Haouchar v Parole Authority of NSW [2025] NSWSC 1246 | Case summary | Zoe

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Haouchar v Parole Authority of NSW [2025] NSWSC 1246 | Case summary | Zoe

On 13 February 2018, Mr Haouchar was sentenced in the District Court to a term of imprisonment of ten years in respect of four offences of robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon, aggravated breaking and entering with the intention of committing a serious indictable offence, knowingly directing activities of a criminal group and assaulting a law enforcement officer in the execution of duty in contravention of various provisions of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The sentence commenced on 26 April 2016 and carried with it a non-parole period of six years and six months that expired on 25 October 2022 (i.e. Mr Haouchar’s parole eligibility date). The expiry date for the head sentence is 25 April 2026.
On 26 September 2022, the SPA directed that Mr Haouchar be released on parole on 25 October 2022, subject to the standard conditions and some additional conditions.
On 15 April 2023, while on parole, Mr Haouchar was charged with further offending. His parole was revoked on 3 May 2023, effective retrospectively from 14 April 2023. The charges leading to the revocation of Mr Haouchar’s parole were subsequently withdrawn. An order was made by the SPA rescinding the revocation of his parole, effective from 2 November 2023.
On 9 January 2025, Mr Haouchar was charged with one offence of conspiracy to murder (s 26 of the Crimes Act) alleged to have been committed between 4 and 29 December 2023, while he was on parole. He was refused bail.
On 9 January 2025, a Breach of Parole Report prepared by a Community Corrections officer, Mr Sean Peters, recommended that Mr Haouchar’s parole be revoked. The SPA revoked the parole order on 21 January 2025, with retrospective effect to 9 January 2025.
By an SPA letter dated 23 January 2025, both the Governor of the Corrections Centre where Mr Haouchar was incarcerated and Mr Haouchar were notified of the revocation. They were told that the SPA would reconvene on 18 February 2025 to reconsider the revocation. Mr Haouchar was advised that he could make submissions.
Mr Haouchar responded on 28 January 2025, indicating that he wished to appear before the SPA by audio-visual link with legal representation.
On 19 February 2025, Mr Haouchar’s solicitor received an email from the SPA, which referred to an attached “stand over memo” dated 18 February 2025. The stand over memo stated that, at its meeting on 18 February 2025, the SPA had considered Mr Haouchar’s case and determined that the matter be stood over until 18 March 2025. The stated reason was “For results of Downing Centre Local Court on 6 March 2025 and for further review”. The email stated that the SPA “will continue to monitor your client’s court results administratively until such time unless the outstanding matters are finalised or Mr Haouchar is granted bail”.
By an email dated 17 March 2025, Mr Haouchar’s solicitor contacted the SPA on the understanding that Mr Haouchar’s matter was listed for review before the SPA the following day. The solicitor asked for the listing to be vacated and stood over to a future date in approximately 8 weeks’ time to permit the solicitor to “liaise with Mr Haouchar’s family and prepare material pertinent to the parole hearing”.
The SPA responded the same day, stating that it was still “currently monitoring the outstanding charges and confirm that the matter is not listed for a review hearing tomorrow”.
By an email dated 2 June 2025, Mr Haouchar’s solicitor asked that his matter, which was listed for review by the SPA the following day, be stood over for a further period of 2 weeks. In its email response dated 2 June 2025, the SPA advised that it was still currently monitoring the outstanding charges, confirmed that the matter was not listed for a review hearing on 3 June 2025 and said that the next tentative review hearing date was 1 July 2025. It added that if the outstanding charges were not finalised, then the review hearing scheduled for 1 July 2025 would be moved to a further date approximately 2 weeks after the Local Court adjournment date.
There was a further exchange of emails on 30 June 2025 regarding the date of a review hearing. The SPA confirmed that Mr Haouchar’s matter was not listed for hearing on 1 July 2025 because the charges at the Local Court had not been finalised. Mr Haouchar’s solicitor was advised that the next tentative review hearing was on 5 August 2025 but that if the outstanding charge was not finalised, then the review hearing would change again.
On 11 July 2025, Mr Haouchar was granted conditional bail by Harrison CJ at CL in respect of the conspiracy to murder charge. However, this did not secure his release from incarceration because he was still serving his sentence for the convictions dated 13 February 2018.
On the same day Mr Haouchar was granted bail, his solicitor emailed the SPA advising that bail had been granted. The email stated that the solicitor was seeking to have Mr Haouchar’s matter listed for review by the SPA and asked when was the first available hearing date.
On Monday 14 July 2025, the SPA responded saying that the matter could be added to the SPA’s hearings list for the following day, 15 July 2025. Mr Haouchar’s solicitor confirmed that the matter should be listed for review then. The SPA asked the solicitor to provide any written submissions by 1 pm on 14 July 2025 to give the SPA members sufficient time to review them.
On 14 July 2025, Mr Haouchar’s solicitor provided the SPA with a bundle of material in support of his application for review of the revocation of the parole order. It comprised:

The reference to the SPA monitoring Mr Haouchar’s “court results administratively until such time as the outstanding matters are finalised” presumably reflects the fact that, at that time, the charge against Mr Haouchar had not been certified by the Director of Public Prosecutions, nor had he been committed to trial.
On 24 July 2025, Mr Haouchar’s solicitor requested a copy of the “full decision of the Board” (emphasis in original). By an email in response dated 24 July 2025, the SPA’s secretariat told Mr Haouchar’s solicitor that the “matter is still under consideration by the Parole Authority as a final determination has not been made” (emphasis added).
On 30 July 2025, Mr Haouchar’s solicitor was provided with a transcript of the SPA hearing held on 15 July 2025.
By an email dated 30 July 2025, Mr Haouchar’s solicitor sought clarification of the SPA’s statement that Mr Haouchar’s matter was “still under consideration by the Parole Authority as a final determination has not been made”.
The SPA’s secretariat responded by email on the same day. It referred again to the “stand over memo” provided to Mr Haouchar’s solicitor on 16 July 2025 and reiterated that the SPA “will be monitoring the outstanding charges at Downing Centre Local Court”. It added that “a final decision will not be made until those charges are finalised”.
As noted above, the summons seeking judicial review was filed on 12 August 2025.
On 16 September 2025, Chen J ordered that the hearing of the summons be expedited. Expedition was sought on the basis that Mr Haouchar’s head sentence is due to expire on 25 April 2026 and an early hearing date of his summons was sought because, if successful, the matter would need to be referred back to the SPA for reconsideration before Mr Haouchar’s head sentence expires.
The SPA has filed a submitting appearance. The Attorney-General, who is named as the second defendant, is the only active defendant. So that the Court had the benefit of an active contradictor, the Attorney-General provided written and oral submissions. In his written submissions the Attorney stated “that the plaintiff’s grounds have some force”.

In his written outline of submissions, Mr Haouchar first sought to argue that he was denied procedural fairness in circumstances where the SPA purported on 15 July 2025 to make a final determination under s 175 of the CAS Act not to rescind the revocation of his parole order, but then proceeded to stand the matter over to 5 August 2025 pending the outcome of a proceeding in the Local Court scheduled for 24 July 2025 relating to the charge of conspiracy to murder. Mr Haouchar submits that the position is analogous to that in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth of Australia (2010) 243 CLR 319; [2010] HCA 41 at [76]–[77]. He contends that his detention was unlawfully prolonged by the SPA’s actions.
It is difficult to see how this particular complaint involves procedural unfairness. If the SPA erred by making a final determination not to rescind the parole revocation order while standing over the matter to a future date, that error is more likely to be of a substantive and not a procedural nature (this may be why, in his oral submissions, Mr Lenehan SC addressed this alleged error under Ground 2 and not the procedural fairness head). It is also difficult to understand Mr Haouchar’s contention that his detention was “unlawfully prolonged”. That contention assumes that the SPA was obliged to rescind the parole revocation order. Plainly, the SPA had some discretion under s 175 in relation to that matter (see at [56] above).
In any event, I am not satisfied that any reviewable error is established as claimed by Mr Haouchar. I accept Mr Haouchar’s submission that, on 15 July 2025, the SPA made a “final” determination of his rescission application, as is reflected in the terms of the formal Notification Letter sent to the Governor of the Corrections Centre. The Notification Letter speaks for itself. It gave notification that the SPA had made a determination in respect of its review of the revocation order based upon the material which was before the SPA at the hearing on 15 July 2025. Subject to other provisions in the CAS Act, such a determination is “final” (see s 193C(4)). That is not to say, however, that this was the end of the matter, as is made clear in the emails sent on 24 and 30 July 2025 by the SPA secretariat (see at [30] and [33] above).
In the light of the history of Mr Haouchar’s case, these emails should be read as confirming that, despite the determination made on 15 July 2025 in response to Mr Haouchar’s rescission application, Mr Haouchar’s case for parole would continue to be reviewed, with particular reference to the outcome of proceedings in the Local Court concerning the charge of conspiracy to murder, which was unknown as at 15 July 2025. The reference to Mr Haouchar’s case being “stood over” post the hearing and determination on 15 July 2025 is consistent with the previous history of the matter, which involved his case being stood over or adjourned on several occasions at the behest of either the SPA or Mr Haouchar himself pending any further relevant developments (see at [10]–[14] above).
In his outline of written submissions, Mr Haouchar’s procedural unfairness case took another direction. With reference to the reason given by the SPA in the Notification Letter, he claims that he was given inadequate notice of the SPA’s concerns regarding whether he could adequately be supervised on parole in light of the “stringent bail conditions” dated 11 July 2025 or by the SPA imposing further additional conditions (the intersection issue). Mr Haouchar draws attention to the fact that, as is reflected in the transcript, Mr Peters gave “positive evidence” at the SPA hearing to the effect that Community Corrections could adequately manage Mr Haouchar if he was released on parole. Mr Haouchar contends that he was “given no opportunity in the circumstances to be heard on this issue, which could have resulted in a different outcome if such an error had not occurred”.
This particular complaint of procedural unfairness was elaborated on by Mr Lenehan SC in oral address. He cited the following statement of principle in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZGUR (2011) 241 CLR 594; [2011] HCA 1 at [9] per French CJ and Kiefel J (footnote omitted):

… Even if the Board is bound in law to act “in the spirit and with the sense of responsibility of a tribunal whose duty is to mete out justice” (to quote Lord Haldane's words in Local Government Board v. Arlidge) it does not follow (and his Lordship proceeded immediately to say so) that the procedure of each such tribunal must be the same: “what that procedure is to be in detail must depend on the nature of the tribunal”. And notwithstanding what Lord Loreburn said in Board of Education v. Rice about “always giving a fair opportunity to those who were parties in the controversy to correct or contradict any relevant statement prejudicial to their view”, the books are full of cases which illustrate both the impossibility of laying down a universally valid test by which to ascertain what may constitute such an opportunity in the infinite variety of circumstances that may exist, and the necessity of allowing full effect in every case to the particular statutory framework within which the proceeding takes place. By the statutory framework I mean the express and implied provisions of the relevant Act and the inferences of legislative intention to be drawn from the circumstances to which the Act was directed and from its subject-matter: cf. Ridge v. Baldwin. As Tucker L.J. said in Russell v. Duke of Norfolk, in a passage approved by the Privy Council in University of Ceylon v. Fernando, there are no words which are of universal application to every kind of inquiry and every kind of tribunal: “the requirements of natural justice must depend on the circumstances of the case, the nature of the inquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject matter that is being dealt with, and so forth”. What the law requires in the discharge of a quasi-judicial function is judicial fairness. That is not a label for any fixed body of rules. What is fair in a given situation depends upon the circumstances. And it is not a one-sided business. What is a fair opportunity to allow the taxpayer in a given case is a question which by its very nature forbids an answer in disregard of the interests of other people. This is particularly true where, as here, the statute giving rise to the duty of decision expressly recognizes and aims to protect the interests of others which may come into competition with those of the taxpayer…

As Mr Haouchar pointed out, it has been held that a decision not to rescind the revocation of a parole order is a decision to which s 193C applies (presumably because such a decision results in the refusal of parole and therefore falls within s 193C(1)(a)). Thus, the SPA must cause a record of its reasons to be kept in the minutes of the meeting: see Samandi v State Parole Authority [2021] NSWSC 1037 at [53] per Davies J. After referring to the terms of s 175(2) of the CAS Act, Davies J stated at [71] that the SPA was not bound to take into account any particular consideration in determining a review of the revocation of a parole order, but was entitled to take into account any such behaviour of an offender (while noting that the SPA was not bound to take any such behaviour into account). His Honour also noted at [74] that the SPA was not bound by the rules of evidence and could inform itself of any matter in such manner as it thinks appropriate (referring to cl 11 of Sch 1 to the CAS Act) and was entitled to take into account allegations of an offender’s wrongdoing.
Applying the principles in Liew and Samandi, I do not regard the reasons given by the SPA in the Notification Letter to be inadequate in law (the evidence is unclear whether the reason was also recorded in the minutes). It is true that the basis for the decision not to rescind the parole revocation order is pithily expressed, but there was no legal requirement for the SPA to elaborate upon the stated reason or to refer to any evidence or other material on which the reason was based. Nor was there any legal requirement for the SPA to state findings of fact.
I might also add that even if, contrary to the above, the reasons were inadequate, it is far from certain that any such error would amount to either a jurisdictional error or an error of law on the face of the record, having regard to what was said in Liew.
I reject Mr Haouchar’s contention that there is analogy between his case and that in Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Tagle (1983) 67 FLR 164. That case involved a statement of reasons under s 13 of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Where it applies, s 13 requires a decision-maker to set out in such a statement findings on material questions of fact, refer to the evidence or other material on which those findings are based and to give reasons for the relevant decision. The required content or standard of such a statement is very different from what amounts to an adequate record of reasons for the purposes of s 193C of the CAS Act.
Finally, Mr Haouchar’s complaint of procedural unfairness is truly a challenge to the merits of the SPA’s decision, not its procedure or method. It was a matter for the members conducting the review to decide whether or not to act upon Mr Peters’ opinion and they were not obliged to invite Mr Haouchar’s response prior to making that assessment. They were not obliged to reveal their thought processes or tentative views (see SZGUR at [9]). Mr Haouchar’s complaint invites the Court to embark upon an impermissible review of the merits of the decision, which is beyond the proper judicial review function. As Brennan J observed in Kioa v West (1985) 159 CLR 550 at 622; [1985] HCA 81 (footnotes omitted):

For the following reasons, I consider that the Notification Letter is fairly to be read in accordance with the first of Mr Tran’s alternative readings and not in the manner suggested by Mr Lenehan SC.
In construing the Notification Letter, it is well to bear in mind that it contains the stated reason for the SPA’s decision not to rescind the revocation. As noted above, such reasons attract the principle in Wu Shan Liang. I acknowledge that only part of the Notification Letter constitutes the reasons of the SPA’s decision not to rescind the parole revocation order. But the letter also needs to be read as a whole and in light of all relevant circumstances as at 15 July 2025. Those circumstances include the fact that the SPA was aware at that time that the conspiracy to murder charge against Mr Haouchar was returning to the Local Court on 24 July 2025. The SPA was also aware that there could be developments concerning that charge which might affect whether Mr Haouchar should be released on parole.
The SPA’s consideration of Mr Haouchar’s case was not confined to s 175. As noted above, the SPA also has power under s 137B to consider an offender’s case at any time after the date on which the offender first becomes eligible for release on parole and without the need for any application, so as to avoid manifest injustice as prescribed in reg 223. Those prescribed circumstances include where it becomes apparent that a matter that was relevant to a decision to refuse or revoke parole is no longer relevant or where such a matter has been addressed in a way that warrants reconsideration. In the light of all these matters, I consider it reasonable to infer that the SPA’s decision to stand Mr Haouchar’s case over to 5 August 2025 reflected the SPA’s understanding that it had an ongoing statutory role and function in relation to Mr Haouchar’s case under s 137B, independently of s 175.
Having regard to the terms of the Notification Letter and the explicit reference therein to the SPA having made a determination, I do not accept that it should be read in the alternative manner suggested by Mr Tran (see at [92(b)] above).
Finally, I do not accept Mr Haouchar’s contention that Osman supports his case. I respectfully agree with Fagan J’s observations at [24] regarding the desirability of any adjournment of the SPA’s proceedings being for a relevantly short time. What his Honour had in mind, however, was an adjournment which deferred the making of a determination. That is not what occurred here. I have accepted Mr Haouchar’s contention that the Notification Letter conveyed a “final” determination. I consider that the determination was based on the material which was then available. The SPA envisaged, however, that there may be a need for the matter to be further considered depending on the outcome of the Local Court proceedings, a matter over which it had no control.
For these reasons, I reject Ground 2.