First, the standard is that required by Wingfoot. A statement of reasons must be sufficient to explain the Panel's path of reasoning, and to enable a court to see whether the Panel's opinion involved any error of law.

Second, the standard of reasons required of a medical panel is not to be equated with the standard of reasons that would be required of a judge giving reasons for a final judgment after the trial of an action in a court.

Third, as a corollary -

• a Medical Panel explaining in a statement of reasons the path of reasoning by which it arrived at the opinion it formed is under no obligation to explain why it did not reach an opinion it did not form, even if that different opinion is shown by material before it to have been formed by someone else.

Fourth, the function of a medical panel is neither arbitral nor adjudicative. Its function in every case is to form and give its own opinion on the medical questions referred to it by applying its own medical experience and its own medical expertise.

Fifth, a panel's reasons must be read fairly, as a whole and in context, and should not be subjected to overly zealous judicial review. ...[17]

1. The applicant's submissions involve an analysis of the panel's reasons of the kind that has consistently been eschewed by the authorities dealing with complaints made about the adequacy of the reasons of administrative tribunals. Specifically, by a close examination of the wording of the applicant's answers to the medical questions and the panel's reasons, the applicant seeks to complain about the panel's reasoning, rather than the adequacy of the panel's reasons.[18]
2. Construing the panel's reasons beneficially, in the sense of not over-zealously in an attempt to discern whether some inadequacy may be gleaned from the way in which the reasons are expressed, it is plain that the panel formed the opinion that the injury the applicant suffered in the course of her employment in 2016 had resolved by the time the panel medically examined the applicant in September 2020. It formed this view because, in its expert opinion, the natural history of the applicant's injury was one which involved a complete resolution of the injury 'within the timeframe of over three and a half years' which had passed since the occurrence of the work injury. The panel were fortified in their opinion by the applicant's presentation on examination (having a normal range of lumbar spine movement without evidence of radiculopathy). Additionally, the panel went on to explain that the applicant's 'noted postural lumbar spine increased lordosis associated with an overweight body habitus' was something 'which may predispose to non-specific lumbar spine discomfort'.
3. We agree with the judge that a fair reading of the panel's reasons show that the panel accepted that the applicant suffered a work-related soft tissue injury to her lower back in December 2016, which was associated with some complaints and symptoms; that soft tissue injury resolved with the passage of time; and the applicant's current complaints did not result from (in the sense that they were not materially contributed to) by the applicant's initial work-related injury.[19] The applicant's attempt to construe the panel's reasons as suggesting that the applicant's complaints and symptoms at the time of the panel's examination were sequelae of the original soft tissue injury must be rejected.
4. Moreover, the submission that it is 'logical and accords with common sense' to infer that continuing complaints and symptoms must be linked to an initial injury in the absence of some intervening event or reason, amounts to no more than a submission that the panel should have engaged in a different reasoning process from that which is set out in some detail in the panel's reasons. The panel explained by reference to the history taken from the applicant, its findings on examination and its expertise, why the applicant's work was a cause of the applicant's original injury, but was no longer materially contributing to the complaints and symptoms from which the applicant was suffering at the time of the medical panel's examination. Although it was not necessary for it to do so, the panel went on to posit a possible reason for the applicant's continuing complaints and symptoms - namely, the applicant's increased lordosis associated with an overweight body habitus.
5. It follows from the above that, contrary to the applicant's submissions, the judge did not err in concluding that the reasons of the medical panel adequately explained the path of reasoning by which it arrived at its opinion unfavourable to the applicant. The applicant's proposed ground of appeal must thus be rejected.

1. The applicant's proposed appeal has no real prospect of success. Accordingly, leave to appeal must be refused.[20]

[1] Grujovska v Brand [2022] VSC 63 ('Reasons').

[2] From the panel's reasons, it is apparent that, in completing the certificate of opinion, the word 'by' was accidentally omitted from this part of the panel's answer to question 2.

[3] In context, while this paragraph was numbered (d), it was the panel's answer to part (c) of question 2.

[4] Expressed by Dr Lionel Schachna, a treating rheumatologist; and Dr Robyn Horsley, an occupational physician.

[12] Gruma Oceania Pty Ltd v Bakar [2014] VSCA 252 (Neave, Santamaria and Kyrou JJA) ('Gruma').

[13] Maimonis v Bourke [2019] VSCA 302, [51] (Ferguson CJ, Beach and Ashley JJA) ('Maimonis').

[14] Gruma [2014] VSCA 252; Maimonis [2019] VSCA 302, [51(3)]. See also Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 271-2.

[15] [2013] HCA 43; (2013) 252 CLR 480 (French CJ, Crennan, Bell, Gageler and Keane JJ) ('Wingfoot').

[16] [2019] VSCA 315 (Beach, McLeish and Ashley JJ).

[17] Ibid [47]-[51] (Beach, McLeish and Ashley JJA) (citations omitted). See also Gamble v Emerald Hill Electrical Pty Ltd [2012] VSCA 322; (2012) 38 VR 45 (Maxwell P and Cavanough AJA); Gruma [2014] VSCA 252; Maimonis [2019] VSCA 302, [51]. See also Sidiqi v Kotsios [2021] VSCA 187, [64] (Beach, Kaye and Osborn JJA).

[18] As to the distinction between a complaint about the adequacy of reasons and reasoning, see Soulemezis v Dudley (Holdings) Pty Ltd (1987) 10 NSWLR 247, 281-2 (McHugh JA); Jordan v Kotsios [2022] VSC 332, [24] (Cavanough J).

[20] See s 14C of the Supreme Court Act 1986.