Halloran v Marris [2026] QDC 4

[2] Starting first with the application to set aisde Judge Gardiner's order of 5 September 2025 appointing the trustee for sale. That order was made by consent and was not appealed. Ms Marris complained about the circumstances in which her consent was obtained, criticising the community legal service that was helping her. Whatever might be the truth of that situation, (and I do not necessarily accept the criticisms that were made from the bar table by Ms Marris in that regard) they do not provide any basis for me to interfere with his Honour's order.

[3] Mr Sheehy, the trustee for sale, took out a sealed copy of Judge Gardiner's order it has been more than seven days since the order was made. Therefore, there is no general power under Rule 667(1) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (the UCPR) for me to vary that order by application. Further, none of the circumstances identified under Rule 667(2)(a)-(f) UCPR apply; therefore, I do not have the power to interfere with that order.

[4] A good deal of significance attaches to that because the effect of the order was to appoint Mr Sheehy as a statutory trustee for sale and he has carried out those orders to the stage where settlement is complete, he has paid the net proceeds of sale into court ($729,545.96) and the only thing that remains is the registration of the transfer, which is presently being prevented by a caveat recently filed by Ms Marris.

[5] Where a joint owner consents to orders for a statutory trust for sale and those orders are unappealed, and the sale takes place under those orders, there is a strong argument that the filing of a caveat to prevent completion of a transfer after settlement of the sale was a misuse of the right to lodge a caveat - or perhaps a contempt of the order of the Court.

[6] Even if that is not so, the lodging of the caveat creates another significant difficulty. Two days before settlement occurred, Ms Marris attempted to obtain a stay of settlement. His Honour refused that stay. In those circumstances, to take further steps to attempt to prevent the completion of the sale by lodging a caveat may also be a contempt or an abuse of process. That is particularly so because it was clear her underlying grievances have been unchanged since the time not long after that order was first made.

[7] For those reasons, it seems to me that there is no discretionary argument favouring me making any order which further interferes with the completion of the sale. Accordingly, her other three applications (which all directly or indirectly seek some such order) must be dismissed.

[8] It is important for Ms Marris to understand that this does not mean claims she might have against Mr Halloran arising out of the care she alleges she gave him have been extinguished. All it means is that the property has been turned into money and the money has been paid into court. It is not going anywhere unless a court orders it be paid out. She can bring or pursue proceedings for any claim she has against the estate or the proceeds of sale and if successful can be paid from those funds.

[9] What is also important to bear in mind is that whatever claim she might have against Mr Halloran, unless his estate has funds to meet it, the most she can get from the estate are the net assets that are in it.

[10] For those reasons, I dismiss the applications in Court Documents 55, 61, 64 and 65.

[11] I should note that Mr Sheehy helpfully drew my attention to an appeal from Judge Barlow's judgment dismissing the stay application brought by Ms Marris. That appeal was lodged on 24 December 2025 after the completion of the sale.

[12] It is a matter for the Court of Appeal to deal with those applications on the evidence put before it. All I can say is that based on the evidence before me, the applications listed before me should be dismissed.

[13] I note that no application was brought before me to remove the caveat.

[14] For those reasons, as I have said, all the applications are dismissed.

[15] The learned trustee has submitted that in the circumstances of this case, I might make an order under Rule 389A UCPR, restricting further applications by Ms Marris in this proceeding. Ms Marris is not here to respond to that application; however, that is because in the course of me giving reasons, she decided she did not want to stay any longer.

[16] I do not consider that it is necessary for an application under r 389A to be made in the presence of the person to whom it is directed if the case favouring it is sufficiently compelling, and the conduct of the potential respondent is such that the Court has good reason to believe no assistance would be obtained.

[17] In my respectful view, the integrity of the court process compels the conclusion that I ought to make such an order in respect of Ms Marris. The history of the proceedings is enough to support that conclusion. Most compellingly, the applications that have been brought before the Court today, of which there are four, are misconceived and continue to seek to agitate the questions resolved by the consent order and Judge Barlow's refusal of the stay application prior to settlement.

[18] For those reasons, I order that Ms Marris not make any further application in proceedings 2311/24 without seeking the leave of the Court.

[19] What that means, so it is clear, is that she cannot and should not serve any application on Mr Sheehy or the other party to this proceeding without first filing an application in this Court, seeking leave to file and serve the application she wishes to make.

[20] Ms Marris has a very strong sense of grievance about this matter and her dealings with Mr Halloran. She has emotional challenges that make it exceedingly difficult for her to deal with the matter. She was accompanied by a support person, Mr Mason, from her Church. With respect to him, he seemed a sensible person who understood the realities of Mr Marris' situation and assisted in settling a tense situation. I extend the gratitude of the Court to him for his assistance.