Han & Han [2025] FedCFamC2F 1285 (15 September 2025)

Biltoft & Biltoft [1995] FamCAFC 45; (1995) FLC 92-614

Ulster & Viney [2016] FamCAFC 133; (2016) FLC 93-722

Damiani & Damiani [2012] FamCA 535

Eames & Eames [2018] FamCAFC 204; (2018) FLC 93-866

Gray v O'Donnell [2009] NSWSC 259

Halstron & Halstron (2022) FLC 94-086

Harris & Dewell & Anor [2018] FamCAFC 94; (2018) FLC 93-839

Interim Finance Pty ltd v Bright Beginnings Learning Centre Glendenning Pty Ltd [2018] NSWSC 36

Keskin & Keskin & Anor [2019] FamCAFC 236; (2019) FLC 93-932

Kramer & Anor & Ward [2017] FamCAFC 270; (2017) FLC 93-817

Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Limited [2011] HCA 11; (2011) 243 CLR 361

MacKinnon & Talbot [2023] FedCFamC1A 156; (2023) FLC 94-161

Masoud & Masoud [2016] FamCAFC 24; (2016) FLC 93-689

Murray & Murray [2020] FamCAFC 293; (2020) FLC 94-000

Ogilvie v Adams [1981] VicRp 92; [1981] VR 1041

Prince & Prince [1984] FamCA 7; (1984) FLC 91-501

Re Italasia Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 811

Rodger & Rodgers [2016] FamCAFC 68; (2016) FLC 93-703

Russo & Wylie [2016] FamCAFC 227; (2016) FLC 93-747

Singerson & Joans [2014] FamCAFC 238

Stubbs & Stubbs (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 534

United Pacific Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Govindasamy [2020] NSWSC 128

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)

1. The parties do all such acts and things and sign all documents necessary to transfer the property situate at B Street, Suburb C in the State of Victoria, being the land more particularly described in Certificate of Title Volume ... Folio ..., to the Wife, at her expense.
2. Contemporaneously with paragraph 1, the Wife refinance the loans secured by mortgage from the National Australia Bank into her sole name.
3. In the event the Wife is unable to comply with paragraph 2 within 90 days, the parties do all things necessary to sell the Suburb C property with such agent and on such terms and conditions as may be agreed between the parties and thereafter distribute the proceeds of sale as follows:

(a) all costs, commissions and expenses of sale;

(b) to discharge the mortgage; and

(c) the balance then remaining to the Wife.

1. The parties forthwith close the joint NAB account, with the balance remaining to be transferred in equal shares to each of the Husband and Wife.
2. Within 90 days the Husband do all acts and things to procure the discharge of the Wife as Guarantor in relation to the mortgage registered on the title of the property situate at D Street, Suburb E and any other related accounts.
3. In accordance with paragraph 2 of the Orders made 2 December 2024, within 90 days, the Husband pay to the Wife the sum of $24,000.
4. In accordance with s 90XT(1)(d) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) the Husband do all such acts and things and sign all necessary documents to instruct his accountant to give effect to an equalisation of the Self-Managed Superannuation Fund, Super Fund 1 and for the Wife's entitlement to be transferred into her Super Fund 2.
5. The base amount to be allocated to the Wife out of the Husband's interest in Super Fund 1 is $59,900.00 ("the base amount").
6. Paragraph 12 has effect from the operative time and the operative time is the beginning of the day upon which the transferable benefit (as defined in r 1.03 of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth)) is transferred to the Trustee of a complying superannuation fund nominated by the Wife.
7. The operative time is to be five (5) business days from the date an Original Certified Copy of the sealed Order is served on the Trustee.
8. Service of these Orders on the Trustee shall be deemed to have occurred on the date of this Agreement by reason that the Husband is a member and trustee of Super Fund 1 and that service of these Orders will enliven the Trustee's obligations in accordance with the operating standards under part 7A of the Superannuation Industry (Supervision) Regulations 1994 (Cth) ("the Rollover").
9. The Wife otherwise retain for her sole use and benefit, to the exclusion of the Husband, the following:

(a) bank accounts in her sole name;

(b) her superannuation;

(c) any motor vehicle registered in her sole name; and

(d) all chattels and personal effects currently in her possession.

1. Save as set out herein, the Husband otherwise retain his interest in the following:-

(a) the property situate at F Street, Suburb G together with any loans and/or mortgages associated with same;

(b) the property situate at D Street, Suburb E, together with any loans and/or mortgages associated with same;

(c) his shareholdings;

(d) bank accounts in his sole name;

(e) his superannuation;

(f) any motor vehicles registered in his sole name;

(g) any interest in the business known as H Business and any associated entities; and

(h) all chattels and personal effects currently in his possession.

1. The Wife indemnify and keep indemnified the Husband with respect to any and all other liabilities and loans including but not limited to tax liabilities.
2. The Husband indemnify and keep indemnified the Wife with respect to any and all other liabilities and loans including but limited to:

(a) tax liabilities;

(b) any and all loans owed to his parents and/or their associated entities; and

(c) any Division 7A Loans.

1. If either party refuses or neglects to sign any document necessary to implement the Final Orders within 14 days of a request to do so, the registrar of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia at Melbourne be appointed to sign the document on behalf of that party pursuant to section 106A of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).
2. If the registrar is required to execute any document pursuant to paragraph 16, the party on whose behalf the registrar signed the documents must the costs of the other party for having any documents executed in the party's name.
3. Unless otherwise specified in these Orders and except for the purposes of enforcing compliance with the terms of these Orders:

(a) each party shall be solely entitled, to the exclusion of the other, to all property, including choses-in-action and financial resources, in the possession and/or control of such party as at the date of these Orders;

(b) insurance policies remain the sole property of the owner named thereon;

(c) each party forgoes any claim they may have to any superannuation benefit and/or interest in any trust or deceased estate that is payable or belonging to or owned by the other;

(d) each party is solely responsible for any liability of whatsoever nature and kind in their respective names; and

(e) any joint tenancy of the parties in any real or personal estate is hereby expressly severed.

1. All extant applications (save as to costs) be dismissed.

1. In the event either party seeks costs, such application be made by way of written submissions within 14 days.
2. In the event of an application being received in accordance with the preceding paragraph, the other party file any written submissions in response within a further 14 days.
3. Any application for costs be determined without an oral hearing.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under a pseudonym has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

1. Ms Han and Mr Han commenced cohabitation and married in 2018. They separated in December 2021. They have one child together, X, who is now six years old.
2. X currently lives with Ms Han and spends five nights per fortnight with Mr Han. Pursuant to Final Consent Orders made on the first day of trial, that time is to increase to six nights per fortnight next year.
3. Arising for determination are the parties' competing applications for orders altering their interests in property.
4. It is agreed that Ms Han will retain a real property in Suburb C worth $2.45 million. It is encumbered by loans from the National Australia Bank with current balances totalling $776,000.
5. Ms Han proposes that Mr Han discharge the loans secured by mortgage against the Suburb C property at his expense. She also proposes a superannuation split of $59,900 in her favour from Mr Han's interest in a self-managed superannuation fund. The particulars of her application are contained in Exhibit A3.
6. Mr Han proposes that Ms Han pay him a sum equivalent to 65% of the equity in the Suburb C property, equating to a payment of approximately $1.088 million.
7. The parties rely on the documents identified in their Outlines of Case and the documents tendered into evidence.

1. Pursuant to section 79 of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), I have a discretion to make such order altering the parties' interests in property as I consider appropriate. I am prohibited from making an order unless I am satisfied, in all the circumstances, it is just and equitable to do so.[1] If I am so satisfied, I am required to take into account the considerations prescribed by subsections 79(4) and 79(5).[2]

1. It is necessary to begin by identifying the existing legal and equitable interests of the parties in property and their existing liabilities.[3] For reasons that follow, I find those interests of value to comprise the following:

1. In opening address, Ms Han modified her contentions with respect to the balance sheet as follows:
   • she agreed with Mr Han's assertion that the current balance of the loans secured by mortgage against the Suburb C property is $776,000;
   • she abandoned her assertion that Mr Han's former interest in a property in J Street, Suburb K ought be included in the balance sheet;
   • she abandoned her assertion that an interim property distribution paid by Ms Han to Mr Han ought be included in the balance sheet; and
   • she abandoned any assertion that Mr Han has watches or jewellery with a value to be included in the balance sheet.
2. In closing address, Ms Han further modified her contentions with respect to the balance sheet as follows:
   • she abandoned her assertion that Mr Han has a legal or equitable interest in H Business; and
   • she implicitly abandoned her assertions that Mr Han has an interest in Motor Vehicle 1 and investment shares, by finally articulating an asset pool that excluded those items.
3. In opening address, Mr Han modified his contentions with respect to the balance sheet as follows:
   • he abandoned his assertions that Ms Han has an engagement ring, furniture and chattels with a value to be included in the balance sheet; and
   • he abandoned assertions that he has personal loans of $213,843, other personal liabilities of $109,015, unpaid income tax of $94,752 and credit card liabilities of $6,078.

1. Mr Han asserts that he owes his parents and their entities $4,667,142. Ms Han contends there is no such loan.
2. Mr Han deposes to purchasing the Suburb G property for $1.15 million in 2003 and then borrowing $1,179,300 from his parents and their entities. He deposes that further loans were advanced to him totalling $634,072 "which assisted with the construction of a new home on the [Suburb G] property".[4]
3. Mr Han, his mother and various entities controlled by his parents, entered a loan agreement on 20 February 2004, which agreement was updated on 1 November 2007.
4. The 2007 agreement refers to a loan of $1,883,560.17 and provides that: [5]
   1. The borrower is to pay interest on the principal sum at the same rate as charged by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia for its variable interest rate for home loans for advances of similar amounts.
   2. The borrower may pay the principal sum or any part thereof to the lenders at any time and interest on such payment shall abate from the date of payment.
   3. The principal sum or the balance of the principal sum and the interest thereon is to be paid by the borrower to the lenders when the lenders give the borrower written notice requesting the payment of the said principal sum or the balance thereof and the interest. The payment shall be made by the borrower to the lenders within six months from the date the borrower receives such written notice from the lenders.
   4. The borrower as beneficial owner charges in favour of the lenders all of his estate and interest legal and equitable in all that piece of land situate and known as F Street, Suburb G in the said State being the land described in certificate of title volume ... folio ... with payment of the principal sum and interest and agrees the lenders may lodge a Caveat against the said land in respect of the charge. The borrower agrees to sign mortgage documents, if requested by the lenders to secure the principal sum and interest thereon and the security is to be F Street, Suburb G in the said State.
   5. IN consideration of these presents the rights powers and liabilities of the lenders and of the borrower shall respectively go and be reciprocally transmissible to their respective heirs successors and assigns in like manner and to all intents and purposes as if after every use of the word "lenders" the words "his or her their successors and assigns" and if after every use of the word "borrower" the words "his or her heirs successors and assigns" had respectively followed or been inserted.
   6. ANY demand or notice will be made in writing signed by an officer or agent of the lenders and may be served on the borrower either by hand or by post. Any demand or notice may be addressed to the borrower at the address or place of business last known to the lenders and will be deemed to have been received on the second business day following the day on which it was posted.
   7. THIS Loan Agreement replaces a Loan Agreement dated the 20th February 2004 made between the lenders and the borrower.
5. On 8 November 2007, a caveat was lodged on the title of the Suburb G property by Mr Han's mother, and the five corporate entities who were party to the loan agreement, asserting an "interest as chargee".[6]
6. Whilst I have significant concerns about the reliability and veracity of Mr Han's evidence, I do not conclude, on the balance of probabilities, that his evidence of having borrowed funds from his parents to purchase the Suburb G property ought to be rejected. Ms Han's suggestion that the loan and caveat were contrived for asset protection purposes does not establish the loan agreement to be fictitious. As Mr Han submits, it cannot be disputed that the caveat was lodged at the time recorded. I accept that Mr Han borrowed funds from his parents for the Suburb G property, on terms that ultimately found reflection in the November 2007 loan agreement.

1. The 2007 loan agreement provides for a loan repayable on demand. It is a "settled rule that a loan of money payable on request (or on demand, or at call, etc.) creates an immediate debt with the result that time runs (for the purposes of the statutes of limitations) from the making of the loan."[7] Such a loan "creates an immediate and enforceable debt and the cause of action arises as soon as the money is advanced".[8] Actions relating to such loans cannot be brought after six years from the date the cause of action accrues.[9]
2. Mr Han submits that the loan is nevertheless not statute barred because there is a "modifier in this agreement" comprising a requirement for written notice to be provided. Referring to a decision in Re Italasia Pty Ltd,[10] he submits that:

.... it says "in order for a special term of a loan contract to prevent the cause of action from arising instantly on the loan being made, there has to be something from which the Court can see that the parties have made provision inconsistent with the ordinary position." And what's inconsistent is - with the ordinary position - is that the demand takes place upon written notice. That's the modifier.

1. Mr Han cites a decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court in Gray v O'Donnell which concludes as follows:

In the contracts that must here be construed, the amounts are payable not "on demand" simpliciter, but "on demand in writing". Further, that demand may be served in accordance with s 170 of the Conveyancing Act. No issue arises as to the service, but the requirement that the demand be made "in writing" and be served in a particular manner, makes clear that the moneys advanced were not payable immediately, but payable only if and when a demand was made in writing. The question can be asked and answered by contemplating whether, on the face of the proper construction of this contract, the parties would consider that the amount was repayable without there ever having been a demand in writing for it. The answer, in my opinion, must be that they would not. The requirement for a demand to be made "in writing" was a condition precedent to the obligation to repay the amount. In other words, the obligation to repay was conditioned upon the service on the borrowers of a demand in writing for the moneys.[11]

1. In Interim Finance Pty Ltd v Bright Beginnings Learning Centre Glendenning Pty Ltd, the New South Wales Supreme Court cited Gray v O'Donnell and held that if "the underlying contract prescribes formalities for making a demand, then the debt becomes payable (and a cause of action in debt arises) only when the demand is made in accordance with the requirements of the contract".[12]
2. In Damiani & Damiani, Justice Watts referred to Gray v O'Donnell and held that where a loan agreement required a written demand, and no such demand had been made, the loan was not statute barred.[13]
3. In Masoud & Masoud, an issue arose as to whether a loan agreement providing for the repayment of the principal sum within one month after a written demand was statute barred. The trial Judge found it was not. On appeal, it was uncontroversial that in that circumstance the limitation period commenced to run from the date of the demand, not the date of the loan.[14]
4. I accept Mr Han's submission that the loan is not repayable on demand simpliciter and accordingly is not statute barred.

1. Where the proof of a loan is in issue, it is necessary to identify the term of the loan, the rate and calculation of interest and the required repayments.[15] Mr Han bears the evidentiary burden of establishing the debt.[16] The loan agreement is of itself insufficient to establish the quantum of the debt.
2. Mr Han deposes that he has calculated he has repaid the principal amount of $622,726 and interest of $308,522. In oral evidence, he accepted that evidence was false, in that he had made no such calculations himself.
3. Somewhat curiously, given the original sums borrowed totalled $1,813,372 and his evidence in relation to repayments, Mr Han now deposes that the loan amount owing is $4,667,142, based on a letter of demand received from his parents' and their entities' accountant on 27 May 2025.
4. Mr Han gave oral evidence that the schedule attached to that letter of demand was prepared by that accountant. The instructions given to the accountant are not in evidence, and it is agreed that the schedule is not evidence of the facts asserted in the schedule.
5. The mere fact that Mr Han's mother's accountant asserts that Mr Han owes her and associated entities $4,667,142 does not establish the fact. Absent any evidence that the calculation underlying the figure is accurate, it is a mere conclusion devoid of particulars that would enable the Court to be satisfied of the conclusion.[17]
6. The absence of evidence in relation to the particulars of the asserted loan is striking. Mr Han is a party to the very loan. He did not give any evidence himself of how his current purported indebtedness was calculated. He falsely averred to having undertaken calculations himself. No explanation was proffered for his failure to call evidence from the other parties to the loan agreements, or the accountant who undertook the calculations. I infer their evidence would not have assisted him.[18] Mr Han's parents were independently on notice of the proceedings in which the loan has always been disputed and have chosen not to intervene.
7. Mr Han has not discharged to my satisfaction his onus of establishing a debt of $4,66,142 owing to his parents and their entities.

Should both parties be responsible for the loan?

1. Even had Mr Han discharged his evidentiary burden of establishing the debt in the sum of $4,667,142, my discretionary treatment of the debt is at large, subject to established guidelines.[19] The essential question is whether both parties should bear the liability, and if so, in what proportion.[20]
2. Mr Han effectively submits that the discretion to exclude liabilities from the balance sheet is limited to unsecured debts, relying on the reference in Biltoft & Biltoft to the discretion not to take into account unsecured liabilities.[21] I do not accept that my discretion is so fettered for the following reasons.
3. Af Petersens & Af Petersens involved an asserted liability to the husband's father which had been secured by mortgage. Justice Nygh ignored outstanding obligations, holding that

.. the Court will not normally take account of debts incurred after the separation and on some occasions has ignored debts, although incurred during the marriage, for which it felt one of the parties should bear exclusive responsibility: Antmann & Antmann [1980] FamCA 64; (1980) FLC 90-908. Needless to say, a debt due does not diminish the property of the parties until it is paid or execution is levied.

....

I do not for these purposes for any moment doubt the existence and enforceability of the debts that I have listed above. But in taking account of the ''obligations'' of the parties, I must consider how pressing such an obligation is. It is fairly common in this Court to meet a situation where a parent has made a loan to a child which is in all respects legally enforceable, but which is not in fact enforced and would not really be expected to be enforced. It is no doubt an ''obligation'' but if the obligation is not likely to have to be met, it should not be taken into account.

The evidence in this case suggests that until July 1980 the husband did not treat the obligation to his father as an immediately pressing need. There is no record of any payment of, or demand for, interest on the loan. The security offered to the father in the form of Bimbil Park was at all times insufficient in value and an offer to made on behalf of the husband to provide additional security over Little Plain was not acted upon. [22]

1. Prince & Prince involved a debt in relation to which a mortgage had been executed in favour of a creditor. Chief Justice Evatt held that:

The assessment of debts and liabilities is not necessarily arrived at by a strictly mathematical or accountancy approach in all cases. While some liabilities are charges upon the property which can be accurately assessed at a certain date, others are at large, or have not been precisely determined, e.g. tax liabilities (Kelly and Kelly (No. 2) (1981) FLC 91-108 p. 76,801). In some cases the amount of the liability can only be estimated generally (Albany & Albany [1980] FamCA 80; (1980) FLC 90-905, p. 75.717). The Court can make an allowance for a particular liability if appropriate to do so. In some cases there are sufficient uncertainties as to the alleged liability to lead the Court to disregard it entirely or partly (e.g. a loan from a parent of the party not likely to be enforced; Af Petersens (supra); Quirk (1983) unreported). In other cases, the Court may take the view that because of the circumstances surrounding the incurring of the liability it ought in justice and equity to be wholly or partly disregarded in determining the appropriate order to make under sec. 79 as between the parties to the marriage. Such a result could be reached where a spouse had incurred a liability in deliberate or reckless disregard of the other party's potential entitlement under sec. 79 (Kimber and Kimber [1980] FamCA 48; (1981) FLC 91-085; Kowaliw and Kowaliw [1981] FamCA 70; (1981) FLC 91-092; Antmann and Antmann [1980] FamCA 64; (1980) FLC 90-908; Af Petersens (supra)). Complex issues can arise in regard to liabilities to third parties (see, e.g. Pockran and Crewes; Pockran [1982] FamCA 65; (1983) FLC 91-311).

Of course, the Court cannot ignore the fact that there is or may be a liability; the effect is simply that it does not consider that the other spouse should be called upon to in effect "contribute"' to the liability by having that spouse's fair share in the parties' property reduced by virtue of its existence. The effect may be that the party who has incurred the liability will be left to meet it out of whatever funds remain to that party after satisfying the property order made under sec. 79 (Af Petersens (supra)).[23]

1. Those paragraphs from Prince & Prince were quoted with approval in Rodgers & Rodgers.[24] In that case, the Full Court, referring to the general approach that the parties' liabilities are deducted from the value of their assets went on to opine that:

It is in our view important to reiterate and emphasise what was said in Biltoft above: there is no statutory prescription which suggests that any such treatment of the liability is mandatory. Despite the frequency with which the "rule" is applied we have not been taken to any authority, nor are we aware of any authority, which suggests that any such "rule" has the effect of a binding rule of law. What emerges from the authorities is that while there might be a "rule" the application of which is appropriate in the vast majority of cases, the manner in which a particular liability should be treated is, ultimately, dependent upon the nature of the liability, the circumstances surrounding the liability and the dictates of justice and equity shaped by each.

The usual practice or "rule" sits comfortably and conformably within that rubric - in many cases, perhaps almost all, liabilities will be deducted from the "gross" value of the property because it will be clear (and even if not expressly stated, determined) that the justice and equity of the case demands that the liabilities should be met by the parties in the proportions in which the court determines the property is to be divided. Liabilities that are vague, uncertain, unlikely to be enforced and the like might be treated differently because those circumstances might, in the circumstances of the particular case, render it unjust and inequitable for liabilities to be deducted in that manner. Those so-called "exceptional cases" are but instances of the broader consideration of the justice and equity of the particular case.[25]

1. I am satisfied that I have a discretion to determine that it is unjust and inequitable for Ms Han to be called upon to contribute to Mr Han's liability to his parents, in circumstances where it is vague, uncertain, or unlikely to be enforced.
2. Similarly to the position in Af Petersens, it is clear that Mr Han has not treated the obligation to his father as an immediately pressing need. He deposes that he was "unable to make significant repayments between 2007 and 2014".[26] The striking aspect of that evidence is that he was then receiving rental income from the Suburb G property. In other words, despite having the benefit of an asset to which he made no financial contribution, he retained the entirety of the income generated from the asset.
3. Despite Mr Han's failure to make any regular repayments towards the loan, there is no evidence of any demand having been made for any payments until 15 years after the original monies were advanced, in September 2019. At that time an email was sent requesting interest repayments. Ms Han deposes that she "raised this email with [Mr Han], he instructed me to ignore it."[27] Consistently, she gave oral evidence that he told her to "just ignore it" and that she believed "what he said that there is no loan".
4. Mr Han suggested to Ms Han that her evidence was inconsistent with her deposition that:

I further advise the Court that I was not aware of these loan agreements until [Mr Han] and I separated and have disputed the legitimacy and enforceability of these agreement[s] throughout these proceedings.[28]

1. It is not. That Mr Han's father had sent an email requesting interest repayments does not establish that the loan agreements were brought to Ms Han's attention.
2. I find no basis for rejecting Ms Han's evidence that Mr Han told her to ignore the email requesting interest payments from his father. Despite filing an affidavit in reply, Mr Han did not respond to her evidence in that respect. In the absence of any contrary evidence, I accept Mr Han instructed Ms Han to ignore the email from his father requesting interest repayments.
3. Mr Han has made further representations that are inconsistent with him owing substantial funds to his father. In a Financial Agreement drafted on his behalf, he asserted there to be no such loan. Instead, he asserted that the Suburb G title was "only in [Mr Han's] name - beneficial owners are [Mr and Mrs Han] who provided the purchase money".[29] Despite Mr Han's oral evidence that he did not understand the difference between a legal and equitable interest in property, his representation that his parents beneficially owned the property is completely inconsistent with regarding himself as liable for a loan worth millions of dollars to them. He continued to retain the rental income from the property without applying that income to repayment of any loan.
4. Also inconsistent with Mr Han's suggestion that he is liable to his parents for the funds borrowed, Mr Han did not ultimately claim interest, said to be being paid on the loans, as an expense associated with generating rental income in his taxation returns. Mr Han could offer no explanation for that failure that occurred in multiple successive years.
5. Inconsistent with Mr Han being now required to repay the loan from his parents, in November 2022, he received a "formal letter of demand from a solicitor then representing the entities demanding repayment of the then outstanding loan amount inclusive of interest".[30] The loan agreement provided for the amount to then become payable within 6 months. It was clearly not then repaid. There is no evidence before me to explain why no enforcement steps were then taken.
6. Consistent with demands being made and no action being taken to enforce the obligations pursuant to the loan agreement, Mr Han deposes to a further letter of demand being made by the entities' accountant in October 2024. Again, there is no evidence of any enforcement steps being contemplated.
7. Mr Han's current position is also entirely inconsistent with him being required to repay his parents $4.67 million by 27 August 2025, as demanded by his parents' accountant on 27 May 2025. He currently deposes to having expenses exceeding his income by $1,753 per week without making any payments to his parents. The only way in which he could hope to repay his parents anything like the money he claims they are owed is by selling the Suburb G property.
8. Mr Han deposes that he has "been attempting to sell the [Suburb G] property since August 2023, without success".[31] That evidence is fanciful in light of his oral evidence that the property was on the market for a few months in December 2023 or January 2024. He was non-responsive to the question of how he could be attempting to sell the property while it is not on the market.
9. That Mr Han intends to sell the Suburb G property is completely inconsistent with his evidence that he has not discussed his intentions regarding the property with his pregnant partner, who has lived with him in the property for 12 months. Also inconsistently with any suggestion that he intends to comply with the now expired demand to pay his parents $4.77 million, he gives oral evidence that he is planning to remain in the property until his baby comes. After that, his intention with respect to the Suburb G property will depend "on how things progress".
10. Mr Han adduces no evidence of any conversations he has had with his parents in relation to their claim for him to pay them $4.77 million. He adduces no evidence of any steps he has taken to comply with the demand from their accountant. He continues to essentially act as if there is no loan owing to his parents. He has not called evidence from his parents to explain whether they in fact intend to sue their son for repayment of $4.77 million. He adduces no evidence of any representation made by them to that effect.
11. As Justice Nygh observed in Af Petersens, a debt does not diminish the property of a party until it is paid or execution is levied. I am not satisfied that execution of the alleged $4.77 million debt will be levied. I consider it to be a loan which is unlikely to be enforced. Certainly, Mr Han's conduct is inconsistent with a finding to the contrary.
12. I am not satisfied that Ms Han should be proportionally liable for the alleged liability. I decline to include it on the balance sheet.
13. To the extent Mr Han suggested that the recently enacted subsection 79(3) of the Act precludes the exclusion of liabilities from the balance sheet, I observe that a Judge of Division 1 of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia has recently ignored liabilities from the balance sheet.[32] Absent any suggestion that decision is plainly wrong, I find no basis upon which to conclude that I am now statutorily prohibited from ignoring liabilities in a way consistent with long-established authority.[33]

1. Mr Han also asserts that he owes $100,000 to H Business for a "construction loan"[34]. The only evidence of any construction on the Suburb G property is Mr Han's deposition that he constructed a new home there between 2004 and 2009. There is no specific evidence with respect to the loan. Mr Han's counsel was invited to identify any such evidence and failed to do so. Mr Han's assertion is inconsistent with his representation through his lawyers in August 2023 that a $100,000 construction loan relating to the Suburb G property was repaid by Mr Han from proceeds of sale of a property in 2023. The evidence does not support a conclusion that Mr Han still owes his father $100,000.
2. Ms Han deposed on 2 July 2025 to having savings totalling $12,906. Her evidence was unchallenged. Mr Han deposes to her having "E 50,000" in savings.[35] The basis for that estimate is not disclosed. The evidence does not satisfy me that, contrary to Ms Han's particularised and unchallenged evidence, that she has savings of $50,000.
3. Mr Han asserts that his savings of $1,000 ought be included in the balance sheet. Ms Han contends such savings should be treated as having a nominal value. I prefer her position in circumstances where her savings have also been excluded from the balance sheet.
4. Mr Han contends that Ms Han has an asset of $25,500 comprising a loan to her sister. In her Financial Statement, Ms Han deposes to having no such asset. In her trial affidavit, she particularises the application of proceeds of sale from real properties in Suburb L. Included is her evidence that she applied some of those proceeds to a "loan to my sister for the purchase of a [...] car for $25,500".[36] She gave oral evidence that the day prior to the final hearing, her sister had transferred her $30,000 which she applied to her legal fees. She went on to say that her sister has accordingly repaid her the original sum owed for the motor vehicle and she now owes her sister $4,500. The evidence was not successfully challenged. I am not satisfied that Ms Han has an asset worth $25,500 comprising a loan to her sister.
5. If Ms Han did not intend, in closing address, to abandon the assertions in her Outline of Case that Mr Han has a valuable Motor Vehicle 1 and investment shares, I would nevertheless not accept the inclusion of those items in the balance sheet for reasons that follow.
6. Ms Han's Outline of Case refers to Motor Vehicle 1 "owned by [H Business] in the possession of the Husband".[37] The fact Mr Han uses that vehicle does not establish that it is beneficially owned by him. I am not satisfied he has a legal or equitable interest in it given it is owned by H Business in which Mr Han has no interest.
7. Ms Han's Outline of Case asserts that Mr Han has investment shares worth $19,000. Mr Han deposes to having no such investments. His evidence in that respect was unchallenged. Ms Han deposes in her affidavit to those shares having been sold. It is not permissible to add back sold assets to the balance sheet.[38] The evidence does not satisfy me that Mr Han has investment shares worth $19,000.
8. Mr Han asserts that Ms Han has superannuation interests worth $245,700. Ms Han deposes to her superannuation balance being $250,083. In the absence of any challenge to that evidence, I prefer her evidence as to the current value of her superannuation interests.
9. The parties otherwise agree on the value and identity of their interests in property and their liabilities.

1. Both parties seek an alteration of their property interests in order to finally determine the financial relationships between them.[39] Implicit in both parties' requests that the Court make orders is an acceptance that the making of an order would be just and equitable.[40] I consider it to be just and equitable to make a property settlement order because there will no longer be the common use of property by the parties.[41]

1. I am required to take into account the matters prescribed by subsection 79(4) of the Act, so far as they are relevant.
2. Mr Han submits that the Court ought adopt an asset by asset approach to the assessment of contributions. Contending that Ms Han made no contributions to property owned by him prior to the relationship, he submits that the "sole adjusting asset can only be the equity in the [Suburb C] property".[42] I reject the submission. All contributions "whether or not they sound in, or are directly linked to, the property available for distribution, should be considered and assessed together with the nature, form and extent of all other contributions of all types contemplated otherwise by s 79(4)."[43]
3. Further, whilst Mr Han's submission properly disavowed any suggestion that I should quarantine particular contributions,[44] that is precisely the effect of his contention that contributions ought only assessed by reference to one asset. There is also a significant risk in his approach of impermissibly requiring a contribution to result in a positive economic result so as to be taken into account. [45] The absence of a causal link between contributions and their financial product or value is not indicative of a party having made no contribution pursuant to subsection 79(4).[46]
4. At the commencement of the relationship, Ms Han owned a property in Suburb L. She had purchased it for $705,000 in 2014 using funds from the proceeds of sale of a property previously owned by her in Suburb M and by obtaining a mortgage of $564,000. In May 2017, Ms Han signed a contract for the construction of two double storey units on the property at a cost of $856,000. In June 2017, she obtained a new loan facility of $1.5 million secured against the property to refinance the existing loan and cover constructions costs.
5. It is not disputed that the Suburb L development was partially complete at the time of the parties' cohabitation in March 2018. Ms Han deposes that at that time her asset position was as follows:
   • she owed $1,090,249.93 on the Suburb L mortgage;
   • the Suburb L units were subsequently sold in 2019 and 2022 for a total sale price of $2,527,000;
   • she owned Motor Vehicle 2 worth $20,000;
   • she had cash savings of approximately $11,755; and
   • she had superannuation entitlements of approximately $102,297.
6. Mr Han deposes that Ms Han then had superannuation of $91,145, but did not challenge Ms Han's evidence in cross-examination. I prefer Ms Han's evidence as to the balance of her superannuation at the commencement of the parties' relationship. He otherwise agrees with Ms Han's assertions as to the value of her motor vehicle and cash savings. He did not challenge her evidence with respect to the Suburb L development, which evidence I accept.
7. Mr Han deposes to owning the following assets at the commencement of the parties' cohabitation:
   • the Suburb G property worth $4.2 million subject to a loan from his parents and their entities of $4,376,362 and a loan from H Business of estimated $100,000;
   • the Suburb E property worth $925,000 subject to a mortgage of $70,675;
   • a one-third interest in a real property in J Street, Suburb K worth $600,000 subject to a loan of approximately $225,000;
   • savings of $13,132;
   • shareholdings of $55,447; and
   • superannuation entitlements of $383,138.
8. Ms Han does not aver to the value of any of the items of real property and disputes the loans relating to the Suburb G property. She deposes to his savings then being $11,700. She otherwise does not take issue with the figures attributed by Mr Han to the then mortgage on the Suburb K property, shareholdings and superannuation.
9. For reasons already given, I do not accept that the Suburb G property was truly encumbered by the loans asserted by Mr Han. He conducted himself inconsistently with owing his parents the sums claimed.
10. I otherwise accept Mr Han's evidence with respect to his initial contributions.
11. Ms Han asserts that Mr Han had, at the time of cohabitation, an interest in H Business. He accepts that he was then a director of its corporate trustee and a beneficiary of the trust. He then had powers as a director of the corporate trustee to effect a lawful distribution to himself, with the result that his interest could then be seen as property.[47]
12. Mr Han asserted through his solicitors in the negotiation of a Binding Financial Agreement between the parties in 2018 that his interest in H Business was estimated to be worth $500,000. I am satisfied that representation made by Mr Han is evidence from which I can at least impressionistically attribute a value to his then interest in H Business.[48]
13. During the parties' relationship, Mr Han worked at H Business. He was a director of the trustee company operating the business. He retained the rental income from the Suburb G and Suburb K properties. He serviced loans associated with the Suburb E and Suburb K properties.
14. Ms Han has been employed with her current employer throughout the parties' relationship and since separation. She was initially employed as an accountant. She met the expenses associated with the Suburb L property.
15. From March until November 2018, the parties lived in the Suburb G property. They then moved into a different property in Suburb G which was owned by Mr Han's parents.
16. In 2019, the Suburb L units were completed and the parties moved into one of them just prior to X's birth. Ms Han was on maternity leave in 2019. Mr Han loaned Ms Han the sum of $189,200 for expenses in relation to the Suburb L property. I prefer Ms Han's unchallenged evidence in relation to quantum of the loan given my reservations about the reliability of Mr Han's evidence.
17. In 2019, the other Suburb L unit sold for $1.155 million. The existing loan was repaid and a new loan obtained for $650,200. From that new loan, Ms Han repaid Mr Han the sum of $192,699 for the monies advanced while she was on maternity leave.
18. Ms Han gives unchallenged evidence that:
    • she returned to work in 2019 as she continued to pay the expenses and mortgage relating to the Suburb L property;
    • Mr Han left the role of caring for X to her;
    • Ms Han's mother helped her look after X and undertook general household duties when Ms Han was working;
    • Ms Han's mother prepared three meals a day for the parties and X;
    • Mr Han did not cook, clean, or maintain the Suburb L property; and
    • Ms Han undertook administrative duties for the business while Mr Han was a director of it, including updating the website, preparing brochures, updating its online accounts, scanning photos, generating payslips and undertaking receptionist duties.
19. I accept Ms Han's unchallenged evidence. There was nothing about the way she generally gave her evidence that caused me to doubt its veracity. As her counsel submits, she made appropriate concessions when challenged. By contrast, Mr Han's evidence contained multiple contradictions that were unexplained by him. He admits falsely claiming twice in these proceedings to having a debt to his parents of $5.37 million.
20. In December 2020, the parties purchased the vacant land comprising Suburb C property for $1.052 million. Mr Han paid the $80,000 deposit by drawing on the loan associated with the Suburb E property.
21. In March 2021, the parties settled on the purchase of the Suburb C land. Mr Han applied $193,186 from a drawing of $447,007 from the business. The balance of the drawing of $266,927 was subsequently deposited into the Suburb E offset account. The balance of the purchase price for the Suburb C property of $841,600 was funded by way of a mortgage in their joint names.
22. In August 2021, Mr Han refinanced the Suburb E property and increased the loan to $595,000 to help cover construction costs for the Suburb C property.
23. In September 2021, the parties entered into a contract for the construction of the house on the Suburb C property with an estimated cost of $685,200.
24. The parties separated in December 2021. Mr Han then had access to approximately $586,000 by way of funds available in the Suburb E loan and Ms Han had approximately $88,000 in her Commonwealth Bank account.
25. In May 2022, Ms Han sold the other Suburb L unit for $1.372 million. $50,000 from those proceeds were ultimately distributed to Mr Han by way of a part property settlement payment. Ms Han has also been solely responsible for X's private school fees which have totalled approximately $43,600.
26. During 2022, the parties both made contributions to the construction costs for the Suburb C property. Ms Han made contributions of approximately $299,000. She also spent $71,000 on fencing, concreting, landscaping, security and an outdoor play area.
27. Since November 2022, Ms Han has been solely responsible for the loan repayments for the Suburb C property. The loan balance has reduced by approximately $33,000 since that time.
28. It is common ground that Ms Han ultimately directly contributed approximately $450,000 to the Suburb C property, and that Mr Han contributed between $555,000 and $572,000. Mr Han's contributions were principally sourced from the Suburb E offset facility.
29. In July 2023, Mr Han sold his interest in the Suburb K property to his sisters for $733,333. His interest had been valued at $900,000 in October 2022. He transferred the sum of $567,000 to H Business.
30. Ms Han has continued to be primarily responsible for X's care after the parties' separation.
31. Mr Han contends that Ms Han's contribution ought be assessed at 35% of the equity in the Suburb C property, equating to $585,900. So much equates to approximately 9% of the current value of the parties non-superannuation assets. I reject that contention as significantly undervaluing Ms Han's financial, non-financial, direct and indirect contributions, including by way of primary homemaker and parent, both before, during and after the parties' marriage.
32. Ms Han contends that her contributions ought be assessed as 30% of the value of the parties' assets. So much would result in a dollar differential between the parties' contributions to non-superannuation assets of approximately $2.6 million. I consider that to give insufficient weight to Mr Han's contributions, and particularly his initial contributions by way of real estate.
33. Taking into account all of the matters to which I have referred, I conclude that an appropriate assessment of the parties' contributions is for Mr Han to be found to have made contributions worth three times those made by Ms Han, namely 75% to Ms Han's 25%. So much results in Mr Han being assessed to have contributed $4,878,750, giving rise to an approximate differential between the parties' positions of $3.25 million.
34. With respect to the parties' superannuation assets, Ms Han deposes that she seeks a split of $59,900 "calculated based on our respective superannuation, taking into account the superannuation [the parties] each had at the commencement of the relationship".[49] Mr Han does not respond to the evidence and did not challenge it. He made no submissions on the topic. Consistent with that evidence, I find Mr Han's contributions to superannuation to be approximately 65.4% and Ms Han's to be 34.6%.

1. I am required to take into account the matters prescribed by subsection 79(5) of the Act, so far as they are relevant.
2. Ms Han is 43 years old and in good health. She is employed as a professional and earns $168,000 per annum plus superannuation. She is also entitled to a company vehicle. If she meets her key performance indicators, she is eligible to an annual bonus of up to $20,000.
3. Mr Han is 50 years old and in good health. He works as a health care professional earning approximately $180,000 per annum as a contractor. He also deposes to receiving rental income of $14,924 per annum.
4. From next year, X will live with Ms Han for eight nights each fortnight and with Mr Han for six nights each fortnight.
5. Mr Han remains a beneficiary of H Business. He worked in the business throughout the parties' relationship and continues to do so (albeit only one day per week). His evidence in relation to his ongoing role at the business has been inconsistent. He has at times claimed only to be undertaking administrative roles at the business but also admits to seeing patients there. He could not explain his remuneration arrangements at the business. He was apparently paid annual wages at the end of each financial year which were repaid to various entities controlled by his parents immediately thereafter. He has had access to considerable funds from the business, including drawings of hundreds of thousands of dollars at various times. He called no evidence from the current directors of the company to explain his relationship with it. I infer their evidence would not have assisted him.
6. Mr Han represented in 2018 that his interest in the business was worth $500,000. There is a sufficient intermingling of finances between Mr Han and the business, even after his resignation as a director, for me to be satisfied that he has access to a financial resource should he need further capital funds. He continues to have the use of a motor vehicle owned by H Business.
7. Mr Han failed to disclose the financial circumstances of his cohabitation with his new partner, other than to give oral evidence that she owns a property which is rented and earns "not much" income. She is a director and principal of a business.
8. Mr Han contends that Ms Han also has financial resources from her family available to her. It is uncontroversial that she received $250,000 from her family to purchase the Suburb M property before the parties' marriage. I nevertheless reject the submission that Ms Han's family continue to provide a financial resource available to her. Ms Han's unchallenged evidence is that her mother receives rental income of approximately $20,000 per annum from a house in Country N which she applies to her expenses and otherwise does not work. I am not satisfied she presents as a significant financial resource available to Ms Han. I do not reach a different conclusion with respect to the account Ms Han manages for her sister-in-law's parents.
9. It was ultimately neither party's case that any adjustment ought be made pursuant to the subsection 79(5) factors. I am nevertheless satisfied that those considerations modestly favour Ms Han.

1. An outcome whereby Ms Han retains 25% of the parties' non-superannuation assets would see her retain assets worth $1,626,250. The current equity in the Suburb C property is $1,674,000. In light of the modest adjusting factors in her favour, the fact Mr Han will retain significantly more valuable property than she will, and that she has paid him a part property settlement of $50,000, I determine that a just and equitable outcome in these proceedings is for Ms Han to retain the Suburb C property subject to its current liability. So much results in her retaining assets worth 25.73% of the overall value of the parties' non-superannuation assets. Mr Han will retain assets worth $4,831,000.
2. I am satisfied that it is just and equitable for the superannuation splitting order sought by Ms Han to be made. It will leave Mr Han with superannuation of $585,345, or approximately 65.4% of the overall value of the parties' interests in superannuation.
3. In the event Ms Han is unable to refinance the loans encumbering the Suburb C property, it is appropriate for the property to be sold in order to sever the financial relationship between the parties, as is proposed by Mr Han. There is no evidence to support a conclusion that public auction is the preferable means of sale. I determine to leave the terms and conditions of sale to be agreed between the parties.
4. Given neither party will be required to make payment to the other (other than by way of costs), I am not satisfied that any default provisions for the sale of other real property is appropriate.
5. I decline to grant the relief sought by Mr Han that funds held in X's account ought be transferred to an account solely controlled by him. He advanced no submission in support of the relief sought.
6. It is appropriate for the parties to close their joint bank account as is proposed by Mr Han.
7. Mr Han took no issue with the relief sought by Ms Han for him to procure her discharge as guarantor for loans associated with the Suburb E property.
8. I determine that time for compliance with the guarantor and mortgage discharges should be 90 days as is initially proposed by Mr Han absent any evidence of the parties' immediate capacities to comply.
9. Because interim orders are ipso facto discharged at the time of the making of final orders,[50] it is appropriate to make further provision for Mr Han to pay Ms Han's costs in accordance with an Order made 2 December 2024.
10. I do not consider the additional specificity proposed by Mr Han in his application for the parties to otherwise retain their existing assets, liabilities and superannuation is necessary. I accordingly prefer the relief sought by Ms Han in that respect. Because I have not found Mr Han to have a legal or equitable interest in H Business, I will provide only that he retain any interest he has in that entity.
11. I am satisfied that the indemnities proposed by Ms Han are also appropriate absent any submission to the contrary.
12. The parties agreed that any other issues of costs arising would be dealt with by way of written submissions without an oral hearing. I decline to make the inconsistent order sought by Ms Han providing for the parties to bear their own legal costs.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and nineteen (119) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Glass.

[1] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79(2).

[2] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79(3)(b).

[3] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 79(3)(a).

[4] Affidavit of Mr Han filed 28 July 2025, paragraph 64.

[6] Affidavit of Mr M filed 11 August 2025 at 5:26pm, page 30.

[7] Ogilvie v Adams [1981] VicRp 92; [1981] VR 1041 at 1045.

[8] United Pacific Finance Pty Ltd (Receivers and Managers Appointed) v Govindasamy [2020] NSWSC 128 at [175], quoted in Halstron & Halstron (2022) FLC 94-086 at [68].

[9] Limitation of Actions Act 1958 (Vic), s 5.

[10] [2017] NSWSC 811 at [17].

[11] [2009] NSWSC 259 at [23].

[12] [2018] NSWSC 36 at [97].

[13] [2012] FamCA 535 at [111].

[14] [2016] FamCAFC 24; (2016) FLC 93-689 at [41] and [61-4].

[15] Ulster & Viney [2016] FamCAFC 123; (2016) FLC 93-721 ("Ulster & Viney") at [28].

[16] Murray & Murray [2020] FamCAFC 293; (2020) FLC 94-000 ("Murray & Murray") at [45].

[17] Kramer & Anor & Ward [2017] FamCAFC 270; (2017) FLC 93-817 at [10].

[18] Kuhl v Zurich Financial Services Australia Limited [2011] HCA 11; (2011) 243 CLR 361 at [63] and [64].

[19] Murray & Murray at [41] and the cases there cited.

[21] [1995] FamCAFC 45; (1995) FLC 92-614 at 82,127.

[22] [1981] FamCA 50; (1981) FLC 91-095 ("Af Petersens & Af Petersens") at 76,669.

[23] [1984] FamCA 7; (1984) FLC 91-501 at 79,076-7; Rodger & Rodgers [2016] FamCAFC 68; (2016) FLC 93-703 at 34.

[24] [2016] FamCAFC 68; (2016) FLC 93-703 ("Rodgers & Rodgers") at [34].

[25] Rodgers & Rodgers at [40]-[41].

[26] Affidavit of Mr Han filed 28 July 2025, paragraph 65.

[27] Affidavit of Ms Han filed 11 August 2025, paragraph 37.

[28] Affidavit of Ms Han filed 1 August 2025, paragraph 95.

[30] Affidavit of Mr Han filed 28 July 2025, paragraph 79.

[31] Affidavit of Mr Han filed 28 July 2025, paragraph 74.

[32] Stubbs & Stubbs (No 3) [2025] FedCFamC1F 534 at [74].

[33] Eames & Eames [2018] FamCAFC 204; (2018) FLC 93-866 at [28] and the cases there cited; Chorn & Hopkins [2004] FamCA 633; (2004) FLC 93-204 at [58] and [59]; Elliston & Dennell (2019) FLC 93-903 at [56]; Wei & Xia [2024] FedCFamC1A 65; (2024) FLC 94-186 at [154] and [167] .

[34] Mr Han's Outline of Case filed 20 August 2025, page 7.

[35] Affidavit of Mr Han filed 28 July 2025, paragraph 52.

[36] Affidavit of Ms Han filed 28 July 2025, paragraph 84(f).

[37] Outline of Case of Ms Han filed 18 August 2025, page 6.

[38] Shinohara & Shinohara (2025) FLC 94-266 at [127].

[39] Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), s 81.

[40] Russo & Wylie [2016] FamCAFC 227; (2016) FLC 93-747 at [54].

[41] Stanford & Stanford (2012) 247 CLR 108 at [42].

[42] Outline of Case of Mr Han filed 20 August 2025, page 15.

[43] Dickons & Dickons (2012) 50 Fam LR 244 ("Dickons & Dickons") at [18].

[44] Singerson & Joans [2014] FamCAFC 238 at [66].

[45] MacKinnon & Talbot [2023] FedCFamC1A 156; (2023) FLC 94-161 at [36] and the cases there cited.

[47] Harris & Dewell & Anor [2018] FamCAFC 94; (2018) FLC 93-839 at [58] and the case there cited.

[48] Akbar & Gandega [2023] FedCFamC1A 174; (2023) 67 Fam LR 593 at [25] and the cases there cited.

[49] Affidavit of Ms Han filed 1 August 2025, paragraph 91.

[50] Keskin & Keskin & Anor [2019] FamCAFC 236; (2019) FLC 93-932 at [31] and the cases there cited.