1. On 4 December 2009, the appellant, Belinda Grooms, was arrested and charged with having, between 30 November and 4 December 2009, trafficked in a controlled drug other than cannabis, namely methylamphetamine. The offence, contrary to

s 603(7) of the Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), rendered Ms Grooms liable to a maximum penalty of 1 000 penalty units (a fine of $110 000) or ten years' imprisonment or both.

2. This is a serious offence, not only because of the maximum penalty that the legislature has prescribed (Makarian v The Queen [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 228 CLR 357 at

372; [30]-[31]), but also because of the social ravage that the distribution and use of the drug can cause.

3. Ultimately, Ms Grooms pleaded guilty to this and another offence, referred to below (at [15]). She was convicted of the offences. The convictions constituted a breach of a Good Behaviour Order of eighteen months imposed on 9 April 2009, when a sentence of eight months imprisonment for the charge of possessing heroin had been suspended after she had served three months of the term of imprisonment.

4. On 10 February 2010, Ms Grooms was sentenced for these three matters to a total of

2 years and 11 months imprisonment with, it appears, a non-parole period of

5. On 4 March 2010, she appealed against the severity of the sentences. The Notice of Appeal stated that Ms Grooms did not seek to adduce further evidence on the appeal, but when the appeal came on for hearing on 16 September 2010, I admitted further evidence on her application in circumstances to which I will refer below.

6. The question then arose as to the effect of this evidence and how I should proceed as well as to the outcome of the appeal. It is to these questions that this decision is directed.

7. The factual circumstances surrounding these offences may be relatively shortly described.

8. Police were, in late 2009, engaged in an undercover operation in relation to Ms Grooms and her partner, Samnang Oeur. This included electronic surveillance under a telecommunications interception warrant granted under s 46 of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), by which police officers recorded certain telephone conversations of Ms Grooms.

9. On 1 December 2009, the police intercepted and recorded a conversation between Ms Grooms and an undercover police officer in which an arrangement was made to meet at a local football club. The officer attended later that evening and met Ms Grooms, who arrived with Mr Oeur, and they discussed the purchase of methylamphetamine for $1 200 which the officer agreed to pay. Ms Grooms then left and returned with a pink balloon containing a white powder and in exchange for which the police officer handed over the $1 200. The substance in the balloon was subsequently analysed to be 3.416 grams of powder containing 16.2% (0.55 grams) of methylamphetamine.

10. There was then further discussion about another purchase of three ounces of methylamphetamine two days later at a price of $8 200 per ounce.

11. Subsequent telephone conversations and text messages between the officer and Mr Oeur and Ms Grooms confirmed similar arrangements at the same football club.

12. On the evening of 4 December 2009, the officer went to the football club and met Ms Grooms who again arrived with Mr Oeur but this time with two other persons. The officer handed over $8 200 cash to Ms Grooms and she indicated that one of the other persons, Mr Paul Pearson, was carrying the drugs. Mr Pearson handed over a cigarette packet containing a condom in which was a white powder. It was later analysed to be 27.808 grams of powder containing 13.6% (3.78 grams) of methylamphetamine.

13. Ms Grooms and Mr Oeur left the football club and were later arrested. They were searched and other items were seized, including a blue and a red balloon which contained powder later analysed to be 3.422 grams of powder containing

N,N-Dimethylamphetamine, which is related to methylamphetamine, and traces of methylamphetamine.

14. A search under warrant of Ms Grooms' residence located some further drugs and drug-related material not of present importance.

15. Ms Grooms appeared in court on 5 December 2009 and was remanded in custody. She was also charged with possession of heroin. I refer to that matter below

16. The proceedings were adjourned from time to time and on 6 January 2010 Ms Grooms entered a plea of guilty and consented to the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court. A Pre-Sentence Report was ordered.

17. On 10 February 2010, Ms Grooms was sentenced as referred to above (at [4]). She had been in custody since her arrest.

18. The charge of possessing heroin, preferred at the same time as the trafficking charge, was laid under s 171(1)(b) of the Drugs of Dependence Act 1989 (ACT), carrying a maximum penalty of 50 penalty units (a fine of $50 000) or imprisonment for two years or both.

19. The charge itself referred to Ms Grooms possessing the heroin on 4 December 2009. The only reference in the statement of facts to heroin is in relation to the seizure of the red and blue balloons which, it continues, "are suspected of containing heroin and methylamphetamine." In fact, the certificate of analysis from the ACT Government Analytical Laboratory, certifies only that Methylamphetamine and

N,N-Dimethylamphetamine were found in the balloons, but not heroin.

20. There is no other reference made in the Statement of Facts to heroin and it does not seem, on the material in the Appeal Book before me, that there were facts to support this charge. There was, of course, a plea of guilty which is an acceptance of all the elements of the charge (see Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501 at 510), but this matter should be further investigated.

21. Initially, the prosecution sought to proceed with sentence on 3 February 2010 but there was no evidence of the quantity or purity of the drugs and the learned Sentencing Magistrate was quite properly critical of the failure to provide this importantly relevant material.

22. The Pre-Sentence Report was, however, ready by the learned Sentencing Magistrate. There appears no reference to its formal tender. There was also included in the Appeal Book a letter, dated 2 February 2010, from Directions ACT. There was, however, no reference to that in the transcript of the sentencing proceedings so it is not at all clear whether it was tendered or not, and, if not, whether it was read by the learned Sentencing Magistrate.

23. Submissions on sentence were also made by both parties but the proceedings were then adjourned so that the analyst's certificates could be provided.

24. That was done on 10 February 2010 and the certificates received in evidence. They were not marked as exhibits, however, a practice that is desirable so that, for example, it could become clear whether items such as the letter from Directions ACT were actually received in evidence or not.

25. Ms Grooms' lawyer submitted that the purity of the drug mixtures was low, which should be taken into account.

26. The other information that had been sought by the learned Sentencing Magistrate on the earlier occasion was the period that Ms Grooms had spent in pre-sentence custody. That was not forthcoming, but the Statement of Facts showed that she was arrested on 4 December 2009 and the bench sheets showed she had been remanded in custody on each occasion since then.

27. The learned Sentencing Magistrate then proceeded to impose sentence which was as follows:

(a) on the trafficking charge: convicted and sentenced to two years and six months' imprisonment, "to serve 12 months" [sic];

(b) on the possessing heroin charge: convicted and sentenced to three months' imprisonment to be served concurrently with the sentence for the trafficking charge;

(c) on the breach of a Good Behaviour Order made on 9 April 2009: breach proved, Good Behaviour Order cancelled and re-sentenced to the balance of the sentence, namely five months' imprisonment.

It appears that the sentence on the re-sentencing in respect of the breach of the Good Behaviour Order was to be added to the twelve months "to serve" (possibly intended to be a non-parole period), so that her Honour then described the sentence as: "So the head sentence is 35 months' imprisonment, non-parole period of 17 months. The sentence is to start on 4 December which is the date she was taken into custody."

28. For present purposes, the important part of the reasons for sentence, and her Honour gave quite extensive reasons, is the following:

I note that she is now pregnant.

...

There are concerns in my view about the quality of lifestyle that she can provide to the child that she is now expecting and it is a fact, a sad fact but a real fact that pregnancy of itself does not automatically enlighten people nor change their long entrenched habits and that is the view that she has that all of a sudden things will magically change for her because she is pregnant. That does not happen like that.

29. This was in response to the following, and significant, part of the plea in mitigation made by Ms Grooms' lawyer:

The pre-sentence report also suggests that Ms Grooms did not have a good start in life. She was born drug dependent, various degrees of assault, parental conflict and involvement with [drugs]. Now, having said that, I suppose the court can no longer accept that as a reasonable excuse, considering the fact that she's been appearing in court on a number of occasions. Your Honour, however, the difference between Ms Grooms today in her circumstances and Ms Grooms back in April 2009 when she was last before the court is that she's pregnant. Ms Grooms says that her soon to be born baby is now her motivation to stay out of drugs and rehabilitate. She also, as said in the pre-sentence report, does not want the baby to have the same start in life as she did.

The question, your Honour, is: Well, is Mr Grooms' motivation realistic or aspirational? Your Honour, to answer that question your Honour would note that this is the first time Ms Grooms is expecting a child, the first time she's been pregnant. And if she is genuine in that she does not want her baby to have a similar start in life as she did, then perhaps Ms Grooms is also genuine with her motivation to get off drugs and look after the baby. And your Honour will also note that Ms Grooms has made steps, small steps but significant steps, to stay off drugs by staying free while she's in the AMC, and also by contacting Guthrie House. Your Honour, Ms Grooms is a young woman who is soon to be a mother. To be given an opportunity, a different opportunity for her to serve time, but also her opportunity to rehabilitate herself and start looking after her baby would, in my submissions, be the ideal sentencing.

30. Ms Grooms gave birth to her child in custody and shortly after was released by this Court on bail pending appeal on 17 August 2010. The fresh evidence related to her reaction to being a mother and the response she had to her pregnancy as a result of it and to her drug taking.

31. The evidence was a letter from a Senior Case Worker employed by Inanna Inc Crisis Service who has been working with Ms Grooms since she was 19. She referred to the fact that she had relapsed into drug use again after being released from prison in September 2009 which led to her further incarceration on her arrest.

32. The Senior Case Worker had been working with her since that time, and when Ms Grooms found that she was three weeks pregnant. She described this as "a turning point in Ms Grooms' life." She described the differences: before her pregnancy she had been "not very productive as she had shown little enthusiasm to achieve goals within the case plan we had formulated." On her first visit with Ms Grooms after the arrest on this occasion, however, Ms Grooms "advocated for drug counselling with me. This was due to her pregnancy and her desire to have her life together ready for the new life she was going to be bringing into the world."

33. The Senior Case Worker described "[a] significant change occurred in Ms Grooms whose whole sense of responsibility and values took on a new light". She added, "Ms Grooms has not faltered in engaging in her counselling".

34. The Senior Case Worker was Ms Grooms' "birthing partner" and described the response of Ms Grooms to the birth and her early mothering, noting that she "has not misused any substances since finding out she was pregnant." She expressed "a strong belief that she will continue with her abstinence."

35. The admission of fresh evidence is governed by s 214 of the Magistrates Court Act 1930 (ACT), in particular s 214 (2), (3) and (4) which provide:

(2) In an appeal to which this section applies, the Supreme Court shall have regard to the evidence given in the proceedings out of which the appeal arose, and has power to draw inferences of fact.

(3) In an appeal to which this section applies, the Supreme Court must-

(a) if it considers it necessary or expedient to do so in the interests of justice -

(i) order the production of a document or anything else that was an exhibit in, or was otherwise connected with, the proceedings out of which the appeal arose, and that appears to it to be necessary to produce for deciding the appeal;

(ii) order any person who was, or would have been if he had been called, a compellable witness in the proceeding to attend for examination before the Supreme Court; and

(iii) receive the evidence, if tendered, of any witness; and

(b) receive evidence with the consent of the parties to the appeal.

(4) If evidence is tendered in an appeal to which this section applies, the Supreme Court must, unless satisfied that the evidence would not afford any ground for allowing the appeal, receive the evidence if -

(a) it appears to the Supreme Court that the evidence is likely to be credible and would have been admissible in the proceeding out of which the appeal arose on an issue relevant to the appeal; and

(b) the Supreme Court is satisfied that the evidence was not adduced in the proceeding and there is a reasonable explanation for the failure to adduce it.

36. In Campbell v Fortey (1987) 85 FLR 462, Miles CJ analysed the effect of essentially identical antecedent statutory provisions. This analysis has been considered a number of times since then. See, for example, Bond v McFarlane (1990) 102 FLR 38; Spatolisano v Hyde [2009] ACTSC 161; Drought v Driesen [2009] ACTSC 46; Saga v Reid [2010] ACTSC 59.

37. The principles determined by his Honour and subsequent consideration may be set out as follows:

(a) As to both s 214(3) and (4):

(i) the provisions apply to appeals against both conviction and sentence from the Magistrates Court;

(ii) the two sub-sections are each a separate head of power to admit the evidence and neither restricts the operation of the other;

(iii) the provisions may be more liberal in the power they give to admit the evidence than the provisions for admitting evidence in a court of criminal appeal on appeal from a trial or sentencing proceeding on indictment;

(iv) the evidence is more likely to be admitted if it has been set out properly in an affidavit, now required by r 5193 of the Court Procedures Rules 2006 (ACT) as explained in Barac v Thexton [2008] ACTSC 137; and

(v) the evidence may not be admitted if the appellant (or, presumably, the respondent) has intentionally refrained from adducing it before the Magistrate so that, in the event of an unfavourable outcome, it may be relied on in the appeal; and

(i) the consideration of the interests of justice referred to in the sub-section is to be read in the light of the notion of a miscarriage of justice as explained by the High Court in cases such as Gallagher v The Queen [1986] HCA 26; (1986) 160 CLR 392 and Meissner v The Queen [1995] HCA 41; (1995) 184 CLR 132;

(ii) the discretion under this provision to admit the evidence is unfettered and is not circumscribed by any requirement to show that the Magistrate erred on any question of fact or law;

(iii) to determine whether it is in the interests of justice, it may be necessary to consider what the Magistrate said or did in the proceedings below; and

(iv) the appellate court is obliged to receive the evidence if both parties consent to it being adduced; and

(i) the appellate court is obliged to receive the evidence if the conditions in the provision are satisfied, namely that the evidence is credible, it would have been admissible before the Magistrate, it was not adduced before the Magistrate and there is a reasonable explanation as to why it was not so adduced;

(ii) the provision does not apply to evidence of events which occurred subsequent to the completion of the proceedings before the Magistrate;

(iii) it does not have to be shown that it was not possible the evidence to be adduced in the Magistrates Court; and

(iv) inadvertence or even a failure to appreciate the likely significance of the evidence may be a reasonable explanation.

38. Having carefully considered the finding of the Magistrate, the nature of the evidence, its importance in the proceedings and its admissibility, I admitted it under s 214(3) of the Magistrates Court Act.

39. The question then arose as to the consequence of its admission.

40. The appellant made, to use her counsel's word, a rather "fluid" submission that

in the event that either fresh evidence is admitted, or that an error is identified, the peculiar and fluid nature of the circumstances pertaining [to] the Appellant's giving birth, will necessitate the court being placed in a position to resentence afresh, via the admission of the usual material on sentence, such as a presentence report and the reception of material as to the Appellant's current circumstances.

41. There is no doubt that, where error is shown, the sentencing discretion of the appellate court is enlivened and must be re-exercised: AB v The Queen [1999] HCA 46; (1999) 198 CLR 111 at 159. The re-exercise of that discretion is often carried out after further evidence is adduced on the re-sentencing, which evidence may or may not have been admissible under s 214 of the Magistrates Court Act.

42. That process, however, is still limited. If, in the exercise of its independent discretion, the appellate court concludes that no different sentence should be passed, the appellant is not to be re-sentenced and the appeal is to be dismissed.

43. The appellant did also submit that errors were made in the sentencing by the learned Sentencing Magistrate and I will deal with those separately.

44. As to the appellant's first submission, however, that, having admitted the evidence, I should proceed to a full rehearing of the sentence, the respondent opposed this course.

45. The responded submitted that to proceed as submitted by the appellant would render the proceedings an appeal de novo: Theodorelos v Nexus Projects Pty Ltd

[2009] ACTSC 149. This was not what the authorities had held to be appeals from the Magistrates Court (namely, a rehearing on the evidence before that court with any additional evidence admitted). See, for example, JA v Goldsmith [2004] ACTSC

79 and Cooper v Corvisy (No 2) (2010) 5 ACTLR 151.

46. The respondent relied on what I had said in Saga v Reid [2010] ACTSC 59. I said:

When considering an appeal where further evidence has been adduced, it seems to me that the court must review the sentence in the light of that further evidence taken together with the evidence before the original sentencing court.
Although the statutory provisions of s 214 of the Magistrates Court Act make further evidence more readily admissible than in an appeal to a court of criminal appeal setting on appeal against sentence for an offence charged on indictment, the approach taken in those circumstances, it seems to me, is the correct approach once that evidence is admitted. This approach was helpfully summed up in R v Nguyen [2006] VSCA 184 as follows (at [36]), namely

... (v) upon the admission of the new evidence, it is unnecessary to determine whether the original sentence was vitiated by error, or whether it was manifestly excessive; and

(vii) the question is, on all the material now before the Court, [whether] any different sentence should be substituted to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(footnotes omitted).

As was said by Crockett J in Eliasen (1991) 53 A Crim R 391 (at 396):

... once the evidence is admitted the question no longer is one as to whether the sentencing judge erred in the exercise of his sentencing discretion. The question then which is for [the appellate] Court to determine is whether on the material then before it a different and, if so, what sentence should be substituted for that passed by the sentencing judge. It is for this reason that I think this Court is relieved from the task of having to examine the various allegations made as to error on the part of the judge when selecting the sentence he thought appropriate in the circumstances.

...

Thus, the task for me is to determine whether, on all the facts and circumstances as I now have them before me, any different sentence should be substituted to avoid a miscarriage of justice and, if so, what sentence to be imposed. In deciding whether a different sentence should be imposed, it seems to me that I should still exercise the sort of restraint mentioned in House v The King [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499 (at 504-5), namely that "[i]t is not enough that the judges composing the appellate court consider that, if they had been in the position of the primary judge, they would have taken a different course".

47. In that decision, I did express (at [77]) some hesitation as to whether this approach was fully to be followed in the light of the more generous provisions for the admission of further evidence in appeals from the Magistrates Court than in appeals from trials or sentences on indictment which, of course, was the situation in R v Nguyen [2006] VSCA 184 and R v Eliasen (1991) 53 A Crim R 391. I do not need to consider that further here.

48. The respondent submitted that these Victorian decisions were not binding on this court, which is correct, and that there were different decisions in other courts. That does not appear to me to be so. Indeed, the principles in R v Eliasen have been adopted, though not always in the same terms, widely throughout Australia.

49. In R v Smith (1987) 44 SASR 587, King CJ, with whom Cox and O'Loughlin JJ agreed, reopened the sentencing proceedings after having determined that admitting further evidence of events occurring after sentence which showed the true significance of facts which were in existence at the time the sentence was imposed.

50. In Anderson v The Queen (1997) 18 WAR 244, the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Western Australia followed R v Eliasen and R v Smith and re-sentenced the appellant.

51. The respondent relied on New South Wales authority, but the position there, it seems to me, is the same as in Victoria. Thus, in R v Bailey (1988) 35 A Crim R 458, Lee J (with whom Maxwell and Yeldham JJ agreed) in the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, said (at 462):

In my opinion in a case such as the present where it is clear that the disease with which the appellant is now suffering, was in fact in existence at the time he was sentenced, it is proper for this Court to allow evidence to that effect to be given on the appeal and to reopen the matter of the proper sentence to be imposed.

This passage was cited with approval in one of the decisions on which the respondent relied, namely, RNM v The Queen [2006] NSWCCA 375 at [50].

52. It seems to me that the position is as follows. The appellate court must decide whether, under s 214(3) or (4) of the Magistrates Court Act, the further evidence is to be admitted. If it is, the court must then consider whether a different sentence should, in the light of this further evidence, have been imposed. If it comes to the view that it should have been, then the sentencing discretion is enlivened and the sentencing proceedings must be re-opened. On those proceedings, still further evidence may then be admitted, though often it is not. Some or all of that additional evidence may not have been admissible under s 214(3) or (4), but should have, of course, to be admissible in sentencing proceedings. If, having considered all this evidence and, of course, the evidence before the Magistrate, the appellate court considers in the exercise of its independent discretion that no other sentence than that of the Magistrates Court should be imposed, the appeal should be dismissed. If that is not the case, then the appellate court should either remit the proceedings back to the Magistrates Court to be dealt with according to law or should sentence the appellant.

53. In this case, it seems to me that the further evidence was very powerful, especially in the light of the approach taken by the learned Sentencing Magistrate. Her Honour was particularly sceptical of the possibility of abstention from drugs because of the appellant's long and entrenched drug history. Her Honour remarked with scepticism that "somehow magically she [could] ... abstain from drug taking". Her Honour commented that such a view was "fanciful and unrealistic" and concluded that Ms Grooms "prospects for rehabilitation in the community [were] ... very, very poor if not non-existent."

54. The further evidence shows that this prognosis was not borne out by the anticipated subsequent events which were, in fact, precisely consistent with the defence submissions made. A Deferred Sentence Order or a suspended sentence would have been able to test that. Had her Honour have had the further evidence before her, then on a critical question on the sentence and on which Ms Grooms' counsel relied, a different sentence would have been appropriate.

55. As a result, I am of the view that the sentencing proceedings may be re-opened. That permits further evidence to be led as to Ms Grooms' current situation.

56. Two actual errors in sentence were also relied on by Ms Grooms, namely, that the learned Sentencing Magistrate did not apply the principle of totality and that her Honour inaccurately calculated the balance of the sentence suspended when the Good Behaviour Order was made earlier and which had to be cancelled because of these offences.

57. Totality is an important sentencing principle, set out by the High Court in Mill v The Queen (1988) 166 CLR 59. The court endorsed the articulation of the principle in Thomas, DA, Principles of Sentencing (Heinemann, 2nd ed, 1979) at 56-7 as follows:

The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation to the offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutive sentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate is 'just and appropriate'. The principle has been stated many times in various forms: 'when a number of offences are being dealt with and specific punishments in respect of them are being totted up to make a total, it is always necessary for the court to take a last look at the total just to see whether it looks wrong[']; 'when ... cases of multiplicity of offences come before the court, the court must not content itself by doing the arithmetic and passing the sentence which the arithmetic produces. It must look at the totality of the criminal behaviour and ask itself what is the appropriate sentence for all the offences'. (footnotes omitted)

58. It is correct, as submitted by Ms Grooms' lawyer that her Honour fully accumulated what she took to be the outstanding balance of the suspended sentence. Her Honour did not expressly refer to the question of totality.

59. Her Honour was, however, acutely aware of the seriousness of the trafficking offence and allocated a low portion of the sentence on that (12 months of a 30 month sentence) to the non-parole period. Her Honour also made the sentence for the charge of possession of heroin wholly concurrent with the trafficking offence. These offences were a serious breach of the Good Behaviour Order which had been imposed for a drug possession offence. Committing crimes on conditional liberty is an aggravating factor. Though referring to bail, Chernov JA articulated the principle in R v Basso [1999] VSCA 201; (1999) 108 A Crim R 392 at 398 as follows:

By committing the offence whilst on bail, the offender demonstrates, inter alia, that he or she has little regard for the law and is prepared to offend notwithstanding that he or she has been granted liberty upon a condition of being of good behaviour pending trial. In my view, as a matter of common sense, the commission of an offence in breach of such a condition constitutes an aggravating factor, which can be taken into account by the sentencing judge in determining the appropriate sentence.

Of course, it has to be borne in mind that Ms Grooms was also dealt with for breaching the Good Behaviour Order and she must not be punished twice for the culpability of committing offences whilst at liberty conditionally.

60. The accumulation of the whole of the balance of the suspended sentence cannot be said to have breached the principle of totality. While her Honour did not make express mention, the process she undertook satisfies me that she was aware of the requirements of totality and did not, in the ultimate sentence, on the facts as she found them, breach the totality principle. It may, of course, have been preferable had her Honour actually expressed compliance with the principle.

61. The second error was said to be in the calculation of the balance of the suspended sentence that was then available to be imposed. The sentence, for possession of heroin, was imposed on 9 April 2009 when Ms Grooms was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment. That sentence was directed to be suspended after three months and a Good Behaviour Order, with conditions, was made for eighteen months. That would have meant she was to be released on 8 July 2009.

62. The Pre-Sentence Report stated that Ms Grooms was in custody from 9 April 2009 "until her release in September 2009". Her Honour accepted this finding. It is not clear to me on what basis she was detained until September when the sentence required her release on 8 July 209. Nevertheless, that is what was reported, unchallenged, and that was the finding of her Honour.

63. As a result, the balance of the suspended sentence was not five months, as her Honour imposed, but, depending on the actual date of Ms Grooms' release in September 2009, in the order of three months or less.

64. Accordingly, there has been an error in the sentence. Had that been the only error, it would have been amended on appeal by substituting three months (or less) for the five months imposed on the re-sentencing for the Good Behaviour Order. It would not have required re-opening of the sentences on the other offences. As, however, the further evidence that I received justifies re-sentencing, this error confirms the decision to re-open the sentencing proceedings.

65. The appeal must be upheld and the sentences set aside. Ms Grooms is to be re-sentenced. I shall list the matter for re-sentence at a date suitable to the court and, so far as practicable, to the parties.

I certify that the preceding sixty-five (65) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of his Honour, Justice Refshauge.

Solicitor for the respondent: ACT Director of Public Prosecutions

(Interception and Access) Act 1979

Procedures Rules 2006

(Interception and Access) Act 1979

Procedures Rules 2006

Grooms v Toohey [2012] ACTSC 28

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (138 paragraphs)

Grooms v Toohey [2012] ACTSC 28 (16 February 2012)

Parties

Legislation Cited (8)

Cases Cited (13)