(a) the nature and gravity of the offence or alleged offence and its relevance to child-related work; and

(b) the period of time since the applicant committed, or allegedly committed, the offence; and

(c) whether a finding of guilt or a conviction was recorded for the offence or a charge for the offence is still pending; and

(e) the ages of the applicant and of any victim at the time the applicant committed, or allegedly committed, the offence; and

(f) whether or not the conduct that constituted the offence or to which the charge relates has been decriminalised since the applicant committed, or allegedly committed, the offence; and

(g) the applicant's behaviour since he or she committed, or allegedly committed, the offence; and

(h) the likelihood of future threat to a child caused by the applicant; and

(i) any information given by the applicant in, or in relation to, the application; and

(j) any other matter that the Secretary considers relevant to the application.

1. Section 13(3) requires the Secretary, in satisfying himself that giving an assessment notice would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children to be satisfied that:
   • (a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the applicant that was not directly supervised by another person while the applicant was engaged in any type of child-related work; and
   • (b) the applicant's engagement in any type of child-related work would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children.
2. On 8 September 2016, a delegate of the Secretary having considered the matters raised in the s 11 material and GYI's response and supporting material, refused the assessment notice and issued a negative notice.
3. GYI has applied to the Tribunal under s 26(1)(b) for review of the decision to give a negative notice. She did so within the time stipulated by s 26(4).
4. Section 26B sets out the jurisdiction of the Tribunal when reviewing a decision to give a negative notice on a Category B application. By s 26B, the Tribunal:

(1) ... must determine that it is appropriate to refuse to give an assessment notice unless satisfied that giving the assessment notice would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children, having regard to any matters to which the Secretary must have regard under section 13(2).

(2) In satisfying itself that giving an assessment notice would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children, VCAT must be satisfied that -

(a) a reasonable person would allow his or her child to have direct contact with the applicant that was not directly supervised by another person while the applicant was engaged in any type of child-related work; and

(b) the applicant's engagement in any type of child-related work would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children.

(3) Even if VCAT is satisfied under subsections (1) and (2) that giving an assessment notice would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children, VCAT must determine that it is appropriate to refuse to give the assessment notice unless it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to give the assessment notice.

1. I should also refer to ss 1 and 1A. Section 1 of the Act defines the main purpose of the Act as:

'to assist in protecting children from sexual or physical harm by ensuring that people who work with, or care for, them are subject to a screening process.'

'When the Secretary or VCAT makes a decision or takes an action under this ACT, the protection of children from sexual and physical harm must be the paramount consideration.'

1. Section 26B(1) requires me to consider the matters in s 13(2). Although it is often convenient to deal with the matters set out in s 13(2) in turn, this is a case where it can properly be said the inquiry into the circumstances of the Category B charges revealed information about other matters properly regarded as relevant, as provided for in s 13(2)(j). Not only are those other matters significant in themselves, they provide a context for an understanding of the circumstances of the Category B offences. I will therefore deal with the circumstances more generally, before turning to a separate consideration of the matters set out in s 13(2)(a)-(j).
2. There was an extensive body of materials presented to me. It addressed: GYI's criminal history; her corrections history and child protection history; and her personal history and circumstances since arrest in July 2015. In addition to the source documents produced by the Secretary as a result of the s 11 inquiries (from Victoria Police, Corrections, Court records and DHHS records), GYI provided the two written responses to the Secretary's invitation to respond to the s 11 material (to which I have already referred); supporting documentation in relation to her participation in drug rehabilitation programs in 2014, and again, from September 2015; information in relation to her participation and progress in the AOD Diploma; and testimonials from family and friends. At the hearing, GYI, her mother, grandfather, and drug counsellor/mentor, Mr Doquile, all gave evidence, and with the exception of her grandfather, were cross-examined.

1. So far as GYI's criminal history was concerned, in addition to the evidence given by GYI, I was provided with her criminal record, extracts of court orders and the police summaries relied on in respect of her various court hearings, the circumstances giving rise to the Category B commercial quantity trafficking charge in 2015 - including a copy of the charges which were preferred - the prosecution summary, and the reasons for sentence.
2. In January 2009, GYI was convicted of and fined for two separate charges of possess, and two separate charges of use amphetamine (speed), one each of possess a dangerous article and prohibited weapon, and one of failing to answer bail. In April 2009, she was dealt with for one charge each of theft and dealing with property reasonably suspected of being proceeds of crime, driving an unregistered vehicle, and a further weapons offence. She was released on an adjourned undertaking to be of good behaviour for 12 months.
3. GYI was next before the court in October 2014. It was then that she was sentenced to a 12 month CCO on the Category B charge of threat to inflict serious injury, and a further related charge of unlawful assault. On the same day, in what appears to be a consolidated hearing in respect of a number of episodes of separate offending, she was convicted of two charges of fail to answer bail, 12 of obtain property by deception and other dishonesty charges, one charge each of possession of methylamphetamine and amphetamine (i.e. ice and speed respectively), one of doing an act prejudicial to the good order or management of a gaol, and four charges relating to use or drive an unregistered vehicle. In respect of all these charges too, she was sentenced to a 12 month CCO.
4. The CCO was breached by non-compliance and the commission of further offences. It was in July 2015, nine months into the CCO that GYI was charged with the Category B commercial quantity trafficking offence. By then, she was on three separate bail orders in respect of charges for offences occurring earlier in the time the CCO was in force.
5. Eventually, on 7 January 2016, GYI was dealt with in the Magistrates' Court for breaching the October 2014 CCO, and resentenced in respect of the original offences (including the Category B offence of threat to inflict serious injury) to a further 12 month CCO. She was at the same time convicted and sentenced for committing an indictable offence whilst on bail and breaching a conduct condition of bail, possession of methylamphetamine, three separate charges of handling stolen goods and one of going equipped to steal. In addition, there were a further seven separate charges relating to driving or using an unregistered vehicle, one charge of exceeding the speed limit and two charges of driving whilst suspended. A 12 month CCO was imposed on all charges. That expired on 6 January 2017.
6. Finally, there is the matter of the second Category B charge, and associated charges. It was a condition of the bail GYI was on in July 2015 that she live at an address in Springvale. In fact she was living in an apartment in South Yarra. When a search warrant was executed in the South Yarra apartment on 7 July 2015, GYI was living there and was found in possession of 11 bags containing a total of 185.6g of 83-90% pure methylamphetamine, two bags containing 75.4g of 73-75% pure heroin, a number of mobile phones, and $2800 in cash. She was found to be carrying a taser, a prohibited weapon, in her coat pocket.
7. Although GYI described her conduct in her submissions to the Secretary and evidence before me as agreeing to turn a blind eye to trafficking activities being conducted in the apartment in return for free rent and free supply of drugs for her own use, her DNA was found on a number of the packages of drugs found in the apartment, and she later admitted assisting in the packaging of the drugs using vacuum sealers found in the apartment, and supplying or acting as a conduit for the supply of drugs to other people.
8. It is an element of the offence of trafficking in a commercial quantity of a drug that the offender is aware, or reckless to the possibility, that the quantity of the drug exceeds the prescribed commercial quantity (for methylamphetamine, 100g pure or 500g mixed). A traffickable quantity (that is, the amount in a person's possession which triggers a presumption of possession for a purpose related to trafficking) is 3g. Possession of less than 3g of methylamphetamine is presumed to be for personal use. Ultimately, the prosecution accepted a plea of guilty to a charge of trafficking, not trafficking in a commercial quantity. Such plea negotiations are not uncommon or improper. The effect was to reduce the maximum penalty for the offence charged from 25 years imprisonment to 15 years.
9. GYI pleaded guilty in the County Court to trafficking in the 186.5g of methylamphetamine and the 75.4g of heroin, to another dishonesty offence - this time theft of mail from letterboxes of other occupants of the apartment building where she was living - a further prohibited weapon charge, in respect of her possession of the taser, a further proceeds of crime charge, this one relating to the $2,800 found in her possession, and again, breaching bail by committing indictable offences on bail and breaching the residential condition of her bail. She was convicted of all charges and on 12 October 2016 sentenced to a CCO for a period of two years. As at the time of the hearing of the application for review before me, that order had been in operation for four months. It is due to expire on 11 October 2018.

1. GYI's Corrections file contained the supervision file in respect of the October 2014 Order, the January 2016 order, and the October 2016 order, the breach proceedings file in respect of the 2014 order, the Assessment Outcome reports requested before the making of the January 2016 and October 2016 orders, and the Judicial Monitoring reports provided pursuant to the January 2016 and October 2016 orders. In addition, it contained the reception assessment report completed when GYI was remanded into custody on 8 July 2015, and the reports provided to corrections by ACSO/COATS following GYI's referral to AOD counselling under the conditions of each of the three CCO's to which she has been sentenced.
2. The files are broadly consistent with the other evidence generally, reflective of GYI's criminal history, including the history of non-compliance I have already set out, and of the other evidence in relation to an initial, relatively short period of ice abstinence in 2014, and her more sustained period of maintaining herself drug free since July 2015.
3. There were some discrepancies in the history of substance abuse recorded in various parts of the Corrections file, and in GYI's evidence. In particular, there were varying and contradictory accounts from her, or attributed to her, in relation to her ice use up to 2008, between 2008 and 2012, from 2012 to her first attempt at rehab in 2014, and following her relapse in 2014 and up to the time of her remand in July 2015. There was also a discrepancy between the Corrections records and GYI's evidence of her alcohol intake at the time she was remanded. In her evidence before me she said it was minimal, but the reception assessment completed on her remand recorded GYI reporting she was drinking up to two bottles of wine a day.
4. GYI gave evidence she used cannabis from her early teens, added speed in her mid-teens, and then "pills" from her late teens. The evidence from the Corrections files, and GYI's evidence before me, was inconsistent and unsatisfactory about when GYI started using ice, and about the extent of any of periods of sustained ice use up to the time of the commission of the threat to cause serious injury charge in 2012.
5. I consider GYI was inconsistent in her descriptions of the extent of her ice use up to the time of the commission of the offence of threat to cause serious injury. I think it likely she exaggerated her use when seeking to excuse or minimise her criminal behaviour, but also likely that she minimised it when dealing with the extent to which her children were exposed to her drug use, particularly her ice use in the period before she lost custody of her children. Although this suggests a tendency to present events in the manner most favourable to her in the circumstances, and leaves me unable to make finding about her actual ice use in late 2012, I do not consider the inconsistent accounts in relation to it to undermine her credibility more generally. Not only is it often difficult for people who have led a chaotic life as a result of their abuse of drugs to place past events in a coherent and consistent chronology, but her counsellor, Mr Doquile, emphasised in his evidence that he had actively discouraged her from looking at the past, and her past periods and levels of ice use, as in his opinion, recovery generally requires a concentration on the present, and dwelling on the detail of past behaviour can be counter-productive.
6. For similar reasons I do not consider it necessary to resolve the conflict in the evidence in relation to GYI's alcohol intake at the time of her remand in custody. Although I do not consider GYI to be a reliable historian in respect of her alcohol intake at the time of her remand, her unreliability in this regard does not lead me to form an adverse view of her credibility more generally. It is not suggested alcohol abuse poses a risk to the safety of children.
7. What I do conclude, from the combination of the criminal history and the history of drug abuse associated with it, is that GYI was, for varying but often extended periods during the period 2008 to 2015, unreliable, unwilling to or incapable of arresting her substance abuse, not prepared to comply with court orders, including answering her bail and complying with her bail and CCO conditions, and not able or prepared to refrain from committing further offences. Over this period her disregard for the law was widespread and indiscriminate. It is fair to characterise her as being prepared to do what she wanted when she wanted without regard to the rights of others, the obligations cast upon her generally in relation to obeying the law, or the specific obligations imposed on her by various court orders.
8. GYI's offending and drug abusing behaviour prior July 2015 stands in marked contrast to her behaviour since then. She has remained substance free, and has submitted to and complied with stringent court ordered conditions, on CISP bail and on her CCO's. She has not committed any further offences. She has sustained this now for 19 months. She has been trusted to care for her children either as the custodial parent, or the weekend carer. She has enrolled in and complied with all course requirements of an AOD course. She is studying and working under supervision and has a career path open to her in AOD counselling. Even making full allowance for the fact that consistent engagement in the workforce is not always easy or feasible for the primary carers of young children, this is a marked change in her attitude to study and work. Her educational and employment record before 2015 suggests that she was not willing or prepared to make a meaningful commitment to engagement in work or study before then.

1. DHHS reported their files revealed nine separate notifications between 2007 and 2015. The first, in 2007, was in relation to allegations of substance use (cannabis, ice and ecstasy) by GYI when pregnant with her second child. GYI gave evidence she had stopped using substances upon discovering she was pregnant. That is consistent with the outcome. Although a protection order was made, the oldest child was permitted to remain in her care, and ultimately the case was closed without any further protective concerns being notified.
2. There were no further notifications until 2012. By then GYI's third and fourth children had been born. Two separate notifications were made in August and November 2012 alleging substance abuse, with consequent parenting and safety concerns. It is to be noted the Category B offence of threat to inflict serious injury occurred between the dates of those notifications. On the first notification, GYI denied substance abuse, no safety concerns were identified, and the case was closed at intake phase. On the second, although the file records a change in GYI's behaviour was noted, it also records that substance abuse was "unable to be confirmed." GYI was referred to a parenting support program, and again the case was closed at intake phase.
3. This is one of the areas where GYI's evidence before me as to whether she was using ice and other substances before, or at the time of the commission of the first Category B offence, or whether she only commenced after the commission of that offence was confusing and contradictory. There was information in the Corrections materials which was at odds with at least parts of her account. As I have already noted, although I have concerns about the accuracy of GYI's evidence concerning the times at and extent to which she was abusing substances over this period, I am not sure whether she is untruthful, minimising or simply an unreliable historian as a result of her history of substance abuse.
4. Between January 2013 and February 2014 there were four notifications alleging substance abuse or parenting concerns. The notes record GYI was by January 2013 acknowledging past substance use. The file records that allegations of neglect, poor parenting or inappropriate physical discipline were not substantiated, although it was noted by January 2013 GYI had disengaged from the parenting support program to which she had been referred in November 2012. She attributed that to conflict with the caseworker. She was re-referred and then maintained her engagement with the support service over the course of that year. In her evidence, GYI said she was living in public housing at the time, and was the subject of malicious reports.
5. By March 2014, only a month after the last of these four reports, a further notification in respect of poor parenting was received. This notification included concerns that GYI was leaving the children unsupervised, or inappropriately supervised, and that discipline was inappropriate. GYI denied the allegations, but in the course of their investigations DHHS received further reports raising parenting concerns. One report was from the police, who had gone to her home to arrest GYI in May 2014, and reported concerns about inappropriate supervision. As a result, a protection application was made, and the children were removed from GYI's care. After some months with GYI's mother, they were placed in their father's custody. DHHS reported it closed the file after GYI had been remanded in custody, and there had been no contact between GYI and the children since they had been in their father's care.
6. GYI gave evidence that, soon after the children had been removed from her care, she went into the Bridge Program of residential rehabilitation, and for a time was able to remain substance free, but by late 2014 had relapsed into substance abuse again. The period of abstinence and engagement with rehabilitation services coincided with the October 2014 court hearing, in which all then outstanding charges, including the Category B offence of threat to inflict serious injury, were dealt with. It was then that GYI was placed on her first 12 month CCO, expiring in October 2015. She said that following her relapse in late 2014 she had deliberately kept away from the children so as to avoid exposing them to risk of harm.
7. The final notification was in December 2015, after GYI had been released on CISP bail in respect of the trafficking and associated charges. DHHS was notified the oldest and youngest child were in her care. On investigation, DHHS was satisfied GYI was substance free, in stable housing, accepting supports, and that her care of the children was being appropriately supervised by her husband, who retained custody of the middle two children. DHHS was satisfied there were no protective concerns and closed the case.
8. In her evidence, GYI confirmed the care arrangement for the children following her engagement with rehabilitative services was one she and her former husband had agreed upon as being in the best interests of the children. She gave two illustrations of her ability to understand her children's needs and put their best interests first. She had arranged for her oldest child, then ten years old, to see a psychologist because she was of the view that he was at an age where he may suffer psychological effects from being exposed to her drug abusing lifestyle in the past. She said although he was not showing any ill effects, she was applying what she had learnt in her own rehabilitation and through studying her AOD course to seek to protect against the harm she now understood children can suffer as a result of exposure to a parent's drug abuse.
9. She further gave evidence that the oldest child had returned to live with his father and the two middle siblings, after she and her former husband had agreed it was in his best interests to return to his father and other siblings. She said she had put his interests ahead of her own, despite her desire to have all of her children return to live with her.
10. GYI gave evidence she cares for all children most weekends, again as a result of a cooperative arrangement with their father. She stressed that she wants to prove she is again capable of caring for all four children, and is working towards that goal. Her evidence, which I accept, is that her desire to prove herself a responsible parent and deserving of having the children in her care has been the motivating force for her being and remaining drug free since July 2015.

Personal history and circumstances since arrest

1. GYI is now 31. On her own account, and as documented in various reports in the Corrections materials to which I have already referred, she began using cannabis in her early teens, and by her late teens was also using speed and "pills". She married young, and had four children who are now aged between 11 and six. That means she must have been only 20 when her first child was born. She described her marriage as "volatile" from the time of the birth of the first child.
2. GYI gave evidence that even after the birth of the first two children, she and her husband used to go clubbing on weekends, that her mother would look after the children when they did so, and that the "pill" taking was confined to those occasions. It was unclear when and how often she used cannabis and speed, after the birth of her first child, and up to late 2012, but in any event as the DHHS reports show, there were no substantiated concerns in relation to care of the children between 2007 and 2012.
3. There is however a reference in the materials to GYI's husband being imprisoned in 2008 for breach of an Intervention Order which had been made in her favour. GYI gave evidence that she and her husband agreed upon his release to give their marriage another try. As part of that agreement she agreed to stop using ice, and did so. It is unclear on the evidence before me what GYI's ice use had been before that agreement, or when and how frequently she resumed ice use after the reconciliation in 2008. This is of course after the first DHHS notification in 2007, occasioned by the report of substance use during the early stages of her second pregnancy. In any event, the marriage continued, and two more children were born.
4. By late 2012, the marriage was again in trouble and in her evidence GYI said that at the time of the commission of the Category B threat to cause serious injury offence, she and her husband were living apart, although she considered the marriage was continuing. The marriage ended, it would appear, soon after the events of the night that gave rise to that charge.
5. Between late 2012 and mid-2014 GYI said she was using ice regularly. She said that she had never used in front of the children, and they had never seen drug paraphernalia in the house, but she now acknowledges she was at times substance impaired when responsible for their care. As the DHHS records to which I have already referred recount, the children were removed from her care by May or June of 2014. By then she was facing charges relating to drug possession, dishonesty and driving offences as well as the charge of threat to cause serious injury. In late June 2014 GYI began a six-week residential program at the Salvation Army Basin Centre, and following her discharge from the program in August 2014, she engaged with counselling and other services which enabled her to remain drug-free for some time thereafter. I have already made reference to the imposition, in October 2016 of the first CCO. It would appear she relapsed soon after that order was made.
6. Her ice use continued and escalated from then. By July 2015, when she was charged with trafficking in a commercial quantity of methylamphetamine, she said she was using significant quantities of ice daily.
7. By the time she was sentenced in the County Court in October 2016, GYI was able to show that she had been and remained drug-free in the two months that she spent in custody and for the 12 months whilst she had been on bail up until the time she was sentenced.
8. The evidence before me reveals that GYI has actively committed herself to her rehabilitation since July 2015. In addition to the frequent urinalysis screens which show that she has remained drug-free, she remains in weekly counselling with Mr Doquile, is undertaking the final semester of her AOD Diploma course, is working under the supervision of Mr Doquile to assist other substance abusers to become and remain substance free, is living in stable housing, is able to cooperate with her former husband over care of the children, is on good terms with her mother and grandfather, and has been trusted to have one, and at times two of her children living with her on a permanent basis, and to have all four children in her care on weekends.
9. She expresses great commitment to remain drug-free, to complete her AOD course and to work as a counsellor to assist other people who have lost years through substance abuse, and to prove herself worthy of having her children back in her care. She has great confidence that she has learnt the skills and strategies to enable her to maintain her commitment to remain drug-free
10. Mr Doquile is clearly very supportive of GYI, and spoke glowingly of the progress she has made, her commitment to her rehabilitation, her ability to sustain change over the past 18 months, and his confidence that she will continue on that path.
11. He considers that GYI has a gift for finding the right language to connect with young people with a history of substance abuse, and is an inspirational role model, showing other people they can turn their life around. In explaining his urging her to make this application, Mr Doquile said he needed her to assist him in his work with young people, including those aged between 16 and 18. There was no suggestion he could not continue to work unassisted by GYI with 16 - 18 year olds, or that he could not obtain assistance from other AOD workers. Nor was it suggested 16 - 18 year olds would be unable to access appropriate AOD support unless GYI were permitted to work with them.
12. GYI gave evidence she believed she was good with children, that she could communicate with them and understand their needs. Her mother gave evidence of her capacity to communicate with her own children, and other children in the extended family.
13. GYI said she wished that she had had somebody like her (that is, the person she is now) to talk to her when she was a teenager, and wanted to help young people who were intent on taking the path she did take a different path and not lose ten years of their life as she did.
14. There was initially some suggestion in the materials that GYI had been told she could not complete her course, or work with Mr Doquile in counselling people unless she had a Working With Children card (that is, had undergone a WWC check and received an assessment notice). However, further enquiries by GYI by the time of the hearing before me reveal she has now been advised that that is not the case. She is able to work, and to continue to work with Mr Doquile in the AOD counselling he undertakes without needing an assessment notice. She is able to complete her course, and has already completed more than the required quota of hours of supervised work.
15. It is only if she wishes to work specifically with young people between 16 and 18, or if Mr Doquile wants her to work specifically with young people between 16 and 18 in one of the specialist counselling services that he provides, that she would need an assessment notice to work with him or in AOD counselling generally.
16. Having dealt with the evidence generally, I will now address the specific matters set out in s 13(2).

The nature and gravity of the Category B offences and their relevance to child-related work, and the period of time since the applicant committed, or allegedly committed, the offences: s 13(2)(a) and (b)

1. The Category B offence of threat to cause serious injury was committed in November 2012, just over four years ago. GYI's then husband was the victim. He was staying with a relative, but she regarded the marriage as continuing. She came to believe he was unfaithful. She rang him one night and a woman answered the telephone. Believing this confirmed her suspicion, and that he was lying to her, she became angry. She drove to the relative's house where he was staying. She was verbally and physically aggressive. She attempted to punch him, picked up a box cutter and threatened to slit his throat, or kill herself. She took his car keys and rifled his wallet. He eventually disarmed her, and she drove away but then returned, threatening him this time with a tyre lever. She left again, again returned a short time later, and surrendered herself to the police.
2. GYI said the marriage was volatile, and that they had committed to trying to make it work, despite the physical and emotional abuse to which she had been subjected, and that she believed her trust had been betrayed. She said she reacted angrily in a manner she regretted. That was borne out by her conduct in returning to the scene and surrendering herself to the police that night, her admissions to the police and guilty plea. GYI also relied on the fact her children were not exposed to her violent behaviour. She left them at home, in the care of a neighbour.
3. More significantly, she relied on the absence of any other aggressive or threatening behaviour to her (now ex) husband, or anyone else, and the better relationship she now had with him, evidenced by their cooperation over custody and care of the children.

1. Notwithstanding the force of these mitigatory factors, in my view the circumstances are relevant to child related work. GYI reacted angrily to hearing a woman's voice. In her mind, that confirmed the suspicion she had been harbouring about her husband's infidelity. Instead of giving herself time to calm down and to consider whether that was proof of infidelity or lies, she acted on her assumption. She instigated a verbal and physical confrontation. It was a 15 minute drive to where her husband was staying. She had plenty of time to calm down, cool down and reflect on the (un)wisdom of creating a confrontation at a time of heightened emotion. She forced her way in to somebody else's home, grabbed a bladed weapon, and threated to use it. Whether the threats were vengeful, an attempt to have him comply with her demands, or to assert he caused her to self-harm is unclear.
2. Whether characterised as loss of control, or calculated use of threats of violence in an attempt to get her way, it shows on that occasion, a real problem with anger management. Whether her suspicions were well founded or not, they were just that: suspicions, and she was prepared to act on them without ascertaining whether she was correct, and when angry, not calming down, or waiting to confront her husband with her suspicions until she was calm and able, or prepared to control her anger. It showed a preparedness to resort to violence and threats, using nearby items as weapons, when suspicious and angry.
3. I have already referred to conflicting evidence as to whether GYI was substance impaired at the time. In my view, whether she was or not makes little difference. Whether substance impaired or not, she jumped to a conclusion, reacted angrily and fuelled her anger, and created a dangerous confrontation.
4. On the other hand, in the 4 years since the commission of the offence, there has been no repetition of such conduct, indicating that GYI is generally, whether substance impaired or not, better able to manage her anger.
5. The second Category B offence of which the Secretary was notified was the outstanding charge of commercial quantity trafficking in methylamphetamine. By the time the matter had come before me that charge had been withdrawn or discontinued. Thus although the lesser charge of trafficking in methylamphetamine to which GYI has now pleaded guilty and been sentenced for is a relevant matter to take into account, it is not a Category B offence, and is not relied upon by the Secretary as such for the purposes of this review.
6. I will deal, therefore, with the trafficking charge when dealing with the matters arising under s 13(2)(g), (h) and (j).

Whether a finding of guilt or conviction was recorded, and the sentence imposed: s 13(2)(c) and (d)

1. A conviction was recorded for the charge, and in October 2014, a 12 month CCO was imposed. By then, two years had passed since the commission of the offence, and GYI was able to demonstrate a relatively short period of successful drug rehabilitation. However, as noted, the period of rehabilitation was short lived, and following relapse and breach of the CCO by non-compliance with conditions and further, unrelated offending, GYI was resentenced for the original offence, to a further 12 month CCO. She has recently successfully completed that further CCO.
2. The recording of a finding of guilt, the imposition of a CCO, and the resentencing to a CCO all reflect the view taken by the sentencing magistrate of the seriousness of the offence, and that balance between just punishment, denunciation, deterrence, and encouraging rehabilitation. Given what I have been told of the circumstances of the offence, of GYI's criminal history, her circumstances at the time of offending, and at the time of the sentencing and resentencing, in my view it was appropriate to mark the seriousness of the offending by the recording of a conviction. Although the offence is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of 15 years, I also consider that it was neither appropriate nor necessary to impose a term of imprisonment having regard to the sentencing factors I have just outlined.

1. This is not a case of youthful folly, or power imbalance between offender and victim. There is nothing arising from the ages of either the applicant or the victim in this case that need separate consideration apart from the general circumstances of the offending which I have already outlined.

Whether the conduct has been decriminalised: s 13(b)(2)(f)

1. The conduct has not been decriminalised. It is still, and rightly so, a serious offence.

The applicant's behaviour since she committed the offence; any information given by the applicant in or in relation to the application: and any other matter that the Secretary considers relevant to the application: ss 13(2)(g), (i) and (j)

1. It is convenient to deal with these three matters together, before turning to the question of the likelihood of future threat to a child caused by the applicant under s 13(2)(h).
2. I have already dealt in considerable detail with GYI's general criminal history, the DHHS information, and the evidence in relation to her circumstances and behaviour before and since the commission of the Category B offence of threat to cause serious injury. A clear distinction can be drawn between her conduct from the time of the commission of this offence until her remand in custody in July 2015, and the time thereafter. Indeed a clear distinction can be drawn between her conduct up until her remand in custody in July 2015, and the time thereafter.
3. There is no doubt that GYI has made considerable progress since her remand. I am satisfied that her expression of determination not to return to abuse of substances is genuine, and that she has demonstrated over the past 18 months a capacity to sustain her resolve.
4. By contrast, GYI's resolve two and a half years ago, in late 2014 to address her substance abuse was unable to be maintained for more than a few months, and her relapse was a serious one. Her substance use escalated after the short-lived period of rehabilitation in 2014, and she failed to comply with the rehabilitative conditions of the CCO. Although she has not committed another offence like the threat to cause serious injury charge, she breached the condition of the CCO that she not commit further offences, that is that she commit to complying with the law. She committed further offences of a like nature to the other types of offences for which she had previously been sentenced.
5. After her relapse in late 2014, not only did her substance abuse escalate, so too did her level of offending. Her disregard for the law moved from relatively minor drug, dishonesty and driving offences to much more serious criminal involvement. As the circumstances of the trafficking charges I have already recounted reveal, GYI was mixing with people involved in significant-scale trafficking, and played a more significant role than her description of accepting free rent and drugs in exchange for "turning a blind eye" to the trafficking going on in the apartment.
6. Although the trafficking in methylamphetamine charge to which she pleaded guilty is not a Category B offence, it, and the trafficking in heroin charge to which she pleaded guilty are very serious charges. The quantity of methylamphetamine is more than 60 times a traffickable quantity, the quantity of heroin more than 20. As GYI now acknowledges, she cannot rule out the possibility that some of the drugs being trafficked from the apartment could have found their way into the hands of children under 18. Other children were also at risk by reason of their exposure to the substance impaired behaviour or drug related activities of adults to whom the drugs were trafficked.
7. GYI continued to offend and use drugs, contrary to the conditions of her first CCO. In fact her offending escalated. She was during the period as she herself acknowledged not to be trusted to care for her children.
8. Her priorities during that period were clearly focused on drug use, and not on changing her life or behaviours so as to have access to, or custody of her children. She was certainly not thinking of the consequences substance abuse or trafficking on her own children let alone on other people's children.
9. This makes her sustained commitment to rehabilitation, and to accepting that she must prove herself worthy of having her own children returned to her care since her arrest for the trafficking charges, all the more impressive.

The likelihood of future threat to a child caused by the applicant: s 13(2)(h)

1. It is clear that the onus is on GYI to establish that there is no likelihood or the likelihood as to a future threat to a child such as to mean that I could reach an affirmative level of satisfaction that there would not be an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children were assessment notice given.
2. I am satisfied that whilst GYI remains drug-free, and is not in or leaving a fraught relationship, her risk of reoffending - whether by the commission of an offence of the same nature as the threat to cause serious injury, or of the other drug, or drug related offences which I have recounted - is low.
3. She is clearly better able to identify the triggers or stressors which make her susceptible to relapse, and has been able to find strategies other than reverting to drug abuse when faced with setbacks. She has shown no recurrence of the poor impulse control or anger management which led to the commission of the Category B offence.
4. The question which has loomed over all of the evidence in this application, and which has troubled me, is whether the period of rehabilitation has been sustained for a sufficiently long time as to give confidence that GYI does not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children in any unsupervised, child-related work. It is less than two years since she was found trafficking in the circumstances I have recounted, and again only a few months since she was placed on a CCO in respect of this offending. Her current CCO has more than 18 months to run.
5. Although much of the evidence and submissions turned on GYI's desire, at the urging of Mr Doquile, to extend the range of people she could deal with in counselling to 16 - 18 year olds, to her acknowledgement of the effect of her drug abuse on her own children, to progress she had made working towards regaining custody of her own children, and her desire to do so, here there are broader considerations that I must consider.
6. An applicant's desire to work, or work in a particular field, or prove him or herself worthy of regaining custody of their own children are considerations which must be considered in the framework of the legislative scheme. I have already recited s 1 and s 1A. The screening process required by the Act, the intensive inquiry into an applicant's past and current circumstances is directed to giving paramountcy to the protection of children from the risk of harm. Here, of course, the risk I must consider is not one of sexual abuse, but physical harm to children.
7. In considering the factors under s 13(2), s 26B(2)(a) requires me to consider what can be called in short form, the reasonable parent test, and s 26B(2)(a) and (b) make it clear that I cannot limit my consideration to any particular type of child-related work. So, although the applicant's desire to work in AOD counselling with 16 - 18 year olds may explain the basis for her application, I cannot limit my consideration of the likelihood of future risk to a child, or of the reasonable parent test, to AOD counselling with 16 - 18 year olds. I must refuse to give an assessment notice unless satisfied that giving it would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children, having regard to the s 13(2) factors, and by reference to s 26B(2)(a) and (b), in respect of any type of child related work.
8. Having regard to the fact that an assessment notice once given is unconditional, I must consider not only the reasonable parent of a 17-year-old engaged in AOD counselling by reason of current or past substance abuse, but also the reasonable parent who places a young child in day care, or trusts otherwise to allow their child to have contact with unsupervised adults in any other type of child-related work.
9. In my view, a reasonable parent, that is a fair-minded person informed about the circumstances that I have canvassed, neither too favourably disposed towards the applicant, nor too unfairly critical of her past, would not allow their child to have direct contact with her that was not directly supervised and whilst engaged in any type of child-related work.
10. Whilst it would appear clear that whilst substance free GYI does not pose a risk to the safety of children, I am satisfied that she did pose a risk to the safety of her own children during the years leading up to the removal of her children in 2014, and to children generally, particularly teenagers vulnerable to substance abuse, in the period after that and before she embarked upon her successful rehabilitation program in late 2015, by reason of her substance abuse. The DHHS file reveals in the past, when her children were in her care, there were times when GYI denied or minimised her substance use. Thus it appears to me that there is also a risk, were GYI to relapse, that she might deny or minimise the substance abuse and again place her children or any children in her care at risk.
11. It is abundantly clear on the material before me that when GYI is abusing substances, she poses an unjustifiable risk to the safety of her own children, and any other children.
12. In my view, a reasonable parent, well-informed and fair-minded would consider an 18 month period of rehabilitation, against such an entrenched history of substance abuse, to be insufficient.
13. Although the applicant does not need an assessment notice in order to care for her own children, the fact she has not sought to discharge or vary the existing custody orders, and have the children returned to her, indicates she accepts that she must show her rehabilitation has to be sustained for a longer period before making application. GYI's own evidence that she is working towards demonstrating her fitness to regain custody of all four children acknowledges that, despite her considerable progress, she has some way to go. In that context, I note that DHHS closed its file after the last notification only after being satisfied that the children's father was supervising GYI's contact with the children, and that she was substance free, in stable accommodation, and submitting to the conditions imposed upon her under court orders.
14. Once it is accepted, as GYI herself does, she must demonstrate she can sustain her progress for a longer period before regaining custody of her own children, and bearing in mind I must be satisfied GYI's engagement in any type of child-related work would not pose an unacceptable risk to the safety of children, then it follows in my view GYI cannot discharge her onus in respect of the reasonable parent test.
15. Despite the admirable progress she has made to date, I consider there has been insufficient time for GYI to demonstrate that the commitment she has shown to date can be maintained for a sufficiently long period as to satisfy me a drug abusing past is well and truly behind her and unlikely to recur. And therefore, that she can discharge that very high onus imposed by s 26B(1), of satisfying me that giving an assessment notice would not pose an unjustifiable risk to the safety of children, were she to be engaged, without direct supervision, in any type of child-related work.
16. I consider it unfortunate that GYI was urged to take this course at such an early stage in her rehabilitation. I sincerely hope that it does not set back her progress or indicate to her that the turnaround that she has managed to achieve to date is not deserving of considerable credit.
17. On the material before me this application was not necessary in order to allow GYI to complete her course, or to engage in counselling work with adults. It was not necessary for her in order to prove that it was safe to permit all of her children to return to her custody. The application is premature.

1. As GYI has not discharged her onus under s 26B(1) it is not necessary for me to consider the public interest under s 26B(2)(3).
2. The application is refused.