Harrop v State of Vic [2025] VCC 795 | Case summary

County Court of Victoria|2025-06-18|Before: Mr J

d v DP (a pseudonym)_ [2024] HCA 41

Ruling: Leave is granted to the plaintiff to re-plead

This is a pleading dispute, where a police officer has commenced a common law proceeding in this Court against the State of Victoria (Victoria Police). Issues to do with the existence, scope and breach of the alleged duty of care arise in a consideration of the pleaded case. In that sense, I am about to again turn over soil in a field that has been ploughed several times by judges of this Court, including by myself, and very recently by her Honour Judge Manova in Sittrop v State of Victoria (Ruling No 3).

By summons dated 17 October 2024, the State of Victoria (Victoria Police) ("the defendant") sought orders including that Daniel Harrop's ("the plaintiff") statement of claim dated 26 March 2024 be struck out.
The defendant's strike out application commenced before me on 21 February 2025 but was adjourned part-heard, after the plaintiff agreed to provide a further proposed statement of claim.
The application resumed before me on 7 April 2025. By then, the plaintiff had provided a further proposed statement of claim dated 7 March 2025 (the "FPSOC"). The hearing resumed on the basis that the plaintiff sought leave to file and serve the FPSOC. The defendant maintained an objection to the plaintiff being able to rely on the FPSOC, for similar reasons it had advanced about the earlier iteration of the pleading.
Overall, the defendant submitted that the FPSOC did not overcome the deficiencies it had argued existed in the first iteration of the pleading.
By the FPSOC the plaintiff, at least in part, brings his claim under s.74 of the Victoria Police Act 2013 (Vic) ("the Act"), which renders the defendant liable for a tort committed by a police officer in the performance or purported performance of the officer's duties.
In addition, in the FPSOC the plaintiff contends that at all relevant times he was employed by Victoria Police as a police officer. It is perhaps that part of the pleading that is the most problematic to the extent that the duty alleged to have been owed was described as akin to the duty an employer owes to an employee.
As the plaintiff submitted, if the relationship of employer/employee is made out, then arguments about the need to plead in accordance with the Act become largely irrelevant. Of course, if those arguments are not accepted, then the reverse applies and the need to plead a proper cause of action is self-evident.
The pleaded case in the FPSOC broadly has two parts to it.
First, the FPSOC sets out a claim based in negligence that the plaintiff submitted arose in contract,[2] because of on an alleged failure by the defendant to take reasonable care for his mental health in the performance of police duties. This part of the pleading raises the assertion that the plaintiff was employed by Victoria Police, or at least engagement as a police officer is akin to that of the relationship of employer and employee ("the employment claim").
Second, the FPSOC sets out a claim based in tort on alleged bullying and harassment ("the bullying claim") of the plaintiff by other police officers during his engagement as a police officer.
Regarding the employment claim, the defendant contends that as a matter of law, the plaintiff was not an employee and that no claim can be brought akin to the employer/employee relationship. Broadly, it says any liability can only be for a police tort and therefore the employment claim is embarrassing and should be struck out or re-pleaded to identify the relevant tort.
In respect to the bullying claim, the defendant accepted that it can be liable in tort for such a claim, but raised what it said were deficiencies in how that aspect had been pleaded.
In a third set of written submissions, the defendant referred to the statement of applicable principles of pleadings in the joint judgment of the Court of Appeal in Uber Australia Pty Ltd v Andrianakis[3] and submitted that the FPSOC "offends each of these principles to a varying degree" and provided a schedule of what it described as objections to various paragraphs of the FPSOC. As a summary, it said that the plaintiff had failed to sufficiently plead the bullying claim so that it was on notice of the claim it had to meet and so that it could comply with its obligations to make discovery.
The defendant accepts that if a police officer commits a tort in the course of service - that can be a tort against another police officer - then the Act provides that a claim can be brought, provided the pleading identifies the tort that is alleged, the resultant duty said to have been owed and how that duty was alleged to have been breached.[4]
Again, as an overview, the plaintiff acknowledged a line of cases that have held that a police officer is not an employee but submitted that a consideration of the applicable case law supports a conclusion that the law has developed incrementally to a point where a police officer can properly be classified as an employee.[5]
Finally, the defendant's position is that the plaintiff should be "sent away to re-plead".[6]

The applicable principles of pleadings are now well-known and not in dispute. They were helpfully discussed and summarised by Derham AsJ in Sarto v Sarto.[7]
There is no need to set the principles out in full, but I concur with what was said in Sarto that the fact that a proceeding arises from a complex factual matrix does not detract from the pleading requirements. To the contrary, the requirements become more poignant.[8]
An application brought under Rule 23.02 of the County Court Civil Procedure Rules 2018 involves a challenge to the sufficiency of a pleading as distinct from the defendant's primary contention, namely, that there is no employment relationship and so no amount of remedial work can disclose a valid claim based on an 'employment' arrangement.
The power to strike out is discretionary. It should only be exercised if, based on the pleading, the "claim is so manifestly hopeless that a trial would be a futility".[9]

Next, the relevant provisions of the Act are set out as follows:

Victoria Police consists of the following persons -

(1) Subject to section 15, the Chief Commissioner may appoint a person as a police officer below the rank of Assistant Commissioner.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Chief Commissioner may appoint a person under this section only if the person satisfies the prescribed criteria for appointment.

(3) The Chief Commissioner, in exceptional circumstances, may waive any of the prescribed criteria for appointment in any particular case.

(4) Subject to subsection (5), an appointment under this section -

(b) may be for a fixed term or on an ongoing basis.

(1) The Chief Commissioner may employ as many police recruits as the Chief Commissioner considers necessary to meet the needs of Victoria Police.

(2) Subject to subsection (3), the Chief Commissioner may employ a person as a police recruit only if the person satisfies the prescribed criteria for employment as a police recruit.

(3) The Chief Commissioner, in exceptional circumstances, may waive any of the prescribed criteria for employment as a police recruit in any particular case.

(4) A police recruit is to be employed on the terms and conditions, and for the period, determined by the Chief Commissioner.

(5) The Chief Commissioner may terminate or extend the employment of a police recruit at any time.

(1) Before a police officer or protective services officer performs any duty or exercises any power as a police officer or protective services officer, he or she must take an oath of office or make an affirmation of office and subscribe that oath or affirmation.

(a) in Form 1 in Schedule 2 for a police officer; or

(b) in Form 2 in Schedule 2 for a protective services officer.

(3) The oath or affirmation is to be administered by -

(a) a magistrate, in the case of the Chief Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner; or

(b) a magistrate, the Chief Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner, in the case of an Assistant Commissioner; or

(c) a magistrate, the Chief Commissioner, a Deputy Commissioner or an Assistant Commissioner in any other case.

(4) If a person other than the Chief Commissioner administers the oath or affirmation, the person must forward the subscribed oath or affirmation to -

(a) the Minister, in the case of the oath or affirmation of the Chief Commissioner; or

A police officer who has taken and subscribed the oath or made and subscribed the affirmation under section 50 has -

(a) the duties and powers of a constable at common law; and

(b) any duties and powers imposed or conferred on a police officer by or under this or any other Act or by or under any subordinate instrument.

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a police tort is a tort committed by a police officer or protective services officer in the performance or purported performance of the officer's duties.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a tort includes -

(a) detrimental action (within the meaning of the Public Interest Disclosures Act 2012) taken by a police officer or protective services officer in reprisal for a disclosure to which Part 6 of that Act applies; and

(3) To avoid doubt, subsection (2) does not limit what is a tort for the purposes of subsection (1).

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), it is irrelevant whether the tort is committed by the police officer or protective services officer alone or jointly or severally with any other person.

(1) For the purposes of this Act, a police tort claim is a claim for damages or other relief in respect of an alleged police tort.

(a) an action for damages under Part III of the Wrongs Act 1958 in respect of an alleged police tort; and

(b) a counterclaim for damages or other relief in respect of an alleged police tort committed by a police officer or protective services officer that is made by a person in a legal proceeding brought by the officer against that person; and

(3) To avoid doubt, subsection (2) does not limit what is a police tort claim.

(1) Subject to this section, the State is liable for a police tort.

(2) Subject to subsection (5), the State is not liable for a police tort if the State establishes on a police tort claim that the conduct giving rise to the police tort was serious and wilful misconduct by the police officer or protective services officer who committed the police tort.

(3) If a police officer or protective services officer commits a police tort for which the State is liable, the officer -

(a) is not liable to any person for the police tort; and

(b) is not liable to indemnify, or to pay any contribution to, the State in respect of the liability incurred by the State.

(4) Subject to subsection (5), the State is not liable for a tort committed by a police officer or protective services officer that is not a police tort.

(5) Subsections (2) and (4) do not apply to a claim brought in reliance on Part XIII of the Wrongs Act 1958."

Next, s.14 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (Vic.) states that:

(b) is a member of the Legislative Council or the Legislative Assembly; or

(c) holds an office as a member of a public entity or of the governing body of a public entity; or

(f) is a public official within the meaning of the Public Administration Act 2004; or

(h) is a member of Victoria Police personnel within the meaning of the Victoria Police Act 2013.

(2) A person specified in subclause (1) is to be taken to be a worker.

(3) Amounts paid or payable to a person specified in subclause (1) in respect of their employment, office or duties are deemed to be remuneration.

(4) In this clause, public entity and public official have the same respective meanings as they have in the Public Administration Act 2004."

Lastly, s.5(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2004 (Vic.) ("OHS Act"), reads as follows:

"(2) For the purposes of this Act and the regulations -

(a) the following persons are taken to be employed by the Crown under a contract of service -

(i) a police officer within the meaning of the Victoria Police Act 2013;

(ii) a police reservist within the meaning of the Victoria Police Act 2013;

(iii) a protective services officer within the meaning of the Victoria Police Act 2013; and

(b) despite any contrary rule of law, the contract of service and the relationship of employer and employee is to be taken to exist between the Crown and each of those persons in respect of the performance of the duties and exercise of the powers as such a person (whether arising at common law, under statute, by the instructions of superiors or otherwise)."

I shall proceed, for the purpose of the defendant's strike out application, by assuming that the plaintiff will establish at trial the material facts pleaded in the FPSOC.
It is not in dispute that from approximately 2002 the plaintiff was a sworn police officer and served as a police officer for Victoria Police.
In the FPSOC the plaintiff alleged that at all relevant times from approximately 2002 he was employed as a police officer and provided particulars at paragraph 6 that were said to establish "employment".
Next, the plaintiff alleged at paragraph 9 of the FPSOC that throughout the course of his service[10] as a police officer he was required to attend what were described as numerous scenes, including scenes of fatalities, that were traumatic and distressing. These events were described broadly in the FPSOC as "the exposures" and particulars were provided.
The plaintiff does not allege negligence by the defendant for the exposures, or operational decisions made relevant to the exposures. In that regard, no doubt deliberately, he avoids the long line of case law that says that only in exceptional circumstances can a police force be liable in tort for operational decisions.
Instead, he alleges that the defendant was negligent because it knew that the risk of a psychiatric injury was a likely and foreseeable consequence of the nature of the plaintiff's duties as a police officer. He alleges that the defendant failed to devise and enforce reasonable systems for the monitoring of psychiatric health of police officers exposed to traumatic incidents or failed to devise and enforce systems to ameliorate the effects of exposure to traumatic and distressing events.
In other words, broadly, the plaintiff first alleged that the defendant was negligent because it knew of the risk of psychiatric harm to him and failed to adequately monitor or respond to the exposures. He relies on negligence either because of a police tort, or because of the breach of the employer/employee duty owed to him.
Next, as a separate but perhaps related cause of action, the plaintiff pleaded in the PFSOC that during his service as a police officer, between 2013 and 2014, he was subjected to bullying and harassment.
In paragraph 12 of the FPSOC, he set out particulars of the alleged bullying and harassment. He identified other police officers who bullied and harassed him at the Mansfield Police Station, before alleging that the defendant had been negligent and breached a duty of care owed to him because of the bullying and harassment.

I have briefly set out a general overview of the dispute in this application, but for completeness, I shall provide more detail of the parties' submissions, where both sides provided detailed written submissions, as supplemented by oral submissions.

The defendant provided three sets of written submissions dated 9 December 2024, 18 February 2025 and 3 April 2025.
As an overview, the defendant submitted that the issues for determination regarding the FPSOC were substantially the same as those that had been ruled impermissible by other judges of this Court in Sittrop v State of Victoria (Ruling)__[11] and Sittrop v State of Victoria (Ruling No 2)[12].
The defendant also referred to a previous decision of mine in Frank Caridi v State of Victoria[13] and a Ruling of his Honour Keogh J in Malaspina and Ors v State of Victoria.[14]
Pausing, my decision in Caridi and Keogh J's decision in Malaspina, whilst in my case hopefully, contain a useful discussion about relevant matters of principle and approach, they should be considered for the fact-rich circumstances in those proceedings where a novel duty of care was alleged, involving what might broadly be described as claims in tort by police officers for operational decisions made by Victoria Police.
The distinction between the factual matrix in this case and those in Caridi and Malaspina is important where the plaintiff in this proceeding alleges breaches of a duty owed to him by other police officers and not based on operational decisions.
As Keogh J noted in Malaspina, police officers are not immune from suit. Further, s.74 of the Act explicitly states the State is liable for a police tort. I shall return to discuss the significance of this later in these reasons, but in this proceeding, senior counsel for the defendant accepted that it can be liable in tort. In that sense, the dispute before the Court is really whether the FPSOC sufficiently identifies the tort.
A "police tort" is described in s.72(1) of the Act as "a tort committed by a police officer". A reference to a police tort is simply a reference to a tort committed by police and otherwise does not have special significance, or term of art to be applied to it.
Returning to the defendant's submissions, it contended that there were various unsatisfactory aspects of the pleading. It contended that the part of the pleading that relied upon a non-delegable duty of care was wrong at law.[15] The defendant complained about the breadth of the pleading, a general lack of provision of material facts, and contended that the pleading (whichever version) failed to properly or adequately plead the police torts relied upon.
Much of the defendant's initial submissions were directed towards the issue of novel duties of care, vicarious liability and applicable principles for pleading. As a broad overview, the defendant contended that "in nearly every aspect of his pleading, the plaintiff falls foul of the applicable principles of pleadings". A helpful appendix was provided with the defendant's objections to the numbered paragraphs of the then version of the pleading.
The defendant provided further written submissions that traversed some of the issues raised in the earlier submissions. The defendant said it applied to have the whole of the pleading struck out and "ask that the plaintiff start afresh".
The defendant then provided a third set of written submissions directed specifically to the FPSOC. It again contended that it would be open to the Court to strike out the whole of that pleading and to ask the plaintiff to start afresh.
The defendant repeated its submission that it was wrong at law to plead that the plaintiff is an employee of the defendant. It again raised the inadequacy of the pleading insofar as it related to a novel duty of care. It made other complaints about what it still said were defects in the pleading, and again provided a helpful table appended to its submissions in which specific objections were noted.

The plaintiff first filed (undated) written submissions on 13 December 2024. These were replaced by amended submissions filed on 17 February 2025.
First, in the written submissions, the plaintiff asserted that the relationship between the plaintiff and the State was that of employer and employee. Next, he made related submissions about the alleged contractual relationship, which, if accepted, were said by the plaintiff to render arguments about the need to plead in accordance with police torts legislation "largely irrelevant".
Second, the plaintiff set out the relevant authorities said to demonstrate that the law had taken an incremental approach to the position where a police officer was now an employee.
The plaintiff said overall that the pleaded case made out a cause based on a contractual duty owed to the plaintiff and was adequately disclosed in the pleadings.
Third, the plaintiff contended that there was nothing novel in the duty alleged. Rather, he said the duty arose from the nature of the relationship between the parties, the control that the Chief Commissioner of Police exercised over the plaintiff and required no enquiry into operational matters.
In oral submission the plaintiff emphasised various provisions of the Act and of other statutes that he said supported his contention that he was an employee of Victoria Police.

The first issue to resolve is whether police are employees of Victoria Police or at least can be treated as if they were akin to employees.
The short answer to this question is that they are not employees. As I shall explain, that is because of the way the law in this area has evolved, in the context of the provisions of the Act. In this regard, I agree with the decisions of other Judges of this Court who have reached the same conclusion.

The slightly longer answer to this question, is that police are not employees because, to steal a line used by Justice J Forrest in Homsi v Homsi[16] (a case involving a novel claim in negligence for psychiatric injury arising out of a motor car accident), there is no authority in this country that supports that proposition.
As a short history lesson, the common law in Australia has developed from a starting point that police officers are not employees.
As mentioned, the plaintiff acknowledged this line of authority. But he sought to make a distinction between cases involving claims brought against police for operational decisions, as opposed to claims such as the present one that are brought by police against the police force, or as against other police officers. The plaintiff contends that is a sufficient distinction to not follow such line of authority.
As a general comment, I consider that a person is either an employee or they are not.
There may be scenarios involving a factual dispute about whether a person was acting within the scope of her or his employment where certain acts or omission occur, but that is not the same as the fundamental question of employment.
Because superior courts have concluded that police officers are not an employee of the police force, I consider that I am bound by those decisions.
In his written submissions, the plaintiff said that the starting point is the decision of the High Court of Australia in Enever v The King.[17] The plaintiff acknowledged that Enever is often referred as establishing that no relationship of employer and employee exists. But the plaintiff said that Evever could be distinguished because it involved a claim against a police officer in the performance of operational activities.
True it is that Enever did not involve a scenario of a claim by a police officer against the police force or another officer, but in my view, as contended by the defendant, Enever stands for the proposition that a police officer was regarded as a holder of public office and, to use an old term, to be treated as a servant of the Crown. The inverse of that position is that a police officer was not held to be an employee of the Crown.
Next, the plaintiff relied on several authorities not strictly analogous with the current proceeding, to encourage a finding that the plaintiff was an employee. He referred to the judgment of Dixon J (as he then was) in Attorney General for New South Wales v Perpetual Trustee Company (Ltd)[18] in support of an argument not to follow the decisions in Enever.
The factual scenario in Perpetual Trustee concerned a claim for damages based on per quod servitium amisit. The majority concluded that for a claim based on injury to a police officer, the relationship of employment was not made out. However, with some force, the plaintiff in this proceeding highlighted the dissenting Judgment of Dixon J, who effectively said that but for considering himself constrained by precedent, His Honour would not have followed the line of authority from cases such as Enever.
Every university student to have studied the law of torts in Australia would know the regard in which Sir Owen Dixon is held. As such, his Honour's Judgment in Perpetual Trustee is one that would likely find favour with me, were I not similarly constrained by precedent, bearing in mind that I sit in an intermediate trial court and not a court of appellate jurisdiction.
Next, is the decision of Marshall J of the Federal Court in Konrad v Victoria Police,[19] which concerned an industrial relations dispute involving a probationary Police Constable and the termination of his employment.
In dealing with what was described as "the employee point" in Konrad, Marshall J commenced by looking at the statutory scheme. As I shall come to, the decision in this case should also commence with the statutory scheme, as informed by the common law.
Next, in Konrad Marshall J then considered some relevant authorities, including Perpetual Trustees and the judgment of Dixon J. As Marshall J concluded, in Perpetual Trustees a majority of the High Court held that members of the police force are not employees. His Honour went on to say that there was nothing in the legal distinction between service as a police officer in New South Wales in the 1950s and a police officer in Victoria in the late 1990s.
As such, like myself, Marshall J found himself bound to conclude that Mr Konrad was not an employee for Victoria Police. But in comments that I think have some force, his Honour also acknowledged the persuasiveness of the submission that much of the terms of engagement as a police officer in Victoria is consistent with an employment relationship.
However, just because a relationship has some of the features of an employment relationship, that does not mean it is an employment relationship. Turning to the High Court again, such a sentiment has recently been expressed in Bird v DP (a pseudonym).[20]
As the High Court noted in Bird just because there are features, in that case between a priest and the church, that are like or even akin to an employment relationship, does not necessarily create an employment relationship.
Therefore, overall, the case law is against the contention advanced by the plaintiff. A police officer, on the current state of the law, is not an employee of a police force, or in this proceeding, is not an employee of the defendant.

In the context of the common law position, turning next to the relevant provisions of the Act, commencing with section 7, which sets out that the constitution of Victoria Police is to include various police officers and "Victoria Police Employees". The latter phrase is a reference to employees other than police officers and sets the scene for an early distinction between police officers and police employees.
Next, section 27 of the Act provides for the appointment of persons as police officers.
Then section 36 provides for the employment of police recruits. A person remains a police recruit until one of several things occurs, including engagement as a police officer.
Next, section 50 provides that a police officer must take an oath or affirmation of office before any duties are performed as a police officer.
Suffice to say, employees in a general sense do not take an oath of office.
Section 51 then provides that a police officer who takes the oath of office has the powers of a constable at common law, or as imposed by any Act of Parliament.
Therefore, put together, the sections of the Act distinguish between police employees, or police recruits as employees, and a police officer who has taken an oath or affirmation of office.
This distinction is readily understandable. Engagement as a police officer is a form of public service, where usual concepts such as the non-delegable duty of care that an employer owes an employee simply have no part to play.
That is not to say that it is all care and no responsibility. The Act prescribes what the defendant/Victoria Police is required to do for police officers and that there is the potential liability in tort.
The plaintiff contended that the Act in effect creates a code of obligations and responsibilities between police officers and Victoria Police, to in effect create an employment relationship. I do not accept that submission.
The starting point for statutory interpretation is the words of the statute. There is nothing in the Act that creates an explicit employment relationship. In several regards the Act confers powers and rights that are incompatible with traditional employment concepts, including the oft cited non-delegable duty of care that an employer owes to an employee.
The fact that the Act specifies or codifies some things that might be part of an employment relationship, begs the question why the parliament thought that necessary if in fact a police officer was an employee? Therefore, rather than assisting the plaintiff's argument that he was an employee, the plain reading of the Act supports a conclusion that a police officer is not an employee and the common law position about that stands, to the extend modified by the Act.
Next, the plaintiff took the Court on a creative journey to other pieces of legislation, to support an argument that the plaintiff was an employee.
For example, Part 1 of Schedule 1 - Further Interpretative Provisions, of the Workplace Injury Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2013 (Vic), deems certain persons to be workers. Section 14 of that Schedule provides that the provisions of that Act apply to persons employed in the public sector and that those persons are to be taken to be a worker. The list of persons includes a member of Victoria Police personnel within the meaning of the Act.
Next, for example, section 5(2) of the OHS Act provides that for the purposes of that Act and related regulations, certain persons are taken to be employed by the Crown under a contract of service and includes police officers within the meaning of the Act. But this is again a piece of legislation that for certain scenarios, such as promoting workplace health and safety, deems police to be something that they are not. As the OHS Act makes clear, the deeming provision applies only for the purposes of that Act. Therefore, it does not extend to create a broad employment relationship.
But rather than support his argument, the provisions in other legislation highlights the lack of an employment relationship. Because police officers are deemed to be workers or to be employed for certain statutory purposes highlights the common law position that they are not employees. In that context, it is worth remembering that the Act, which regulates the engagement of police officers, contains no such deeming provision.
Therefore, for this proceeding, I prefer the submissions of the defendant and conclude that the plaintiff was not an employee of the defendant.
But that does not mean that there can be no liability in tort. Therefore, as sought by the defendant, the plaintiff should be given leave to re-plead, in accordance with the conclusions I have expressed in this Ruling.

Turning next to the part of the FPSOC that sets out the bullying claim, the dispute here is narrower.
The plaintiff said he had provided a sufficient pleading in respect to that part of the claim. He submitted that he had spelt out in sufficient detail and with sufficient specificity the allegation of bullying and harassment, including by identification of the alleged bullies, the time and location. He submitted to require further specifics as contended for by the defendant would be ridiculous.[21] He submitted that the current FPSOC properly set out the claim and that the defendant had sufficient particulars of it to meet the case brought against it and engage in the interlocutory process.
On the other hand, the defendant contended that the proposed pleading had a deficiency in that it pleaded an amorphous assertion that the Chief Commissioner of Police owed the plaintiff a duty of care.[22] It submitted that the way the bullying claim had been set out by officers many ranks below the Chief Commissioner and geographically remote from that person "leaves within it an entire lacuna in terms of jurisprudence".[23]
The defendant contended that where the plaintiff was not an employee, where vicarious liability did not therefore apply and where liability had to be established through the mechanism set out in ss.72-74 of the Act, this part of the FPSOC should also be struck out and the plaintiff directed to re-plead.
In general, the purpose of pleadings is to ensure that the case is identified with clarity, so that the opposing party knows the case to be met and the issues for trial can be identified. Pleadings should also be as brief as is consistent with clarity. But, in my opinion, claims based on bullying and/or harassment are of a type where a proper, detailed and bespoke pleading, is needed, with sufficient particulars, to allow a meaningful and sensible response by a defendant.
But, here, I have sympathy for the submissions advanced by the plaintiff because he has, perhaps unusually for such a claim made a very real attempt to identify the bullies, what happened, where and when. I agree with his submission that the need to plead the material facts with sufficient particularity should not descend to become a minute-by-minute examination of his service as a police officer.
But having said that, where I have ruled that he was not an employee and was not owed a duty akin to that of an employee, the proper basis for the tort alleged must be set out. The FPASOC instead links the bullying claim back to allegations of the duty said to have been owed in contract or because of an employment relationship.
As will be clear, the plaintiff needs to re-plead what I have described as the employment part of the case. While the pleader has the mont blanc in hand, the bullying pleading should also be revisited to properly acknowledge the basis upon which the Act allows such a claim in tort to be brought.

There are deficiencies in the FPSOC that can only be addressed by starting afresh.
For the reasons given, leave is granted to the plaintiff to re-plead.
Subject to any matters that the parties raise, I propose to order that the plaintiff be granted leave to re-plead in accordance with this ruling.
Further, as the defendant has been successful, I propose to order that the plaintiff pay the defendant's costs of the summons on a standard basis, to be assessed by the Costs Court in default of agreement, with a stay on the payment of such costs until the conclusion of the proceeding, or as otherwise ordered.
I invite the parties to draft orders to give effect to this ruling.