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[2026] QSC 68
General information, not legal advice.
Supreme Court of Queensland
2026-04-10
McCafferty J
Original judgment source is linked above.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - REVIEWABLE DECISIONS AND CONDUCT - DISCRETION NOT TO ENTERTAIN APPLICATION - GENERALLY - where the applicant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a child - where the respondent made a restricted prisoner declaration in respect of the applicant under s 175H of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) for a period of seven years - where as a consequence of the declaration the applicant is prohibited from applying for parole until 4 March 2030 - where the applicant seeks judicial review of the respondent's decision to make the restricted prisoner declaration - where the application is made more than two years out of time - where there is no adequate explanation for the delay - whether an extension of time should be granted - whether the application should be dismissed
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - REVIEWABLE DECISIONS AND CONDUCT - DECISIONS TO WHICH JUDICIAL REVIEW LEGISLATION APPLIES - DECISIONS UNDER AN ENACTMENT - DECISIONS UNDER INSTRUMENTS - where the applicant was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a child - where the respondent made a restricted prisoner declaration in respect of the applicant under s 175H of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) for a period of seven years - where the applicant wrote to the respondent identifying an error in the declaration and requesting that it be vacated - where the respondent acknowledged the error but refused to vacate the declaration - where the applicant purports to seek judicial review of the respondent's decision not to vacate the declaration - where the respondent seeks dismissal of the application pursuant to s 48 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) - whether the relevant enactments confer upon the respondent any power to "vacate" the declaration - whether the impugned correspondence is a "decision" - whether the impugned correspondence is a decision to which the Judicial Review Act applies - whether any reasonable basis for the application has been disclosed - whether it is inappropriate to allow the application to continue - whether the application should be dismissed
Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld), s 4, s 4(a), s 24AA
Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld), s 32(3)
Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld), s 21, s 21(2), s 26, s 26(1)(b), s 48, s 54
Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld), s 140
Accused A v Callanan [2009] 2 Qd R 112; [2009] QSC 12, cited
Allwood v Sundin [2020] QSC 188, cited
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321; [1990] HCA 33, cited
Chibanda v Chief Executive, Queensland Health [2018] QSC 128, cited
Concord Data Solutions Pty Ltd v Director-General of Education [1994] 1 Qd R 343, cited
Griffith University v Tang (2005) 221 CLR 99; [2005] HCA 7, applied
Hoffman v Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board [1994] 1 Qd R 369, cited
Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259; [1996] HCA 6, cited
Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Nicholls [2013] QSC 68, cited
Parole Board Queensland Legal Services for the respondent
[1] In July 1996, Jean-Douglas Griffiths (the applicant) brutally raped and murdered a 16-year-old child. His offending was attended with sadistic, brutal and depraved circumstances. It commenced with the applicant grabbing his victim by the throat, forcing him to undress and proceeding then to rape him and commit other acts of sexual molestation. Throughout the violent sexual attack, the applicant reassured the deceased child that he would not kill him. That reassurance was false. After his sexual assaults concluded, he placed a belt around the neck of his victim and strangled him to death.
[2] The applicant presented to the police station that day and confessed to the murder. He provided police with details of what he had done. The applicant told police he had killed the deceased child because he refused the applicant's sexual advances. He described his strangulation of the deceased to police. It is unnecessary to record the details of what the applicant told police.
[3] On 2 December 1997, the applicant pleaded guilty to murder and was sentenced (by Moynihan J) to life imprisonment.
[4] In July 2009, the applicant became eligible for parole. On 19 March 2021, he applied for parole. That application was deferred for reasons which are not necessary to detail.
[5] In December 2021, amendments were made to the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) (Corrective Services Act). Those amendments provided the President of the Parole Board with a new power to make a "restricted prisoner declaration" in respect of prisoners who had committed particular types of offences. If the President makes a restricted prisoner declaration about a prisoner, that prisoner is prohibited from applying for parole under the Corrective Services Act while the declaration is in force and any deferred application is automatically refused.[1]
[6] A restricted prisoner declaration may only be made about a "restricted prisoner". Section 175D of the Corrective Services Act defines this term. It provides:
A prisoner is a restricted prisoner if the prisoner has been sentenced to life imprisonment for -
(a) a conviction of murder and the person killed was a child; or
(c) 1 conviction of murder and another offence of murder was taken into account; or
(d) a conviction of murder and the person has on a previous occasion been sentenced for another offence of murder."
[7] On 3 March 2023, the then-President of the Parole Board made a restricted prisoner declaration about the applicant in this form:
"I, Michael John Byrne KC, President of Parole Board of Queensland, acting pursuant to s. 175H of the Corrective Services Act 2006 (Qld) ('the Act'), am satisfied that it is in the public interest to make a declaration about Jean-Douglas GRIFFITHS, a Restricted Prisoner within the meaning of s.175D(b) of the Act and hereby do so.
This declaration is specified to take effect on 4 March 2023 and will end on 4 March 2030. Jean-Douglas Griffiths may not apply for parole pursuant to s.180 for the duration of this declaration.
Consequently, the prisoner's parole application received on 19 March 2021 which was deferred pursuant to s.193AA(2) of the Act is refused."
[8] The declaration was accompanied by a detailed set of reasons.
[9] On 11 June 2025, the applicant wrote to the current President of the Parole Board about the declaration. He asserted that the declaration was unlawful and requested that it be removed.
[10] On 14 July 2025, solicitors then retained by the applicant also wrote to the current President of the Parole Board. This correspondence, presumably sent on instructions, elaborated upon the applicant's letter sent the previous month. The point advanced in this correspondence was that the declaration was made pursuant to s 175D(b) of the Corrective Services Act and was thus "unlawful" because the applicant did not, as they put it, "meet the criteria" provided for by that subsection.
[11] The reference to the applicant not meeting the "criteria" is in truth a contention that the applicant was not a restricted prisoner as described in s 175D(b) because he did not have more than 1 conviction of murder. The correspondence did not address the fact that, uncontroversially, the applicant fell within the definition of s 175D(a) and was, by definition, a restricted prisoner.
[12] On 12 August 2025, the current President of the Parole Board provided a response to the two letters he had received. This response accepted that the declaration incorrectly referred to s 175D(b) and ascribed this to an administrative error. It informed the applicant that the reasons for the declaration had articulated the basis for the declaration, including that the applicant had been convicted of murder and the person killed was a child. The applicant was informed that the declaration otherwise complied with s 175I of the Act and remained in effect.
[13] On 9 October 2025, the applicant filed what he intended to be an application for statutory order of review under the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) (Judicial Review Act). The nature of the application, and what it in fact seeks to review, has evolved since it was first filed. Its evolution continued during the hearing.
[14] On 10 November 2025 an amended application was filed. A further amended application was filed on 24 November 2025. These applications raised a complaint of defamation. There are various difficulties with this complaint. This is not the occasion to essay them.
[15] During the hearing it became apparent that what the applicant is seeking is to review two matters. The first matter is the decision to make the restricted prisoner declaration on 3 March 2023 (the restricted prisoner declaration). The second matter is what the applicant characterises as the decision not to vacate the declaration communicated on 12 August 2025 (the refusal to vacate the declaration).
[16] The respondent has applied seeking orders that the applicant's application be dismissed under s 48 of the Judicial Review Act. As filed, the respondent's application and submissions were directed toward the restricted prisoner declaration. The respondent, quite properly, did not oppose the applicant raising further issues with respect to the refusal to vacate the declaration. Given the applicant's incarceration, and the fact he was unrepresented, I did not make any direction that his application be amended.[2] The respondent did not insist on an amendment and was able to advance submissions at the hearing as to why the attempt to challenge this matter should also be dismissed.
[17] For the reasons explained below, I have determined that the applicant's application for statutory order of review in respect of both the restricted prisoner declaration and the refusal to vacate the declaration should be dismissed.
[18] The immediate hurdle faced by the applicant is that he requires an extension of time of over two years to bring his application which, ordinarily, should have been filed within 28 days.
[19] Section 26 of the Judicial Review Act requires that an application for statutory order of review be made no later than 28 days after the decision sought to be reviewed was made. The restricted prisoner declaration was made on 3 March 2023. There is no suggestion that the applicant was not made aware of the decision shortly after it was made.
[20] The application, in its original form, was filed on 9 October 2025. That does not preclude this Court from granting an extension of time.[3] In determining whether an extension of time should be granted the following matters are relevant:
(a) the explanation given for the delay;
(b) whether the grant of an extension would be fair and equitable in the circumstances; and
(c) the merits of the application for review.[4]
[21] The applicant has not provided any sworn explanation for his delay. His reason for the delay can only be gleaned implicitly from other filed material. His amended application for review dated 24 November 2025 suggests that the relevant correctional facility where he is imprisoned did not have a current copy of the Corrective Services Act. A similar point is contained in one of his written submissions. During the hearing, the applicant informed the Court that he received the current copy of the Corrective Services Act in 2024. Precisely when was not identified. But, accepting that this is correct (and accepting that his incarceration may have presented some disadvantages), it does not explain why the applicant waited until October 2025 to file the application. The absence of an explanation is a persuasive factor against an extension of time.[5] The applicant has not adequately explained the significant delay in bringing his application. This is sufficient to decline an application to extend time.
"Judicial review of administrative decisions should be undertaken promptly. The requirement to bring a proceeding within the stipulated or a reasonable time is normally essential to that outcome. As was observed in Aurukun Bauxite Development Pty Ltd v Queensland, a party is 'not entitled to arrogate the decision when to start a proceeding to themselves, in violation of a statutory requirement to bring it within a particular timeframe...' Entities and individuals are entitled to proceed on the basis that a decision is not going to be the subject of a judicial review challenge if no such challenge is brought within a reasonable time." (citations omitted)
[23] In my view, quite apart from the failure to provide a satisfactory explanation, the public interest is not served by granting an extension of time. It is not served by encouraging delay. Judicial review of any decision should be undertaken promptly after it is made. In this case it has not been. The mere fact that there might be an absence of prejudice to the respondent is not sufficient to grant an extension.[8]
[24] The prospects or merits of the application may also be a relevant factor. An application which is without merit is "unlikely to be granted an extension of time, even if there is a satisfactory explanation for the delay."[9] To assess the merits it is necessary to understand precisely the grounds upon which the applicant relies. That is not an easy exercise. The applicant has made no attempt to articulate them in a manner falling within the framework of the Judicial Review Act. On the clearest view the applicant advances two main arguments:
(a) First, the exercise of the power to declare him a restricted prisoner was unlawful, or "erroneous", because the declaration incorrectly referred to s 175D(b) of the Corrective Services Act; and
(b) Secondly, the decision was "inherently unjust" and "excessive".
[25] There is no merit in the first argument. The power to make a restricted prisoner declaration, which the former President exercised, is contained in s 175H of the Corrective Services Act. It provides, relevantly:
"175H Deciding to make restricted prisoner declaration
(1) The president may make a restricted prisoner declaration about a restricted prisoner if the president is satisfied it is in the public interest to do so.
(2) In considering the public interest the president must have regard to the following matters -
(a) the nature, seriousness and circumstances of the offence, or each offence, for which the prisoner was sentenced to life imprisonment;
(b) any risk the prisoner may pose to the public if the prisoner is granted parole;
(c) the likely effect that the prisoner's release on parole may have on an eligible person or a victim.
(3) Also, in deciding whether to make a restricted prisoner declaration the president must have regard to the following information -
(a) the restricted prisoner report about the prisoner;
(b) if an eligible person has, under section 188, at any time made a submission in relation to a parole application made by the prisoner - the submission;
(c) any relevant remarks made by a court in a proceeding against the prisoner for the offence for which the prisoner was sentenced to a term of life imprisonment;
(d) if the prisoner made a submission under section 175G(3)(d) - the submission.
(4) Without limiting subsections (2) and (3), the president may have regard to any other matter or information the president considers relevant to the public interest.
[26] The declaration can only be made about a "restricted prisoner". The class of persons who meet this description is set out in s 175D. A mere misdescription, as occurred here, does not alter the fact that the applicant was and remains a restricted prisoner: he is a person who has been sentenced to life imprisonment for a conviction of murder where the person killed was a child.
[27] To erroneously refer to a different definitional subsection does not alter the ability to exercise the power under s 175H. The power to make a declaration under s 175H is conditioned upon the President being satisfied of certain matters. The relevant sub-classification of a restricted prisoner is not one of those matters. All that was required was that the applicant was a restricted prisoner within the meaning of s 175D. He is. The exercise of power was therefore lawful.
[28] So far as it is contended that the decision is unjust or excessive, the applicant has not advanced any substantive arguments as to why this is the case. His submission, broadly described, is that the decision is excessive because he was a child at the time of his offending, is now 14 years past his parole eligibility date and has completed all recommended programs while incarcerated.
[29] A critical aspect of the applicant's submission is his contention that the restricted prisoner declaration provided for in the Corrective Services Act cannot be applied to him because he was a child at the time of his offending. That argument is premised on the assertion that the applicant was, in fact, a child at the time of his offending. That premise is incorrect. The applicant was 17 years old at the time. The version of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) in force at the relevant time expressly provided that a person who was 17 years old or more was not a "child".[10] The suggestion that the current regime, or regime in place when the restrictive prisoner declaration provisions were engaged, alter this by reason of s 140 of the Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) is simply wrong.
[30] Similarly, the applicant's suggestion that s 32(3) of the Human Rights Act 2019 (Qld) (Human Rights Act) is somehow engaged is also wrong. That section identifies certain rights in criminal proceedings. Section 32(3) specifically provides that "a child charged with a criminal offence has the right to a procedure that takes account of the child's age and the desirability of promoting the child's rehabilitation." There are two difficulties with the applicant seeking to rely upon s 32(3). The first is that the applicant's criminal proceedings were concluded in 1997, decades before the Human Rights Act was enacted. The second difficulty is that this provision can have no application to an offender who was by force of legislation at that time an adult when his offending occurred.
[31] It was not, expressly at least, suggested that the decision to make a restricted prisoner declaration was incompatible with the applicant's human rights. In any event, it is difficult to see how there is any merit in the suggestion. By s 8 of the Human Rights Act, a decision is compatible with human rights if it does not limit a human right or limits a human right only to the extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with s 13. That section provides that "a human right may be subject under law only to reasonable limits that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom." While it is unnecessary to determine this point, there are compelling reasons why restricted prisoner declarations, assuming they in fact limit a human right, do so to an extent that is reasonable and demonstrably justifiable in accordance with s 13. It should also be recorded that at the conclusion of the hearing the respondent provided notice to the Attorney-General and the Queensland Human Rights Commission, neither of whom sought to intervene.
[32] The arguments advanced by the applicant - that he became eligible for parole 14 years ago and has completed, so he contends, all recommended programs for his offence while incarcerated - are matters which seek to engage in a review of the merits of the decision. An application for judicial review does not provide an occasion for the court to substitute its views for those of the relevant decision-maker. A court reviewing administrative decisions "must beware of turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision."[11] The Judicial Review Act does not make the Supreme Court a merit review tribunal.[12] The is no suggestion that the conduct and decision of the former President of the Parole Board in making the restricted prisoner declaration engaged any of the grounds specified in s 21(2) of the Judicial Review Act. In these circumstances, the challenge to the decision is without merit.
[33] The same position must be taken with respect to a further argument made by the applicant at the hearing that a clinical psychologist had considered him suitable for parole with conditions. That argument lends no support to the proposition that the decision of the former President was unjust or excessive. The former President had this material before him. The fact that he did not act in accordance with it, and instead preferred the views of consultant psychiatrists, is a complaint seeking to review the merits of the decision.
[34] The applicant has made his application more than two years out of time. He has not provided an adequate justification for the grant of an extension of time in the circumstances. Because the application was filed out of time, and an extension of time has been refused, the appropriate order is that the application be dismissed. In these circumstances, it is unnecessary to make an order dismissing the application under s 48 of the Judicial Review Act.
[35] The applicant's challenge to this matter is also out of time. The respondent did not, quite appropriately, take that point for this aspect of the case. It did however seek orders that it be dismissed under s 48 of the Judicial Review Act.
[36] I consider that there is no reasonable basis for the application to challenge the refusal to vacate the declaration.
[37] In challenging this "decision", the applicant does not seek to challenge the making of the declaration or the process leading up to the declaration but rather focuses upon the fact that it contains "misleading information". It is for this reason that he contends the respondent is required by law to ensure the declaration be vacated. The "misleading information" relied upon is the declaration's incorrect reference to s 175D(b).
[38] The declaration did not describe the applicant as a person that has more than one conviction for murder. It recorded nothing other than that he was a restricted prisoner "within the meaning of s 175D(b)." This error in description did not affect the making of the order. In my view, it was nothing more than a typographical error.
[39] To be reviewable under the Judicial Review Act, the President's correspondence of 12 August 2025 must meet two criteria. First, it must be a decision. Second, it must be a decision to which the Judicial Review Act applies within the meaning of s 4(a).
[40] As to the first criteria, the relevant event said to constitute the decision is the refusal of the President to vacate the restricted prisoner declaration. Once the declaration is made under s 175H of the Corrective Services Act there is no express power to amend, vary, or revisit the declaration. Under s 229A, the President has the "power to do all things necessary or convenient to be done for the performance of the president's functions." It was not contended that this provision contained a power to vacate a restricted prisoner declaration. It would, however, be an unusual outcome if this provision authorised the President to vacate a declaration (which is what the applicant seeks) because it contained a typographical error, particularly one which did not affect the exercise of the power.
[41] The respondent submits that the only other possible source of power is s 24AA of the Acts Interpretation Act 1954 (Qld) (Interpretation Act). This section provides that if an act "authorises or requires the making of ... [a] decision" the "power includes power to amend or repeal [the] decision." This power, as s 24AA(b) provides, is "exercisable in the same way, and subject to the same conditions, as the power to make ... the decision."
[42] There are two difficulties in any reliance on s 24AA. The first is that what the applicant is seeking is to have the decision vacated because the reference to s 157D(b) is incorrect. It is difficult to see how, under s 24AA(b), the power to vacate could be exercised in those circumstances.
[43] In any event, there is a second difficulty. Section 4 of the Interpretation Act provides that its operation "may be displaced, wholly or partly, by a contrary intention appearing in any Act." There are, in my view, indications of a contrary intention appearing within the Corrective Services Act. The framework underlying restricted prisoner declarations was designed to protect the community and reduce the re-traumatisation of victims' families. That measure was achieved, in part, by conferring authority on the President to declare that a person falling with the definition of a restricted prisoner not be considered for parole for a period up to a maximum of 10 years.
[44] The procedure to be followed in making an order in the first instance requires the President to be satisfied that the order is in the public interest. There are various mandatory considerations that the President must have regard to in considering the public interest. There are also further mandatory considerations that the President must have regard to, including the restricted prisoner report about the person. The duration of the order is for a specified period not exceeding 10 years. It would be an unusual outcome if once the President had made the order, in accordance with the legislative procedure identified, it could be subsequently vacated. There is no power within the Corrective Services Act to do so_._ The absence of such a power is consistent with an intention to displace the operation of s 24AA of the Interpretation Act. It follows in my view that this provision does not give power to the President to vacate an order once made.
[45] So far as the second criteria is concerned, the question whether a matter is a decision for the purposes of the Judicial Review Act requires it to be one for which provision is made by or under a statute.[13] In terms of s 4(a), this also requires the decision to be one of "an administrative character made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, under an enactment (whether or not in the exercise of a discretion)." In Griffith University v Tang[14], Gummow, Callinan and Heydon JJ made the following observations:
"[89] The determination of whether a decision is 'made ... under an enactment' involves two criteria: first, the decision must be expressly or impliedly required or authorised by the enactment; and, secondly, the decision must itself confer, alter or otherwise affect legal rights or obligations, and in that sense the decision must derive from the enactment. A decision will only be 'made ... under an enactment' if both these criteria are met. It should be emphasised that this construction of the statutory definition does not require the relevant decision to affect or alter existing rights or obligations, and it will be sufficient that the enactment requires or authorises decisions from which new rights or obligations arise. Similarly, it is not necessary that the relevantly affected legal rights owe their existence to the enactment in question. Affection of rights or obligations derived from the general law or statute will suffice."
[46] In my view, the President's letter of 12 August 2025 is not a decision in the relevant sense. Nor does it satisfy the test from Tang. It is critically important that the complaint advanced by the applicant was not about the making of the declaration, but rather that it contains information that is "false and misleading", being the incorrect reference to s175D(b) and not s 175D(a).
[47] In exercising the power to make a restricted prisoner declaration, the President was not required to be satisfied of the type of restricted prisoner the applicant was. Whether he was a child murderer or had murdered more than 1 person was irrelevant. It is therefore difficult to see how the current President's refusal to "vacate" the decision is something which confers, alters or otherwise affects legal rights or obligations. There was not, as the applicant contended at the hearing, "a legal responsibility to vacate [the] declaration and apply one that is actually admissible and correct." Nor was there, as the applicant contends, a duty on the part of the President to make a decision under s 22(1) of the Judicial Review Act.
[48] It follows that there is nothing in President's letter of 12 August 2025 that meets the description of a decision to which the Judicial Review Act applies. In these circumstances I am satisfied that it is both inappropriate for proceedings in relation to the application to be continued and that there is no reasonable basis for the application. Either way, s 48 of the Judicial Review Act is engaged.
[49] Accordingly, the application for statutory order of review is dismissed. The respondent does not seek its costs of the application. There will therefore be no order as to costs.
[2] Section 54 of the Judicial Review Act 1991 (Qld) confers a discretion on the Court to permit a document lodged with the registry to be amended in a way specified by the Court.
[4] Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Nicholls [2013] QSC 68 at [77]; Hoffman v The Queensland Local Government Superannuation Board [1994] 1 Qd R 369 at 372.
[5] Chibanda v Chief Executive, Queensland Health [2018] QSC 128 at [20].
[6] Waratah Coal Pty Ltd v Nicholls [2013] QSC 68 at [78].
[7] [2018] QSC 128 at [19].
[8] Allwood v Sundin [2020] QSC 188 at [247].
[9] Chibanda v Chief Executive, Queensland Health [2018] QSC 128 at [21].
[10] Juvenile Justice Act 1992 (Qld), as at 1 December 1994, s 5.
[11] Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272 (Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ).
[12] Concord Data Solutions Pty Ltd v Director-General of Education [1994] 1 Qd R 343 at 346-7 (Thomas J); Accused A v Callanan [2009] 2 Qd R 112; [2009] QSC 12 at [7] (Applegarth J).
[13] Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 337 (Mason J).
Griffiths
President, Parole Board Queensland [2026] QSC 68
(1990) 170 CLR 321
(2005) 221 CLR 99
(1996) 185 CLR 259