Haynes v Couzens [2000] VSC 345

Supreme Court of Victoria|2000-08-25|Before: BEACH, J.

This matter comes before the Court as a matter of some urgency. It is an application brought by the Plaintiffs, Braden Haynes and the Beaumaris Football Club Inc, pursuant to sections 3 and 4 of the Administrative Law Act 1978 in respect of the decision of the Tribunal of the Victorian Amateur Football Association to impose two weeks' suspension on the First-Plaintiff for striking an opposition player during the course of a football match on 5 August 2000.

As I understand the situation, the Senior team of the Beaumaris Football Club is to take part in the Grand Final of its division tomorrow.

In the light of the urgency of the matter my reasons will, therefore, be briefer than they otherwise might be.

I think the first thing to bear in mind is that it is now quite well established that the courts will not interfere with the decision of a domestic tribunal unless they are satisfied that the tribunal has really gone astray. The matter was referred to comparatively recently by the Court of Appeal in Australian Football League & Ors v. Carlton Football Club Limited & Anor [1998] 2 VR page 546.

At page 550 Tadgell, J.A. who was the Presiding Judge said:

"Statutes aside, the courts have been disposed to interfere in a limited way with decisions of private or domestic tribunals in order to protect private rights that have been adjudged to deserve protection, including rights in property."

"If it is a decision that is seen not to be made in good faith, or to be the product of bias or other dishonesty, or not to be made in accordance with the principles of natural justice, the courts will upset it, and the basis for doing so in these several circumstances has been variously expressed."

"It remains the law, for example, that if a domestic tribunal was designed to enquire into facts, there must be due inquiry. The tribunal must do the job it was designed to do and not merely go 'through the motions of doing', as Vice Chancellor Shadwell put it. A Court may well step in if it can be seen that the whole thing is a farce, hence it has been said that the courts will interfere if the conclusion reached by the tribunal is plainly absurd or unreasonable or such that no reasonable man could come to the conclusion or that no reasonable man could honestly arrive at it, or that the conclusion was reached in disregard of one of the fundamental principles of natural justice."

In the present case it is not said that the Tribunal's decision was not made in good faith or that it was the product of bias or other dishonesty. It is not suggested that the proceedings before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's decision was a farce, or that the conclusion it arrived at was plainly absurd or unreasonable, or one that no reasonable man could honestly arrive at. What is said is that in arriving at the decision it did the Tribunal denied the Plaintiffs natural justice.

Three matters are relied upon in that regard. It is said:

Firstly, that the Tribunal refused to allow the First-Plaintiff's advocate to produce statutory declarations and videos concerning the First-Plaintiff's style of playing.

Second, it failed to allow the First-Plaintiff's advocate to make oral submissions on his behalf concerning the finding that the Tribunal should make.

Finally, it is said that the Tribunal denied the Plaintiffs natural justice in that it failed to allow the First-Plaintiff's advocate to make submissions in relation to the question of the any penalty which was to be imposed on the First-Plaintiff.

During the course of the hearing the First Plaintiff's advocate did endeavour to produce statutory declarations and videos related to the First-Plaintiff's style of play. However, the Tribunal refused to accept such material ruling that in its opinion the material was irrelevant.

I am not persuaded it made any error in that regard. What the Tribunal was required to determine was what occurred during the course of the football match on 5 August; did the First-Plaintiff strike the member of the opposition team in question or did he not. I fail to see that the First-Plaintiff's style of football, as demonstrated in the videos of earlier matches, has any real bearing on the matter.

As to the second complaint, namely that the Tribunal failed to give the First-Plaintiff's advocate an opportunity to make submissions on behalf of the player, there is a dispute between the parties.

In a letter dated 10 August 2000 written by the President of the Beaumaris Football Club to the Chairman of the VAFA Tribunal and Investigations Committee, the President has set out the complaint that the Plaintiffs make in that regard.

I quote from Exhibit RPN 3 to the affidavit of Ronald Phillip Nicholson sworn 22 August 2000:

"5. A further consequence of this Tribunal ruling was that the Advocate was prevented from making his final summary of the case as allowed under Schedule A - Rule 15 and that therefore the player was not given a full and proper hearing in contravention of the Tribunal's own rules. Its refusal constitutes an unequivocal denial of natural justice."

However, in his affidavit of 24 August 2000 the Chairman of the Tribunal which heard the charge has sworn:

13. "Having been informed by Nicholson (and I interpolate, who was the advocate for the first plaintiff) that he did not wish to call additional witnesses, I asked Nicholson, Haynes, Umpire Gallagher and Rossiter to leave the hearing room so that the Tribunal could consider the evidence and reach a decision. 14. "Before leaving the hearing room neither Umpire Gallagher nor Nicholson sought to summarise their cases. Thus Nicholson's assertion (see para 5 of Exhibit RPN 3 of his Affidavit sworn 22 August 2000) that he was prevented from making his summary of Haynes' case (as allowed under Schedule A - Rule 15) is denied."

Finally in this regard in his affidavit in reply sworn 24 August, Nicholson has sworn:

2. "I dispute paragraphs 13 and 14 of the Couzens Affidavit. At the Tribunal hearing I appeared as the firstnamed plaintiff's ('the Player') advocate pursuant to Schedule AA of the Victorian Amateur Football Association ('VAFA') ('the Rules'). At the close of evidence, but before the Tribunal delivered its finding, I attempted to make submissions summing up the Player's case pursuant to 2(iii) of the Rules. It was at this time that Couzens produced the VAFA Handbook, referred to page 111 of same, and told me, inter alia, that submissions regarding character evidence and evidence of Haynes' previous record could be made later 'if necessary'. I understood this to mean that although I was prevented from making a submission of the Player's case I would be allowed to make submissions as to character after the Tribunal had delivered its finding."

Where there is a conflict in the evidence as there is in this case, unless it is clear that what has been sworn to on behalf of the Tribunal is wrong, the Court will, as a matter of practice, act on the version of events as given in this case by the Chairman of the Tribunal.

The third matter relied upon by the Plaintiffs relates to the penalty imposed on the First-Plaintiff. There are three rules of the Victorian Amateur Football Association which are said to be relevant to this issue. They are Rules 103, 106 and 116.

"The Tribunal in imposing any penalty for an offence or offences against the Laws of the Game of Football as may be adopted by the Association from time to time shall impose a penalty which is not less than the penalty prescribed by Rule 106 of these Rules."

"The penalties prescribed for offences against the Laws of the Game of Football as adopted by the Association from time to time shall be those set out in Schedule D to these Rules."

If one looks at Schedule D one sees that the minimum penalty to be imposed for striking a player is two matches. That is the minimum penalty of suspension.

"The period of suspension of a player by a Tribunal shall correspond to the number of premiership matches in either the first or second rounds in which the suspended player is eligible to represent his Club unless the Tribunal otherwise orders."

It is argued that the wording of Rule 116 is such as to give the Tribunal a discretion as to suspending a penalty of suspension which has been imposed, or at the least, to give the Tribunal a discretion as to when it is to be served. In that latter connection it is said, for example, that if the player in question was aged say 18 and his club was competing in two of the series of final games, the Under 19s and the Seniors, and the Under 19s finals series match was tomorrow and its Senior series match was next week, the Tribunal could say in respect of that 18 year old player - "one suspension will relate to the match to be played by the Under 19s tomorrow, the other suspension will relate to the Seniors game next week".

I find it very difficult to interpret the Rule in that fashion myself, but then that fact only highlights the observation I made earlier that one is dealing with a domestic tribunal and the Rules of a domestic tribunal, and it may well be that those far more familiar with the Rules than I am do give it the interpretation contended for. But whether that be the case, the fact of the matter is that the minimum penalty to be imposed for striking is suspension for a period of two weeks, and there is, in my opinion, nothing in Rule 116 which enables the Tribunal to suspend that penalty.

In the present case, therefore, the penalty imposed upon the First-Plaintiff was the minimum penalty which could be imposed. In my opinion it cannot be said that the Tribunal denied the First-Plaintiff, or for that matter, the club, natural justice in failing to allow the First-Plaintiff's advocate to make submissions in respect of that matter.

Finally, I would point out that in any event the relief sought by the Plaintiffs is discretionary, and pursuant to s.42 of the Administrative Law Act the Court may refuse such an application if it is satisfied that no matter of substantial importance is involved.

In my opinion, no question of substantial importance is involved in this case and the application, therefore, must be dismissed.

I do not consider that the matters advanced by counsel for the Plaintiffs in relation to the question of costs are sufficient to justify departing from the normal rule that the costs of an application of this nature will normally follow the event. I order that the Plaintiffs pay the Defendants' costs of the application.

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