GZD v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 326;

I was sexually assaulted in the mouth and in the vagina when I was 15 or 16 years old.

1. On 20 December 2024, an Assessor found that the documentary evidence was sufficient to establish that the Applicant was a victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault. The evidence before the Assessor was as follows:

(1) Police report event number E818100065: Sexual Assault reporting Option Questionnaire (SARO) dated 11 June 2024 ('the police report')

(2) A certificate of injury (COI) dated 26 June 2024 and counselling notes dated 3 March 2024, 19 June 2024, and 26 June 2024 ('the medical reports').

1. The Assessor found that the act of violence was made up of a series of related acts 'as two or more acts were committed against the victim, by the same offender over a period of time': Assessor's decision at [6]. The Assessor was satisfied that the Applicant was injured as a direct result of the act of violence and that she sustained psychological harm, including Post Traumatic Stress disorder (PTSD): Assessor's decision at [8]. The Assessor approved a Category C recognition payment in the sum of $5000.
2. On 27 February 2024, the Applicant applied for internal review of the Assessor's decision. The Applicant submitted that the following acts of violence can be identified in the police report and that these acts constitute a series of related acts for the purpose of s 19(4) and establishing eligibility for a recognition payment for the purposes of s 35(2)(b) of the VRS Act.

(1) "I woke to [the Offender] putting his penis in my mouth" (sexual assault)

(2) "rubbing my vagina from the outside of my pants" (sexual touching)

(3) [The offender] "put his hands over my mouth very tightly" (common assault)

(4) I tried to move but was pinned down with [the offender] on top of me (common assault)

(5) "he then pulled my hair" (common assault)

(6) "[The offender] opened my mouth and put his penis back inside" (sexual assault)

(7) "took off my pants" (common assault)

(8) "sexually penetrated me till he ejaculated" (sexual assault)

(9) "every time I moved to get away he grabbed me tightly" (common assault).

1. The Applicant submitted that the injury she suffered as a direct result of the acts of violence constituted a serious bodily injury for the purpose of s 35(2)(a) of the VRS Act.
2. A support letter was submitted from a Family Support Case Worker at the Aboriginal Women's and Children's Crisis Service.
3. On 9 April 2025, a Senior Assessor was 'satisfied on the balance of probabilities, that [the Applicant] was a primary victim of child sexual assault'. The Senior Assessor found that the Applicant 'was a primary victim of an act of violence, involving a sexual assault, consisting of oral and vaginal penetration, which occurred when she was around 15 years of age'. The Senior Assessor was satisfied 'the counselling evidence verifies that [the Applicant] sustained psychological injury as a result of that violence'.
4. The Senior Assessor was satisfied that the Applicant was a primary victim of an act of violence and approved a Category C recognition payment in the amount of $5000. The Senior Assessor found 'that the sexual assault occurred on one occasion and therefore does not form a series of related acts' and that evidence was insufficient to find that the injury sustained by the Applicant as a result of the act of violence constituted a serious bodily injury for the purpose of s 35(2)(a) of the VRS Act.
5. On administrative review, the Applicant's position is that the Tribunal should set aside the decision made on 9 April 2025 and substitute a decision that the Applicant is entitled to a Category B recognition payment in the sum of $10 000 on the basis that:

(1) The Applicant suffered serious bodily injury as a result of the sexual assault for the purposes of s 35 (2) (a) of the VRS Act; and/or

(2) The Applicant was a victim of a series of related acts for the purposes of s 35(2)(b) of the VRS Act.

1. The Applicant applied for administrative review of the Respondent's decision with respect to her application for a recognition payment on 2 May 2025. Section 51(1) of the VRS Act provides that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine an application to the Tribunal for administrative review of a decision made by the Commissioner following an internal review of a decision with respect to a recognition payment.
2. The Tribunal's powers in relation to an application for administrative review are governed by s 63 of the ADR Act, which provides that in determining an application for administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision under the ADR Act, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is, having regard to the applicable law and the material before it: s 63(1) of the ADR Act.
3. In determining this application for administrative review, the Tribunal may decide to affirm the decision under review, vary the decision under review, set the decision under review aside and make a decision in substitution or set the decision under review aside and remit for reconsideration by the administrator with directions or recommendations: s 63(3) of the ADR Act.

1. It is not in dispute that the Applicant was a primary victim of an act of violence under sections 19 and 20 of the VRS Act and that she has provided the documentary evidence required by s 39(2)(b) of the Act sufficient to establish her eligibility for a recognition payment.
2. The issues the Tribunal must determine are as follows:

(1) whether the Applicant was a victim of an act of violence that was one of a series of related acts for the purpose of s 35(2)(b) of the VRS Act; and

(2) whether the Applicant suffered a serious bodily injury as a direct result of the sexual assault for the purpose of s 35(2)(a) of the VRS Act.

1. The VRS Act sets out eligibility criteria for victims of violent crime to receive different types of support and assistance. This review concerns a recognition payment. A recognition payment is a payment made in recognition of the trauma suffered by a victim of an act of violence: VRS Act s 34.
2. Section 5 of the VRS Act provides:

5 Meaning of "victim of crime"

(1) For this Act, a victim of crime is a person who suffers harm as a direct result of an act committed, or apparently committed, by another person in the course of -

(a) a criminal offence, including a criminal offence involving a motor vehicle, or

(b) conduct of a kind referred to in the Modern Slavery Act 2018, section 5(1), definition of modern slavery, paragraph (b).

(2) A person suffers harm if, as a result of such an act -

(a) the person suffers actual physical bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm, or

...

1. Section 17 of the VRS Act relevantly provides that the object of Part 4 of the VRS Act is to provide support for victims of acts of violence.
2. Section 19 of the VRS Act defines 'act of violence' as follows:

19 Meaning of "act of violence"

(1) In this Act, act of violence means an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons -

(a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and

(b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and

(c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more of those persons.

...

(3) For the purposes of this section, violent conduct extends to sexual assault and domestic violence.

...

(4) Except as provided by subsections (5) and (6), a series of related acts is two or more acts that are related because -

(a) they were committed against the same person, and

(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner -

(i) they were committed at approximately the same time, or

(ii) they were committed over a period of time by the same person or group of persons, or

(iii) they were, for any other reason, related to each other.

(5) An act is not related to another act if, in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner, having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought not to be treated as related acts.

(6) An act is not related to any earlier act in respect of which support is given under this Act if it occurs after the support is given.

(7) For the purposes of this Act, a series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons, constitutes a single act of violence.

(8) In this Act -

sexual assault and domestic violence means any of the following -

(a) sexual intercourse (within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900) with a person without his or her consent or with consent obtained by means of a non-violent threat,

(b) sexual intercourse (within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900 ) with a child under the age of 16 years or with a person having a cognitive impairment (within the meaning of that Division),

(c) self-manipulation (within the meaning of section 80A of the Crimes Act 1900) which a person is compelled to engage in because of a threat (within the meaning of that section),

(d) sexual touching (within the meaning of Division 10 of Part 3 of the Crimes Act 1900) of a person without his or her consent or sexual touching of a child under the age of 16 years or the carrying out of a sexual act (within the meaning of that Division) with or towards a child under the age of 16 years,

(e) participation with a child under the age of 18 years in an act of child prostitution (within the meaning of section 91C of the Crimes Act 1900) or the use of a child under the age of 18 years for the production of child abuse material (within the meaning of section 91FB of the Crimes Act 1900),

(f) any other act resulting in injury that occurred in the commission of a personal violence offence (within the meaning of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007) against any of the following persons -

.... [omitted]

1. Section 20(1) of the VRSA Act provides that '[a] primary victim of an act of violence is a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of that act'.
2. Section 18 of the VRS Act defines injury as follows: 'injury means actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm but does not include injury arising from loss or damage to property'.
3. Section 23(1) of the VRS Act provides that a primary victim of an act of violence is eligible for the support under the scheme described in s 26 of the VRS Act. A primary victim of an act of violence, or somebody acting on their behalf, may apply for a recognition payment in recognition of the trauma suffered: s 38 of the VRS Act.
4. Division 5 of Part 4 of the VRS Act concerns recognition payments. To access a recognition payment, the applicant must submit documentary evidence as required by s 39 of the VRS Act. Section 39 provides:

39 Documentary evidence

(1) An application for victims support is to be accompanied by such documentary evidence as may be required by the approved form.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the documentary evidence to be required:

...

(b) for an application for financial assistance for economic loss under section 26 or 27 or for a recognition payment - is:

(i) a police report, or a report by a Government agency or any other agency that provides support services to victims of crime, sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant's claim to be a victim of an act of violence or act of modern slavery, and

(ii) a medical, dental or counselling report verifying that the applicant or child who is the primary victim concerned has actually been injured as a result of an act of violence or act of modern slavery.

1. The category of recognition payment payable depends on the nature of the act of violence. Section 34 provides that for the purpose of Division 5 'sexual assault' has the meaning it has in section 19(8)(a), (b), (c) or (e) and 'series of related acts' has the same meaning as in section 19(4) of the VRS Act. Section 35 of the VRS Act provides for the following categories of recognition payment:

35 Categories of recognition payment

(1) A category A recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery that apparently occurred in the course of the commission of a homicide.

**(2) A category B recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery of the following kinds - **

(a) a sexual assault resulting in serious bodily injury or which involved an offensive weapon or was carried out by 2 or more persons,

(b) a sexual assault, sexual touching or sexual act or attempted sexual assault involving violence that is one of a series of related acts.

**(3) A category C recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery involving any of the following - **

(a) a sexual assault other than one referred to in subsection (2) (b),

(b) an attempted sexual assault resulting in serious bodily injury,

(c) an assault resulting in grievous bodily harm,

(d) physical assault of a child that is one of a series of related acts.

(4) A category D recognition payment is a payment given in respect of an act of violence or act of modern slavery involving any of the following -

(a) sexual touching or sexual act,

(b) an attempted sexual assault involving violence other than one referred to in subsection (3) (b),

(c) a robbery involving violence,

(d) an assault (not resulting in grievous bodily harm).

(emphasis added)

1. Section 36 of the VRS Act provides for the payment of recognition payments:

36 Recognition payments

(1) Recognition payments are payable as follows:

(a) a category A recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable -

(i) to each family victim (other than a child referred to in subparagraph (ii)) who, immediately before the death of a primary victim as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (1), was financially dependent on the primary victim, and

(ii) to each child of a primary victim who, immediately before the death of the primary victim as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (1), was under the age of 18 years,

(b) a category A recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to the following who were not, immediately before the death of the primary victim concerned, financially dependent on a primary victim who died as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (1):

(i) a parent, step-parent or guardian of the primary victim,

(ii) any person who, immediately before the death of the primary victim, was the victim's spouse or de facto partner as referred to in section 22 (3) (b),

(c) a category B recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to a primary victim who suffered injury as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (2),

(d) a category C recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to a primary victim who suffered injury as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (3),

(e) a category D recognition payment of an amount prescribed by the regulations is payable to a primary victim who suffered injury as a result of an act of violence described in section 35 (4).

(2) Only one recognition payment is payable to a single victim in respect of a series of related acts of violence against the victim.

(Emphasis added)

1. The Victims Rights and Support Regulation 2019 (NSW) prescribes the amounts payable under s 36 of the VRS Act: r 14.

1. The Applicant relies on her application for review filed on 2 May 2025 and the written submissions filed by her representative on 26 June 2025 and 16 July 2025. The Applicant did not seek to provide written or oral evidence to the Tribunal and relied on the evidence that was before the Senior Assessor in support of the application for administrative review: see paragraph [3] above.
2. The Respondent filed documents under s 58 of the ADR Act on 10 June 2025 and written submissions filed on 4 July 2025.
3. The solicitors for the Applicant and the Respondent appeared before the Tribunal at the hearing on 1 August 2025. The Applicant did not seek to give evidence, and the Respondent did not seek to cross-examine the Applicant. The Applicant and the Respondent made oral submissions.

1. The Applicant submits that the Respondent made three errors: first, the Respondent erred in finding that the Applicant was not a victim of a sexual assault involving an act of violence that is a series of a related acts; second, the Respondent erred in finding that the Applicant was not a victim of sexual assault resulting in a serious bodily injury; and third, the Respondent erred by failing to interpret the VRS Act as beneficial legislation.
2. The Applicant's position is that she satisfies section 19 of the VRS Act because, on the balance of probabilities, she was a victim of sexual assault involving violence that was one of a series of related acts and/or a sexual assault that resulted in serious bodily injury in the form of a really serious psychological injury. On this basis, the Applicant is eligible for a category B recognition payment of $10,000.

1. The Applicant submits that the police report supports the finding that the Applicant was a victim of multiple acts of violence as set out at paragraph 5 of this decision record.
2. The Applicant relies on FDT v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2022] NSWCATAD 155 ('FDT') as support for the proposition that a single sexual assault can, in itself, constitute a sexual assault that involves an act of violence that is a 'series of related acts' committed by one person. The Applicant notes that while the Respondent disagrees with the findings in FDT, the decision in FDT was not appealed.
3. The Applicant submits that s 61HA of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ('Crimes Act') defines sexual intercourse as:

(1) For the purposes of this Division, "sexual intercourse" means--

(a) the penetration to any extent of the genitalia or anus of a person by--

(i) any part of the body of another person, or

(ii) any object manipulated by another person, or

(b) the introduction of any part of the genitalia of a person into the mouth of another person, or

(c) the application of the mouth or tongue to the female genitalia, or

(d) the continuation of sexual intercourse as defined in paragraph (a), (b) or (c).

...

1. The Applicant submits that the definition of 'circumstances of aggravation' in s 61J(2) of the Crimes Act does not include other acts of sexual intercourse without consent.
2. The Applicant submits that the Applicant was a victim of three acts of sexual intercourse without consent - oral penetration followed by oral penetration followed by vaginal penetration - separated by other acts of physical violence. The Applicant submits that she was a primary victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault involving violence that was one of a series of related acts.

1. The Applicant submits that the only question for the Tribunal to consider is whether the medical evidence is sufficient to satisfy the Tribunal that, on the balance of probabilities, the injury the Applicant suffered as a direct result of the act of violence was a serious one. With respect to the Respondent's submission that it is difficult to establish a causal link between the Applicant's presentation in 2024 with the act of violence that occurred in 2014, the Applicant submits that as the Respondent has agreed the medical evidence establishes that the Applicant suffered an injury as a direct result of the act of violence, the only question for the Tribunal to determine relates to the severity of the injury.
2. The Applicant submits that it is relevant that the act of violence was the first act of violence experienced by the Applicant and that the act of violence had a profoundly detrimental impact on her day to day functioning immediately after the act of violence. The Applicant relies on counselling notes that indicate the alleged offender attended the same high school as the Applicant and after the sexual assault she became withdrawn and would not go anywhere.
3. The Applicant submits that while the injuries she suffered as a direct result of the act of violence were exacerbated by her subsequent experience of violence, the root cause of her current injuries is this act of violence. In this respect the counselling notes report that a subsequent sexual assault by a different offender involving oral penetration 'further impacted on the Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that the client experienced after both assaults'.

1. The Applicant has been assessed as eligible for a Category C recognition payment on the basis that she was a primary victim of an act of violence perpetrated that caused her injury. The Respondent's position is that the correct and preferable decision is to affirm the decision under review.

1. The Respondent's position is that the Applicant was subject to a single act of violence. The Respondent's position is that the Senior Assessor was correct to find that the sexual assault occurred on one occasion and therefore did not form a series of related acts. The Respondent submits:

Conduct that occurs in the course of a single incident or occasion of sexual assault, should not be characterised as a "series of related acts" for the purpose of establishing eligibility for a Category B

1. The Respondent submits that the consequence of adopting the interpretation of a series of related acts advanced by the Applicant would be to render meaningless the distinction between a Category B payment and a Category C payment meaningless.
2. The Respondent submits FDT v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2022] NSWCATAD 155 was wrongly decided and, in any event, distinguishable from the present matter on the facts of the case. The Respondent submits that in GCL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 200 same Tribunal member concluded that an assault that occurred in GCL's room 'involved both sexual touching and a sexual assault as well as at least one instance of a physical assault': GCL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 200 at [81].
3. The Respondent's position is also consistent with the Tribunal's approach in subsequent decisions: GFI v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSW CATAD 128; FFL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2022] NSW CATAD 107; GNY v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSW CATAD 12.

1. The Respondent submits that while serious bodily harm is not defined in the VRS Act it is apparent that serious bodily harm involves a higher threshold than actual bodily harm. The Respondent refers to BMF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCATAD 97 at [71] where the Tribunal considered the meaning of actual bodily harm and stated:

The case of R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 at 509 provides authority for the proposition that actual bodily harm means "any hurt or injury to a person, which does not have to be permanent, but is more than merely transient or trifling." Whilst that case deals with actual bodily harm, in an instance of psychological harm, the harm must also be more than transient or trifling. Both physical and psychological or psychiatric injuries through different types of evidence constitute harm to the person. The threshold is that the hurt or injury must also be something that has an effect (general or specific) but importantly one that is more than transient or trifling

1. The Respondent submits that the award of Category B recognition payment would be inconsistent with the purpose of the VRS Act, which is that the most serious forms of sexual assault attract a category B payment, a proposition the Respondent contends is supported by the second reading speech to the VRS Act which states:

...the amount [of recognition payment] will vary, depending on the nature of the act of violence' with $10 000 being payable to 'a victim of the most serious kinds of sexual assault - one involving serious injury, the use of a weapon or multiple offenders, or for a victim of a series of related acts involving sexual assault, indecent assault, or attempted sexual assault involving serious bodily injury.

1. With respect to the facts of this case, the Respondent's position is that the medical evidence is not sufficient to support a finding of serious bodily injury as a direct result of the act of violence. The Respondent submits that it is difficult to establish a causal link between the Applicant's presentation in counselling sessions in 2024 and the act of violence that occurred a decade earlier in circumstances where the Applicant was subject to supervening traumas.

1. It is not in dispute that the Applicant is a primary victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault that caused her injury. Where the parties disagree is whether the act of violence perpetrated against the Applicant was one of a series of related acts and whether the Applicant suffered serious bodily injury as a result of an act of violence.
2. The Tribunal accepts that while the purpose of the VRS Act is beneficial, this must not obscure the essential question 'determining the meaning the relevant words used require': Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown [2003] HCA 54 at [33]. Furthermore, the evidence must be sufficient to make the findings sought or relied upon by a party: GNY v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 12 at [42].

1. The Tribunal finds that the police report is sufficient to establish that the Applicant was the primary victim of two acts of violence, involving a sexual assault consisting of oral penetration and a sexual assault of vaginal penetration that occurred when she was around fifteen years of age.
2. The Senior Assessor was satisfied that the sexual assault consisting of oral penetration and the sexual assault consisting of vaginal penetration occurred on one occasion and therefore formed one single act of violence, and not an act of violence comprising 'a series of related acts'.
3. In FDT Senior Member McAteer found a woman who was a victim of sexual assault on a beach was a victim of an act of violence that was one of a series of related acts that occurred on same day rather than a solitary act of violence. The Tribunal found at [50]-[54]:

51 The COPS Event held within both Exhibits 'A-1' and 'R-1' provides evidence of at least four separate assaults which would (of themselves, constitute separate but related acts constituting one 'act of violence' for the purpose of s -19 of the VR and S Act.

52 The COPS Event refers to the following matters which in my view constitute individual acts coupled with possible offence references:

(the offender) began to pull at my clothes. (common assault)

He shoved it (his erect penis) in my face (indecent assault / common assault / commit act of indecency)

He slapped me in the face with his erection (indecent assault / common assault / commit act of indecency),

Touching my vagina with his left hand (indecent assault / sexual assault / common assault / commit act of indecency)

Placed his hand around my neck. He was squeezing hard with his right hand. I was trying to remove his hand while still pushing him away and trying to keep my knees together, it was hard to breathe. ... I lost consciousness. (assault / assault occasioning actual bodily harm)

The reference to: I came to, .. (offender) standing over me. He pulled a full condom off his penis and threw it into the sand, pulled his pants up.. coupled with the other evidence about the offender's intentions and the evidence that my neck and vagina were extremely sore, is evidence of ( sexual assault - unlawful sexual intercourse -aggravated sexual assault)

53 In my view the above evidence demonstrates and establishes that FDT was the victim of at least six separate acts of violence that for the purposes of s 19 constitute an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons that have all involved violent conduct that have resulted in injury to one of those persons ( FDT ).

54 In the circumstances of the offences FDT would have been terrified and would have received a combination of physical and psychological injuries from the acts collectively. In that regard I find that all of the elements concerning related acts of violence are made out. In my view the evidence is clear that as a result the elements of s 36 (2) (b) are made out in that the sexual assault, sexual touching or sexual act or attempted sexual assault involved violence and was one of a series of related acts.

1. The Tribunal found it was 'clear that the physical and indecent assault concluded prior to the significant sexual assault where the offender commenced to rape FDT' and accepted that 'the circumstances of the offences' appeared to meet the criteria in s 36(2)(b) of the Act: FDT at [57].
2. The Respondent's position is that FDT was wrongly decided, and, in any event, that is distinguishable on the facts because in FDT the 'physical and indecent assault' involved strangulation which resulted in a period of unconsciousness and the applicant regained consciousness as the 'significant assault ended'. The Respondent infers that 'it would appear that the loss of consciousness was a relevant factor in the Tribunal finding that an assault had concluded prior to the commencement of the sexual assault.'
3. The Respondent submits the fact a sexual assault may include physical violence or threats before, during or after the act, is recognised in s 61J the Crimes Acts 1900 (NSW) as an aggravating circumstance as opposed to a separate offence. The Respondent submits that a physical assault should not be characterised as a separate offence or act for the purpose of establishing 'a series of related acts' as the consequence of such an approach would be that almost all sexual assaults would, by virtue of the nature of offending, be capable of being characterised as a series of related acts. Such an outcome would be inconsistent with the clear intention of s 35 of the VRS Act to confer eligibility for different categories of recognition payment in respect of different sexual offences and the circumstances of offending. This is because it would render insignificant the distinction between different sexual offences and the circumstances of the offending as set out s 35(4)(a) and (b), s 35(3)(a) and (b) and s 35(2)(a) and (b) of the VRS Act.
4. In the Tribunal's view, there is force to the Respondent's submission that if every element of an offender's conduct during a sexual assault was intended to be treated as a discrete act of violence, then almost all sexual assaults would be capable of being characterised as a series of related acts because sexual assaults, by their nature, involve a level of violence and threat. The Tribunal accepts that physical violence that occurs during the offence of sexual assault may be considered an aggravating circumstance (s 61J of the Crimes Act) rather than a discrete act of violence. However, in the Tribunal's view, this argument does not apply in relation to two or more acts of sexual assault that are, in their nature, sufficiently distinct from each other such that, if only one of the relevant acts of sexual assault had occurred, it would have been sufficient to establish the applicant was a victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault for the purpose of the s 35(3)(a) of the VRS Act.
5. The question the Tribunal must consider in this case is where, in circumstances where it is accepted that sexual assault involving oral penetration was followed by sexual assault by the same perpetrator involving vaginal penetration, the Applicant was a victim of a ''series of related acts' for the purpose of eligibility for a category B recognition payment.
6. Section 19 (4) of the VRS Act provides that except as provided by s 19(5) and (6), a series of related acts is two or more acts that are related because:

(a) they were committed against the same person, and

(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner -

(i) they were committed at approximately the same time, or

(ii) they were committed over a period of time by the same person or group of persons, or

(iii) they were, for any other reason, related to each other.

1. Section 36(2) of the VRS Act provides that only one recognition payment is payable to a single victim in respect of a series of related acts of violence against the victim.
2. The definition of 'series of related acts' in s 19 of the VRS Act operates 'to treat conduct which would amount to separate offences as a single act of violence for the purposes of the statute' and, in particular for the purposes of the recognition payments which may be made under the VRS Act: DRJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights (No 2) [2020] NSWCA 242 at [54].
3. Section 19 of the VRS Act contemplates that two or more acts are related because they were committed at approximately the same time by the same person or they were committed over a period of time by the same person. The Tribunal is of the view that the conduct constituting the acts of violence in the nature of sexual assault involves two acts of violence. First, the Applicant was the victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault that involved the offender putting his penis in her mouth while she was asleep. After this assault had concluded, the Applicant was sexually assaulted through vaginal penetration. Had the conduct only involved the first act of violence, that involved oral penetration of the Applicant's mouth, the Applicant would be entitled to category C recognition payment as defined in s 35(3)(a) of the Act as a victim of a sexual assault.
4. The Tribunal finds that the Applicant was subject to at least two distinct sexual assaults: a sexual assault involving penetration of the mouth and a sexual assault involving vaginal penetration. The Tribunal finds that the sexual assault involving vaginal penetration occurred after the sexual assault involving penetration of the mouth, had ended. The Tribunal is satisfied that the conduct that constitutes the 'act of violence' by a perpetrator involves 'two or more acts', each of which would, of itself, be sufficient to establish that the Applicant was a primary victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault (as opposed to conduct that would amount to circumstances of aggravation). The Tribunal accepts that the two acts are related because they were committed by the same person on the same date.
5. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal has considered the approach of the Tribunal in the following matters: FFL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2022] NSWCATAD 107 (FFL), GNY v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 12 (GNY); GFI v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 128 (GFI) and GCL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 200. However, the issue that arises in the present case in relation to the application of s 19 and s 35(2)(b) of the VRS Act was not directly considered by the Tribunal in any of these matters.
6. In any event, the Tribunal considers the present matter is distinguishable on its facts. FFL relates to the Tribunal's decision to affirm the decision to approve a category C recognition payment to a victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault in circumstances where the applicant gave evidence to the Tribunal that he was subject to a single sexual assault: FFL at [38]. GNY concerns sexual assault of a 15-year-old involving one offender and a sexual assault involving vaginal penetration: GNY at [7]. Both these matters are distinguishable from the present case which concerns a sexual assault involving oral penetration and a sexual assault involving vaginal penetration.
7. In GFI, the Tribunal set aside the decision on the basis that the applicant was entitled to a Category C recognition payment in respect of an attempted sexual assault resulting in serious bodily injury. The facts in GFI concerned sexual touching and did not address the argument that two distinct acts of sexual assault by the same offender, which are different in nature, but occur on the same date, fell within the definition of a 'series of related acts in s 19(4) of the Act. Likewise, the Tribunal in GCL did not specifically address this question: GCL v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 200.
8. The Tribunal is satisfied that, in the circumstances of this case and having accepted that there were two discrete and separate sexual assaults by the same offender, the acts of violence fall within the definition of 'a series of related acts' in s 19(4) for the purpose of assessing eligibility for a recognition payment under s 35 of the VRS Act.

1. Section 18 of the VRS Act defines 'injury 'as meaning 'actual bodily harm, grievous bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm...' However, the Act does not define the term 'serious bodily injury' or identify the factors that distinguish it from actual bodily harm.
2. In submissions, the parties agreed that that while serious bodily injury is not defined in the VRS Act, serious bodily injury is a higher threshold than actual bodily harm. With respect to the meaning of serious bodily injury, the parties both referred to BDJ v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (No 2) [2014] NSWCATAD 187 where Senior Member McAteer considered the meaning of serious bodily injury under the VRS Act. The Tribunal has considered that decision and the authorities referred to therein.
3. In assessing whether the act of violence in this matter resulted in serious bodily harm, the Tribunal is guided by the following principles:

(1) Actual bodily harm means any hurt or injury to a person, which does not have to be permanent, but "must be more than merely transient or trifling": R v Donovan [1934] 2 KB 498 at 509; BDJ v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (No 2) [2014] NSWCATAD 187 at [38].

(2) Where "a person is caused hurt or injury resulting, not in any physical injury, but an injury to their state of mind for the time being, that is within the definition of 'actual bodily harm'": R v Miller [1953] 2 All ER 529 at 534; BDJ v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (No 2) [2014] NSWCATAD 187 at [38].

(3) Whether the injury is psychological or physical, the threshold is that the injury must also be something that has an effect (general or specific) and is more than transient or trifling. The psychological injury does not need to be permanent but needs to go beyond merely trifling or transient emotions, feelings and states of mind: BMF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2020] NSWCATAD 97 at [71]; see also Shu Qiang Li v R [2005] NSWCCA 442 at [45].

(4) Serious bodily injury must be 'serious,' which, when serious is given its ordinary meaning, is understood as: 'of grave aspect', 'giving cause for apprehension': The Macquarie Dictionary (9th edition); BDJ v Victims Compensation Fund Corporation (No2) [2014] NSWCATAD 187 at [41]; CRT v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2017] NSWCATAD 174 at [34]- [35].

(5) Serious bodily injury must be as a direct result of the act of violence, but the act of violence does not need to be the sole cause of her injury but rather a proximate, effective or dominant cause: Dobbie v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2018] NSWSC 1989 at [68]; CRT v Commissioner v Victims Rights [2017] NSW CATAD 174 at [35].

(6) Whether a particular injury will constitute a serious bodily injury is a question that will turn on the facts of the particular case. This question is to be determined by the decision-maker, or the Tribunal on review, as the finder of fact.

1. The Applicant has provided a certificate of injury and counselling notes prepared by her counsellor. The Applicant first engaged with this counsellor on 3 May 2024 and reported being the victim of sexual assaults when she was a child. The sexual assaults were perpetrated by two different offenders at different times. The first act of violence, which is subject of the decision under review, involved non-consensual sexual intercourse involving oral penetration and non-consensual sexual intercourse involving vaginal penetration. The second act of violence, which is not the subject of the decision under review, occurred at a later time and involved non-consensual sexual intercourse involving oral penetration by a different perpetrator.
2. In respect of the child sexual assaults that are the subject of this application, the certificate of injury records that the Applicant 'blamed herself for what happened', 'developed a fear of men', 'was afraid of going to sleep', 'had nightmares', was 'not believed by friends and got bullied for lying about being raped' , 'lost friends', 'had poor school attendance', 'found it hard to have healthy sexual relationships after [the sexual assaults]' and 'it affected her interpersonal relationships'. The certificate of injury provides the following provisional diagnosis:

[The applicant] had suicidal thoughts and self harm urges. [The applicant] had symptoms of depression and PTSD.

1. The Respondent submits that while the certificate of injury provides a provisional diagnosis of PTSD, there is no formal diagnosis of psychological or psychiatric disorder or evidence of a referral to obtain a formal diagnosis. The Respondent submits that while the certificate also provides a provisional diagnosis of suicidal thoughts and self-harm urges, it is unclear from the certificate whether this is a current symptom, or whether the Applicant reported this following the act of violence. The Respondent also submits that the Applicant has been subjected to various supervening traumas, which mean that it is difficult to establish a causal link between her presentation in the counselling sessions in 2024 and the act of violence that is the subject of this application.
2. The Applicant submits that the Tribunal should follow the approach of SM Riordan in CRT v Commissioner v Victims Rights [2017] NSW CATAD 174, a matter concerning a 14-year-old victim of a single sexual assault, where SM Riordan stated at [35]-[36]:

In the context of the current matter, to establish that she has suffered "serious bodily injury" as a result of the sexual assault, CRT must prove on the balance of probabilities that she suffered psychological or psychiatric harm that is more than trifling; is of grave aspect; and/or gives cause for apprehension.

However, the Act does not require CRT to prove that the sexual assault is the sole cause of her current psychological or psychiatric injury, provided that the evidence establishes that the injury directly resulted from the act of violence.

1. As noted above, the Senior Assessor found that the Applicant was the victim of a sexual assault that resulted in injury, but not serious bodily injury. Like the Assessor and the Senior Assessor, the Tribunal is satisfied that the evidence before it is sufficient to find, on the balance of probabilities, that the injury resulted directly from the act of violence.
2. The Tribunal is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant has suffered psychological or psychiatric harm and actual bodily harm as a direct result of the act of violence. The Tribunal is satisfied that, as a direct result of the act of violence, the Applicant suffered psychological or psychiatric injury, that is an injury to her state of mind that is psychological and more than transient or trifling, manifesting in symptoms of PTSD, depression, and suicidal ideation and that her symptoms have continued for approximately 10 years. While the injury may have been exacerbated by subsequent trauma, the Applicant is not required to establish that act of violence is the sole cause of the injury as the evidence is sufficient to establish the injury directly resulted from the act of violence.
3. Having found that the Applicant was subject to actual bodily harm, the Tribunal now turns to the question of whether the injury to the Applicant reaches the threshold of a 'serious bodily injury.' The question of whether bodily injury constitutes serious bodily injury is necessarily a question of fact and degree that must be determined based on the available evidence. While there is no requirement in the VRS Act for a formal diagnosis of PTSD, in such matters the finder of fact must be satisfied that serious bodily injury has been inflicted as a direct result of the sexual assault with evidence sufficient to support such a finding: GNY v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 12 at [35].
4. The Applicant has submitted that it is relevant that this is the first act of violence perpetrated against the Applicant. The Applicant was a child who was still at school when the sexual assaults occurred, and it is submitted the injury that resulted from the act of violence had a profound impact on her state of mind and daily functioning at a formative age. The counselling records satisfy the Tribunal that the injury impacted on the Applicant's daily functioning: she became withdrawn, her school attendance suffered, as did her sleep and interpersonal relationships, and she experienced suicidal thoughts and self-harm urges.
5. While the VRS Act provides for categories of recognition payments where Category B recognises the most serious sexual assaults, s 35(2) and s 35(3) of the VRS Act do not distinguish between the sexual assault of a child or the sexual assault of an adult. However, the Tribunal considers that the structure of the VRS Act gives weight to the view that the sexual assault of a child is a particularly grave matter. Section 61J of the Crimes Act identifies circumstances of aggravation for the purpose of the offence of aggravated sexual assault to include circumstances in which: the complainant is under the age of 16 years. The Crimes Act also provides for a separate offence of sexual assault of a person above the age of 14 and under 16 years of age.
6. In assessing whether the psychological injury that resulted from the act of violence is a serious bodily injury, the Tribunal has considered the available evidence about the impact of the injury on the Applicant as a child and the current impact of the injury. The Tribunal accepts the Applicant's submissions that there is no evidence that supports a finding the Applicant recovered from the effects of the psychological or psychiatric injury that resulted from the assault in 2014 before her experience of subsequent trauma. To the extent that there is a degree of ambiguity in the counselling reports about whether the Applicant expressed suicidal ideation immediately after the act of violence or in the years that followed, the Tribunal accepts the Applicant's submission that symptoms of suicidal ideation as a result of an act of violence is relevant to the assessment of whether the injury is a serious bodily injury, whether the suicidal ideation manifests immediately after the act of violence or at a later point in time.
7. Based on the totality of the evidence before the Tribunal, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant was the primary victim of an act of violence in the nature of sexual assault resulting in serious bodily injury for the purpose of s 35(2)(a). While it is strictly unnecessary to make this finding as the Tribunal has already found that the Applicant is eligible for a Category B recognition payment pursuant to s 35(2)(b), if the Tribunal were wrong in its analysis of s 35(2)(b), Applicant would, for the reasons given above, be entitled to a category B recognition payment pursuant to s 35(2)(a) of the VRS Act.

1. The Tribunal is satisfied that the elements of s 19 and s 20 of the VRS Act have been met on the available evidence and that the Applicant has satisfied the relevant requirements for documentary evidence in s 39(2)(b) of the VRS Act.
2. For the reasons above, the Tribunal finds that the Applicant is eligible for a Category B recognition payment pursuant to s 35 (2) (a) and s 35(2)(b) of the VRS Act.
3. The Tribunal finds that there are no relevant factors under s 44 of the VRS Act that would justify the reduction of the recognition payment.
4. On the basis of the Tribunal's findings of fact, the correct and preferable decision is to set aside a decision of the Respondent on 9 April 2025 and substitute a decision that the Applicant is entitled to a Category B recognition payment in the amount of $10,000.

(1) The decision of the Respondent dated 9 April 2025 is set aside.

(2) In substitution of that decision the Applicant is approved a Category B recognition payment in accordance with s 35 (2) and s 36 (1) (c) of the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.