Whether it is appropriate to make the orders sought
39 Section 87(1A) provides:
The Court may, if it appears to the Court to be appropriate to do so, act in accordance with:
(a) whichever of subsection (2) or (3) is relevant in the particular case; and
(b) if subsection (5) applies in the particular case - that subsection.
40 In the present case, subsection (2) is the relevant subsection and subsection (5) does not apply. Subsection 87(2) provides:
If the agreement is on the terms of an order of the Court in relation to the proceedings, the Court may make an order in, or consistent with, those terms without holding a hearing or, if a hearing has started, without completing the hearing.
41 The key words in in s 87(1A) are "… if it appears to the Court to be appropriate…". To decide whether it is appropriate to make the orders sought it is necessary to understand the requisite standard of satisfaction.
42 The Court has expressed the requisite standard in numerous decisions, which I summarised in Austin on behalf of the Eastern Maar People v State of Victoria [2023] FCA 237 at [33]-[37] as follows. Those remarks were made in the context of an agreement under s 87A of the NTA but they are equally applicable to an agreement under s 87:
[33] The requirement under s 87A(4)(b) that the Court be satisfied that the proposed consent determination is "appropriate" takes into account the emphasis in s 87A, and in the NTA more generally, of resolving issues through negotiation and alternative dispute resolution, with the objective of resolving native title claims without judicial determination (Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 474 at [36] per North J (Lovett (No 1)); Agius (No 6) at [63]). It is also consistent with the overarching obligation under ss 37M and 37N of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) to promote the just, efficient and cost-effective resolution of disputes: see Agius (No 6) at [66]; Phyball v Attorney-General (NSW) [2014] FCA 851 at [9] per Jagot J. It recognises, consistent with the limitation expressed in s 68, that a determination of native title is a determination of rights and interest in land that confers proprietary rights against the whole world: Agius (No 6) at [64]; Malone on behalf of the Western Kangoulu People v State of Queensland [2021] FCAFC 176; 287 FCR 240 at [92] per Rangiah J.
[34] It is necessary to understand that in undertaking that assessment the State was not required to be satisfied that there is evidence as to those matters that would meet the standard of the balance of probabilities, nor necessarily to be satisfied that there is evidence in an admissible form at all. Rather, the State was required to be satisfied that there is material which provides a foundation for the application which is believable and rational: Yaegl People #1 v Attorney General (NSW) [2015] FCA 647 at [9] per Jagot J.
[35] The State is obliged to discharge its responsibilities in the interests of the community in Victoria as a whole: Smith v Western Australia [2002] FCA 1249; 104 FCR 494 at [38] per Madgwick J. This necessarily includes and recognises the interests and claims of the claimant group and of other Indigenous peoples of Victoria: Agius (No 6) at [72]. This imposes upon the State a duty to be satisfied that there is a "credible", "rational", "sufficient" or "cogent" basis for the determination (Western Bundjalung People v Attorney-General (NSW) [2017] FCA 992 at [21] per Jagot J; Agius (No 6) at [64], [74]; Holborrow on behalf of the Yaburara & Mardudhunera People v State of Western Australia (No 3) [2018] FCA 1108 at [45] per Barker J), without the level of proof required in a contested application (Western Bundjalung at [21]; Malone at [87]), and it requires the Court to consider the material presented for the limited purpose of determining whether the State has made a rational decision in that regard: Munn for and on behalf of the Gunggari People v Queensland [2001] FCA 1229; 115 FCR 109 at [29]-[30] per Emmett J; Lovett (No 1) at [37]; Brown v Northern Territory [2015] FCA 1268 at [23] per Mansfield J.
[36] The requisite standard of satisfaction is intended to enable rather than prohibit the making of a consent determination. It is not to be understood in rigid terms as a threshold or barrier to making a determination, and it should be approached rationally and flexibly to ensure that the purposes of s 87A of the NTA will be achieved; Lovett (No 1) at [36]; Agius (No 6) at [75]; Holborrow at [44].
[37] As I said in Eagles on behalf of the Combined Thiin-Mah, Warriyangka, Tharrkari and Jiwarli People v Western Australia [2019] FCA 508 at [19]-[22] in relation to a consent determination under s 87, in remarks which are equally apposite to a consent determination under s 87A:
In deciding whether it is appropriate to make the proposed orders it must be kept in mind that the Court's function under s 87 focuses on the making of an agreement by the parties, and the power must be understood in the context of the Act's emphasis on negotiation and alternative dispute resolution, rather than judicial determination in a contested proceeding. The power in s 87 is only exercisable when an agreement has been reached and the power should be exercised flexibly and with regard to the purpose for which the provisions are designed.
The Court is not necessarily required to make findings or embark on its own inquiry as to the merits of the claim made in an application for a consent determination under s 87: see Ward v State of Western Australia [2006] FCA 1848 (Ward) at [8] (North J); Cox on behalf of the Yungngora People v State of Western Australia [2007] FCA 588 (Cox) at [3] (French J); Lander v State of South Australia [2012] FCA 427 at [11]-[12] (Mansfield J); Freddie v Northern Territory [2017] FCA 867 (Freddie) at [16]-[17] (Mortimer J). Rather, the Court must be satisfied, inter alia, that it is appropriate to make the orders sought. The indicia that will be sufficient to satisfy the Court of the appropriateness of a consent determination will be determined on a case by case basis. In some cases it may be appropriate to make orders under s 87 where the Court has received no evidence of the primary facts substantiating native title if the Court is satisfied that the parties have freely and on an informed basis come to an agreement: see Hughes (on behalf of the Eastern Guruma People) v Western Australia [2007] FCA 365 at [9] and Ward at [8].
Even so, as French J observed in Cox the concept of appropriateness also recognises that the determination made by the Court is one made as against the whole world, and not just between the parties to the proceeding. The Court must be conscious that the rights conferred are enduring legal rights, proprietary in nature. This informs considerations including the requirement for the free and informed consent of all parties and the State's agreement that there is a credible and rational basis for the determination proposed: Freddie at [18].
The requirements of s 87 may, and will likely, be met where the Court is satisfied that a relevant government respondent (such as the State in the present case), through competent legal representation, is satisfied as to the cogency of the evidence upon which the Applicant relies. The Court is entitled to rely on the processes established by a State or Territory for assessing native title claims and to proceed on the basis that the State or Territory has made a reasonable and rational assessment of the material to which it has had access in deciding to enter into an agreement: Freddie at [23]-[24] and the authorities there cited.
43 In McKellar on behalf of the Wongkumara People v State of Queensland [2024] FCA 699 at [66] I expanded upon the requirement for a credible or cogent basis for a State party's agreement under s 87A (which is equally applicable to an agreement under s 87) as follows:
The State parties have a duty to be satisfied that there is a "credible" or "cogent" basis for each of the proposed consent determinations: Western Bundjalung People v Attorney-General (NSW) [2017] FCA 992 at [21] (Jagot J). The credible evidence standard is one that requires significantly less than the evidence thought necessary to justify judicial determination under the civil standard: Lovett on behalf of the Gunditjmara People v State of Victoria [2007] FCA 474 at [38] (North J), citing Munn for and on behalf of the Gunggari People v Queensland [2001] FCA 1229; 115 FCR 109 (Emmett J); see also Watson v Western Australia (No 6) [2014] FCA 545 at [29] (Gilmour J). The Court must consider the material before it for the limited purpose of being satisfied that the State parties are acting rationally and in good faith in agreeing to the proposed consent determinations: Munn at [29]-[30].