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[1989] NSWCA 96
Court of Appeal (NSW)
1989-12-14
Gleeson CJ, Clarke JA, Meagher JA
Original judgment source is linked above.
GLEESON CJ, CLARKE and MEAGHER JJA 14 December 1989, 14 December 1989
Gleeson CJ After a hearing in the District Court which lasted some five days Gibson DCJ found a verdict for the plaintiff in found a verdict for the plaintiff in this action in the sum of $2665. Costs followed the event. The action was relevantly a claim for damages for conversion of ertain items of personal property which belonged to the plaintiff and were damaged in a fire that occurred in the flat in which those items were located.
The dispute between the plaintiff and the defendant company arose following certain repairs, renovations or replacement activities that were undertaken following the fire and to an extent in conjunction with the claim made by the plaintiff upon her insurers.
It follows from the decision of this Court in Gurr v Robinson unreported, 10 February 1986, that the unsuccessful defendant requires leave to appeal to this court. It was held in that case that the sum of $5,000, which constitutes the statutory threshold relating to the need for leave to appeal from judgements ins the District Court, does not include the amount of costs awarded against an unsuccessful party. In that case the President said this:
"The requirement laid down by the Parliament in s130 of the District Court Act 1973 that leave of the Supreme Curt is needed to appeal from the District Court where the appeal involves directly or indirectly any 'claim demand or question to or respecting any property or any civil right amounting to or of the value of', relevantly less than $5,000 has several justifications. These are to be kept in mind in deciding applications such as the present one for leave to appeal. One justification is that, where the amount in issue in a case is small, the parties have a special interest in finality. Protracted litigation necessarily involves costs and inconvenience. If the stake is small, the costs may soon become disproportionate to the amount in issue. Secondly, the provision reflects a number of public interests which must be protected by the Court. They include the discouragement of litigation, the principal purpose of which is to recover an order for costs, and the efficient and cost-effective use of court time, which necessarily involves large public costs."
In the present case learned counsel for the applicant has been unable to point to any issue of law which is of general importance in relation to the matter and when invited to indicate to the Court his best point and the nature of the argument that he would advance in support of it quite quickly found himself involved in an examination of a complicated set of facts and somewhat unsatisfactory and unclear evidence in relation to those facts.
The learned trial judge in his reasons for judgment adverted to the circumstance that the case was quite a stale one by the time it came on for hearing before him and that that circumstance was reflected in uncertainty of recollection and the unsatisfactory nature of evidence given on behalf of both of the parties to the litigation.
It is perfectly apparent from what has been said on behalf of the applicant that the dispute that gave rise to the litigaton simply involved factual issues which the learned judge found somewhat difficult of resolution.
I can see nothing to justify the grant of leave in the present case and I would
5 propose that the application for leave to appeal be dismissed with costs.
10 The order of the Court is that the application for leve to appeal is dismissed with costs.
Counsel for the Appellant: S Motley 15 Solicitors for the Appellant: Mannix Enright and Leitch Counsel for the Respondent: CA Evatt
Solicitors for the Respondent: Teakle Ormsby and Associates
HARBRETT PTY LTD
SUSANNE RUTH BUTLER