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[2026] ACTSC 167
Supreme Court of the ACT
2026-05-25
McCallum CJ
Original judgment source is linked above.
Source: the ACT Courts (www.courts.act.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.
SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: Harrison v Hodgkinson Citation: [2026] ACTSC 167 Hearing Date: 22 May 2026 Decision Date: 25 May 2026 Before: McCallum CJ Decision: (1) The application for leave to appeal from the order of the Presidential Member made on 11 February 2026 is dismissed. Catchwords: APPEAL APPLICATION – LEAVE TO APPEAL – Appeal against the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal – Where the tribunal dismissed an interim application to have the dismissal of an earlier interim application set aside – Where no right of appeal exists – application for leave to appeal is dismissed Legislation Cited: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT), s 86 Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT) Parties: Rachel Anne Harrison (Applicant) Quentin Hodgkinson (Respondent) Representation: Counsel Self-represented (Applicant) B Collaery (Respondent) Solicitors Self-represented (Applicant) Collaery Lawyers (Respondent) File Number: SCA 7 of 2026 Decision Under Appeal: Tribunal: ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Before: Presidential Member Daniel Date of Decision: 11 February 2026 Case Title: Harrison v Hodgkinson Tribunal File Number: AA 68 of 2025 McCALLUM CJ: EX TEMPORE REASONS (REVISED)
By application filed 16 March 2026, Rachel Harrison seeks leave to appeal against orders made in the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal (ACAT) by Presidential Member Daniel on 11 February 2026 in ACAT proceedings AA 68 of 2025. Leave is required for any appeal to this Court from a decision of the Appeal Tribunal: s 86(4) of the ACT Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2008 (ACT) (ACAT Act).
Leave to appeal in the present case must be refused. In order to explain my reasons for reaching that conclusion, it is necessary to set out some of the history of the proceedings.
Ms Harrison was a tenant of a premises in respect of which the respondent, Mr Hodgkinson, was the managing agent. The tenancy was terminated for non-payment of rent. In accordance with the terms of the lease, Mr Hodgkinson sought to conduct a final inspection of the premises. His attempt to do so was unsuccessful, for reasons I will return to explain. Mr Hodgkinson would later inform the Tribunal that he ultimately arranged for the premises to be cleaned at his own expense, presumably after Ms Harrison had vacated the premises.
Civil dispute application
On 18 March 2025, Ms Harrison filed a civil dispute application in the ACAT (file number XD 314 of 2025) seeking damages for an alleged civil trespass on the premises on the occasion on which Mr Hodgkinson originally attempted to conduct the end of lease inspection.
That application was heard on 22 July 2025 by Member Hanton. Both Ms Harrison and Mr Hodgkinson appeared at the hearing. It was not in dispute that Mr Hodgkinson had passed through the common area of the strata title property and knocked on the front door of Ms Harrison’s premises at 8.30 am. What was in dispute was whether Ms Harrison had advised Mr Hodgkinson that the time he had nominated for inspection was not suitable. A notice to vacate dated 17 February 2025 had been provided to Ms Harrison and the end of lease inspection had been scheduled for 3 March 2025. Initially it was notified that the inspection would take place at 10 am. Subsequently, notice was given that it would happen at 9 am. Ms Harrison alleged that, notwithstanding her having informed Mr Hodgkinson on 2 March 2025 that the nominated time and date were not suitable to her, he entered the premises at that time.
The transcript of that hearing is before me in an affidavit affirmed by Mr Hodgkinson on the present application. The transcript records that Ms Harrison informed the Tribunal that she had heard knocking and loud yelling at the front door. She said she thought she had been in bed at that time. She got up to see who was at the door. She asked who it was. She said it was a shock to her that someone was there because they had not rung the security bells at the front entrance to the property (Mr Hodgkinson explained that he had access to the premises in his capacity as a managing agent).
Ms Harrison informed the Tribunal that, without answering her question, the male unlocked the front door, said his name and stepped inside the property, telling her that she needed to move out. She stated that she then said, “You shouldn't be here. You haven't even rung the doorbell. You haven't identified yourself. Please leave now” and that the man then closed the door and left promptly.
It may be noted from the other material presented to the Tribunal by Ms Harrison that she ought to have known that the person attending was the managing agent, since she had sent correspondence the previous day about the proposed appointment (stating that the time was not suitable) and he attended at around the nominated time. In any event, the Tribunal member in his reasons for decision noted that the central issue was whether or not the respondent had entered the premises. Mr Hodgkinson accepted that he had unlocked the door after knocking and hearing no response. However, he said that he “did not step one inch into the house” because Ms Harrison “started abusing” him.
The Tribunal member noted that there was no question that there was authority under the Residential Tenancies Act 1997 (ACT) to conduct an end of lease inspection, so long as proper notice had been given. The member found that proper notice had been given and that there was no evidence of the applicant’s claim that she had sought to change the date. The member concluded that on the balance of probabilities it was unlikely that Mr Hodgkinson did more than open the door of the premises, which he had authority to do, and accordingly that, since he left the premises after being challenged by the applicant and did not continue the inspection, no trespass had occurred. Accordingly, the application was dismissed.
Application for Appeal
On 24 July 2025, Ms Harrison filed an appeal from that order (file number AA 68 of 2025). That application was listed on 27 November 2025. Ms Harrison did not appear. The appeal application was dismissed.
On 19 December 2025, Ms Harrison filed an application for “interim ex parte orders” seeking to have the order dismissing the appeal application set aside on the grounds that she was prevented from attending the hearing because she had been medically unwell and had been hospitalised. That application was listed on 7 January 2026. Ms Harrison did not appear. Presidential Member Daniel dismissed the application.
On 9 January 2026, Ms Harrison filed an application seeking “urgent interim orders”, claiming that she had not been afforded the opportunity to join the conference on 7 January 2026 before Member Daniel. I note that material filed by Ms Harrison indicates that the reason she did not attend in person on 7 January 2026 was that it was her daughter’s birthday.
The application filed on 9 February 2026 was listed before Presidential Member Daniel on 11 February 2026. The Presidential Member noted that Ms Harrison had notice of the listing on 7 January 2026 and that she had not attended in person because she was interstate with family. It was noted that she did not have her laptop with her and had instead attempted to join the hearing by telephone. The Presidential Member did not consider those events to afford a sufficient explanation for not attending the Tribunal on 7 January 2026. The application was accordingly dismissed.
What emerges from that chronology is that, while it may be assumed that Ms Harrison's central grievance is with the dismissal of her civil dispute application on 22 July 2025, Ms Harrison did not appear to argue her appeal from that decision. Since the dismissal of the appeal in her absence, she has brought a series of interlocutory applications concerning that decision, each of which has been dismissed by the Presidential Member.
Ms Harrison could have sought leave to appeal to this Court from the dismissal of her Appeal Application on 27 October 2025: s 86(1)(a)(i) of the ACAT Act. Instead, what she has done is to seek leave to appeal from the Presidential Member’s order dismissing her interim application to have the dismissal of an earlier interim application set aside. There is no right of appeal from such a decision. For that reason alone, the application must be dismissed.
In any event, having given careful consideration to the transcript of the proceedings before the original decision-maker, including his reasons for the decision dismissing that application, and the subsequent hearings, I see no point of fact or law worthy of a grant of leave to appeal to this Court. On the contrary, it appears that Mr Hodgkinson has been much vexed by Ms Harrison's repeated applications to the ACAT and now to this Court.
Orders
Harrison
Hodgkinson