In breach of clause 2.3, the Tenant has failed to take out insurance cover for the premises in the names of the landlord and the tenant that meets the requirements of the lease and provide satisfactory evidence of that cover upon the landlord's written request.

1. The Default Notice then set out what the Landlord required the Tenant to do to remedy the breaches. It states, in part:

To the extent that these breaches are capable of remedy the Landlord requires that you remedy them within 14 days by:

1. Ceasing to use or allow the premises to be used as halfway housing and in a manner that is noxious, offensive, illegal, causes nuisance or disturbance to other occupiers and/or damage to the premises or building.
2. Taking out and providing evidence of the insurance required by clause 2.3 in the names of the Tenant and the Landlord that otherwise meets the terms of the lease and can be verified by the Landlord with the insurer.
3. Removing the floating/Laminate flooring and replacing it with new carpets.
4. Paying $1,766.60 on account of the Landlord's expenses and legal costs referred to in Item 9.

1. On 6 August 2025, the Tenant filed this application seeking an interlocutory order restraining the Landlord from re-entering the Premises and forfeiting the Lease.

1. The legal principles relevant to the granting of an interlocutory injunction are well established and not in dispute. It is unnecessary to extensively repeat those principles in these short reasons, suffice to say that the Tenant must establish that there is a serious question or questions for trial and that the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction.[1] In Sudjalim Pty Ltd v Homle Pty Ltd,[2] Almond J summarised those principles as follows:

It is common ground that on an application for an interlocutory injunction, the Court will need to determine whether there is a serious question to be tried as to the plaintiff's entitlement to relief; whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of an injunction, including whether the plaintiffs are likely to suffer an injury for which damages will not be an adequate remedy; and whether there are any discretionary considerations which weigh for, or against, the grant of relief. These questions must be examined together.[3]

1. I shall apply those principles in determining this application for injunctive relief.

1. In the Default Notice, the Landlord alleges that the Tenant:

(a) used the Premises for a use that is not permitted under the Lease;

(b) failed to procure public liability insurance for the Premises in accordance with the terms of the Lease; and

(c) altered the Premises without the Landlord's written consent.

1. During the hearing on 20 August 2025, Mr Ong, the solicitor who appeared on behalf of the Landlord, raised a further allegation of breach; namely, that the use of the Premises for short-term accommodation (irrespective of whether that short-term accommodation is characterised as providing a 'halfway house') is contrary to the Owners Corporation Rules, which were purportedly amended in January 2025 to prohibit that activity within the apartment complex.
2. The allegation that the use of the Premises is contrary to the Owners Corporation Rules is not part of the Default Notice. Nevertheless, it is appropriate that I make some observations in relation to that allegation, given the parties placed significant weight on that issue.

Did the Tenant breach the Owners Corporation Rules?

1. It is not entirely clear what clause of the Lease is contravened if the Tenant does not comply with the Owners Corporation Rules. Clause 2.1.13 of the Lease states that the Tenant must comply with all laws relating to the use or occupation of the premises. It is unclear whether the Owners Corporation Rules constitute a 'law' for the purpose of clause 2.1.13. I was not taken to any authority or statutory provision to clarify that issue.
2. Nevertheless, the Landlord, in her affidavit dated 19 August 2025, deposed to the following:
   1. On 30 January 2025, pursuant to recent changes in legislation, the owners corporation promptly made a rule banning short stay accommodation.
   2. The rule was subsequently registered by the Land Registry on 30 May 2025, and reads:

"No lot may be used for short stay accommodation unless the lot is contemporaneously being used as the owner or occupier's primary residence and that person remains residing in the lot whilst the short-stay occupant stays the lot"

1. The extract of the purported amendment of the Owners Corporation Rules referred to above substantially mirrors changes made and reflected in cl 5.5, Sch 1 to the Owners Corporation Act 2006 (Vic). The Tenant does not dispute that its use, as permitted under the Lease, is to provide short-stay accommodation.
2. However, the Tenant contends that the purported amendment to the Owners Corporation Rules was not validly approved by the members of the owners corporation. The Tenant produced the minutes of the Owners Corporation Special General Meeting conducted on 30 January 2025, which recorded that the motion to change to the Owners Corporation Rules by incorporating that prohibition was not passed. The minutes state, in part:

1. Similarly, the Minutes of the Annual General Meeting dated 29 January 2025 stated:

The resolution proposed in the Meeting Agenda was read and considered.

"No lot may be used for short stay accommodation unless the lot is contemporaneously being used as the owner's or occupant's primary residence and that the person remains residing in the lot whilst the short stay occupant stays in the lot."

1. In my view, the allegation of the Tenant failing to comply with the Owners Corporation Rules, as purportedly amended, raises several questions for trial, insofar as the Landlord can rely upon that allegation as a basis to re-enter and forfeit the Lease. Specifically:

(a) the allegation is not referred to in the Default Notice;

(b) there are questions whether a breach of the Owners Corporation Rules constitutes a breach of the Lease, especially where the stated permitted use under the Lease is precisely that which is said to be a breach of the Owners Corporation Rules; and

(c) there are questions whether the Owners Corporation Rules were validly amended. Indeed, that question is currently before the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in a separate proceeding case-managed under the Owners Corporation List ('the OC Proceeding').

1. Consequently, this allegation of breach clearly raises a serious question for trial. No doubt, this issue will be explored more fully in the OC Proceeding. As matters currently stand, I do not accept that this allegation can be relied upon as a basis to re-enter the Premises and forfeit the Lease.

1. In her affidavit dated 19 August 2025, the Landlord deposed to the following:
   1. The building comprises 52 residential lots in a General Residential Zone, approximately 37 of which are privately owned and either occupied or leased as residences, and 15 are used by the applicant to operate its business.
   2. The original lease of the premises was to a Quest Apartment Hotels franchisee (25 Redan Street Pty Ltd) for use as a Quest Serviced Apartment as a member of a large professional serviced apartment network with many locations worldwide.
   3. The applicant's current use of the premises and others in the building is primarily as "supported accommodation" (often termed "halfway housing") for freshly released prison convicts, high-risk mentally ill patients, crisis accommodation and rough sleeping services through government programs and providers such as Alfred Hospital and Launch Housing.
   4. The applicant's current use of the premises (and others), the effect of its activities and guests on the premises, other occupiers and compatibility with the building are so far removed from the character of the original Quest serviced apartment use under the original lease that they could not be considered the same use.
2. The Landlord further deposes to the Tenant having admitted certain facts in documents produced in the OC Proceeding. In my view, it is not appropriate to have regard to documents which have been filed in another proceeding and presumably under compulsion of Tribunal orders for use in this proceeding without the Tribunal first releasing the party seeking to rely on that document from the implied undertaking given to the Tribunal that no document so produced would be used for a collateral purpose.[4]
3. In my view, the term serviced apartment is capable of several meanings. The fact that persons who occupy the Premises under a short-term rental agreement are referred by government agencies or hospitals does not, in my opinion, necessarily change the character or meaning of that term. Whether or not occupiers of a serviced apartment or short-term rental apartment are disruptive or considered to be of bad character, is a different issue. There are provisions within the Lease which expressly deal with bad or illegal behaviour of persons occupying the Premises. In other words, even if the Premises were managed by a franchisee of the Quest Apartment Hotels, the possibility of a guest conducting illegal activity, being disruptive or causing damage is still feasible. The mere fact that that happens or could happen does not change the character of the permitted use.
4. Clearly, determining whether the actual use of the Premises is consistent with the permitted use of the Premises will require significantly more evidence than what is currently before the Tribunal. It will also require detailed legal submissions as to how that evidence is to be construed. Consequently, I find that this issue gives rise to a serious question for trial.

1. The Landlord deposes to the following:
   1. The premises were originally leased to the applicant's predecessor with carpets...
   2. The Disclosure Statement 2007 provided with the applicant's injunction also refers to carpets...
   3. Despite consent never having been requested for such work, a recent inspection showed the premises carpets have been removed and replaced with a sort of floating laminate flooring, which does not appear professionally installed or maintained and is now dislodged and dilapidated...
   4. The applicant does not deny these alterations were performed but says that they were in place when it took a transfer of the lease.
2. The Tenant submitted that it took over possession of the Premises on 19 February 2024.[5] It is submitted that at that time the condition of the apartment was poor. Photographs were produced to corroborate that submission. In addition, the Tenant produced a statement from Hongli Huang, the former director of Tenant, which states:

In July 2022, I took over the management of a hotel property located at 25 Redan St, St Kilda VIC 3182. The building and rooms were in a severely dilapidated condition.

Under the lease agreement, the landlord was responsible for repairs to the property's hardware, including flooring, kitchens, and bathrooms. Upon my inspection, Room 15 was in the worst condition. The bathroom and kitchen were both blocked, water had seeped into the walls, and the carpet was mouldy, frayed and producing a foul smell. The room was clearly not fit for human occupation.

I contacted the landlord's agent immediately and requested urgent renovations. The building manager informed me that he would speak to the landlord. Several days later, the manager told me that the landlord refused any refurbishment and was only concerned about rent. I told the manager that this was unacceptable, as the room could not be occupied and I had a duty to my guests.

The manager said I could carry out improvements myself but stated that under the landlord's policy, renovations could only be requested every five years, meaning the next opportunity would be in 2027. I found this unreasonable given the room is uninhabitable condition.

For the next six months, I repeatedly contacted the landlord's agent to seek a resolution, but I received no assistance. I became increasingly frustrated that all parties involved were prioritising money over the health, safety and basic living conditions of the occupants.

Eventually I used my own funds to carry out renovation of Room 15, including complete change of kitchen, waterproof in the kitchen area, replaced new floor, also I put a new security door. In addition, there was problems with water leak from the window to floor, that is the reason for moldy [sic] carpet. That is the reason we have to complete water proof from the wall and complete remove of the carpet. The work was essential to make the room habitable and to allow the lawful operation of my business.

This statement is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief and I make it knowing that it may be used as evidence.

1. Hongli Houng was not called to give evidence, nor was there any affidavit filed to corroborate what was said in the statement referred to above. Nevertheless, photographs were furnished, which showed, prima facie, that the Premises were currently in reasonable condition.
2. It seems to be common ground that the carpet was replaced with a floating floor more than three years ago. Based on the evidence before me, the issue was first raised in the Default Notice. In my view, it is disingenuous to raise this issue three years after the carpet was replaced and as a basis to substantiate a breach of the Lease.
3. Further, it is reasonable to infer, prima facie, that the Tenant would not have undertaken that work at its own expense unless that work was reasonably required. Section 52 of the Retail Leases Act 2003 (Vic) ('the RLA') would, prima facie, place an obligation on the Landlord to make good carpet damaged through water ingress. Section 52(4) of the RLA states:

The tenant may arrange for urgent repairs (for which the landlord is responsible under this section or under the terms and conditions of the Lease) to be carried out to those things if -

(a) the repairs are necessary to fix or remedy a fault or damage that has or causes a substantial effect on or to the tenant's business at the premises; and

(b) the tenant is unable to get the landlord or the landlord's agent to carry out the repairs despite having taken reasonable steps to arrange for the landlord or the agent to do so.

1. Notwithstanding that the statement of Hongli Huang is not sworn evidence or in an affidavit form, the content of that statement does raise a serious question for trial. My finding is reinforced by the fact that the issue concerning the installation of a timber or laminate floating floor has only been raised for the first time three years after installation. In my view, that raises a secondary question whether the Landlord impliedly consented to that work being done.

1. The Landlord deposes to the following:
   1. Following the default notice of 24 July 2025, the applicant on 5 August 2025 subsequently provided a "Certificate of Currency" to my solicitor....
   2. I am not satisfied that the certificate of currency satisfactory evidence of the insurance required by the lease because:
      1. The applicant's email sending it stated: "We are arranging for the landlord, Helen May, to be added as an interested party to our current public liability insurance policy".
      2. It does not specify my premises.
      3. The policy schedule is not provided, which takes precedence over it.
      4. It was issued by BizCover Pty Ltd, not the insurer (AIG).
      5. It states it is current only as at the date of issue.
      6. The insurance period stated the date that it was sent to me, from 4 PM that day, 6 minutes before the email sending it to me.
      7. It states there is no obligation to inform me of any alteration to it, or if the policy is later cancelled or altered for any reason, and that it confers no rights upon me.
      8. Even if it did cover my premises, and remains current, there is no evidence of insurance predating its provision to me on 5 August 2025, meaning cover likely does not exist for any liability occurring prior to that date and time.
2. The difficulty in determining whether the insurance procured by the Tenant complies with the provisions of the Lease is that a copy of that insurance policy has not been produced by the parties. Only the certificate of currency has been produced. That certificate of currency names the Landlord as an interested party (public liability) and that the nature of her interest is as landlord.
3. Without comprehensively analysing the terms and conditions of the insurance policy, it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether the Tenant is in breach under the terms and conditions of the Lease. Moreover, disputes over the meaning of one or more terms within an insurance policy are not uncommon and usually require the Tribunal or a Court to consider legal submissions and all relevant documents.
4. Without the benefit of legal submissions and production of all relevant documents, I find that the question whether the insurance policy procured by the Tenant complies with the Terms of the Lease remains a question for trial. It is not a question that can be determined within the context of an interlocutory injunction application.
5. Having said that, it is common ground that a form of public liability insurance policy has been procured by the Tenant and it relates to the whole of the apartment complex located at 25 Redan Street, St Kilda. It names the Landlord (and the other landlords) as interested parties and recognises their interest as landlords. In my view, the production of that document is sufficient to dispel the notion that no public liability insurance has been procured. What remains to be determined is whether the specific terms of that public liability insurance comply with the terms of the Lease.

1. As is often the case where a tenant seeks to restrain a landlord from re-entering retail premises, the balance of convenience will favour granting interlocutory relief. This is because the business operations of the retail tenant are often so interconnected with the leased premises. Consequently, depriving the retail tenant of occupation makes it difficult if not impossible to compensate that party by an award of damages alone.
2. However, this case is different. Here, the Landlord has filed a further affidavit after the hearing correcting submissions made on her behalf by her by her solicitor during that hearing. Specifically, Mr Ong submitted that the Landlord intended to carry out further refurbishment work and then lease the Premises under a 'normal' residential tenancy leasehold.
3. In her supplementary affidavit dated 21 August 2025 the Landlord states that the statement made by her lawyer during the hearing was not correct and as a result of a misunderstanding. She deposed to the following:
   1. The truth is I plan to use my unit to stay during my regular trips to Australia to see family and friends. These trips are typical for 6 or so weeks at a time, so it is much more cost-effective and convenient to use my own unit than to stay at hotels, which cost more than the rent I received for the unit, given I bear all the outgoings.
4. In contrast, the Tenant submitted that the Premises are currently occupied by a person with a handicap and there would be difficulty in relocating that person to other premises that might become available on another level of the apartment building, given that the apartment building does not have a lift. In addition, the Tenant submitted that it had invested funds to refurbish and maintain the Premises and that a loss of its tenure would adversely affect business operations.
5. Balancing the interests of each party is not always a simple exercise. Sometimes, as is the case here, the prejudice suffered by one party by the grant of an interlocutory injunction is evenly matched by the prejudice suffered by the other party if the injunction is refused. In other words, I accept that irrespective of the outcome of this interlocutory injunction application, one party will be prejudiced.
6. However, in balancing the interests of both parties and, to a lesser extent the non-party, being the person occupying the Premises, I have regard to the strength of the claims made by the Landlord. As observed by Almond J in Sudjalim Pty Ltd v Homle Pty Ltd, 'an apparently strong claim may lead a court to more readily grant the injunction where the balance of convenience is fairly even. A more doubtful claim, which nevertheless raises a serious question to be tried, may still attract interlocutory relief if there is a marked balance of convenience in favour of it'.
7. I do not accept that the allegations of breach of lease raised in the Default Notice can be described as an apparently strong claim. Although I accept that the Landlord is concerned that persons who occupy apartments within the building complex have adversely affected the quiet enjoyment of other occupants within the apartment complex; and may have engaged in illegal activity or caused damage to the common property. However, I am not persuaded, based on the evidence before me, that those persons who have committed those acts were persons who occupied the Premises.
8. In that respect, I note that the evidence of the Landlord is not firsthand. She is domiciled overseas and the information which is set out in her affidavit is garnered from what she was told by others or from other third-party sources. Consequently, I consider that care should be taken when attributing too much weight to that evidence.
9. Therefore, when weighing the interests of both parties, I consider that the balance of convenience favours granting an interlocutory injunction.

1. Having regard to my findings, I will make an order restraining the Landlord from re-entering the Premises in reliance upon the Default Notice.
2. I will reserve the costs of this proceeding, noting that under s 92 of the RLA, costs are not awarded in retail tenancy disputes unless special circumstances exist, as set out in that provision.

[1] Australian Broadcasting Corporation v O'Neill [2006] HCA 46; (2006) 227 CLR 57; Bradto Pty Ltd v State of Victoria [2006] VSCA 89; (2006) 15 VR 65.

[2] [2020] VSC 838.

[4] Hearne v Street [2008] HCA 36; (2008) 235 CLR 125,

[5] After 2024, the directorship of the Tenant changed.