Nature of the application and applicable principles
- The Applicants seek:
1. orders determining their remuneration in their capacity as administrators, receivers and managers and deed administrators in a total amount of $179,557 (excluding GST), comprising $167,557 (excluding GST) in respect of work undertaken from 20 February 2020 to date and a further amount capped at $12,000 (excluding GST) for work that remains to be done;
2. an order that the Applicants' remuneration (as determined by the Court), costs and expenses be paid out of the assets of the Trust nunc pro tunc;
3. an order requiring the Applicants to file with the Court within four weeks their final account as receivers and managers of the property, assets and undertaking of the Trust;
4. an order that, upon the filing of that final account, the Applicants be discharged as receivers and managers of the property, assets and undertaking of the Trust;
5. an order granting liberty to interested persons to apply to the Court to set aside or vary the orders within three weeks from the date of the orders; and
6. an order requiring the Applicants to provide a copy of the orders to the Company's creditors and shareholders, the unit holders of the Trust and ASIC in the manner prescribed by the orders made by Black J on 28 April 2020.
- I am satisfied by Ms Daoud's affidavit referred to at [3] above that the interlocutory process was served on shareholders and creditors of the Company, unit holders of the Trust and ASIC prior to the hearing on 7 February 2022. As I have already mentioned, there was no appearance on behalf of any person other than the Applicants at that hearing.
- To the extent that the application is for determination of the Applicants' remuneration as court-appointed receivers of the Trust assets, the principles summarised by Brereton J (as his Honour then was) in Re Say Enterprises Pty Ltd apply: [2]
"The remuneration of court-appointed receivers is provided for by (NSW) Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005, r 26.4 which provides that a receiver is to be allowed such remuneration (if any) as may be fixed by the Court. Founding on what Young CJ in Eq said in Ide v Ide, but drawing on the qualifications expressed in later cases, the relevant principles may be restated as follows:
(1) A receiver is entitled to the costs, charges and expenses properly incurred in the discharge of the receiver's ordinary duties, or in the performance of extraordinary services that have been sanctioned by the Court.
(2) The ultimate question is what amount of remuneration is 'reasonable', and this involves considering whether the work in respect of which remuneration is claimed was reasonably undertaken in the due course of the receivership, and whether the amount claimed for it is a fair and reasonable reward for it. The objective is to award a sum or devise a formula which will reasonably and fairly compensate the receiver for the time and trouble expended in the execution of his or her duties and the responsibility he or she has assumed.
(3) The receiver bears the onus of justifying the reasonableness and prudence of the tasks undertaken for which remuneration is sought, and the reasonableness of the remuneration claimed for them.
(4) Remuneration may be allowed on the basis of a fixed salary, a commission on receipts, or a quantum meruit having regard to the time, trouble and responsibility involved. It is a matter for the Court to determine what basis is appropriate in the particular case, having regard to the principle that the remuneration must be reasonable.
(5) If a time-based approach is adopted, the Court is guided by professional scales of charges, with emphasis on the broad average or general rate charged by persons of the relevant status and qualifications who carry out the relevant type of work. The Court will usually act on time sheets created in the receiver's office, provided that they do significantly more than merely detail the total number of hours spent by the receiver and officers of particular grades on his or her staff.
(6) By analogy, the task involves consideration of the matters referred to in Corporations Act, s 425(8), which applies to receivers appointed under an instrument, namely:
(a) the extent to which the work performed by the receiver was reasonably necessary;
(b) the extent to which the work likely to be performed by the receiver is likely to be reasonably necessary;
(c) the period during which the work was, or is likely to be, performed by the receiver;
(d) the quality of the work performed, or likely to be performed, by the receiver;
(e) the complexity (or otherwise) of the work performed, or likely to be performed, by the receiver;
(f) the extent (if any) to which the receiver was, or is likely to be, required to deal with extraordinary issues;
(g) the extent (if any) to which the receiver was, or is likely to be, required to accept a higher level of risk or responsibility than is usually the case;
(h) the value and nature of any property dealt with, or likely to be dealt with, by the receiver;
(i) whether the receiver was, or is likely to be, required to deal with:
(i) one or more other receivers; or
(ii) one or more receivers and managers; or
(iii) one or more liquidators; or
(iv) one or more administrators; or
(v) one or more administrators of deeds of company arrangement;
(j) the number, attributes and behaviour, or the likely number, attributes and behaviour, of the company's creditors;
(k) if the remuneration is ascertained, in whole or in part, on a time basis:
(i) the time properly taken, or likely to be properly taken, by the receiver in performing the work; and
(ii) whether the total remuneration payable to the receiver is capped;
(l) any other relevant matters.
(7) Many of those factors - in particular, pars (d) - (e) and (g) - (h) - have as their unifying theme the concept of proportionality (being the relationship of the work done and the remuneration claimed to the value of the estate), which is an important consideration in determining reasonableness.
(8) It will rarely be appropriate for a Judge to review a decision of a Registrar on remuneration on an item-by-item basis.
(9) In respect of disbursements, no Court approval or specific order is necessary in the absence of a challenge, although receivers should scrutinise them to ensure that they are reasonable and properly payable, and the Court has an inherent jurisdiction to review receivers' disbursements as they are officers of the Court. However, a receiver may seek a direction that he would be justified in paying certain disbursements in order to obtain prior protection in respect of such a disbursement."
- To the extent that the application relates to the Applicants' remuneration for work undertaken in their capacity as voluntary administrators, and later deed administrators, of the Company, the Applicants invoke the Court's inherent equitable jurisdiction to allow a trustee remuneration, costs and expenses out of trust assets. That jurisdiction extends to persons such as liquidators and administrators who are, for all practical purposes, controlling a trustee. [3]
- The Applicants' submissions refer to the judgment of Brereton J in Re North Food Catering Pty Ltd, [4] in which his Honour summarised the position as follows, drawing on the judgment of Black J in Re IMF Global Australia Ltd (in liq) (No. 2) [5] :
"(1) The court has an inherent equitable jurisdiction to allow a trustee remuneration, costs and expenses out of trust assets, and this extends to a person such as a liquidator who is, for practical purposes, controlling a trustee (see Re Application of Sutherland [2004] NSWSC 798; (2004) 50 ACSR 297; Trio Capital Ltd (admin appointed) v ACT Superannuation Management Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 941; (2010) 79 ACSR 425).
(2) The court may decline to exercise that jurisdiction where the company does not solely act as trustee and has sufficient beneficial assets to meet the liquidators' remuneration costs and expenses and where the work done by the liquidator in relation to trust assets may properly be treated as done for the purposes of winding up the company affairs. Thus, generally where a company has assets which are not held on trust, the liquidators' costs should usually fall on its non-trust assets (see Re GB Nathan & Co Pty Ltd (in liq) (1991) 24 NSWLR 674 at 685-689; Re Greater West Insurance Brokers Pty Ltd [2001] NSWSC 825; (2001) 39 ACSR 301).
(3) Where the company has both trust assets and assets held beneficially by the company, the costs can be apportioned such that the remuneration attributable to the statutory liquidation work would fall on the assets beneficially owned by the company, whereas that which related to administering the trust property might fall on the trust assets (see Re French Caledonia Travel Service Pty Ltd (in liq) [2003] NSWSC 1008; (2003) 59 NSWLR 361; 48 ACSR 97 at [212])."
- In that case, Brereton J concluded following a review of relevant authorities that, where a company's sole business has been to act as trustee of a trust and the company has no assets other than the assets that it holds on the terms of the trust, liquidators of the company are entitled to be paid their remuneration for their work in administering the trust assets and for their general liquidation work out of the trust assets. [6]
- The principles applicable to the inherent equitable jurisdiction are those summarised by Gleeson J in In the matter of BBY Ltd (receivers and mgrs. apptd) (in liq): [7]
"52 The Court's approach when exercising its inherent equitable jurisdiction to allow remuneration out of trust assets in connection with the administration of a trust fund is described in In the matter of Houben Marine Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] NSWSC 745 at [20]-[21], where I said:
[20] In allowing remuneration to the liquidator, the Court treats the work done in administering the trust as an incident of the liquidation, and approaches the application for remuneration as analogous to one by an official liquidator for approval of remuneration: Alphena Pty Ltd (in liq) v PS Securities Pty Ltd (ACN 141 021 445) (as trustee of the Joseph Family Trust) [2013] NSWSC 447; (2013) 94 ACSR 160 at [53], [63]-[64]. Accordingly, regard may be had, by analogy, to the factors listed in the now repealed s 473(10) of the Corporations Act (which continues to apply to the administration of Houben by reason of the transitional provisions in the Corporations Act, s 1581(1)).
[21] The essential question which arises on the present application, as arises under the applicable provisions of the Corporations Act with respect to court appointed liquidators, is whether the remuneration of which approval is sought is 'reasonable': Sanderson, as liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sakr [2017] NSWCA 38 (Sakr).
53 The essential task of the Court, constituted by a judge, when asked to approve remuneration of a liquidator is encapsulated in the statement by Barrett J in Re Anderson Group Pty Ltd [2002] NSWSC 764 ; (2002) 20 ACLC 1607 at [12]:
In the ordinary course, the process of determination comes down essentially to ensuring that the work upon which the claim was based was work undertaken in the due course of administration and that the amount claimed for having done that work is a fair and reasonable reward for it.
54 That proposition was repeated by the Court of Appeal in Sanderson as Liquidator of Sakr Nominees Pty Ltd (in liq) v Sakr (2017) 93 NSWLR 459; [2017] NSWCA 38 (Sakr) at [69]-[72], where Bathurst CJ (the other members of the Court agreeing) said that the essential task of the Court is to allow reasonable remuneration.
55 As explained in Re Houben Marine at [23]-[25], several of the propositions in Sakr have relevance, by analogy, to an application such as the present for approval of a liquidator's remuneration out of the assets of a trust of which the company in liquidation is a trustee.
56 First, the onus is on the liquidator to establish that the remuneration claimed is reasonable. It is the function of the Court to determine the remuneration by considering the material provided and by bringing an independent mind to the relevant issues: Sakr at [54].
57 Second, the question of proportionality - in terms of work done as compared with the size of the property the subject of the administration or the benefit to be obtained from the work - is an important consideration in determining reasonableness: Templeton v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2015] FCAFC 137 at [32]; (2015) 108 ACSR 545. The work done must be proportionate to the difficulty and importance of the task in the context in which it needs to be performed: Templeton citing McLure JA in Conlan (as liquidator of Rowena Nominees Pty Ltd) v Adams [2008] WASCA 61; (2008) 65 ACSR 521 at [47]. This is what is encompassed in assessing the value of the services rendered: Sakr at [55].
58 Third, the mere fact that the work performed does not lead to augmentation of the funds available for distribution does not mean that the liquidator is not entitled to be remunerated for it. Provided it was reasonable to carry out the work and the amount charged is reasonable, there is no reason a liquidator should not recover remuneration for undertaking such work: Sakr at [57]-[58].
59 Counsel for the liquidators submitted that the present applications are analogous to one by a liquidator for approval of remuneration and that the Court may have regard to the factors listed in the statute for approval of the liquidators' remuneration. So much can be accepted insofar as the factors in s 60-12 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule, being Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act, may be taken as an indication of the types of considerations that inform the question of reasonableness in the present case…"
- As s 60-10 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) is not directly applicable to the present application, I need not be troubled by the unusual circumstance that most of the remuneration in respect of which orders are now sought has already been approved by a resolution of creditors of the Company. If s 60-10 did apply to the present application, that circumstance would preclude the Court determining the remuneration. [8]
- As the Applicants submitted, and as will be apparent from the principles extracted above, there is no substantive difference between the principles to be applied in determining their remuneration as external administrators in the exercise of the Court's inherent equitable jurisdiction referred to above and the principles that apply to the determination of their remuneration as court appointed receivers and managers of the assets and undertaking of the Trust.