Harry (Administrator), in the matter of Trinder (deceased) [2025] FedCFamC2G 2171 (8 December 2025)

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 24.04(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 24.04 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth).

1. These are bankruptcy proceedings within the Court's jurisdiction under s 27 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ("the Act") in respect of a petition that was brought under s 247 of part XI for the administration of a bankrupt deceased estate. The deceased died on 23 October 2024, and according to the Statement of Affairs from the administrator of the bankrupt estate pursuant to letters of administration by order of the Supreme Court of Queensland made on 25 August 2023, the estate became insolvent around September 2024. Before the administration of the estate is involved, there are a number of other areas of litigation that it is unnecessary for this Court to delve into.
2. At the commencement of the hearing, there was one creditor identified being Mr Craig Trinder, who was granted leave to appear through his solicitor, Mr McClelland, in respect of a claim or interest against the estate in respect of or relating to a motorcycle that apparently has been in dispute since 2017. There was a further party that sought to be heard, but accepted that at this stage there was no affidavit in support to establish that they are creditors of the estate, although they may have an interest in the outcome of the estate. The Court declined to grant leave to parties who are not creditors to appear. There was no dispute but that the estate was insolvent and in excess of the relevant statutory amount. In those circumstances, the Court is satisfied that it was proper to make an order pursuant to s 247 of the Act.
3. The Court was assisted by helpful submissions and well-drawn affidavits on behalf of the administrator of the estate, but also identified the proposed trustee and the consent to act as trustee from Mr James Andrew Robba. The only matter that was the subject of perhaps any discord was that on the last occasion when this matter was before the Court, being 24 November 2025, there were observations from another Judge of this Court suggesting some ability to determine the outcome of Mr McClelland's client's claim. There was no basis for those observations and they should not have been made. There was no basis for the reserving of costs.
4. Bankruptcy proceedings are ones that must be dealt with expeditiously. It is not apparent to this Court why the petition was not heard and determined promptly as it should have been following its filing on 24 June 2025 on its first return date and it is certainly not apparent to the Court why it was not dealt with on 24 November 2025 as it is apparent that the relevant creditors had been notified. The Court notes that there was evidence of service on the relevant creditors. The Court does not propose to descend into that evidence beyond identifying that it is satisfied that it is appropriate to make the orders being sought by the petitioner.
5. The Court adds that it is perfectly apparent that the petitioner has incurred costs and expense in administering the estate following the orders made by the Supreme Court of Queensland, all of which have given rise to the proceeds that are now able to be identified in the Statement of Affairs. It would be perverse not to ensure that those costs and expenses in that administration rank equally with the petitioner's costs in the making of this petition. The net proceeds of the insolvent estate that may be available for distribution are not ones in respect of which it would be just and equitable for the administrator not to have a priority in respect of their costs and expenses. Section 109(1)(d) of the Act must be broadly interpreted as it is a beneficial provision to protect the administration of the deceased insolvent estate to the making of orders under part XI of the Act.
6. The Court made the order under s 109(1)(d) of the Act, and so far as necessary, the Court also relied upon the Court's broad powers under s 30(1)(b) of the Act.
7. It is for these reasons the Court makes the above orders.

I certify that the preceding seven (7) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Ex Tempore Reasons for Judgment of Judge Street.