Haddara v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

Facts 2 The applicant is a Lebanese national. He arrived in Australia on 4 February 1998. On 12 March 1998 he applied for a protection visa; a decision to refuse the application was made on 31 March 1998 and the applicant applied for review by the Tribunal. That review resulted in the decision which the applicant now asks the Court to set aside. 3 The applicant's claims are summarised in the following paragraphs of the Tribunal's decision: "According to the information provided by the applicant, he is a Sunni Muslim from north Lebanon. He left Lebanon following an incident in which a boy was killed on his land by the applicant's runaway tractor. The applicant was taken into custody for one night while the matter was investigated, but was subsequently cleared by a judge who found that there had been no negligence on the applicant's part. The applicant has provided a document purporting to be a translation of the judge's findings. The applicant claims that he continued to be harassed and threatened by members of the dead boy's family, and that he had to carry a firearm and call on the protection of members of his own family when he went out at night because he was in fear of his life. He claims that the dead boy's family refused the offer of blood money from the applicant's father because they wanted to kill the applicant. He claims that this is because they are from a different social class and hold different political opinions to the applicant's family. He claims that the boy's family belong to the Socialist Arab Baath party, allied to Syria, which is opposed to feudalism and large land holders such as the applicant. The applicant claims that members of his extended family have been killed in the past (in undisclosed circumstances), and states that feuds in Lebanon are a serious matter. He claims that family feuds are inseparable from politics because all families belong to and are under the patronage of a particular 'zaim'. In this particular matter the applicant had the support of two members of parliament, who he claims were instrumental in securing his release from prison; the applicant claims that no protection is available because the closest police station is twenty kilometres away; although he is licensed to carry a firearm he cannot protect himself against scheming and treachery. In response to the primary decision rejecting the application on the basis that the harm feared by the applicant was not directed at him for any of the Convention reasons, the applicant submitted that the real reason that the other family wanted to kill him was because of his membership of a particular social group comprised of 'land owning families in the Akka region'. He claims that had the death of the boy been caused by a member of his own family's 'group', they would not have reacted in the same way - the fact that the applicant was held responsible for the boy's death served only to heighten the enmity his family already felt for the applicant for political and class reasons." 4 The Tribunal accepted that the applicant left Lebanon in the circumstances claimed: he was in fear of his life as a result of a blood feud with a neighbouring family following the boy's death. The Tribunal gave no weight to an anonymous telephone call to the Department in which the caller had said that the feud had been settled. The Tribunal found, however, on the evidence before it that: "Apart from the applicant's unsupported assertions, there is no credible evidence before me to support a finding that he is at risk of any harm as a consequence of his membership of a particular social group comprised of land holders in Akka; or because of his political opinion. Such independent evidence as there is suggests that this particular dispute is about revenge for the death of the boy, and that such disputes are common and serious. All of the supporting documentation provided by the applicant, including letters from two Lebanese members of parliament, corroborates his account of the tractor accident causing the death of the boy for which he was blamed by the boy's family; none, however, refer to any political element in the motivation of the family to cause the applicant harm." The Tribunal noted also that the applicant made no claims of threats or harassment except following the boy's death and pointed to an absence of evidence "suggesting that political or class differences between families or other groups are, at the present time resolved by violence or killing, to any significant extent". The Tribunal accordingly found that, although the applicant feared for his life should he return to Lebanon and his fears were well founded, what he feared did not amount to persecution for a Convention reason. The harm the applicant feared resulted from a personal vendetta not political opinion or membership of a social group.

Statutory requirements: actual or deemed receipt? 16 Section 425 and s 426, as in force during the relevant period, provided as follows: "425 (1) Where section 424 does not apply, the Tribunal: (a) must give the applicant an opportunity to appear before it to give evidence; (b) may obtain such other evidence as it considers necessary. (2) Subject to paragraph (1)(a), the Tribunal is not required to allow any person to address it orally about the issues arising in relation to the decision under review. 426 (1) Where section 424 does not apply, the Tribunal must notify the applicant: (a) that he or she is entitled to appear before the Tribunal to give evidence; and (b) of the effect of subsection (2) of this section. (2) The applicant may, within 7 days after being notified under subsection (1), give the Tribunal written notice that the applicant wants the Tribunal to obtain oral evidence from a person or persons named in the notice. …" Certain provisions of the Migration Regulations are important also. So, by way of background, is s 504 of the Migration Act, which authorised the making of the regulations: "504 (1) The Governor‑General may make regulations, not inconsistent with this Act, prescribing all matters which by this Act are required or permitted to be prescribed or which are necessary or convenient to be prescribed for carrying out or giving effect to this Act and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, may make regulations: … (e) making provision for and in relation to: (i) the giving of documents to; (ii) the lodging of documents with; or (iii) the service of documents on; The Minister, the Secretary or any other person or body, for the purposes of this Act; … (3) The regulations that may be made under paragraph (1)(e) include, but are not limited to, regulations providing that a document given to, or served on, a person in a specified way shall be taken for all purposes of this Act and the regulations to have been received by the person at a specified or ascertainable time." 17 The relevant regulations were reg 4.41 and reg 5.03. They provided: "4.41 (1) If: (a) a document is to be given to, or served on, a person for the purposes of a review by the Tribunal; and (b) no other provision as to the manner of giving or serving the document is made by the Act or these Regulations; the document may be given or served: … (d) if the person has not lodged an address for service: (i) by giving it to the person personally or to a person duly authorised to receive documents on behalf of the first‑mentioned person; or (ii) by posting it to the person at his or her last‑known place of residence; … 5.03 (1A) This regulation applies to a document sent by the Minister, a Tribunal or review officer to a person in that person's capacity as: (a) an applicant, of any kind, under the Act or these regulations; … (1) For the purposes of the Act and these Regulations, and subject to the Act and specific provision elsewhere in these Regulations, a document is taken to be received by the person to whom it was sent at the time that the document is taken to be received at the address to which the document is sent, which is either: (a) if the document is sent from a place in Australia to an address in Australia - 7 days after the date of the document; … (2) Subregulation (1) does not apply to a document unless it is sent within 7 days after the date of the document." 18 In Uddin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1041 Hely J said at par 22: "The authorities establish that s 425 and s 426 are cumulative requirements in the sense that the giving of a notice under s 426 will not necessarily exhaust the s 425 obligation: Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs v Capitly [1999] FCA 193. But, unless a s 426 notice was given to the applicant, the proposition that he was given an opportunity to appear before RRT to give evidence, does not get off the ground. Even if the effect of the regulations is such that the s 426 notice is deemed to have been received by the applicant such that the requirements of s 426 are satisfied, there is or may be a further question as to whether the obligation imposed upon RRT by s 425 is satisfied where, as a matter of fact, the opportunity for which s 425 makes provision is not extended to the applicant." So, in this case, compliance with s 426 was a necessary condition of compliance with s 425 but not necessarily a sufficient condition. The Minister's contention that the Tribunal complied with s 426 depends on the validity of the following reasoning: the letter of 21 January 1999 was a notification of the kind required by s 426. It was also a document as to the manner of giving or serving of which no other provision was made by the Act or regulations and which might therefore be served (as it was in fact served) by posting it to the applicant at his last‑known place of residence. Similarly, the letter was a document sent by the Tribunal to the applicant in his capacity as an applicant under the Act; and, there being no contrary provision of the Act or specific provision elsewhere in the regulations, it was taken to be received by the applicant, having been sent from a place in Australia to an address in Australia, seven days after 21 January 1999. Because the notification was thus taken to have been received, the applicant equally must be taken to have been notified. 19 It is not difficult to appreciate the force of an argument along those lines simply as a matter of construction of the relevant provisions. If correct it would have the consequence (as here) that an applicant was notified under s 426 although the applicant never in fact received the notification (that might be defended as a necessary, if unfortunate, consequence of the need to achieve certainty in the administration of the Act). It would also have the consequence that an applicant who actually received a notification posted immediately before the expiry of seven days after its date would not, as a practical matter, be able to give written notice to the Tribunal within the period allowed by s 426(2): Sook v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 86 FCR 584 at 589 per Burchett J. But the argument in any event encounters an obstacle in the form of authorities in this Court to which counsel for the Minister properly and helpfully referred me. The decisions of particular importance are Sook and Uddin, the only decisions, so far as I am aware, in which the applicability of reg 5.03 to s 426 has been directly considered. In Sook Burchett J held - probably obiter - that reg 5.03 does not apply to s 426. Neither Moore J nor Katz J, the other two members of the Full Court in Sook, found it necessary to consider the question. Burchett J held that the words "subject to the Act" in subreg (1) operate to exclude from the regulation the obligation under s 426 that the Tribunal "must notify" the applicant. His Honour held at 591, following the decision (in relation to s 478 of the Migration Act) of Merkel J in Wang v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1997) 71 FCR 386 that "actual notification" was required. His Honour said, at 592: "The proper conclusion from all these considerations is that regs 4.41 and 5.03 do not operate so as to reduce or set aside the clear effect of s 426, by virtue of which the Tribunal 'must notify the applicant' of the specified rights, as rights really and not notionally conferred by the Act." 20 In Uddin Hely J considered the authorities and preferred the view of Burchett J to the contrary view of Beaumont J (who had not been referred to certain of the earlier authorities) in Susiatin v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 83 FCR 574. Hely J held, accordingly, that reg 5.03 did not apply to a notification under s 426 and, accordingly, actual notification was required. His Honour said at par 34: "The decision of Burchett J is a decision directly on s 426 of the Act. In my view, neither the conclusion which his Honour reached, nor the reasoning on which it is based can be characterised as clearly wrong. In those circumstances I think that I should follow his Honour's decision, with the result that the procedures required to be observed by s 426 of the Act in connection with the making of the decision were not observed, as the applicant was not notified prior to the decision of the matters referred to in s 426(1)(a)." That was the ground on which Hely J expressly based his decision. I do not think it is open to me to hold that it is clearly wrong: plainly, I think, it is not, although another view might have been open. I should, therefore, follow Uddin and, indirectly, the views expressed by Burchett J in Sook. The findings of fact which I have already made necessarily mean, in my view, that the applicant was not actually notified of the matters required by s 426(1). Because the procedures required by s 426 were not observed, neither were those required by s 425. It follows that the applicant has made out the ground of review in s 476(1)(a) of the Migration Act and, there being no suggestion that there is any discretionary basis on which relief should be refused, the Tribunal's decision should be set aside and the matter remitted for determination. 21 In those circumstances it is unnecessary for me to consider two other possible bases on which authorities suggest that the applicant might succeed. In Singh v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 613 Einfeld J held that where a registered letter, addressed to a particular place, is in fact taken to and kept at a post office, rather than taken by the postal service to the particular address, it is to be regarded as "sent to" the post office rather than the address. In Li v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 1147 Gyles J expressed the view, obiter, that reg 5.03 is, at least in part, invalid: see at par 45 to par 50. In the circumstances it is unnecessary, and therefore I think undesirable, that I say anything about either of those matters.

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