GSF v William Campbell Foundation

Texts Cited: Nil

Category: Principal judgment

Parties: GSF (First Applicant)
GSG (Second Applicant)
William Campbell Foundation (First Respondent)
Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice (Second Respondent)

Representation: Solicitors:
First Applicant (self-represented)
Second Applicant (self-represented)
NLS Law (First Respondent)
Crown Solicitor (Second Respondent)
K Giblin, Legal Aid NSW (Separate Representative, Group A children)
R Hosking, Legal Aid NSW (Separate Representative, Group B children)

File Number(s): 2024/00402120; 2025/00490076

Publication restriction: Proceedings 2024/00402120:
Pursuant to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 64(1)(a), the publication or broadcast of the names of the children the subject of these proceedings and the Applicants is prohibited.
Pursuant to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 65, the publication or broadcast of the name of any person who appears as a witness, of any person to whom these proceedings relate or of any person who is mentioned or otherwise involved in the proceedings is prohibited.
Note: a reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.
Proceedings 2025/00490076:
Pursuant to the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 (NSW), s 65, the publication or broadcast of the name of any person who appears as a witness, of any person to whom these proceedings relate or of any person who is mentioned or otherwise involved in the proceedings is prohibited.
-br-Note: a reference to the name of a person includes a reference to any information, picture or other material that identifies the person or is likely to lead to the identification of the person.

REASONS FOR DECISION

What were these applications about?

1. These Reasons for Decision provide reasons for refusal of two applications for summary dismissal of applications presently before the Tribunal.

2. Two foster carers have sought review of two decisions:

3. a decision by a designated agency to remove children from their care, and

4. a decision cancelling the authorisation of each of the carers.

5. On 18 May 2026, at the commencement of the hearing of the two applications for review, an application was made seeking summary dismissal of the two review applications. Oral submissions were made by all parties. That application for summary dismissal was refused. Reasons for the refusal decision were sought. The matters were heard 18-22 May 2026 and adjourned until 23 June 2026.

6. On 23 June 2026, when the hearing recommenced, a further application was made for summary dismissal of the proceedings. Oral submissions were made. After consideration of the further application, it was also refused. Written reasons for the refusal were also sought.

7. An earlier application for summary dismissal made on 9 January 2026 was refused by Principal Member Dr J Lucy, GSF v William Campbell Foundation [2026] NSWCATAD 46 and reasons for that refusal were published on 16 February 2026, referred to below.

Statutory framework for summary dismissal

6. Relevantly, Section 55 (1) (b) of the Civil and Administrative Act, 2103 (NSW) provides as follows:

55 Dismissal of proceedings

(1) The Tribunal may dismiss at any stage any proceedings before it in any of the following circumstances--

…

(b) if the Tribunal considers that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance,

…

What needs to be established in a summary dismissal application?

7. We gratefully adopt the history of the matter set out in Principal Member Lucy’s decision at paragraphs 1-32 and, at paragraphs 39-77, her learned exposition of the principles, legislation and case law to be considered in determining a summary dismissal application.

8. We concur with Principal Member Lucy’s view, expressed at paragraph 76 of her Reasons for Decision, that the words “frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance” all require “formation of a certain or concluded determination that a proceeding would necessarily fail: Spencer v Commonwealth (2010) HCA 28; (2010) 241 CLR 118 at [53])”. We agree that, as Principal Member Lucy stated at [71], ‘lacking in substance’ refers to a matter “so lacking in merit or substance as not to be fairly arguable” rather than one which does not have “reasonable prospects of success”. The Tribunal needs to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the application is untenable. Where there are contested matters of fact and/or law, it may be difficult to reach that level of satisfaction.

9. In determining whether summary dismissal is warranted, a Court or Tribunal will exercise its discretion with “exceptional caution” and only if “the case of the plaintiff is so clearly untenable that it cannot possibly succeed” as Barwick CJ (as he then was) put it: General Steel Industries Inc v Commissioner for Railways (NSW) (1964) 112 CLR 125 at 129-130.

10. As Dixon J stated in Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91:

“once it appears that there is a real question to be determined whether of fact or law and the rights of the parties depend upon it, then it is not competent for the court to dismiss the action as frivolous and vexatious and an abuse of process”.

11. See also Spencer v The Commonwealth (2010) 241 CLR 118.

12. In WW v AJFW [2024] NSWSC 754 Rees J discussed the power of NCAT in Section 55(1)(b) as follows:

90.……NCAT “conscious always of the gravity for an applicant or plaintiff of summary dismissal of proceedings” and the applicability of the General Steel principles: BDK v Department of Education and Communities [2015] NSWCATAP 129 at [66].

104……..Further, whilst there is a divergence of views in the authorities about whether NCAT has the power to permanently stay its own proceedings, it has an express statutory power under s55(1)(b) of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act to dismiss proceedings at any stage if the Tribunal considers that the proceedings are frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance. In BDK v Department of Education and Communities [2015] NSWCATAP 129, the Tribunal considered that s55(1)(b) conferred a broad power, at [66]:

“In our view a reasonably broad connotation should be given to the meaning of the four categories of conduct identified by s55(1)(b). The intent of the provision, as we see it, is to seek to give the Tribunal a broad power to deal with abuses of its processes, and for them to be interpreted and applied in a power which captures any kind of abuse of process, that can reasonably be seen to fall within their compass. While ‘misconceived’ and ‘lacking in substance’ may be seen as relatively specific terms, we think a flexible, purposive interpretation can be adopted in determining whether proceedings are ‘frivolous’ or ‘vexatious’, conscious always of the gravity for an applicant or plaintiff of summary dismissal of proceedings.”

Such an approach was endorsed in Minister for Education and Early Childhood Learning v Zonnevylle [2020] NSWCA 232; (2020) 103 NSWLR 91 at [45] (per McCallum JA, Macfarlan and Leeming JJA agreeing). So, for example, in Kirby the Tribunal concluded, “Even if NCAT lacks the power to permanently stay proceedings, if the proceedings are found to be an abuse of process, in my view s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act would permit the Tribunal to dismiss the proceedings on the ground that they are vexatious”: at [7].

13. It was not suggested by any of the parties that these proceedings are “frivolous”. Even if this had been suggested, we do not accept that they are frivolous, given the evident significance of the relevant decisions to the children and to the carers.

14. It was also not suggested that the proceedings were “vexatious”. In Zonnevylle v Secretary, Department of Education [2021] NSWCATAD 361 (3 December 2021) Senior Member Higgins stated at [20] that:

20 In Attorney-General v Wentworth (1988) 14 NSWLR 481 at 491, Roden J provided an explanation of the term “vexatious” as it appears in provisions such as s 55(1)(b) to include - proceedings that are found to be maintained “for collateral purposes and not for the purpose of having the court adjudicate on the issues to which they give rise”.

21 It is accepted that the collateral purpose must be the predominant purpose and does not need to be the only purpose: Williams v Spautz [1992] HCA 34; (1992) 174 CLR 509. Furthermore, the intention of the applicant must be determined objectively, and not subjectively.

22 Proceedings may be vexatious even if they invoke an available legal right: BDK at [72].

23 Hence, in this application, the onus is on the respondent to establish, on the balance of probabilities, that:

(1) the proceedings are vexatious because the applicant is maintaining his administrative review proceedings for a collateral purpose, to be determined objectively, and that purpose is the predominant purpose of the proceeding; and

(2) in the circumstances, the Tribunal should exercise its discretion and dismiss the applicant’s administrative proceedings on the grounds that they are vexatious.

15. No collateral purpose was suggested in this matter and we are not satisfied that the proceedings are vexatious.

16. In GGG v University of Sydney [2024] NSWCATAD 264 J Sullivan, Senior Member stated as follows:

56. An application to the Tribunal ought not be decided in a summary way other than in the clearest of cases and with exceptional caution. In considering an application for summary dismissal, the substantive applicant’s case must be taken at its highest. It therefore falls to the University, who seeks the dismissal, to establish that the Applicant’s case is so obviously untenable that it cannot succeed, is manifestly groundless, or discloses a case which the court (and here, the Tribunal) is satisfied cannot proceed: General Steel Industry v Commissioner for Railways [1964] HCA 69; (1964) 112 CLR 125; Batistatos v Roads and Traffic Authority of New South Wales [2006] HCA 27; (2006) 226 CLR 256.

17. In DND v Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force [2025] NSWCATAD 132 J Gatland SM expressed it thus:

The Tribunal may dismiss proceedings at any stage where it considers the proceedings are, among other matters, misconceived or lacking in substance; Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, s55(1)(b). In Fox v Commissioner of Police, NSW [2016] NSWCATAD 77 at [26], the Tribunal, considering the meaning of the words of s55(1)(b), observed that:

“...The term “misconceived” represents a claim that does not “disclose a cause of action”, while “lacking in substance” may be seen as referring to a claim where the defendant could obtain summary judgment: Alchin v Rail Corporation of New South Wales [2012] NSWADT 142. There is also an overlap between the concepts identified in s 55(1)(b). For example, a proceeding may be frivolous or misconceived because it is lacking in substance: Worldwide Enterprises Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation [2010] VCAT 1125, [39].”

18. In Reimers v Health Care Complaints Commission [2026] NSWCATOD 19, the Hon ADCJ Ainslie-Wallace AM stated at [42] that:

In Health Care Complaints Commission v Clarke [2022] NSWCATOD 55, the Tribunal referred to Ugur v Attorney General for New South Wales[6] on the question of summary dismissal where the court considered what must be demonstrated to found the application where the Court said that a “... lack of a tenable cause of action must be clearly demonstrated.”

The application of s55(1)(b) was considered in BDK v Department of Education and Communities [7] where the Appeal Panel said at [66]:

In our view a reasonably broad connotation should be given to the meaning of the four categories of conduct identified by s55(1)(b) The intent of the provision, as we see it, is to seek to give the Tribunal a broad power to deal with abuses of its processes, and for them to be interpreted and applied in a power which captures any kind of abuse of process, that can reasonably be seen to fall within their compass. While ‘misconceived’ and ‘lacking in substance’ may be seen as relatively specific terms, we think a flexible, purposive interpretation can be adopted in determining whether proceedings are ‘frivolous’ or ‘vexatious’, conscious always of the gravity for an applicant or plaintiff of summary dismissal of proceedings.

19. In YJC v Public Guardian [2024] NSWCATAP 160, the Appeal Panel of NCAT, comprising the President, Armstrong J, Deputy Preesident Britton and Mr Le Breton stated as follows:

107. To exercise the discretion to dismiss proceedings under s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act, the Tribunal was required to undertake a two-step process. First, to find that the proceedings are “frivolous or vexatious or otherwise misconceived or lacking in substance”. Finding that the proceedings fell within one or more of the categories listed in s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act was a necessary pre-condition to the exercise of the discretion to dismiss the proceedings under that sub-section. Only after determining whether that pre-condition was satisfied, was the Tribunal permitted to undertake the second step and to decide whether to exercise the discretion to dismiss the proceedings under s 55(1)(b).

108. Second, if we are wrong and it can be inferred from the Reasons that the Tribunal found that the proceedings “lacked substance” in the sense that they “would be of no practical effect” (see Davis v NSW Minister for Health [2023] NSWCATAP 211 at [53]), the Tribunal has applied the wrong test.

53 We agree with the view expressed by the Appeal Panel in BDK that a “reasonably broad connotation” should be given to the meaning of each of the four categories of proceedings listed in s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act. Ms Davis is correct that the phrase “lacking in substance” can mean proceedings where it is found that the initiating claim or application is based on an “untenable proposition of fact or law” or “is not reasonably arguable”. However, there is nothing in the text, context or purpose of s 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act to suggest that these are the only findings which might justify the conclusion that the proceedings are lacking in substance. A range of findings could potentially justify a conclusion that proceedings are “lacking in substance”, including that the proceedings “would be of no practical effect”, or that the initiating application was based on an “untenable proposition of fact or law” or was “not reasonably arguable”. Equally, a range of findings could potentially justify a conclusion that proceedings are “vexatious”, “frivolous” or “misconceived” (see, e.g., the analysis of Roden J about the term vexatious in Attorney-General v Wentworth at 491).

54 Section 55(1)(b) of the NCAT Act empowers the Tribunal to govern its own processes, to ensure that its processes are not abused and to ensure that its resources are applied to resolving real, not confected, amorphous or nebulous disputes….

The state of proceedings at the time of the summary dismissal application made on 18 May 2026 and considerations applying to both summary dismissal applications

20. At the time the hearing of the two substantive applications commenced on 18 May 2026, the interim bar on GSF imposed by the Office of the Children’s Guardian (‘OCG’) on 3 November 2025 under s17(2) of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 had not been lifted. It was argued on 18 May 2026 that as the interim bar had not been lifted, the applications of GSF - for a review of the decision cancelling authorisation as a carer and the decision to remove the children from the care of GSF and his wife - were hopeless, as an interim bar automatically cancels an individual’s authorisation as a carer: Regulation 37(1)(b) of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Regulation 2022.

21. It was argued that the applications were lacking in substance because there were “no pathways” for the applications to succeed. It is therefore necessary to consider that proposition. That is done below but without any intention to pre-judge these issues, which are contested, or the outcome of these applications, also contested. Evidence remains to be heard and submissions made. We make no assessment as to the strength of either the claims of the applicants or past actions or responses of the respondents. In setting out possible issues and scenarios we do so intending only to consider whether the applications are “lacking in substance” or otherwise meet the criteria set out in Section 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, 2013.

22. We were pointed to the decision in FZM & FZO v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2024] NSWCATAD 360, a decision of Principal Member Ransome. In that matter, after the Tribunal heard an application for review of a decision to remove children and de-authorise a carer, but before a decision in that matter, final orders were made by the Children’s Court as to permanency, rendering the applications for review of decisions to remove a child moot and lacking in practical utility. We agree that in those circumstances, there was no practical utility in the applications being permitted to continue and that, in the events that transpired, the proceedings became “lacking in substance”. However, for the reasons set out below, we do not see that such a position has been reached in these matters, and FZM & FZO is, therefore, distinguishable from the circumstances in this case.

23. An interim bar operates as an automatic cancellation of an authorisation (Regulation 37(1)(b)). If an interim bar is lifted, then there can be a revival of the authorisation under Regulation 37(4)(b) at the discretion of the designated agency.

24. It is open to the OCG to lift an interim bar if it sees fit to do so. A person subject to an interim bar may also apply for a review of that interim bar, which could result in it being lifted; s 29(1)(c)(ii) of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012. The interim bar imposed on GSF has not been made final, so there remains a possibility that the interim bar could be lifted in the future.

25. Section 63 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act, provides as follows:

(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:

(a) any relevant factual material,

(b) any applicable written or unwritten law.

(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.

(3) In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:

(a) to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or

(b) to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or

(c) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or

(d) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.

26. Section 66 provides that:

(1) A decision determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision takes effect on the date on which it is given or such later date as may be specified in the decision.

(2) If any such decision varies, or is made in substitution for, an administrator's decision, the decision of the Tribunal is taken:

(a) to be the decision of the administrator (other than for the purposes of an administrative review under this Act), and

(b) to have had effect as the decision of the administrator on and from the date of the administrator's actual decision, unless the Tribunal orders otherwise.

27. These are fairly broad powers on a merits review. If the interim bar is not operative at the time of the Tribunal’s decision in the substantive review applications, then it would be open to this Tribunal to make a decision to either dismiss, vary, set aside and remit, or set aside and substitute another decision, in regard to the original decision to cancel GSF’s authorisation.

28. Some of these outcomes could, conceivably, play a part in GSF being authorised in the future, either by William Campbell Foundation, with whom he was a registered carer since 2017, or some other agency.

29. Even if the interim bar continued to be operative at the time of the substantive decision, if the Tribunal found that the original cancellation decision by William Campbell Foundation on 1 October 2025 should be set aside, then the authorisation of GSF would have continued until the imposition of the interim bar on 3 November 2025. The consequence of that would be that if the interim bar were lifted, then the status quo ante - that is, the situation existing before the cancellation of the authorisation - may be revived, pursuant to Regulation 37(4)(b). It would be open to William Campbell Foundation to make a further decision at that time either reviving the authorisation or choosing not to revive the authorisation of GSF, but that would have to be made in accordance with the legislative framework and on the available evidence at the time.

30. GSG is also an applicant. Evidence has been given that GSF has left the matrimonial home (though still in a relationship with his wife) so that if the applications she has brought were both successful, the children, or some of them, could potentially live with her and, potentially, another authorised carer (named in the proceedings) could assist her. An example of a decision where authorisation was restored with conditions is DRO v South Coast Medical Aboriginal Corporation [2019] NSWCATAD 204. An example of a decision where authorisation was restored without conditions is FMP v Secretary, Department of Communities and Justice [2023] NSWCATAD 128.

31. Thus, there is a ‘pathway’ that is conceivable for that to occur, depending on the decisions of the Tribunal in the matter and subsequent decision of the designated agency, the first respondent.

32. Alternatively, if GSG was to be successful in her authorisation application review, and the first respondent made a further decision to cancel her authorisation, GSG would at least be ‘in good standing’ to apply for authorisation by another agency, albeit still required to submit to their processes of accreditation, but with a different decision having been made in these applications.

33. In considering the evidence that GSF is no longer living at the home, as stated in his affidavit of 18 May 2026 and in cross examination, the Tribunal is required to consider the evidence of the applicants “at its highest”. Thus, for the purpose of these summary dismissal applications, we accept that evidence, which was tested by the respondents in cross examination.

34. The Tribunal needs to make decisions in all matters, including a summary dismissal application, in light of the ‘paramountcy principle’ set out in Section 9 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998. We have taken that principle into account here.

35. It is in the interests of children who may be in need of foster care that those who are willing to care for children as foster-carers, and expose themselves to the rigorous checks and applicable standards involved in that endeavour, do not lose their authorisation to care for children for arbitrary or unjustified reasons. For that reason, unless the grounds for summary dismissal are established, a review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 (NSW), available under the law, should be properly undertaken on the merits of the matters to be determined, rather than dealt with summarily.

36. In this case, there are contested matters of fact and law in issue. The two carers deny that the care they provided was inadequate and seek restoration of their authorisation to care for children and restoration of the children who were removed from their care.

37. Establishing a case for summary dismissal of the authorisation cancellation decisions in such circumstances is a ‘high bar’, given the legislative framework set out in Section 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 and the case law that has been consistently applied in the Tribunal in interpreting Section 55, including in some of the cases referred to above. See in particular Dey v Victorian Railways Commissioners (1949) 78 CLR 62 at 91, set out above and referred to in various matters.

38. Likewise, the decision to remove the children from the care of GSF and GSG, in whose care they had been, was a significant decision for those children and for the foster-carers. The three Group A children, two of whom had very significant disabilities and behavioural issues, had lived with GSF and GSG from around September 2017 until they were removed and entered respite care on 9 September 2024. The two Group B children, one of whom had disabilities, lived with the applicants from September 2022 until they were removed on 18 October 2024. As GSF put it when giving evidence, “we were a family”.

39. The decision to remove each and every child was a very significant decision, with important real-life implications, critical to each of the children’s welfare, safety and well-being. A review application is an opportunity both for the children (in whose interests separate representatives have been appointed) and the former carers, to interrogate the decision and for the “correct and preferable decision” to be determined; s63(1) of the Administrative Decisions Review Act.

40. It is very unfortunate that it has taken so long for the matter to reach a hearing on the substantive matters, which could have a bearing on the outcome of the decision as to orders arising from removal of the children. Nevertheless, unless the tests set out in Section 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act are met, the hearing should be allowed to take place to determine those issues on their merits, rather than that application being summarily dismissed.

41. The proposition that the applicants were authorised “as a couple”

42. It was argued that in support of the applications for summary dismissal that GSF and GSG were authorised “as a couple”, rather than individually, and that if GSF could not be authorised because the interim bar remained in place or became permanent, GSG could not remain authorised or resume care of the children or some of them. That is, the argument put to the Tribunal was that regardless of what decision it made on the substantive matter, it was not possible for GSG’s authorisation to be restored as it related to a joint authorisation with her husband and his authorisation remained cancelled by virtue of the interim bar imposed by the OCG.

43. The evidence submitted in support of the proposition that the applicants were ‘jointly authorised’ was a letter of authorisation sent by William Campbell Foundation to GSF and GSG at the same address, which was the address of both of them at the time. It was dated 16 June 2017 and stated:

“Dear [GSF] and [GSG],

This letter confirms your approval as an Authorised Community Foster Carer with the Wiliam Campbell Foundation as at 16 June 2017.

You have been authorised as Short and Long Term foster carers with William Campbell Foundation.

William Campbell Foundation has approved you to care for up to 2 children long term and available for respite or short term placements up to the maximum of three children.

I would like to take the opportunity to thank you for your participation in the assessment process and welcome you to the William Campbell Foundation Foster Care team.

We look forward to working with you as you embark on your foster care journey with us.”

44. A further letter dated 12 September 2022 was also in evidence. Similarly addressed, it stated:

“Following your annual carer review and in consultation with you, William Campbell Foundation have changed your current authorisation.

Your previous authorisation was to care of 4 children long term. Your authorisation is now for care of up to 5 children long term.

This change will take effect form the 12th September 2022. Placement matching will be considered prior to placement to determine your suitability to provide care for individual children.

Your changed authorisation is subject to ongoing annual reviews or sooner if required. …”

45. It is evident that there was probably at least one letter after the letter of 16 June 2017 and prior to the letter of 12 September 2022 changing the conditions on the authorisation from a maximum of 3 children in long term placement and 2 in short-term placement to the care of 4 children long term.

46. Regulations 17 and 18 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Regulation 2022 provides as follows:

17 Application to be an authorised carer in a private capacity

(1) A natural person may apply in writing to a designated agency to be an authorised carer.

(2) On receipt of an application, the designated agency must provide the applicant with information about the following—

(a) the rights and responsibilities of authorised carers,

(b) the authorisation process including the criteria an applicant must satisfy,

(c) permanent placement options for a child or young person in out-of-home care.

(3) An application must be accompanied by the information the designated agency reasonably requires to assess the applicant's capability and suitability to be an authorised carer.

(4) An application may be withdrawn, by written notice or verbally, before it is determined.

18 Determination of application

(1) A designated agency determines an application by--

(a) approving the application and authorising the applicant as an authorised carer, or

(b) refusing the application.

(2) A designated agency must not authorise an applicant as an authorised carer unless the agency is satisfied the applicant is capable and suitable to be an authorised carer.

(3) Before authorising an applicant as an authorised carer the designated agency must--

(a) be satisfied the applicant and each adult residing on the same property as the applicant have complied with the requirements of the Child Protection (Working with Children) Act 2012 for engaging in child-related work as an authorised carer, and

(b) obtain or conduct a uniform suitability assessment of the applicant and each co-resident of the applicant and determine the result of each element of the assessment is satisfactory, and

(c) be satisfied the applicant has completed the education or training required by the agency, and

(d) receive from the applicant a signed statement that the applicant has read, understood and will comply with the code of conduct for authorised carers approved by the Minister under the Act, section 248C, and

(e) take into account--

(i) the functions of an authorised carer and the risk the applicant would be unable to properly perform the functions, and

(ii) risks to a child or young person if the applicant is authorised, including risks from the applicant's home and from a person who resides on the same property as the applicant, and

(iii) relevant information available to the agency.

(4) Authorisation of an applicant as an authorised carer under this section takes effect when the designated agency gives the applicant written notice of the authorisation.

(5) The principal officer of a designated agency must carry out the functions of the agency under this section, unless the Children's Guardian approves the carrying out of the functions by another person.

(6) Failure to comply with subsection (5) does not affect the validity of an authorisation under this section.

47. It is notable that these regulations are expressed in the singular, regarding “a natural person” and “an applicant” without any assumption that a couple could apply as a couple or that an authorisation could be approved as a couple. By way of submissions, the second respondent stated that in the NSW Carers Register, a couple is registered as a “household”. Be that as it may be, it does not change the fact that each individual must be individually authorised and the legislation applies to each individual carer, which leaves open the possibility of GSG being authorised in her own right.

48. In addition, we note the terms of Regulation 31:

An authorised carer is personally responsible for carrying out the carer's functions and duties.

49. For the purpose of these summary dismissal applications, we accept that in determining the placement of children and numbers placed, the fact that a household consists of two authorised carers would be taken into account. The letters of authorisation of 16 June 2017 and 12 September 2022 stipulate numbers of children the carers are authorised to care for.

50. However, we find that does not mean that if one person is not, or ceases to be, an authorised carer that the authorisation of the other carer would automatically be cancelled or that the conditions on their authorisation could not be amended to allow that carer to care for children previously cared for by two authorised carers.

51. Conditions of the authorisation are imposed and may be varied and revoked from time to time pursuant to Regulation 30, which states that:

(1) A designated agency may, by written notice--

(a) impose reasonable conditions on the authorisation of an authorised carer, including a condition that the authorised carer may provide out-of-home care only to specified children or young persons or to a specified class of children or young persons, and

(b) vary or revoke a condition imposed under this subsection.

(2) Action under subsection (1) takes effect when the notice is given to the authorised carer.

52. Those conditions are imposed on each individual carer. Conditions for each authorised carer in a couple may be the same, however it is conceivable that they may be different for each carer. Meeting the conditions attached to the authorisation is, we find, the responsibility of each individual carer.

53. GSF gave evidence that, over the years, William Campbell Foundation had asked him to undertake short term emergency and respite work and that he had done so. GSG also posed the question that if she and her husband were authorised only as a couple, and they were not authorised as individuals, on what basis could William Campbell Foundation have asked her husband to undertake such work as an authorised carer. That work took GSF away from the home to be with children in caravan parks or other emergency settings, leaving GSG with the care of the five children from time to time. There was no change made to the authorisation to accommodate that.

54. Coupled with the legislative basis indicating that authorisation is of each individual carer, and not a couple, this strengthens our view that GSF and GSG were authorised as individual foster carers. If it were otherwise, presumably Wiliam Campbell Foundation would have needed to insert a condition allowing members of the authorised couple to provide services as an individual carer whilst such emergency or short-term work was being undertaken. We find that each of GSF and GSG must have remained an authorised carer in their own right for such arrangements, where they individually cared for a child or children, to have occurred.

55. It is clear at least from paragraphs 10 and 17 of the affidavit of Ms Kerry Roddam dated 30 April 2026 that two of the Group A children were each (at least at the time of that affidavit) placed with a single female (that is, in two different households with a single female authorised carer in each of the two households) so there is no prohibition on at least one child being placed with a single woman on a long-term placement. That affidavit also makes clear that the Group A children have not been kept together. We find that there is the possibility, if the care application succeeded, that one or more of the children could be placed with one of the applicants in the future, depending on the conditions attached to the authorisation.

56. The Tribunal finds that there are very real issues of fact and law being contested in this hearing and that the applications are not “lacking in substance”. The grounds for summary dismissal set out in Section 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act, 2013 have not been met. It is therefore appropriate for the hearing to continue on both applications of both applicants.

The First Application

57. In addition to the matters set out above in relation to both summary dismissal applications, we also consider matters pertaining to the 18 May application only.

58. On the first day of hearing, the summary dismissal application was made in circumstances that the interim bar remained in place but, on GSF’s evidence, he was not living in the home where the children had been cared for. He had moved out, apparently in the hope that the children could be restored to GSG, with possible assistance from another (named) authorised carer. Paragraph 100 of Principal Member Lucy’s decision of 16 February 2026 (refusing the summary dismissal application), to which our attention was drawn, referred to a situation where the interim bar remained in force and GSF continued to reside at the home. This situation has apparently not occurred.

59. That being so, the pre-conditions foreshadowed by Principal Member Lucy as being either possible or likely to result in a successful summary dismissal application were not present on 18 May 2026, when the summary dismissal application was made, as GSF no longer lived in the home.

60. The situation otherwise remained very much as it was when Principal Member Lucy refused the earlier summary dismissal application.

61. We find that when the summary dismissal application was made on 18 May 2026, for the reasons set out above and on the evidence before the Tribunal at that time, the requirements for summary dismissal set out in Section 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 were not established.

The 23 June 2026 application

62. In addition to the reasons set out above in relation to both summary dismissal applications, we also consider matters pertaining to the 23 June 2026 application only.

63. On 23 June 2026, at the commencement of the adjourned hearing, a further, fresh application for summary dismissal was made. It was argued that the evidence of the Chief Executive Officer of the first respondent, given once the substantive hearings commenced and after the first application for summary dismissal was made, was that she would not re-authorise either of GSF or GSG as foster carers in the future. It was argued that this meant that the review applications were futile.

64. We have considered the evidence of the Chief Executive Officer regarding re-authorisation and restoration of the children to the care of the applicants. We find that although she expressed her views on those matters, if the applicants were successful on the substantive matters, as a matter of law, she would be required to assess the strength of their applications for re-authorisation at that time and to make decisions regarding the appropriate placement of each of the children on all the evidence then available, including the decisions of the Tribunal. Expressing concluded views on those matters at this point, could be construed as pre-judging those issues, which could vitiate such a decision. Such views could not bind the agency at a future point in time.

65. In light of issues such as the availability of suitable alternatives for placement of the each of the children, including some children with very high needs, the agency could conceivably take a different view in the future in relation to authorisation of one or more of the applicants and one or more of the children. The wishes and preferences of each child would also be taken into account in the matrix of issues considered in relation to each child at the relevant time (which is not now). Those are dynamic factors that cannot presently be determined, if the best interests of the children are given paramountcy.

66. Additionally, even if William Campbell Foundation did not re-authorise these former foster-carers, a decision by this Tribunal as to the correct and preferable decisions in the matters may be taken into account by other designated authorising agencies and be relevant to authorisation by another agency and the appropriate care of other children.

67. For these reasons, we are not satisfied that the substantive applications before the Tribunal are “lacking in substance” or that the other criteria set out in Section 55 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2013 have been satisfied. There is also no abuse of process, lack of utility, misconception or frivolousness established by the respondents that could enliven Section 55. We therefore refuse the application made on 23 June 2026 for summary dismissal of these applications.

ORDERS

1. The application for summary dismissal made on 18 May 2026 is dismissed.
2. The application for summary dismissal made on 23 June 2026 is dismissed.
3. The matter remains listed for further hearing on 21-23 July 2026.

**********

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar