Hartley v Envisage Construction and Design Pty Ltd

Consideration

Section 140 of the CP Act relevantly provides: "140 Transfer of proceedings to higher court (1) The Supreme Court may, of its own motion or on application by a party to proceedings before the District Court … order that the proceedings, including any cross-claim in the proceedings, be transferred to the Supreme Court. … (3) Proceedings in the District Court on a claim for damages arising from personal injury or death are not to be transferred to the Supreme Court under this section unless the Supreme Court is satisfied - (a) in the case of a motor accident claim or a workplace injury damages claim - (i) that the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, if successful, is likely to be more than $1,000,000, and (ii) that the case involves complex legal issues or issues of general public importance, or (b) in any other case - (i) that the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, if successful, is likely to exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court, or (ii) that there is other sufficient reason for hearing the proceedings in the Supreme Court. …"
The term "workplace injury damages claim" is defined to mean a claim for an award of damages to which Div 3 of Pt 5 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW) applies. Section 151E of Workers Compensation Act provides: "151E Application - modified common law damages (1) This Division [Div 3 of Pt 5] applies to an award of damages in respect of - (a) an injury to a worker, or (b) the death of a worker resulting from or caused by an injury, being an injury caused by the negligence or other tort of the worker's employer."
Because neither defendant was the plaintiff's employer, the relevant provision is s 140(3)(b) of the CP Act and the relevant jurisdictional limit is $750,000, having regard to the definition of "jurisdictional limit" in s 3(1) of the CP Act and ss 4 and 44(1)(a) of the District Court Act 1973 (NSW).
Under s 140, the Court is not required to make an assessment of the strength of the plaintiff's case as to liability or quantum, since these are matters for the trial judge. The task to be undertaken by a Court has been described as "a matter of impression".
One essential element to be considered is whether, in the words of s 140(3)(b)(i): "the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, if successful, is likely to exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court". (underlining added)
As a result, the Court's task is not to attempt to assess the likely damages on all the evidence before it.
In Johnstone v State of New South Wales [2006] NSWCA 105, Giles JA (Santow and McColl JJA agreeing) said, at [22] - [23]: "[22] … Plainly [the judge] was not to engage in an exercise of complete assessment, but was to arrive at a likelihood, and of necessity he had to do so to an extent as a matter of impression, albeit founded on the evidence before him. The judge did this and, in my opinion, he sufficiently explained why he did not accept the suggested assessment of $1.6 million. [23] It was submitted that the judge should have gone to each of the items in the assessment, and stated his own assessment in substitution for that proposed on behalf of the claimant, so that it was demonstrated quasi-mathematically that the threshold of $750,000 was not achieved. I do not think that is correct. The question for the judge was not an assessment of the individual components of a damages claim, but rather the broader question of whether it appeared likely to him that if the claimant were successful his damages would exceed $750,000 …"
As Adamson J explained in Aitofi v The Council of the City of Sydney [2020] NSWSC 611 at [29], the words "if successful" are not confined to liability but extend also to damages. Thus, it is not sufficient merely to assume that the plaintiff will be successful in establishing that one or other of the defendants is liable. Rather, it is also necessary to assume that the plaintiff will be successful in establishing the general basis on which the plaintiff's claim for damages is put.
The evidence adduced in support of an application for transfer must generally provide a sufficient basis for the damages claimed. In my view, there is a basis in the evidence before me to support the propositions that the plaintiff has, as a result of the accident on 16 January 2016, sustained injury which required significant treatment, caused pain and suffering, has had ongoing adverse effects on the plaintiff's health, well-being and capacity to perform various types of work and may have caused his earning capacity to be reduced to a greater or lesser extent.
The requirement to be satisfied that the amount to be awarded to the plaintiff, is likely to exceed the jurisdictional limit of the District Court, if the plaintiff is successful, does not mean that the figures put forward by the plaintiff's solicitors must be accepted without question. Common experience teaches that such figures might not be achieved at a final hearing, when all the evidence has been considered by the trial judge. Nonetheless, as Adamson J said in Aitofi at [30], the Court should not adopt too sceptical an approach to such figures where there is some evidence for the scenario on which they are based.
Further, Pt 6 of the CP Act is relevant to the assessment required by s 140. Adamson J in Aitofi said at [31]: "To read the words "if successful" in s 140 too narrowly would hardly advance the "just, quick and cheap resolution of the real issues in the proceedings" in accordance with the overriding purpose in s 56. Had the application for transfer not been made, his solicitors could potentially, in that event [namely the plaintiff being entitled to recover more than $750,000], be found to be liable in negligence for not seeking the transfer. … [The plaintiff not being able to recover the full amount of his damages] would amount to irremediable prejudice and is a matter to be taken into account under Part 6 of the Act."
The first defendant contended that the plaintiff had delayed in making the application to transfer. The accident alleged occurred on 16 January 2016. Proceedings in the District Court were commenced on 10 January 2018. A further amended statement of claim was filed on 7 February 2020.
The transfer application was foreshadowed in about April 2020 and was filed on 28 July 2020, after some discussion between the parties as to consenting to unlimited jurisdiction or transfer. Given the difficulties during 2020 with the COVID-19 pandemic, it does not appear to me that there has been such delay as would strongly militate against the plaintiff's transfer application.
There was some evidence concerning when the matter might be heard in the District Court at Wollongong, it was far from clear when a final hearing might actually take place. Nonetheless, the prejudice involved in depriving the plaintiff of the opportunity to recover more than the jurisdictional limit of the District Court would not, in my view, be cured by the availability of a hearing date in the District Court which might be earlier than the date available in this Court.
Furthermore, the transfer to this Court is not without some benefit to the defendants and risk to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff were to recover less than $500,000 in damages, he may not be successful in obtaining an order for costs of the proceedings, having regard to the terms of r 42.34 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW).
There was a substantial basis, on the material before the Court, for having some doubt as to whether the plaintiff would be likely to recover more than $750,000.00. Nonetheless, I am required to make an assessment of the case advanced by the plaintiff, if successful. On that basis, I am prepared to find that there is a realistic, but far from overwhelming, chance of his obtaining judgment for an amount in excess of $750,000, which is the relevant jurisdictional limit. Whether or not he does so after a final hearing remains to be seen. The risk that the plaintiff may be successful but not recover a sufficient amount to entitle him to an award of costs in his favour was no doubt considered by the plaintiff's solicitors when pursuing this transfer application.
For these reasons and taking into account all the considerations referred to above, I am satisfied on balance that an order for transfer ought be made.

At a glance

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Judgment (9 paragraphs)

Parties

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (2)