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[2012] WASC 131
Supreme Court of WA
2012-04-03
Edelman J
Original judgment source is linked above.
(These reasons were delivered at the conclusion of the hearing with amendments made in this published judgment to grammar and syntax only.)
The application for an interim injunction and a freezing order
1 This is an application by chamber summons for a mandatory interim injunction and freezing orders.
2 The application is brought in the inherent jurisdiction of this court and also by reference to s 167(1)(o)(a) and s 25(9) of the Supreme Court Act 1935 (WA), and O 52 and O 52A of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA).
3 The application is ex parte. It is brought ex parte because of the fear that the defendants may dissipate assets or dispose of the subject matter of the proceedings (a crane) prior to any orders being made.
4 I set out the background below. The background is derived from an affidavit of Mr Choon Bock Lim affirmed on 30 March 2012. Mr Lim is the managing director of the plaintiff, Haruki Machinery Pte Ltd (Haruki Machinery). There is also an affidavit from a private investigator, Mr Sean Parker, affirmed on 29 March 2012 to which I will make reference. I have also been provided with a short affidavit of service of a letter on the second defendant, Mr Parker, and attempted service of the letter on the first defendant, and another affidavit from a lawyer acting for Haruki Machinery which is mainly concerned with explaining the correction of an error in the recording of Haruki Machinery's interest in the crane on the Personal Properties Securities Register under the Personal Properties Securities Act 2009 (Cth).
6 Haruki Machinery is the owner of a crane with serial number GH0301931. The crane was manufactured in 2005.
7 In 2009 Haruki Machinery hired out the crane to the first defendant, RSM Crane Sales & Hire Pty Ltd (RSM Crane Sales). RSM Crane Sales is controlled by the second defendant, Mr Barry Harold Parker. The director of the Haruki Machinery, Mr Lim, dealt with Mr Parker at all times.
8 In very brief and broad summary, Mr Lim says the following.
(a) he was currently in jail for sentences imposed on him for offences of handling stolen trucks and cranes;
(b) that Mr Parker would be in jail for five to seven years; and
(c) that the crane is currently with police and is locked up to be used as evidence and being seized under proceeds of crime legislation.
The principles concerning freezing orders and interim injunctions
9 Since this application is ex parte and the relief is for a short period, I will set out only in very brief, and broad, outline the principles to be considered in an application of this sort. A minimum condition of a freezing order is that there must be a good arguable case. But this is not sufficient. A freezing order is a drastic remedy which should not be granted lightly. All of the circumstances must be weighed in light of the potential serious prejudice to a defendant.
10 In National Australia Bank Ltd v Bond Brewing Holdings Ltd [1990] HCA 10; (1990) 169 CLR 271, 277, Mason CJ, Brennan and Deane JJ explained that a freezing order could be obtained even if there was not shown to be a positive intention by the party against whom the order was sought to frustrate any judgment. However, as the joint judgment of the plurality in Cardile v LED Builders Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 18; (1999) 198 CLR 380, 394 [26] observed, it is important to fashion any freezing order in a manner which the court considers appropriate to ensure that it is not abused.
11 As for the question of an interim injunction, this legal test is separate from the question of whether a freezing order should be granted. However, they both share the requirement that the applicant have a good arguable case (in the case of a freezing order) or that there is a serious question to be tried (in the case of an interim injunction).
12 In Beecham Group Ltd v Bristol Laboratories Pty Ltd [1968] HCA 1; (1968) 118 CLR 618, 622 623 the High Court (Kitto, Taylor, Menzies & Owen JJ) said that a claim for an interlocutory injunction requires consideration of whether the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case, in the sense that if the evidence remains as it is there is a probability that at the trial of the action the plaintiff will be held entitled to relief and whether the inconvenience or injury which the plaintiff would be likely to suffer if an injunction were refused outweighs or is outweighed by the injury which the defendant would suffer if an injunction were granted. This was quoted with approval in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57, 82 [65] (Gummow & Hayne JJ). Consideration must also be given to the question of whether damages would be an adequate remedy.
13 The first order I will make is to admit this matter to my CMC list.
14 I turn then to the question of the injunction and the freezing orders sought.
15 I accept that, on the limited (and ex parte) evidence before me that there is a serious question to be tried, and a reasonably arguable case, concerning whether the defendants, RSM Crane Sales and Mr Parker, are liable for the torts of detinue or conversion. I also accept that there are serious questions to be tried, and a reasonably arguable case, concerning the liability of the defendants for contractual debts which have accrued, subject to the possibility of any counterclaim by Mr Parker for the expenses which he may allege to have been incurred. The evidence currently before me suggests that, at the very highest, that counterclaim would be for less than half of the primary claim.
16 I also note that the basis upon which this finding of serious question to be tried or a good arguable case is made is, as is usual, made upon necessarily limited evidence.
17 I also accept, again on the limited ex parte evidence before me, that there is a real possibility that the crane might be sold or disposed of without the consent of Haruki Machinery and that recovery of it may by Haruki Machinery become difficult. I do note, however that Haruki Machinery's interest in the crane is registered on the Personal Properties Securities Register under the Personal Properties Securities Act. An error in the register has now apparently been rectified.
18 I also accept, again on the limited ex parte evidence before me, that there is a possibility that Mr Parker may seek to place his assets beyond the reach of Haruki Machinery or may deal with the crane in a manner which makes its recovery difficult.
19 In these circumstances, I consider that relief in the form of a freezing order should be given to protect against the possibility of Mr Parker moving his assets outside Australia or moving them beyond the reach of Haruki Machinery. That relief should be limited to a short period, to enable Mr Parker to raise with the court any objection to the orders at the first return. My first available date, which is when the return of these orders should be listed before me, is 2.00 pm on 18 April 2012.
20 Similarly, I consider that relief in the form of an interlocutory injunction should be granted to prevent Mr Parker from dealing with the crane, or interfering with the crane in any way including selling it, hiring it, or transporting it to any other location. If the location of the crane is not known, Mr Parker should also be ordered to disclose to Haruki Machinery the current location of the crane. Again, that relief should be limited to a short period, to enable Mr Parker to raise any objection with the court at the first return. My first available date, which is when the return of these orders should be listed before me, is 2.00 pm on 18 April 2012.
21 These orders are considerably more limited than those which are sought by Haruki Machinery. I do not consider it appropriate, in an ex parte application, to grant a mandatory injunction requiring the crane to be returned. It is enough to give orders prohibiting Mr Parker from dealing with, or interfering with the crane in any way.
22 Nor do I consider it appropriate for the freezing order to extend to prevent Mr Parker and his wife (against whom no claim is made or suggested) from selling the residence at 3 Ali Turn, Canning Vale in which he and his wife, Ms Tina Parker, are joint owners. This point was properly conceded by counsel. Provided that the freezing order prevents him from disposing of any proceeds of sale outside Australia and prevents him from moving his assets beyond the reach of Haruki Machinery then this is the appropriate extent of orders currently necessary on the evidence before me, at least until the first return of this matter on 18 April 2012.
23 Haruki Machinery also sought the appointment of a receiver in the alternative. A passage from Civil Procedure in Western Australia was quoted in support of the proposition that this appointment can be a valuable adjunct to the grant of a freezing order. The following sentence reads: 'this is a drastic step not to be lightly taken, and a party must make out a clear case for that remedy', citing Beach Petroleum NL v Johnson (1992) 9 ACSR 404, 406. I do not consider that the appointment of a receiver is appropriate, particularly on an ex parte basis.
24 I will hear from counsel concerning the appropriate form of orders to give effect to these reasons.
(2006) 227 CLR 57
(1990) 169 CLR 271
(1999) 198 CLR 380
(1968) 118 CLR 618