLC 94-123 ("Bielen & Kozma") at [51]-[55].

[21] [2024] FedCFamC1A 112 at [33].

[22] [2015] FamCAFC 146 at [27], cited by the Full Court very recently with approval in Pacotto & Galvin at [60].

[34] Cauchi & Cauchi [1993] FamCA 140; (1994) FLC 92-447 at [17] - [20].

[36] Stanford v Stanford (247) CLR 108.

[41] [2004] FamCA 633; (2004) FLC 93-204 at [55].

[42] Weir & Weir [1992] FamCA 69; (1993) FLC 92-338 ("Weir").

[43] Morrison v Morrison (1994) FLC 92-573 at [81,671].

[44] K & K (2003) FLC 93-135, applying Chang v Su [2002] FamCA 156; (2002) FLC 93-117 and Weir.

[45] [2022] FedCFamC1A 53; (2022) 64 Fam LR 633 at [14].

[49] Dickons & Dickons [2012] FamCAFC 154; (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 ("Dickons") at [21].

[51] Norbis v Norbis [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513 at [524].

[52] Jabour; Benson & Drury at [35].

[54] Aleksovski v Aleksovski [1996] FamCAFC 111; (1996) FLC 92-705, per Baker and Rowlands JJ at [83,434].

[60] at [49] citing Maine & Maine [2016] FamCAFC 270; (2016) 56 Fam LR 500 at [47]-[52]; Britt & Britt (2017) FLC 93-764 at [74]-[75]; Keating & Keating (2019) FLC 93-894 at [27]-[43], [52]-[67].

[63] Section 151B Child Support (Assessment) Act 1989 (Cth).

[65] Acknowledging the comment made by Aldridge J in Martell & Martell [2023] FedCFamC1A 71; (2023) 66 Fam LR 650 at [55] in respect of the use of that language.

[67] [2024] FedCFamC1F 512, at [158].