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[2020] VSCA 273
Court of Appeal (Vic)
2020-11-02
Mr J, Priest JA, Weinberg JA
Original judgment source is linked above.
DPP v Guo [2020] VCC 1572 (Judge McInerney)
CRIMINAL LAW - Appeal - Sentence - Aggravated Burglary - Possessing prohibited weapon - Aggregate sentence of 12 months' detention in youth justice centre - Whether open to judge under s 32A of the to impose an aggregate sentence of detention on both charges - Whether charges based on same facts, or part of a series of offences of the same or similar character - Appeal allowed - Resentenced to 12 month community correction order.
2 Following a plea, on 1 October 2020 the judge sentenced the applicant on both charges to an aggregate sentence of 12 months' detention in a youth justice centre.
3 The applicant sought leave to appeal against that sentence on five grounds.
(i) the requirements of s 32A(1) of the Sentencing Act had not been satisfied;
(ii) the learned sentencing judge failed to comply with the requirements of s 32A(4) of the Sentencing Act;
(iii) the Applicant only fell to be sentenced for two offences;
(iv) one of the two offences for which the Applicant fell to be sentenced (namely, the 'related summary offence') was much less serious than the other offence for which the Applicant fell to be sentenced; and
(v) one of the two offences for which the Applicant fell to be sentenced was a 'related summary offence'.
6 Before turning to the merits of the application, it is necessary to summarise the applicant's offending. In order to do so, it is convenient to draw on the Summary of Prosecution Plea Opening, which was treated as an agreed statement of facts:
Charge 1 - aggravated burglary - offensive weapon
Arrest and search warrant, related summary offence - possess prohibited weapon without exemption (2 extendable batons)
7 On the plea, counsel for the applicant submitted that a community correction order ('CCO') should be imposed on his client.
9 The Community Corrections Officer who assessed the applicant's suitability for a CCO considered that he posed a 'low risk of re-offending'. Somewhat curiously, however, given the assessing officer's otherwise favourable conclusions, the officer assessed the applicant as being unsuitable for a CCO, the apparent rationale being that it was the applicant's low risk of recidivism that rendered him unsuitable. The assessing officer's reasons included the following:[9]
Mr Guo was forthcoming with information throughout the assessment and answered all questions put to him. ... Mr Guo [is] reported to be studying and is financially supported by his parents. Mr Guo confirmed he would have no issues co-managing commitments of education and that of a CCO.
Mr Guo indicated he would reside in West Melbourne with his partner, if afforded an opportunity to undertake a CCO. Mr Guo advised his partner is supportive and provides a positive influence. Mr Guo further advised of daily contact with his parents via video call. Mr Guo reported his parents are ashamed and disappointed with his behaviour however, remain supportive. When prompted to discuss peers, Mr Guo advised to have ceased contacts with peers during the operation period of the offending due to negative influences. Mr Guo reports to now socialise with positive peers from his partners social network.
When invited to discuss the offending behaviour, Mr Guo attributed his offending to socialising with negative peers. Mr Guo reported his peers had pressured him into offending and felt obliged to take part. Mr Guo reported to have offended shortly after immigrating from China, with a small social network in Melbourne. When prompted to discuss, Mr Guo reported of the negative impacts the offending would have on the victims and the trauma caused. Mr Guo stated he's very remorseful of his behaviour.
Whilst Mr Guo presents to this service with adequate willingness and capacity to undertake a CCO, due to his low risk of recidivism he's been found unsuitable for an order.
Prior to COVID-19, CCS would have recommend one condition of community work for low risk offender. ...
Furthermore, due to Mr Guo having been assessed as a low risk offender, a condition of offence specific program condition is respectfully not recommended. Mr Guo will be deemed not suitable for participation in any programs by the Forensic Intervention Service branch due to his low risk.
10 A very experienced youth justice worker, Mr Stephen Riordan, compiled a Youth Justice report, dated 28 September 2020. He deemed the applicant to be 'a suitable candidate to be placed in a Youth Justice Centre', albeit that he considered that consigning the applicant to custody in either a prison or a youth justice centre would have a 'negative and possibly lasting effect' on the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation. Mr Riordan said (among other things):
Mr Guo is a young man of 20 years of age who has pleaded guilty to his involvement in an Aggravated Burglary that occurred on 2/11/2018 when he was 18 years of age. Through no fault of his own the matter has taken some time to resolve into a plea. Mr Guo has no previous convictions, and prior to the commission of this offence was a person of good character. He is a Chinese national that has a basic grasp of the English language. The writer assessed him has having reasonable prospects for rehabilitation, as Mr Guo has not engaged in criminal activity in the past and has admitted his guilt in regard to these offences. He has aspirations of obtaining higher learning qualifications by attaining his Bachelor of Business and ultimately his Masters in Business. The regime of the Youth Justice Centre Order was explained to him and whilst he is extremely anxious about being incarcerated in any custodial facility, he would prefer to be placed in a youth justice centre over an adult prison.
In regard to the remaining criteria, Mr Guo's maturity appeared to be age appropriate for a 20 year old but this was difficult to establish due to the language and cultural differences. It is the writer's opinion that if Mr Guo were to be placed in custody, either in an adult jail or a youth justice centre, that Mr Guo would have difficulty navigating a custodial setting. He will be an impressionable first timer who will be totally unaware of the accepted behavioural norms usually associated with custodial facilities. It is highly probable he would come to the attention of some of the more unscrupulous and experienced prisoners and possibly be harassed, ridiculed and stood-over on a regular basis. Conversely, Mr Guo may feel the need to assimilate with the other prisoners and in order to achieve that objective he may copy some undesirable prison behaviours to gain acceptance from the mainstream population. Clearly, this scenario would not support the prospects of Mr Guo's overall rehabilitation, rather it would have a negative and possibly lasting effect.
11 The judge, as we have mentioned, imposed an aggregate sentence of 12 months' detention in a youth justice centre on both the indictable and the summary charge.[10] He was wrong to have done so. As we will explain, in the circumstances of this case s 32A of the Sentencing Act 1991 ('the Act') simply did not permit the judge to impose an aggregate sentence of detention. Thus, the sentence imposed was not in accordance with law, and must be set aside.
12 In his reasons for imposing the aggregate sentence of detention, the judge remarked that the maximum penalty provided for aggravated burglary 'discriminates the crime as inherently serious', and the applicant's crime was 'objectively serious'. Although there 'may have been two major organisers' of the offence who were older than the applicant, he was very 'a willing participant in the enterprise'. The principles that guide the sentencing court are as set out in Hogarth,[11] Meyers[12] and Maslen.[13]
13 The judge said that he 'adopted' the principles in Mills,[14] and 'accepted' the principles in Doran.[15] He also acknowledged that the applicant had no prior criminal history, and that he had received a favourable report under s 32 of the Act. Further, citing Guden,[16] the judge acknowledged the risk of the applicant being deported; and he referred to the requirement - a consequence of the current pandemic - that the applicant be isolated if detained in custody. Additionally, the judge accepted that the applicant was entitled to a 'discount' for his guilty plea, both because it had utilitarian value and it demonstrated remorse.
14 Ultimately, the judge rejected the contention that a community correction order was appropriate, given
the seriousness of this offence and the aggravation surrounding it, and balancing all other factors I have concluded that there is no other sentence appropriate, but for a sentence involving confinement.
15 In support of ground 5, the applicant's counsel submitted that discrete sentencing error was demonstrated by the imposition of an aggregate sentence, in purported compliance with s 32A of the Act. The relevant summary offence in this case was not, as is required by s 32A(1), 'founded on the same facts' as the offence of aggravated burglary, and did not form part of a series of offences of the same or similar character.[17] Thus, it is clear that the two extendable batons located by police in a search of the applicant's premises on 30 November 2018 had no connection to the aggravated burglary committed four weeks earlier.
16 Counsel for the respondent fairly conceded that the aggravated burglary charge and the weapons charge were not founded on the same facts, and did not form part of a series of offences of the same or similar character. As a result, s 32A of the Act did not authorise the imposition of an aggregate sentence of detention. Counsel submitted, however, that the serious nature of the applicant's offending otherwise justified a sentence of detention under s 32.
17 As we have said, it is clear that ground 5 must succeed, and that the sentencing discretion has been reopened. That being so, it is strictly unnecessary to consider whether the sentence first imposed was manifestly excessive.
18 We note, however, that counsel for the applicant submitted that, given that the applicant was 18 years old at the time of the offence and 20 at the time of sentence, the principles outlined in Mills were relevant, so that rehabilitation was far more important in this case than general deterrence. The applicant was a 'young offender' within the meaning of s 3(1) of the Act. He was also a first offender, without prior convictions and of positive good character.
19 Counsel submitted that the applicant's admissions to police gave rise to much of the case against him. He had admitted far more than the prosecution could have proven against him, this being in the context that the complainant had left the jurisdiction and returned to China, and had ceased contact with the police. The principles in Doran were thus applicable.
20 Further, the assistance that the applicant gave to police was reinforced by this plea of guilty, which was entered early and on the basis that the applicant would provide evidence against others. Counsel submitted that the applicant was entitled to a significant discount not only for entering a guilty plea, but doing so when he knew the victim was overseas. He was also entitled to a significant discount for the full confession he made at interview, as well as for agreeing to give evidence against others, if required.
21 Counsel submitted that the sentencing judge accepted that the applicant had become involved in the offence due to the negative influence of associates with whom he had become friendly, having left China and arrived in Victoria isolated and alone. His lack of maturity was also relevant to his culpability.
22 Furthermore, the Youth Justice report made it clear that confinement in either a prison or a youth justice centre would have a deleterious effect on the applicant's rehabilitation. A sentence that did not involve confinement would meet all relevant sentencing criteria.
23 So far as relevant, s 32A of the Act provides:
32A Aggregate sentence of detention
(1) This section applies if a young offender is convicted by a court of 2 or more offences which -
(a) are founded on the same facts; or
(b) form, or are part of, a series of offences of the same or a similar character.
(2) The court may impose an aggregate sentence of detention in respect of those offences in place of a separate sentence of detention in respect of all or any 2 or more of them.
...
(4) If the court proposes to impose an aggregate sentence of detention it must, before doing so, announce in open court, in language likely to be readily understood by the young offender -
(a) the decision to impose an aggregate sentence and the reasons for doing so; and
(b) the effect of the proposed aggregate sentence.
...
24 It is clear that the extendable batons found in the applicant's possession had not been used in commission of the aggravated burglary, and had no other connection with it. The offence of aggravated burglary and the offence of possessing prohibited weapons thus could neither be said to be founded on the same facts, nor be characterised as offences which formed, or were part of, a series of offences of the same or a similar character. Section 32A therefore did not permit the judge to impose an aggregate sentence of detention. That being so, it was necessary to set the sentence aside.
26 In resentencing, we have had regard to: the applicant's youth; his previous good character and lack of prior convictions; the fact that the aggravated burglary, although serious, appears to have been an aberration borne of peer pressure; the applicant's full confession and other co-operation with police, including his willingness to provide evidence against others; his remorse; the applicant's pleas of guilty; and the fact that he has already been punished by confinement, having spent a month in detention to this point.
27 We have also been influenced by the reports that were before the sentencing judge, both of which bear on the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation. As we have noted, the applicant was assessed as unsuitable for a CCO solely - and, it might be thought, paradoxically - on the basis that he posed a low risk of recidivism.
28 Moreover, the Youth Justice report made it clear that, as 'an impressionable first-timer', it is 'highly probable [that the applicant] would come to the attention of some of the more unscrupulous and experienced prisoners and possibly be harassed, ridiculed and stood-over on a regular basis', or 'may feel the need to assimilate with the other prisoners, and in order to achieve that objective he may copy some undesirable prison behaviours to gain acceptance from the mainstream population'. In Mr Riordan's opinion, 'this scenario would not support the prospects of [the applicant's] overall rehabilitation, rather it would have a negative and possibly lasting effect'.
29 Ultimately, we concluded that, in light of the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation - and notwithstanding the seriousness of his offending - a sentence involving his further confinement was not called for. As to that, we consider that the observations of Sir John Young in Chmil bear repetition:[19]
I think it should be remembered that in the long run the community is better served and better protected if a young offender is rehabilitated and led away from a life of crime than if after a short or long gaol sentence, imposed to satisfy a public clamour for retribution, he is taught the ways of the criminal.
30 In light of the foregoing, at the conclusion of the hearing in this Court on 29 October 2020, we granted leave to appeal against sentence; allowed the appeal; and set aside the orders in the County Court. Having informed counsel of our intention to do so, and having invited submissions as to the proposed course, we announced that on the charge of aggravated burglary we would sentence the appellant to 28 days' detention in a youth justice centre - time already served - to be followed upon his release from detention by a conditioned CCO of 12 months' duration. On the summary charge, we announced that we would convict and discharge the appellant.[20]
31 The following day, however, we were informed by the appellant's counsel that their further researches had revealed that it was not possible to combine a period of detention in a youth justice centre with a CCO.[21] Very sensibly and fairly, counsel at both ends of the Bar table agreed that the Court could exercise the powers available to it under s 104B of the Act. We thus imposed a CCO of 12 months' duration on the charge of aggravated burglary.
[1] His date of birth is 26 January 2000.
[2] Crimes Act 1958, s 77. The maximum penalty is 25 years' imprisonment.
[3] Control of Weapons Act 1990, s 5AA. The maximum penalty is 240 penalty units or imprisonment for 2 years.
[4] Leave was sought to add ground 5, it not having been included originally in the notice of application for leave to appeal.
1. The Learned Judge fell into error under section 5(4) of the Sentencing Act 1991 in determining that confinement was the only means to fulfil the purpose of the sentence on the Applicant when it was not.
2. The Learned Judge fell into error in determining the seriousness of this particular offence outweighed the principles in sentencing a young offender within the Sentencing Act and those derived from Mills.
3. The Learned Judge failed to give appropriate weight to the Applicant's admissions pursuant to Doran and further to his acceptance to assist the prosecution in prosecuting others
4. In all the circumstances, the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive.
It will be appreciated that grounds 1, 2 and 3 appear to be 'particulars' of the fourth ground.
[10] Pursuant to s 6AAA of the Sentencing Act 1991, the judge declared that, but for the plea of guilty, he would have sentenced the applicant to three years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 20 months.
[11] Hogarth v The Queen [2012] VSCA 302; (2012) 37 VR 658.
[12] DPP v Meyers [2014] VSCA 314; (2014) 44 VR 486.
[13] Maslen v The Queen [2018] VSCA 90.
[14] R v Mills [1998] 4 VR 235.
[15] R v Doran [2005] VSCA 271.
[16] Guden v The Queen [2010] VSCA 196; (2010) 28 VR 288.
[17] See Fitzpatrick v The Queen [2016] VSCA 63, [50].
[19] Attorney-General v Chmil (Unreported, Victorian Court of Criminal Appeal, Young CJ, McInerney and Jenkinson JJ, 1 August 1977).
[21] See Sentencing Act 1991, s 44(1). See also Scammell v The Queen (2015) 72 MVR 56, 62 [20]; Bradshaw v The Queen [2017] VSCA 273; (2017) 269 A Crim R 67, 81-2 [54].
Guo
The Queen [2020] VSCA 273
(2012) 37 VR 658
(2014) 44 VR 486
(2010) 28 VR 288
(2015) 72 MVR 56