s.536LU - Application for an unfair deactivation remedy

Application for an unfair deactivation remedy - applicant was protected from unfair deactivation - deactivation failed to comply with the Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code - merits considered - applicant supplied fraudulent identity documents - valid reason established - deactivation not unfair - application dismissed.

[1] On 17 December 2025, Mr Hamza Riaz (the Applicant) made an application pursuant to s 536LU of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act) seeking an unfair deactivation remedy. In its Form F89A response, Raiser Pacific Pty Ltd (the Respondent), raised a jurisdictional objection that in deactivating Mr Rasier it complied with the Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code (the Code).

[2] On 13 April 2026 I conducted a hearing, in advance of which both parties filed material in accordance with the directions issued. Ms Emilee Fairlie, Senior Manager Industrial Relations, was called to give evidence for the Respondent which was represented by Ms Sarah Fregon of Dentons Australia who was granted permission to appear pursuant to s 596(2) of the Act. The Applicant failed to attend the hearing, nor advise of his unavailability, seek an adjournment or respond to repeated attempts by my Associate to contact him by phone at commencement of proceedings. In these circumstances I decided to proceed with the hearing as listed.

[3] Ms Fairlie states that in order for a Driver Partner to use the Respondent's Driver App (the Driver App) and receive trip requests from Riders, they must complete the following steps before being able to accept ride requests;

(b) second, follow certain onboarding steps to activate the Driver Partner account. This is so that the Respondent can confirm that they meet the legal requirements to provide "point to point" transport services in their State or Territory. These documents include:

(iii) evidence that the Driver Partner has CTP insurance;

(iv) a medical assessment or background checks (such as a criminal history check or driver history check); and

• (b) third, sign a Services Agreement[1] with the Respondent.[2]

[4] The Services Agreement includes the following relevant provisions in relation to fraudulent and dishonest conduct;

(i) clause 6.1(a)(iii) of the Services Agreement requires a Driver Partner to 'meet Rasier Pacific's background check and driving record requirements';

(ii) clause 6.1(b)(i) of the Services Agreement requires a Driver Partner to 'provide Rasier Pacific with satisfactory evidence of ... licences ... on request'; and

• (iii) clause 15.2 of the Services Agreement states the Respondent is entitled to remove the Applicant's access to the Uber Driver Platform if he violates the Community Guidelines[3] or any other Uber Policy.

[5] The Community Guidelines that apply to Driver Partners also contains the following relevant information;

(i) the Community Guidelines at the section titled 'How Uber enforces our guidelines' state the Respondent is entitled to deactivate a Driver Partner's access to the Driver Platform if he or she has engaged in fraudulent activity; and

(ii) the Deactivation Information at the section titled 'Our case review processes' states a Driver Partner may lose access to the Uber Driver Platform if they have 'engaged in or is alleged to have engaged in unlawful or fraudulent behaviour against the rules set out in our Community Guidelines'

• [6] Mr Fairlie further states that in addition to initial onboarding checks, the Respondent may sometimes require Driver Partners to periodically re-upload certain documents. This could for example include their Driver's License when the license is approaching its expiry date, when regulatory arrangements change or to ensure the person using the account is the same person who was originally approved.[4] Documents provided by Driver Partners are reviewed by the Respondent's Document Processing Agents, who are 'human representatives,' in its community Operations team.

• [7] Ms Fairlie maintained that ensuring that Driver Partners provide genuine identity documents is essential for maintaining safety, regulatory compliance and integrity of the Driver Platform. She goes on to state that when a Driver Partner first signs up, the Respondent checks their identity details and driver credentials and records the details of the documents they provide. If that driver later uploads new documents (for example, a driver's licence or vehicle certificate), the Respondent checks it against the records already held for that individual. During these checks, Document Processing Agents compare the newly uploaded documents with existing account records and, where required, confirm details with the relevant regulatory bodies. If the information does not match, for example, if a different licence number appears; this indicates potential identity or document authenticity issues and poses a regulatory and safety risk to the Driver Platform.[5]

[8] The Applicant commenced performing work as a Driver Partner using the Uber Driver Platform (the Platform) on 27 December 2021. According to Ms Fairlie, the Applicant set up multiple accounts which are detailed below.

• [9] On 27 December 2021, the Applicant created an account on the Driver App using the email xxxxxxxxxx@gmail.com (Account 1). As part of the account creation process for Account 1, the Applicant supplied a Western Australian Driver's License with an expiry date of 2 July 2024, it identified the Applicant's date of birth as 1 March 1995, and the last four digits of the license number were '9473'[6]. On 27 December 2021, when setting up Account 1, the Applicant signed a Services Agreement with the Respondent but did not complete any trips using Account 1. On 3 January 2022, Account 1 was identified as a duplicate account and was subsequently deactivated.[7]

• [10] On 5 February 2022, the Applicant created another account on the Driver App using the email 'xxxxxxx816@gmail.com' (Account 2). As part of the account creation process for Account 2, the Applicant supplied a standard 'Car' Victorian Driver's License with an expiry date of 2 July 2024, it identified the Applicant's date of birth as 1 January 1993, and the last 4four digits of the license number were '4740'[8]. When setting up Account 2, the Applicant signed a Services Agreement with the Respondent, commenced performing work on 9 February 2022[9], and completed 323 trips using Account 2.[10] On 3 March 2022, Account 2 was deactivated by the Respondent[11]. Account 2 deactivation followed two Rider complaints about the Applicant. The first complaint alleged sexual misconduct by the Applicant towards a Rider on 27 February 2026[12] (the First Complaint) for which the Applicant received a warning[13]. The First Complaint was followed by a further complaint received on 2 March 2022[14] (the Second Complaint) regarding a verbal altercation between the Applicant and a Rider.[15]

[11] The Applicant in his filed evidence denied the allegations that led to deactivation of Account 2. He strongly denies that he engaged in any sexual misconduct as claimed by the Respondent. He also claims to have been unaware at the time of the First and Second Complaints as to how the complaints system works or how easily accounts could be deactivated. He says he also later learned that passengers could make false or exaggerated complaints and that he did not have a dash-cam at the time to defend himself.

• [12] On 28 December 2022, the Applicant created a further account on the Driver App using the email 'xxxxxxxxxx539@gmail.com' (Account 3). As part of the account creation process for Account 3, the Applicant supplied a standard 'Car' Victorian Driver's License with an expiry date of 2 July 2024, it identified the Applicant's date of birth as 1 March 1995, and the last four digits of the license number were '4464'[16]. On 28 December 2022, when setting up Account 3, the Applicant signed a Services Agreement with the Respondent. The Applicant did not complete any trips using Account 3. On 21 June 2025, Account 3 was identified as a duplicate account by the Respondent, and it was subsequently deactivated. The Respondent did not send the Applicant any deactivation communications for this account.[17]

• [13] On 15 April 2024, the Applicant created another account on the Driver App using the email 'xxxxxxxxxxxx75@gmail.com' (Account 4). As part of the account creation process for Account 4, the Applicant supplied a Heavy Rigid Victorian Driver's License with an expiry date of 2 July 2027, it identified the Applicant's date of birth as 1 March 1995, and the last four digits of the license number were '4464'[18]. On 16 April 2024, when setting up Account 4, the Applicant signed a Services Agreement with the Respondent. On 20 November 2024, he entered into the most recent Services Agreement[19] with the Respondent (the Services Agreement). On 17 April 2024[20], the Applicant commenced performing work on the Driver Platform and completed 4,261 trips on Account 4 before it was deactivated by the Respondent on 18 December 2025.

[14] On 20 June 2025, the Applicant created an account on the Driver App using the email 'xxxxxxxx123@gmail.com' (Account 5). As part of the account creation process for Account 5, the Applicant supplied a Heavy Rigid Victorian Driver's License with an expiry date of 2 July 2027, it identified the Applicant's date of birth as 1 March 1995, and the last four digits of the license number were '8866'. On 20 June 2025, when setting up Account 5, the Applicant signed a Services Agreement with the Respondent. The Applicant did not complete any trips using Account 5 before it was identified as a duplicate account by the Respondent and deactivated on 21 June 2025. The Respondent did not send the Applicant any deactivation communications for this account.

• [15] As stated above, on 27 June 2024 as part of the Respondent's identity check requirements, the Applicant uploaded a copy of his driver licence to Account 4. The Applicant's driver licence number ended in '4464'[21]. On 21 June 2025, as part of the Respondent's identity check requirements, the Applicant uploaded a copy of his driver licence for Account 5 which had a license number ending in '8866'[22]. Ms Fairlie explained that the two Driver's Licenses contained almost identical details, including the expiry date, with the only difference being the last four digits of the licence number. She drew attention to similar anomalies in relation to Driver Licences submitted for Accounts 2 & 4.

[16] Mr Fairlie goes on to state that on or around 17 December 2025, a Document Processing Agent rejected the Applicant's driver licence uploaded to Account 4, on the basis that the document appeared to be counterfeit. As stated above, the Respondent requires that all identity documents be genuine and unaltered, as any modification or overlay compromises the integrity of the verification process.

• [17] On 17 December 2025, the Respondent sent an in-app message to the Applicant concerning Account 4. The message contained a Preliminary Deactivation Notice[23] (Preliminary Deactivation Notice) which stated relevantly stated as follows,

Hello Hamza, According to your agreement with Uber (which includes adhering to our Community Guidelines), which can be accessed through your profile, you must submit accurate information and authentic documentation.

You are receiving this message because a document you provided appears to be fraudulent and we are considering terminating your access to the Uber Driver app.

Before a final decision is made, we are providing you with the opportunity to respond to this preliminary deactivation notice. During this period, we have suspended your access to the platform which takes effect immediately from the time and date of this notice (17 December 2025). Suspension of your access means that you will be unable to accept or complete trips/deliveries during the suspension period.

Respond to this Notice: You may provide an explanation or relevant information regarding the flagged activity. Please respond using the link below within 7 days from the date of this notice to ensure your input is considered.

Request a Discussion: You may also request a discussion with a representative of Uber Eats. If you wish to do so, please submit your request using the link below within 2 days.

Seek Support or Representation You are entitled to appoint a person (other than a lawyer acting in a professional capacity) to support or represent you during this process.

[18] When cross-examined on the Preliminary Deactivation Notice, Ms Fairlie conceded that it did not specify that it was the Applicant's Driver's Licenses submitted for Accounts 4 &5 that gave rise to a suspicion of fraud. She explained that the Respondent refrains from providing too much specificity in the notices, for reasons relating to limiting the risk of further fraud being engaged in.

• [19] In accordance with the Preliminary Deactivation Notice, the Applicant had seven days to provide a response to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice and two days to request a discussion with a representative of the Respondent. He provided written responses on 17 & 18 December 2025[24] but did not request a telephone discussion with a representative of the Respondent.[25] In his response on 17 December 2025, the Applicant relevantly stated as follows;

I am writing to respectfully request a review of the restriction placed on my account due to an alleged fraudulent document.

I would like to clearly state that I have not uploaded any fraudulent or incorrect document. I kindly request that you please inform me which specific document has been flagged so I can understand the issue and resolve it properly.

I would like to clarify that I am currently driving a rental vehicle only, a Toyota Camry with plate number 1LY2UA. All documents uploaded for this vehicle (registration, insurance, and related paperwork) were provided directly by my rental company. Any other vehicles listed on my account are not being used, and I had previously contacted Uber to request their removal.

I have also attached a verification screenshot showing that the vehicle documents were approved/verified, to support my claim and help clarify any misunderstanding.

[20] Ms Fairlie explained that she had reviewed the Respondent's internal system to understand the process undertaken by Community Operations team, in assessing whether to proceed with deactivation of the Applicant's Account 4. She summarised the steps taken as follows;

(a) On or around 26 December 2025, a member of the Respondent's Community Operations team considered the Applicant's written responses to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice

(b) The agent also reviewed the attachments the Applicant provided in response to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice.

(c) The member of the Respondent's Community Operations team determined that the Applicant's written and verbal responses to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice did not require any additional lines of enquiry

(d) Further, the agent decided that Account 4 should be deactivated:

(i) because the Applicant uploaded two licences containing identical details except for the last four digits, with one licence ending in '4464' on account 5 and another ending in '8866' on Account 5;

(ii) the Applicant's responses to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice did not provide adequate information to refute the assessment that the driver licence uploaded on 27 June 2024 was counterfeit;

(iii) the additional documents that the Applicant submitted were irrelevant to the assessment being undertaken; and

(iv) the submission of a driver licence with different licence numbers is treated as fraudulent conduct and is in breach of the Respondent's Community Guidelines.[26]

• [21] Ms Fairlie further states that on 26 December 2025, a member of the Respondent's Community Operations Team notified the Applicant, via an in-app message, of the decision to permanently deactivate his Account, being Account 4: because he had failed to submit accurate information and authentic documentation (Final Deactivation Notice)[27]. The Final Deactivation Notice stated as follows;

According to your agreement with Uber (which includes adhering to our Community Guidelines), which can be accessed through your profile, you must submit accurate information and authentic documentation.

Further to your preliminary deactivation notice (which can be found in your email inbox or the inbox of the Uber Driver app), we are writing to inform you that after carefully reviewing your account and the information you submitted as part of your response, we've decided to terminate your access to the Uber Driver app because you must submit accurate information and authentic documentation. This decision is final.

This deactivation will take effect immediately upon receipt of this email.

Your final payment will be deposited into your account during the next payment cycle.

As your account has been deactivated, the creation of another account on the Uber platform will be considered fraudulent activity and is prohibited"

[22] Ms Fairlie also conceded during cross-examination that the Final Deactivation Notice also lacked specificity as to the specific documents said to be fraudulent.

• [23] Ms Fairlie also confirmed that between 22 December 2024 and 21 December 2025, the Applicant earned a total of $37,329.28 on the Driver Platform resulting in average weekly earnings of $1,233.68 per week[28].

[24] The Applicant gave evidence that after one of his earlier accounts had been deactivated, he was desperate to regain his sole source of income and came across a person on TikTok who claimed they could legitimately reactivate deactivated Uber accounts. He states he paid approximately $1,000 to this person believing this was a genuine service and provided his original genuine documents believing that this person had an official team who handled these matters. He claims he was unaware this person might use fake or altered information. He denies knowingly submitting false documents himself, claims that if anything improper was done, he was misled, deeply regrets trusting a third party and acted in good faith and without dishonest intention.

[25] It is uncontroversial that the Applicant was deactivated by the Respondent on 26 December 2025 having been subject to preliminary deactivation on 17 December 2025 and as such he is able to make an application (s 536LU(1)). The Respondent confirmed that his earnings from performing work for the Respondent in the 12-month period immediately preceding his deactivation fell below the contractor high income threshold that if met or exceeded would otherwise preclude the application being made (s 536LU(2)).

[26] Having found the Applicant was deactivated and that his earnings were below the contractor high income threshold, I am obliged under s 536LW of the Act to deal with the following initial matters before considering the merits of the application;

(a) whether the application was made within the period required in subsection 536LU(3);

(b) whether the Applicant was protected from unfair deactivation within the meaning of s 536 LD; and

(c) whether the deactivation was consistent with the Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code (the Code).

[27] Relevant to the determination of the initial matters I am satisfied that;

• the Applicant was deactivated on 26 December 2025 and filed his unfair deactivation application on 17 December 2025 following his preliminary deactivation, that latter date being within 21 days of the date of his deactivation; and

• the Applicant was an employee like worker, he performed work through or by means of the Respondent's digital platform and he had been performing work for the Respondent on a regular basis for a period of at least 6 months at the time of his deactivation.

[28] Having regard to the above, I am satisfied that the application was made within the required period (s 536LU(3)) and that the Applicant was protected from deactivation at the time he was deactivated (s 536LD). The third initial matter about which I must be satisfied before considering the merits of the application is whether the Applicant's deactivation was consistent with the Code (s 536LW(c)). A person's deactivation will be consistent with the Code, if, at the time of the deactivation, the Digital Labour Platform Operator complied with the Code in relation to the deactivation (s 536LJ(3) of the Act). I now turn to consider whether the Respondent complied with the Code.

Whether deactivation was consistent with the Code

[29] Section 536LW(c) requires me to determine whether the deactivation of the Applicant was consistent with the Code prior to any assessment of the merits of the application (i.e. whether the deactivation was unfair). In the event the Applicant's deactivation is found to have been consistent with the Code, any further consideration of whether the deactivation was unfair becomes unnecessary and the Application must be dismissed. I turn now to consider whether the deactivation of the Applicant was consistent with the Code.

Section 8 & 9 - whether deactivation warning required

[30] Section 8(1) of the Code requires an employee like worker to be given a warning notice in writing before deactivation. Section 8(2) of the Code sets out the matters that must be dealt with in the warning. Section 9 of the Code provides an exception to the requirement to provide such a warning. That is where a digital labour platform operator 'believes on reasonable grounds' that the worker's conduct or capacity warrants immediate modification or suspension of access to the digital labour platform, or it is not reasonable to allow continued access to the platform. No deactivation warning was provided by the Respondent.

[31] I am satisfied that the Respondent was not required to provide a deactivation warning in accordance with s 8(1) of the Code. That is because the Respondent had reasonable grounds to believe that the Applicant's conduct in providing fraudulent identity documents was sufficiently serious that it warranted immediate suspension of his access to the Platform, and it was not in my view reasonable to allow him to continue performing work via the Platform while an investigation was conducted. It follows that I am satisfied that suspension of the Applicant's access to the Platform without provision of a warning was permitted by s 9 of the Code having regard to the nature of the Applicant's alleged misconduct.

Section 10 - Application of Division 3 - Process for deactivation

[32] Having found the Respondent complied with s 9 of the Code, I am satisfied the Respondent was entitled to commence the deactivation process set out in Division 3 of the Code.

[33] Turning now to s 11 of the Code which deals with the requirement to provide a preliminary deactivation notice. Relevantly, s 11(2) the Code requires that 'The preliminary deactivation notice must include sufficient information to enable a reasonable person in the position of the employee-like worker to understand the matters mentioned in subsection (1).

[34] The Preliminary Deactivation Notice provided to the Applicant on 17 December 2025 relevantly stated that the Applicant was required to 'submit accurate information and authentic documentation', that it appeared to the Respondent that he had submitted fraudulent documents and that the Respondent was considering terminating his access to the Driver App. The Respondent contends and it has put forward evidence in these proceedings that the Applicant supplied a fraudulent Driver's License document.

[35] I accept that the evidence in these proceedings supports a conclusion that the Applicant supplied a fraudulent Driver's License document when establishing Account 4 and/or Account 5. That does not however mean the Respondent complied with s 11 of the Code. Significantly, it failed to specify the nature of the alleged fraudulent document supplied. No mention was made in the Preliminary Deactivation Notice of the alleged fraudulent Driver's License. The omission is significant in circumstances where a valid Driver's License is, on the evidence of Ms Fairlie, only one of the documents required to be provided when opening a Driver account. Other documents referred to by Ms Fairlie includes vehicle registration, CTP insurance, and a medical assessment or background checks (such as a criminal history check or driver history check).

[36] The failure of the Respondent to specify in the Preliminary Deactivation Notice that the Applicant was alleged to have supplied a fraudulent Driver's License means that it (the Preliminary Deactivation Notice) would not in my view have enabled a reasonable person in the Applicant's position to understand what the alleged misconduct was. My view is fortified by the Applicant's response on 17 December 2025 when he appeared unsure of what the Respondent was referring to in the Preliminary Deactivation Notice. The Applicant referred in his response to his vehicle registration and requested specific details of the alleged fraudulent documents. It is not apparent that clarification was provided to the Applicant as requested by him.

• [37] For the sake of completeness I note that the Preliminary Deactivation Notice advised the Applicant that the Respondent was considering his deactivation from the Platform[29], that he had a right to respond to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice within seven days, that being a reasonable period in my view[30], that he had a right to request a discussion with a representative of the Respondent[31] and that he was entitled to appoint a person to provide him with support or representation[32]. I note that the Applicant responded in writing to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice on 17 & 18 December 2025 but did not request a discussion with a Representative of the Respondent nor appoint a support person or representative.

[38] It follows from the foregoing that I am not satisfied that the Preliminary Deactivation Notice included sufficient information that would 'enable a reasonable person in the position of an employee like worker to understand the matters mentioned in subsection (1)'.

• [39] Having found that the Respondent was entitled to commence deactivation in accordance with Division 3 of the Code, it had the right to modify the Applicant's access to the Platform[33]. The Applicant's access to the Platform was suspended and took immediate effect on issue of the Preliminary Deactivation Notice[34]. The Preliminary Deactivation Notice specified that the deactivation took immediate effect[35] and the consequences of the deactivation[36], that being the Applicant would be unable to accept or complete trips/deliveries during the suspension. Finally, the suspension of the Applicant's access to the Platform, which was to take effect at the time the Preliminary Deactivation Notice was issued, was specified in that notice[37]. I am satisfied the Respondent complied with the requirements of s 12 of the Code.

Section 13 - Steps after Preliminary Deactivation Notice is Given

• [40] Relevant to compliance with s 13 of the Code, the Applicant responded to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice, the response was given within the specified seven days and was given in writing. A human representative of the Respondent considered the Applicant's response and determined that no further enquiries were required. I am satisfied on the basis of the material before me that no further enquiries were reasonably warranted[38]. I am satisfied the Respondent complied with the requirements of s 13 of the Code.

Section 14 - Outcome of Respondent's Consideration and Inquiries

• [41] After providing the Preliminary Deactivation Notice and complying with the applicable elements of s 13 of the Code, the Respondent decided to terminate the Applicant's access to the Platform[39]. I am satisfied that the Applicant was notified in writing of his deactivation as 'soon as reasonably practicable'[40] having regard to the Applicant having provided his written response to the Preliminary Deactivation Notice on 17 &18 December 2025 and the Final Deactivation Notice being provided to him 26 December 2025.

[42] In order for a deactivation to be consistent with s 14(4) of the Code it is necessary that;

(a) the reason for the termination is a valid reason; and

(b) the operator considers on reasonable grounds that the reason has been established.

• [43] In the decisions of Kumar v Portier Pacific Pty Ltd[41] (Kumar) and Mohamad v Portier Pacific Pty Ltd[42] (Mohamed) the term 'valid reason' where it appears in s 14(4)(a) of the Code, was interpreted differently to that term where it is used in s 387(a) of the Act and in s536LH(1)(a) of the Act. In Kumar, Deputy President Saunders explained that the requirement in s 14(4)(a) of the Code - that the reason is a 'valid reason' - should be understood as a test of the quality of the reason.

[44] Turning to the reason for the Applicant's Platform deactivation, the alleged conduct that led to deactivation of his account, that of supplying a fraudulent Driver's License was in breach of the Services Agreement and the Community Guidelines. I am satisfied that the conduct that led to deactivation of the Applicant's account was sufficiently serious to establish a 'valid reason' within the meaning of s 14(4)(a) of the Code. I note for completeness that s 19 of the Code sets out matters that may constitute a valid reason for deactivation. This includes conduct at s 19(7), that of an employee-like worker engaging in fraudulent or dishonest conduct, including theft of property.

• [45] The second limb of s 14(4) does not require me to be satisfied that the alleged conduct occurred. Rather, I must determine whether Uber believed on 'reasonable grounds' that the reason (the conduct) was established. The supply by the Applicant of a fraudulent Driver's License was plainly apparent to the Respondent, which provided reasonable grounds for it to consider the alleged conduct had been established.[43]

[46] It follows from the foregoing, that having regard to the material that was before the Respondent at the time of the deactivation of the Applicant's account, I am satisfied there was a valid reason for the termination of the Applicant's account (s 14(4)(a)): that being his supply of a fraudulent Driver's License. I am further satisfied that the Respondent considered on reasonable grounds that the conduct of supplying a fraudulent driver licence was established (s 14(4)(b)).

[47] Notwithstanding my findings in relation to the Respondent's compliance with s 14(4) of the Code, the Respondent failed to comply with s 14(6) of the Code. That is because the Final Deactivation Notice fails to contain sufficient information to enable a reasonable person in the position of the employee-like worker to understand the reason for the deactivation. While the Final Deactivation Notice refers to 'fraudulent activity,' it fails to particularise the specific nature of the fraudulent activity, that is the supply of a fraudulent Driver's License document to the Respondent. As I have already found, the Preliminary Deactivation Notice was similarly deficient in that it failed to specify with sufficient particularity the reasons for Applicant's preliminary deactivation.

[48] While the Respondent has largely complied ; the Code contains various mandatory requirements, including those dealt with above. The mandatory nature of those obligations is made clear by use of the term 'must' when describing specific actions that must be taken by digital platform operators in complying with relevant requirements of the Code. By failing to meet the mandatory requirements set out in ss 11(2) & 14(6) of the Code, I am satisfied that these failures mean that the Applicant's permanent deactivation from the Platform was not consistent with the Code. It is therefore unnecessary for me to deal with the balance of the relevant Code requirements.

[49] Having dealt with the preliminary matters set out in s 536LW and found the Respondent failed to comply with the Code, it is necessary for me to now deal with the merits of the case.

[50] In considering whether the Applicant's deactivation was unfair, it is useful to first set out the relevant statutory requirements. Section 536LF defines where a person has been unfairly deactivated in the following terms;

A person has been unfairly deactivated if the FWC is satisfied that:

(a) the person has been deactivated from a digital labour platform; and

(c) the deactivation was not consistent with the Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code."

[51] Section 536LH lists the criteria to be considered by the Commission in determining whether a deactivation was unfair;

" 536LH Criteria for considering whether a deactivation was unfair etc.

(1) In considering whether it is satisfied that a person's deactivation was unfair, the FWC must take into account:

(a) whether there was a valid reason for the deactivation related to the person's capacity or conduct; and

(b) whether any relevant processes specified in the Digital Labour Platform Deactivation Code were followed; and

(c) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.

(2) Despite subsection (1) and any other provision of this Part, a deactivation that occurs because of serious misconduct of the person who was deactivated is not unfair.

[52] As will be apparent from reviewing the statutory provisions set out above, for a person to have been unfairly deactivated, the Commission must be satisfied in respect of all three elements set out in s 536LF; except where serious misconduct is established. Where serious misconduct of the person is objectively established to the Commission's satisfaction, the deactivation will be taken not to be unfair. That is regardless of the digital platform operator's compliance with the Code or any other matters the Commission may otherwise consider relevant.

Whether there was a valid reason for deactivation (s 536LH(1)(a))

• [53] There is significant case law going to the meaning of the term 'valid reason' in the context of s 387(a) of the Act, where it is one criterion to be considered when assessing whether a dismissal was unfair. The approach of the Commission in applying the term 'valid reason' in dealing with an application for an unfair deactivation by an employee-like worker pursuant to s 536LH(1)(a) was dealt with by a Full Bench in Hotak v Portia Pacific Pty[44] (Hotak) where it relevantly stated as follows;

"[94] Turning now to the merits of the application. We must take into account each of the matters specified in s 536LH of the Act. As to whether there was a valid reason for the deactivation related to the person's capacity or conduct (s 536LH(1)(a)), the same language is found is s 387(a) of the Act. For that reason, we consider that the same principles should apply in determining whether there was a valid reason within the meaning of s 536LH(1)(a) of the Act. They may be summarised as follows:

(a) In cases relating to alleged conduct, the Commission must make a finding, on the evidence provided, whether, on the balance of probabilities, the conduct occurred.

(b) It is not enough for a digital labour platform operator to establish that it had a reasonable belief that the worker engaged in particular conduct.

(c) The digital labour platform operator bears the evidentiary onus of proving that the conduct on which it relies took place.

(d) In cases where allegations of serious misconduct are made, the Briginshaw standard applies so that findings that a worker engaged in the misconduct alleged are not made lightly.

(d) It is necessary to consider whether the digital labour platform operator had a valid reason for the deactivation of the employee-like worker, although it need not be the reason given to the worker at the time of the deactivation.

(e) A "valid" reason for deactivation is one that is "sound, defensible or well founded" and not "capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced." A reason that is "valid" will involve something more than a minor failing or trivial misdemeanour, and must be of sufficient gravity or seriousness to justify deactivation.

[95] It is clear from s 536LH(2) of the Act that a deactivation that occurs because of serious misconduct of the person who was deactivated is not unfair. In cases involving allegations of serious misconduct against an employee-like worker, it is not enough for the digital labour platform operator to hold a reasonable belief that the worker engaged in the conduct. The requirement for the deactivation to have occurred "because of serious misconduct of the person who was deactivated" in s 536LH(2) means that the digital labour platform operator has the evidentiary burden to prove that the alleged conduct occurred and that it meets the definition of serious misconduct in the regulations." (Citation omitted)

[54] I am satisfied on the evidence before me that the Applicant supplied a fraudulent Driver License in support of his Account 4 and/or 5 applications. I am also satisfied that he engaged in the same conduct in respect to Accounts 2 & 3. By his failure to appear in the proceedings, the Applicant has failed to rebut the Respondent's evidence. The Applicant in his filed material simply claims that the supply of a fraudulent license to the Respondent was due to the unscrupulous act of an unnamed third party he sought assistance from in gaining reactivation of his account. No details were provided as to who this third party was and when the contact occurred. I found that claim regarding an unidentified third party acting on the Applicant's behalf to be unconvincing. Even if the Applicant's claim that he used the services of a third party were to be believed, the conduct of that third party was undertaken on the Applicant's behalf. It is therefore taken to be conduct authorised by the Applicant. That is so because it ought to have been plainly apparent to the Applicant that to engage in or authorise conduct directed to securing a new account, in circumstances where the Applicant had already had multiple accounts deactivated, was prohibited by both the Services Agreement and Community Guidelines.

[55] The reasons for preventing establishment of duplicate accounts are compelling. One of the reasons for prohibiting duplicate accounts is to prevent a deactivated Driver from circumventing the effect of their deactivation. That is particularly important in circumstances where a driver has been deactivated for conduct that represents a safety risk to a Rider. The present case is an example of why such a prohibition is important. The Applicant was deactivated in 2022 following separate complaints of sexual harassment and aggression towards Riders. The health and safety reasons for guarding against the use of duplicate accounts is clear in my view.

[56] The Applicant ought to have been aware of the prohibition on establishing a duplicate account/s and yet still engaged either directly or through a third party in the act of attempting to establish a duplicate account. Even if a fraudulent Driver's License had not been supplied, the act of establishing a duplicate account would in my view separately establish a valid reason for termination of the Applicant's access to the Platform. I find the Applicant's attempt to exculpate himself from the alleged conduct by blaming an unidentified third party to be self-serving and unconvincing.

[57] The supply of a fraudulent Driver's License by the Applicant is 'more than a minor failing or trivial misdemeanour.' It is in my view of 'sufficient gravity or seriousness' to justify deactivation of the Applicant. I am comfortably satisfied that a valid reason for the Applicant's deactivation has been established. This weighs strongly in favour of a finding that the Applicant's deactivation was not unfair.

Whether whether any relevant processes specified in the Code were followed (s 536LH(1)(b))

[58] I have previously found that the Respondent failed to comply with mandatory requirements in ss 11 & 14 of the Code. That was because of the Respondent's failure to identify with sufficient precision the nature of the alleged misconduct in the Preliminary Deactivation Notice. By that failure it did not include sufficient information that would have enabled the Applicant to properly respond. The Respondent also similarly failed to specify the reason for deactivation in the Final Deactivation Notice with sufficient precision. The failure of the Respondent to comply with relevant requirements of the Code weighs in favour of a finding that the deactivation of the Applicant was unfair.

[59] In his written material, the Applicant raised the impact of the deactivation on his personal and financial circumstances and claims that driving for the Respondent had been his only reliable source of income. He failed to produce any evidence going to income he may have earnt from alternate sources prior to or since his deactivation on 26 December 2026. A such I am unable to draw any conclusion on the impact of deactivation of the Applicant's account. It is a neutral consideration.

[60] There are two further matters that I have identified as relevant. Firstly, the Applicant has established multiple accounts with the Respondent following deactivation of Account 2 in 2022. Even putting to one side the fraudulent conduct the Applicant engaged in, the conduct of establishing duplicate accounts is contrary to the Services Agreement and Community Guidelines. Finally, I note for completeness that while the Applicant was deactivated for the supply of a fraudulent Driver's License in respect of Accounts 4 & 5, it is plainly apparent that he engaged in similar misconduct in relation to Accounts 2 & 3. These two matters weigh firmly in favour of a finding that deactivation of the Applicant's account was not unfair.

[61] In determining whether the deactivation was unfair I am required to take into account the matters set out in s 536LH(1). While the Respondent did not comply with ss 12(2) and 14(4) of the Code, I regard those failures as procedural rather than substantive and as such I place limited weight on those failures. A valid reason for the Applicant's Platform deactivation is clearly established, and I have found it to be sufficiently serious as to outweigh the procedural failings of the Respondent in complying with the Code. The further matters that weigh in favour of a finding that the deactivation was not unfair is that of the Applicant's establishment of multiple accounts and the supply of a fraudulent Driver's License in respect of Accounts 2 & 3. It follows, and I am satisfied, that the Applicant was not subject to an unfair deactivation within the meaning of s 536LF.

[62] I am satisfied that the Applicant was protected from unfair deactivation at the time he filed his unfair deactivation application in the Commission on 17 December 2025. While the Respondent failed to comply with the Code in relation to its deactivation of the Applicant, his deactivation was not unfair within the meaning of s 536LH of the Act. That is because of the weight I attached to the valid reason for the Applicant's deactivation and other relevant matters. It follows that the application for an unfair deactivation remedy must be dismissed.

[63] An order giving effect to this decision will be issued concurrently with this decision.

[1] Exhibit R1, Witness Statement of Emilee Fairlie, dated 16 February 2026, Annexure A

[6] Exhibit R2, Second Witness Statement of Emilee Fairlie, dated 13 April 2026, Annexure T

[28] Exhibit R1, at [51]-[52], Annexure S

[29] As required by S 11(1)b) of the Code

[30] As required by s 11(1)(c)(i) of the Code

[31] As required by s 11(1)(c)(ii) of the Code

[32] As required by s 11(1)(d) of the Code

[35] As required by s 12(3)(a) of the Code

[36] As required by s 12(3)(b) of the Code

[38] As required by ss 13(8) & (9) of the Code

[39] As required by s 14(1) of the Code

[40] As required by s 14(2) of the Code

[41] [2025] FWC 2275 at [8]

[42] [2025] FWC 2337 at [4]

[43] As required by s 14(4)(b) of the Code

[44] [2025] FWCFB 214

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