1. For the reasons set out below, I have concluded that it is appropriate for the orders to be filed in the Supreme Court and a certificate to that effect will issue.

1. Pursuant to s 60(2) of the SAT Act, this matter was determined entirely on the documents.
2. Those documents were:
   1. affidavit of Christopher Root sworn 2 July 2025;
   2. witness statement of Christopher Root signed 30 June 2025;
   3. document entitled 'statement of delivery' signed by Leilani Wilkins with the date 7 June 2025. The reference to 7 June 2025 must be incorrect because Ms Wilkins declares that on 7 July 2025 she hand delivered to the respondent a copy of the application for the certificate, the Tribunal's orders of 4 July 2025, and my Associate's email dated 4 July 2025;
   4. the orders of the Tribunal made 24 June 2025; and
   5. submissions of the applicant dated 6 August 2025.
3. The respondent did not participate in this matter. In order to give him an opportunity to do so, he was notified that the Tribunal had listed the matter for a directions hearing on 9 July 2025.
4. The respondent did not attend the directions hearing or make any contact with the Tribunal about the directions hearing at all.
5. In the circumstances, I am satisfied that it was appropriate to proceed to determine this matter without any involvement of the respondent.

1. Decisions of the Tribunal that are not monetary orders may be enforced in accordance with s 86 of the SAT Act.[1] Section 86(2) of the SAT Act provides:

A person seeking to enforce a decision under this section may file in the Supreme Court -

(a) a copy of the decision that a judicial member or the executive officer has certified to be a true copy; and

(b) the person's affidavit as to the non-compliance with the decision; and

(c) a certificate from a judicial member stating that the decision is appropriate for filing in the Supreme Court.

1. A 'decision' of the Tribunal includes an order, direction, or determination of the Tribunal.[2]
2. Once the documents referred to in s 86(2) are filed in the Supreme Court, the 'decision' is taken to be a decision of the Supreme Court and may be enforced accordingly.[3]

The applicant's evidence in support of the certificate

1. In support of its application the applicant relies upon the affidavit of Christopher Root sworn 2 July 2025 and his witness statement dated 30 June 2025.
2. In his affidavit Mr Root swears that he is the operations manager for the applicant and in that role he manages Western Australian caravan parks which are operated by the applicant.
3. He also swears that:

(a) the respondent has displayed behaviour consistent with the sovereign citizen movement, including declaring that he owns the relevant caravan park;

(b) on 30 June 2025 he personally served the respondent with a copy of the final orders which had been made by the Tribunal on 24 June 2025;

(c) as at 2 July 2025, the respondent had not provided vacant possession of Site 9;

(d) as at 2 July 2025, the respondent continued to reside in the caravan park; and

(e) as at 2 July 2025, the respondent had not paid his outstanding rent or utility fees.

1. The meaning to be given to the requirement in s 86(2)(c) that the certificate given by the judicial officer state that the decision 'is appropriate for filing in the Supreme Court' was considered by the then President of the Tribunal, Pritchard JA, in Rogers and the Owners of the Linx at Nexus Strata Plan 47739.[4] After considering the statutory context of s 86(2)(c) and broader contextual considerations, her Honour concluded:[5]

[T]he purpose behind s 86(2)(c) of the SAT Act is that the issue of the certificate involves a screening or filtering process, performed by a judge of the Tribunal, to determine whether the decision is one which is appropriate (that is, suitable, fitting or proper) for filing in the Supreme Court, with the consequence that it may be the basis for enforcement proceedings, including proceedings in the nature of contempt proceedings. That purpose will be served by the judge considering whether there is any reason why it would not be suitable, fitting or proper for the decision to be filed, and thus enforced, including by contempt proceedings, in the Supreme Court, but subject always to the overarching principle that the proper administration of justice requires that the Tribunal's orders be complied with, and in the event that they are not, that they are able to be enforced.

1. Her Honour identified the following matters as matters to which the Tribunal must have regard in determining whether to grant a certificate under s 86(2)(c):[6]
   1. whether the applicant for the certificate has provided prima facie evidence of non-compliance with an order of the Tribunal, because the judge could not be satisfied that the order was appropriate for filing in the Supreme Court without such evidence;
   2. the nature of the order made by the Tribunal - as her Honour observed, it would not be appropriate to enforce the Tribunal's programming orders in the Supreme Court;
   3. whether there has been a complete failure to comply, or a partial failure to comply, with the Tribunal's order; because where there has been partial compliance further directions by the Tribunal (in the exercise of its power to make ancillary orders) may facilitate complete compliance and obviate the need to issue the certificate;
   4. whether the failure to comply is attributable to ambiguity in the order of the Tribunal; because where the order is not clear and unambiguous it is unlikely to be appropriate for enforcement in the Supreme Court because it could not be the basis for a contempt proceeding and nor could the Court appoint another person to perform an order which was not clear in its terms;
   5. whether the party entitled to the benefit of the order has agreed to accept performance in a different way; because if the parties have agreed to performance in a manner different from that required by the terms of the order itself, it may not be appropriate to enforce the order; and
   6. whether other means exist for the party alleging non-compliance or partial compliance with the order to secure performance.
2. Her Honour noted that the matters she identified were not exhaustive. I accept and adopt her Honour's identification of the purpose behind s 86(2)(c) and the matters to which the Tribunal ought to have regard in considering whether to grant the certificate sought.

1. From the material filed by the applicant in support of the application for the certificate, I am satisfied of the following matters:
   1. the Tribunal's orders of 24 June 2025 are final orders;
   2. the order of the Tribunal that the respondent give vacant possession of Site 9 by 5 pm on 1 July 2025 is unambiguous;
   3. the affidavit of Mr Root, in which he says that the respondent is still in occupation of Site 9 at the Caravan Park, provides prima facie evidence of non-compliance by the respondent with the order as at 2 July 2025;
   4. additionally, in its written submissions the applicant's solicitor states that he is instructed that as at the date of the filing of the applicant's written submissions (6 August 2025) the respondent is still in occupation and has not provided vacant possession of his site.[7] I accept that statement as prima facie evidence of non-compliance by the respondent as at 6 August 2025; [8]
   5. there is no basis for me to think that the applicant has agreed to accept performance of the order in some other way or at some later time. No such evidence was given by the applicant and the respondent did not attend to suggest any such alternate arrangement had been made; and
   6. there is no means by which the applicant can secure performance other than through enforcing the order in the Supreme Court.
2. In those circumstances, I am of the view that it is appropriate to issue the certificate stating that the non-monetary order of the Tribunal, made on 24 June 2024 (i.e. order 2) is suitable for enforcement in the Supreme Court.

1. The applicant has also sought that the Tribunal make what is characterised as 'ancillary' orders because it says that the orders made on 24 June 2025 are not sufficient to allow the Sheriff to take any action.
2. The orders sought are said to be of a kind described in s 95 of the Civil Judgments Enforcement Act 2004 (WA) (CJE Act); being property seizure and delivery orders. The applicant submits that once made, and taken to be orders of the Supreme Court in accordance with s 86(4) of the SAT Act, they would adequately allow for enforcement.
3. The orders sought are:
   1. That the Sheriff (or an officer of the Sheriff) is to personally serve a copy of this order upon Mr Noakes by 1 September 2025 with:

(a) the Sheriff having power to enter, including forcibly enter, on the property known as Site 9 Northam Caravan Park, 150 Yilgarn Avenue, Northam WA 6401 (Property) for the purposes of doing so; and

(b) there being liberty to apply in the event that personal service is not able to be effected.

1. If Hampshire (WA) Parks Pty Ltd does not receive vacant possession of the Property by 4 pm on 8 September 2025, then, at any time after 9 am on 9 September 2025, the Sheriff may retake possession of the Property and by this order is given the same powers as if the Sheriff was executing a property seizure and delivery order in relation to the Property including:

(a) having power to enter and retake possession of the Property, with such assistance as may be required, and, if necessary, by force, and evict persons not entitled to be there, take possession of the Property and deliver it into the possession of Hampshire (WA) Parks Pty Ltd; and

(b) authorising Hampshire (WA) Parks Pty Ltd or the Sheriff to dispose of any goods or assets left at the Property, except for Mr Noakes' caravan;

(c) authorising Hampshire (WA) Parks Pty Ltd to sell Mr Noakes' caravan.

1. Once Hampshire (WA) Parks Pty Ltd receives possession of the Property it is to:

(a) arrange for any mail addressed to Mr Noakes received at the Property to be posted to an address as directed by Mr Noakes or if no address is provided, to return to sender;

(b) advise Mr Noakes of an address at which any personal effects or assets of his may be removed from the Property can be collected within the following 90 days after which Hampshire (WA) Parks Pty Ltd may destroy the goods; and

(c) arrange for the sale of Mr Noakes' caravan and to apply the proceeds of the same in the following order:

1. reimbursement of expenses relating to the sale of the caravan;
2. payment to Hampshire (WA) Parks Pty Ltd for any amount owed by Mr Noakes; and
3. any remaining surplus to be paid to Mr Noakes.

1. The applicant submits that the ancillary orders sought can be made pursuant to s 73 of the SAT Act.
2. Section 73 of the SAT Act confers upon the Tribunal the power to make ancillary orders. It states:

(1) A power of the Tribunal to make an order or give a direction (the primary power) includes the power to make the order subject to conditions and the power to make any ancillary order or direction the Tribunal considers appropriate for achieving the purpose for which it may exercise the primary power.

(2) An ancillary order may provide for a decision of the Tribunal in relation to a reviewable decision to be implemented by a person who is not the original decision-maker whether or not that person is party to the proceeding.

1. In my view, even if s 73 of the SAT Act empowered the Tribunal to make the orders sought by the applicant (about which I have reservations), it is my view that it is not necessary to make the orders sought because the orders can properly be made by the Supreme Court under the CJE Act.
2. Section 5 of the CJE Act provides that that Act applies in respect of any judgment given by the Supreme Court, the District Court and the Magistrates Court in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction.
3. Section 86(4) of the SAT Act provides that an order in respect of which a certificate has been issued under s 86(4) of the SAT Act is taken to be a decision of the Supreme Court and may be enforced accordingly upon the filing of the documents set out in s 86(2) of the SAT Act. Those documents are:

(a) a copy of the decision that a judicial member or the executive officer has certified to be a true copy; and

(b) the person's affidavit as to the non-compliance with the decision; and

(c) a certificate from a judicial member stating that the decision is appropriate for filing and enforcement in the Supreme Court.

1. Thus, once the relevant documents have been filed in the Supreme Court, the Tribunal's order is to be regarded as an order of the Supreme Court.
2. Part 5 of the CJE Act deals with enforcing non-monetary judgments of the Supreme Court (among others).
3. Section 94 provides that Div 1 of Pt 5 of the Act applies if a judgment of a court requires or has the effect of requiring a person to give possession of any real property or personal property to another person.
4. In my view, the order of the Tribunal, if taken to be an order of the Supreme Court, is an order meeting the character of orders to which Div 1 of Pt 5 of the CJE Act will then apply.
5. Division 1 of Pt 5 of the CJE Act then sets out the process for the enforcement of those kinds of judgments. Section 95(1) provides that a person seeking to enforce an order to which the Division applies may apply to the Court for an order addressed to the Sheriff, authorising the Sheriff to seize the property concerned and to deliver it to the person. Section 95(3) permits the court to make ancillary and consequential orders. Therefore, in my view the orders which the applicant seeks the Tribunal to make in the exercise of its powers under s 73 of the SAT Act are already provided for in the CJE Act and should be sought from the Supreme Court. Accordingly, I will not make the ancillary orders sought by the applicant.

1. The applicant seeks an order that the respondent pay the applicant's costs of the proceeding for the issue of the certificate of enforcement and the ancillary orders fixed in the sum of $3,553.00.
2. As the applicant identified in its submissions, the starting point for costs in the Tribunal is found in s 87(1) of the SAT Act. That subsection provides that unless otherwise specified in the SAT Act, the enabling Act, or an order of the Tribunal under s 87, each party bears its own costs. Section 87(2) of the SAT Act then provides that unless otherwise specified in the enabling Act, the Tribunal may make an order for the payment by a party of all or any of the costs of another party or of a person required to produce a document or material on the application of the party under s 35. Therefore, the Tribunal has a wide discretion in relation to costs in this matter, although starts from the position that parties generally bear their own costs in Tribunal proceedings.
3. The applicant submits that the Tribunal has previously exercised its discretion to award costs (particularly compensation for legal costs) in circumstances where a party has failed to comply with its orders. It cites, as examples Randall and Town of Vincent[9] and Aydogan and Town of Cambridge.[10]
4. Each of those cases concerned an award of costs where a party had failed to comply with programming orders which had been made by the Tribunal and attendance at a directions hearing which would otherwise have been unnecessary was therefore required. They were not matters involving non-compliance with final orders.
5. In Randall, Senior Member Parry (as his Honour then was) found that the applicant's preparation for hearing was prejudiced by the respondent's failure to comply with orders that were made pursuant to s 34(1) of the SAT Act for the speedy and fair conduct of the proceeding. His Honour had expressed concern that conditions which had been imposed by the respondent were not certain and therefore could not be validly imposed. Accordingly his Honour ordered that by [a particular date] the Respondent was to file and give to the applicant re-drafted conditions which were both final and certain. His Honour said that without those re-drafted conditions the applicant could not address in their evidence and submissions conditions capable of lawful imposition. His Honour ordered that the respondent pay the applicant's costs fixed in the sum of $275 because:

(a) the directions hearing had been necessitated by the respondent's default in compliance with the Tribunal's orders;

(b) that default had prejudiced the applicant in its preparation for a hearing which was imminent;

(c) the respondent had failed to provide an adequate explanation for the default; and

(d) the explanation which had been offered was misconceived.[11]

1. In Aydogan, Member Jordan ordered that the applicant pay the respondent's costs of attendance at a particular directions hearing fixed at $300. The Member held that the directions hearing had only been necessitated by the respondent's failure to comply with an order that it provide to the Tribunal and the respondent a statement of issues, facts and contentions; a bundle of documents upon which it intended to rely at the hearing of the application and a statement of evidence by each witness upon whose evidence it intended to rely at the final hearing.
2. With the documents not having been provided in compliance with the orders, the Tribunal agreed to a request by the respondent to hold a directions hearing to determine what further orders were required. The Tribunal found that the directions hearing was necessitated by the applicant's non-compliance with earlier orders, no adequate explanation for non-compliance had been given and, therefore, it was appropriate to compensate the respondent for the professional costs of having had his solicitors attend the directions hearing.[12]
3. The applicant submits that this case is analogous to the two cases it referred to because the application, made under s 86 of the SAT Act, for a certificate has been necessitated by the respondent's failure to comply with the Tribunal's orders in circumstances where, it is submitted, that he does not have a defensible reason for failing to do so.
4. In my view, this case is not analogous to Randall and Aydogan because this matter concerns a request made under s 86 of the SAT Act arising from a failure by a party to earlier proceedings to comply with a final order made by the Tribunal in the substantive proceeding.
5. It is of course true that had the respondent complied with the final orders, the applicant would not have had to take the step of seeking to have the Tribunal issue a certificate from a judicial member stating that the decision is appropriate for filing in the Supreme Court (SAT Act s 86(2)(b)).
6. In my view, however, the mere fact that there has been non-compliance with the Tribunal's orders, which resulted in the making of the request under s 86 of the SAT Act, is not sufficient to justify the making of an order that the allegedly non-complying party pay the costs associated with the application for the certificate where the starting point in Tribunal proceedings (subject to any provisions to the contrary in the enabling Act) is that the parties bear their own costs. In granting a certificate under s 86(2)(c) the Tribunal is not making a finding of actual non-compliance with its order. That is for the Supreme Court if and when enforcement proceedings are brought there. The Tribunal is only required to accept that there is prima face evidence of non-compliance. In some cases it may ultimately be that the Supreme Court does not accept that there has been noncompliance.
7. In my view, before making an order for costs in this kind of matter, the Tribunal must be satisfied that the conduct of a party, in the course of the Tribunal's dealing with the request for the certificate under s 86, is such that would justify a departure from the position that in proceedings in the Tribunal each party bears its own costs. That is, I would need to be satisfied that the respondent's conduct in the proceeding for the grant of the certificate was unreasonable before I would order costs against him. Examples of conduct which, if it had occurred, might have been unreasonable could include requesting an adjournment without a reasonable basis for doing so or making unreasonable submissions in opposition to the grant of the certificate. In this case the respondent simply chose to take no part in the proceeding. I do not consider that conduct to have been so unreasonable as to justify the making of a costs order against him and I decline to do so.

1. I will issue the certificate pursuant to s 86(2)(c) of the SAT Act stating that the decision of the Tribunal made on 24 June 2025 is appropriate for filing in the Supreme Court.
2. The applicant's applications for ancillary orders and for costs are dismissed.

I certify that the preceding paragraph(s) comprise the reasons for decision of the State Administrative Tribunal.

[4] Rogers and The Owners of the Linx at Nexus Strata Plan 47739 [2021] WASAT 70.

[5] Rogers and The Owners of the Linx at Nexus Strata Plan 47739 [73].

[6] Rogers and The Owners of the Linx at Nexus Strata Plan 47739 [84].

[7] Applicant's written submissions in support of the request for a certificate from a judicial member dated 6 August 2025 para 10.

[8] The Tribunal is not bound by the rules of evidence (SAT Act s 32(2)(a)) and may inform itself as it sees fit (SAT Act s 32(4)).

[9] Randall and Town of Vincent [2005] WASAT 147 (Randall).

[10] Aydogan and Town of Cambridge [2006] WASAT 98 (Aydogan).