For the reasons that follow, the Tribunal finds that under the statutory scheme for recognition payments established by the Act, the Applicant is only entitled to one recognition payment in respect of the acts of violence that occurred between 1 July 2014 and 1 July 2024.

GVA v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2026] NSWCATAD 13 | Case summary | Zoe

NSWNSWCATAD

GVA v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2026] NSWCATAD 13;

[2026] NSWCATAD 13

NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity|2026-01-16

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Source facts

Court

NCAT Administrative and Equal Opportunity

Decision date

2026-01-16

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (79 paragraphs)

[1]

The disclosure of the name of the applicant is prohibited. This order is made under section 64(1)(a) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013.

[2]

This is an application for review of a decision made by the Commissioner of Victims Rights ('the Respondent') on 28 March 2025 under the Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 (NSW) ('the Act') with respect to a recognition payment.
The Applicant was the victim of domestic violence and sexual assaults by the same perpetrator over a prolonged period. The alleged offender is her former partner. In the decision that is the subject of this review the Respondent accepted that the Applicant was the primary victim of both domestic violence and incidents of sexual assault that were perpetrated by her ex-partner between 1992 and 2023 and approved a Category B recognition payment in the sum of $10 000.
The issue that arises in this review is whether the Applicant is entitled to two recognition payments in relation to her experiences of sexual assault and domestic violence. In considering this question, the Tribunal has only considered domestic violence and sexual assaults that occurred within the period from 1 July 2014 to 1 July 2024. This is because an application for a recognition payment in respect of an act of violence involving sexual assault or domestic violence must be made within 10 years of the relevant act of violence occurring.

[55]

When the matter was remitted for reconsideration by the Respondent, the disagreement between the parties focused on the question of whether the Applicant is entitled to two separate recognition payments, one in respect of a physical assault that occurred in 1997, and the second in respect of the sexual assaults that occurred between 2018 and 2022. The Applicant submitted the Applicant sustained a bone fracture as a result of the assault in 1997 that did not heal properly and required surgery in 2021. However, the Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to consider an act of violence that occurred in 1997 because of the time limits imposed by section 40(5) of the Act.
A preliminary issue that arises for consideration is whether the acts of violence perpetrated against the Applicant between 1 July 2014 and 1 July 2024 are by definition 'a series of related acts' for the purpose of s 19(4) of the Act. While the Respondent submits that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that the acts of violence that occurred between 2014 and 2024 involved a discrete physical assault (not involving sexual assault), having regard to the relevant definitions in section 19(8) of the Act, for the reasons below the Tribunal is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was the victim of acts of sexual assault and domestic violence in the relevant period.
The Tribunal finds that the acts of sexual assault and domestic violence that occurred in the relevant period between 2014 and 2024 are a series of related acts for the purpose of section 19(4) of the Act. This is because these acts were committed over a period of time by the same person for the purpose of s 19(4)(a) and (b)(ii) of the Act. At the hearing, the Applicant did not dispute that the acts that occurred within the relevant period fell within the definition of a series of related acts.
The issue in dispute is whether the Tribunal should exercise its discretion to determine that the acts of violence "ought not be treated as related acts" pursuant to section 19(5) of the Act. Section 19(5) states:

[63]

The Respondent submits that to the extent that the Applicant wishes to limit the first application to the alleged assault in 1997, the application has been lodged out of time: section 40(5) of the Act. The Respondent submits that while there is evidence to support a finding that the Applicant was a victim of sexual assaults perpetrated by the alleged offender within the period of 10 years after the relevant act of violence, there is limited particularisation of a physical assault during the period. To the extent that there is evidence of a physical assault in September 2023, the Respondent's position is that there is insufficient particularisation of injury that is the direct result of a physical assault and no medical evidence to verify injury as a direct result of the act.
The Respondent submits that the two applications concern acts perpetrated by the same offender over a period of time and therefore fall within the definition of a series of related acts for the purpose of section 19(4) of the Act. The Respondent's position is that section 19(5) of the Act is not enlivened in this case. The Respondent submits this position is consistent with the express terms of section 19(4) and section 19(5) of the Act considered in the context of the Act as well as the approach of the Tribunal in the following matters: GFM v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 156; FRF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2023] NSWCATAD 146; and CFV v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2016] NSWCATAD 152.
With respect to the beneficial nature of the Act, the Respondent notes that the Victims Support Scheme was established by the Act to replace the Victims Compensation Scheme under the Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW) ('the Repealed Act') after concerns about the ballooning liability of the Victims Compensation Scheme. The Respondent disagrees with the Applicant's submission that the beneficial purpose of the Act supports the approval of two recognition payments. The Respondent submits the Tribunal should follow the approach to statutory construction in Victims Compensation Scheme v Brown [2003] HCA 54, which concerned the eligibility of an applicant for compensation under the Repealed Act.

[64]

The Tribunal is satisfied that the Applicant was the primary victim of an act of violence as defined in sections 19 and 20 of the Act. With respect to an application for a recognition payment, the Tribunal accepts that the application for an act of violence involving domestic violence or sexual assault must be made within 10 years: section 40(5) of the Act. Accordingly, the Tribunal has restricted its consideration of the evidence of acts of violence to acts that occurred between 1 July 2014 and 1 July 2024.
The Tribunal is satisfied that on the balance of probabilities that the Applicant was the victim of repeated instances of sexual assault and domestic violence by the alleged offender between 1 July 2014 and 1 July 2024. The evidence before the Tribunal indicate that charges of sexual intercourse without consent and one count of aggravated sexual assault - inflict ABH(DV) were made in respect of incidents alleged to have occurred between 2018 and 2022 and that some charges were subsequently withdrawn. The Tribunal has considered the police reports and courts records before the Tribunal as well as the police statements by the Applicant. On the evidence before it, the Tribunal, is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was the primary victim of acts of violence in nature of sexual assaults perpetrated against her by a person with whom she was in domestic relationship between 2018 and 2022.
The Tribunal accepts that the Applicant was subject to domestic violence within the relevant period between 1 July 2014 and 1 July 2024. Section 19(8) of the Act defines sexual assault and domestic violence for the purpose of the Act. Section 19(8)(f) of the Act captures any other act (in addition to those acts identified in section 19(8)(a)-(e)) resulting in injury that occurred in the commission of a personal violence offence where the perpetrator commits the offence against a person with whom they have or had a domestic relationship.
With respect to the claim that the Applicant was subject to domestic violence (not involving sexual assault) in the relevant period between1 July 2014 and 1 July 2024, the Applicant relies on the following evidence:

[66]

The Tribunal accepts that there is sufficient evidence to substantiate, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was the victim of acts of domestic violence within the relevant period. In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal notes that the term 'personal violence offence' is defined in section 4 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) to include specific criminal offences in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) and the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence Act 2007 (NSW). Pursuant to section 11 of Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) a personal violence offence committed by a person against another person with whom the person who commits the offence has (or has had) a 'domestic relationship' is a domestic violence offence. A personal violence includes stalking or intimidation with intent to cause physical or mental harm: section 13 of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW).
The Tribunal acknowledges the argument that the act of violence that occurred in 1997 had a distinct character and resulted in a distinct injury (a bone fracture with long-term complications requiring surgery). However, in the Tribunal's view, the same distinction cannot be identified in respect of the acts of domestic violence (not involving sexual assault) that occurred between 2014 and 2024.
Are the acts of violence related for the purpose of section 19(4) of the Act?
The Tribunal accepts that the legislature intended that the concept of "related acts" to capture acts committed over a period of time by the same person" and gives the Respondent, and the Tribunal on review, a broad discretion to determine acts are related "for any other reason". Having considered the definition of 'a series of related acts' in section 19(4) of the Act, the Tribunal finds a series of related acts can include sexual assault and domestic violence (other than acts involving sexual assaults) where the acts of violence are committed over a period of time by the same person against a victim with whom the perpetrator has or had a domestic relationship.
The Tribunal is satisfied that the acts of violence identified in this case are a series of related acts as defined in section 19(4) of the Act. In oral submissions, both parties agreed that the acts of violence are related acts of violence for the purpose of section 19(4) of the Act. The Tribunal is satisfied that the acts of violence are related because they were committed by the same person over period of time: section 19(4)(b) of the Act. Where the parties disagree is whether the acts ought not be treated as related acts pursuant to section 19(5) of the Act. It is to this question that the Tribunal now turns.

[74]

In the present case, the fact that a victim of domestic violence in the applicant's circumstances who has subjected to abuse by the same perpetrator over many years may only be eligible for one recognition payment for a single act of violence would appear to be the intended consequence of statutory scheme for recognition payments. To the extent that section 19(5) of the Act has the potential to operate to ameliorate a particularly harsh or anomalous outcome under the Act, the relevant power must be exercised in a manner which is consistent with the statutory scope and purpose of the Act, having regard to the particular circumstances of the relevant acts. To find the acts ought not be related, the Tribunal must be satisfied that, having regard to the facts of the individual case, the particular circumstances of the acts justify forming the opinion that those acts ought not be treated as related acts.
In the absence of appropriate justification by reference to the particular circumstances of the acts concerned, the broad proposition that the Tribunal should exercise the discretion in section 19(5) of the Act because sexual assault and domestic violence (not involving sexual assault) by the same perpetrator ought not be treated as 'related acts' is inconsistent with the language and structure of the statutory framework for recognition payments in Division 5 of the Act. While section 19(3) makes it clear that, for the purposes of section 19, violent conduct extends to sexual assault and domestic violence, this does not preclude acts of sexual assault and domestic violence committed by the same person over a period of time being identified as a series of related acts for the purpose of section 19(4) of the Act.
With respect to the particular circumstances that may justify the Commissioner, or the Tribunal on review, forming an opinion that the Acts ought not be related, the Tribunal has previously found that where acts of violence have a distinct character this may warrant a finding that they were not part of the same series of related acts: DKJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2018] NSWCATAD 270 at [39]. In DKJ the Tribunal considered whether 12 acts of violence committed by the same perpetrator should be considered as a series of related acts. The Tribunal found that the five incidents that occurred in the period during which there was an enforceable AVO protecting the applicant constituted 'different particular circumstances when contrasted with the other incidents': DKJ at [40]-[47]. The Tribunal found the particular circumstances of there being an enforceable ADVO in force justified separating the period of violence into two unrelated acts and the applicant was awarded two Category D recognition payments on the basis of a single application. The Tribunal's decision was not challenged on appeal.
The Respondent has referred to the decisions of the Tribunal in matters involving domestic violence and sexual assaults, where the Tribunal either declined to find the acts ought not be related under section 19(5) of the Act or did not consider the operation of this provision. Relevantly:

[75]

(1) In GTO v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 182 the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant was a victim of sexual assaults and domestic violence as defined in s 19(8) of the Act and that these acts of violence, which occurred over a six-year period by the same perpetrator and in the same location, were a series of related acts as defined in s 19(4) of the Act. Notwithstanding the applicant's submissions to the contrary, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the acts of violence ought not be treated as related acts pursuant to s 19(5) of the Act. While the Applicant sought to distinguish this matter on the basis that there was no medical evidence of grievous bodily harm or physical injury in GTO, as noted above, the Applicant is out of time to make a claim with respect to physical assault in 1997. Moreover, the available medical evidence does not verify that the Applicant experienced grievous bodily harm or physical injury as a result of the domestic violence (not involving sexual violence) in the relevant period between 2014 and 2024.

(2) In GFM v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 156 GFM argued that the physical acts of violence should be characterised as an assault that resulted in grievous bodily harm and that GFM was eligible for a Category C recognition payment in the sum of $5000 in addition to the category B recognition payment that had been approved. In this matter, while the applicant submitted two certificates of injuries, the diagnosis was the same for both acts of violence. The Tribunal found that GFM was a primary victim of a sexual assault and domestic violence that was perpetrated by the same offender over a period of time from May 2017 to November 2019 and that she suffered psychological injury. The Tribunal considered that the medical evidence did not distinguish between the different acts of violence in relation to causation of psychological injury. The Respondent submits that GFM can be distinguished on the basis that there was no evidence of physical injury to separate the physical and sexual violence. However, as noted above, the only evidence of GBH in this present matter relates to the incident in in 1997, which cannot be considered by the Tribunal: s 40(5) of the Act.

(3) In FRF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2023] NSWCATAD 146 ('FRF') SM Riordan rejected the argument that in view of the beneficial nature of the Act, the Tribunal should exercise its discretion under section 19(5) of the Act. In this case FRF was the primary victim of multiple sexual assaults perpetrated by the same offender over a period of time between 2010 and 2020 in the context of a domestic relationship and relied on a single medical report verify psychological injury. The Tribunal accepts the Applicant's submission that this matter is distinguishable from the present case in so far as the Tribunal found the nature of the acts of violence were 'generally the same, namely sexual assaults': FRF at [52].

(4) In CFV v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2016] NSWCATAD 152 the Tribunal was satisfied that the CFV was the primary victim of acts of violence (in the nature of sexual assault and domestic violence), which occurred over a period of time from 2000 to 2011, and that she suffered physical and psychological injuries as a result. The Tribunal found that the acts were related for the purpose of s 19(4) of the Act and approved a single category B recognition payment. The Tribunal notes that this matter did not address the question of whether a determination should be made under section 19(5) of the Act.

[76]

The Tribunal is satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the Applicant was subject to acts of domestic violence and sexual assaults committed by the same person in the period between 2014 and 2023. In respect of the medical reports submitted as required by section 39(2)(b)(ii), the Tribunal finds that the medical evidence does not establish that the Applicant sustained an injury in the nature of grievous bodily harm as a result of a physical assault (not involving a sexual assault) in the relevant period between 2014 and 2024. As noted above, the injury that the Applicant sustained in 1997 cannot be considered.
The Applicant has been approved a category B recognition payment for a sexual assault, sexual touching or sexual act involving violence that is one of a series of related acts. Under the Act, the categories of recognition payments do not specifically refer to domestic violence or acts that resulting in injury that occurred in the commission of a personal injury offence (within the meaning of the Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW)) against a person who has (or had) a domestic relationship with the offender. It is apparent that a Category B recognition payment can recognise act of violence involving sexual assault and domestic violence that is one of a series of related acts. Domestic violence that does not involve sexual violence may be recognised through a category C payment if the act of violence resulted in grievous bodily harm or through a category D payment for an assault (not relating in grievous bodily harm).
Once it is acknowledged, as it must be, that the Applicant is out of time to claim in respect of the act of violence that occurred in 1997, the Applicant's argument that the acts ought not to be related because the physical assault resulting in a broken bone occurred at separate time and gave rise to separate charges and different injuries from the sexual assaults falls away. The Tribunal considers that the available medical evidence indicates that the Applicant experienced injury, that is psychological or psychiatric harm, as a direct result of a series of related acts in the nature of sexual assault and domestic violence. However, the medical evidence does not establish that the Applicant was injured as a direct result of a separate physical assault that occurred between 2014 and 2024 or that the Applicant suffered an injury in respect to domestic violence (not involving sexual assaults) that occurred between 2014 and 2024 which is distinct from the injury relied on in relation to the sexual assault claim.
On the evidence before it, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the acts of violence that occurred within relevant period ought not to be treated as related acts for the purpose of section 19(5) of the Act. The consequence of this determination is that the Applicant is only entitled to one Category B recognition payment, and the correct and preferable decision is to affirm the decision under review of the Respondent dated 28 March 2025.