Northern Territory ( Defamation Act 1938, s 6A)
· It is available only under the common law in Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory.
795 I will begin by considering the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW) (Divn 7). Whereas the common law requires that the comment should be based on facts that are true or privileged, the New South Wales Act moderated that requirement. In substance, the defence can still be made out where some of the facts relied upon, as the basis for the comment, were untrue, or could not be proved to be true, provided that the comment represented an opinion that might reasonably be based upon other material, also relied upon, which was true (s 30(3)). Here, however, it is asserted by the defendants that the facts, which formed the basis of the comment, were all true, so that s 30(3) can be put to one side. In that context, and adapting the helpful analysis of Simpson J in Fawcett v John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited [2008] NSWSC 139 at para [142], the following issues arise:
· First, was the imputation a comment or a statement of fact?
· Secondly, if it was a comment, is the factual basis for it sufficiently indicated or identified in the published material?
· Thirdly, if so, are the facts substantially true?
· Fourthly, did the imputation relate to a matter of public interest (s 31)? Here, the plaintiffs concede public interest (PS: para [316])
· Fifthly, where the comment is that of the defendant (s 32) or a servant or agent of the defendant (s 33), was the opinion expressed by the comment held by the defendant, its servant or agent, as the case may be? The onus is upon the plaintiffs to prove that the opinion represented by the comment was not honestly held by the defendants (s 32(2)) or the servant or agent (s 33(2)), as the case may be.
· Alternatively, where the comment is that of a stranger, and in context, not the comment of the defendant, its servant or agent (s 34(1)), the onus is upon the plaintiffs to prove that the publication complained of was not in good faith for public information or the advancement of education (s 34(2)).
796 Dealing with these issues, let me for convenience, repeat the imputation:
"5(a) Jeremy Griffith, who holds himself out as a scientist, publishes work of such a poor standard that it has no support at all from the scientific community."
797 Addressing the first issue, the question is, having regard not only to the terms of the imputation but the matter published, whether the imputation would be regarded by the ordinary reasonable viewer as a comment or a statement of fact (John Fairfax Publications Pty Limited v O'Shane [2005] NSWCA 164 paras [28]/[29]). Here, the plaintiffs identified the following passages as giving rise to the imputation: (PS: para [319])
" Jackson:
They'll be asked to devote their lives to the promotion of Griffith's ideas and an increasing number are taking up the challenge. The intriguing question is, why? What do they see in a man whose theories are widely derided by the scientific community? How does he command their devotion? Our guest reporter is Theologian, Doctor David Millikan. (Ex N: lines 46-51)
Millikan:
The answer, he believed, lay in the evolutionary process. As human beings developed minds, they became aggressive and took it out on the innocence of animals. Griffith became obsessed with his ideas but he'd been a poor student and in the world of philosophy and theology he was an amateur. (Ex N: lines 380-385)
Macartney-Snape:
He didn't do very well at university. You know, he was described as almost backward at school. And you know, he's a kid from the Australian bush it's. You know he's not in the main stream of, of intellectual thought, yet he's dealing with the most important idea of all. (Ex N: lines 390-394)
Millikan:
For thirteen years Griffith wrote compulsively. As he did it began to dawn on him that his writings were answering the great questions of life. In the end he was convinced that he was a prophet and he had written half a million words. But he felt like a voice crying in the wilderness. It was not until he met Tim Macartney-Snape and his friends associated with 'Australian Geographic' that Griffith began to find the public recognition he craved. (Ex N: lines 398-405)
Millikan:
But is it an understanding based on science? Griffith has gone to enormous lengths to find endorsement. He sent eight hundred copies of his book to leading scientists and journals around the world. But today he is alone, rejected by the scientific community. (Ex N: lines 976-980)
Flannery:
No, it's a pretty poor book about the subject. It's it's very selective. It doesn't take into account the various important points of views, or differences in points of views. Its interpretation is based upon this very, very narrow data base with a very large interpretation at the top. No, I'd from what I've seen of it, I must say, I'm singularly unimpressed as, as an attempt to explain human nature and what humans are about. (Ex N: lines 986-993)
Macartney-Snape:
I think, you know we are just going to have to put up with the fact that academia won't accept us, at least academia as it is now won't accept us. It's up to young people coming up in the ranks to, who who are sufficiently outrageous if you like in their preparedness to accept new ideas who who will take it on, who will realise the truth in it. (Ex N: lines 997-1002)"
798 The defendants identified the context a little more broadly. They identified the following parts of the programme as giving rise to the lack of support in the scientific community: (cf DS: para [1.227] - referring to Ex N(2))
"(a) set out … the history of the evolution of Mr Griffith's ideas (lines 356-385, 398-405);
(b) described Mr Griffith's works as relayed by Mr Griffith (lines 311-321, 498-501, 508-515, 541-544, 798-803, 810-825, 887-896, 959-965, 1021-1027, 1032-1046), Dr Millikan (lines 326-339, 503-506, 517-523, 546-550, 792-796, 805-808, 835-837, 869-873);
(c) set out the view of Mr Griffith (lines 101-102) and Mr Macartney-Snape (lines 255-259, 1096-1097) that the ideas have a rational, scientific explanation;
(d) set out the attempts made by Mr Griffith to obtain support from the scientific community (lines 976-980); and
(e) set out the views of Mr Macartney-Snape and Mr Griffith as whether they had received support and the reasons for why they may have received no support. Mr Macartney-Snape stated that Mr Griffith is not in the main stream of intellectual thought (lines 390-394); and Mr Macartney-Snape stated that they have to put up with the fact that academia will not accept them (lines 997-1003)."
799 As pointed out in O'Shane (para [25]), extracting from Gately on Libel and Slander (10th ed, 2004, para [12.6]), the defence of fair comment, fundamentally distinguishes between statements of fact and expressions of opinion, where the latter embraces much more than mere opinion - extending to deductions, inferences, conclusions, criticisms, remarks and observations (cf Fawcett at para [139]).
800 The onus is upon the defendants to establish that the imputation is comment. Here the defendants, in submissions, provided the following analysis in support of the conclusion that the imputation was comment: (DS: para [1.224])
"1.224 Imputation 5(a) contains qualitative terms (' holds out', 'support', 'poor standard' ), and quantitative terms ( 'at all', 'scientific community' ). Both sets of terms are in themselves judgmental and suggestive of opinion. It could possibly be a defamatory allegation of fact if it did not contain multiple qualitative and quantitative terms. Further, the fact that imputation contains the subordinate conjunction 'that' is a conclusion arising from what immediately precedes it. The words of the imputations appear to the reasonable reader to be conclusionary: Mitchell v Sprout [2002] 1 NZLR 766 at [19]."
801 The plaintiffs submitted that, on the contrary, the imputation was a statement of fact (PS: para [318]). Alternatively, one aspect but not others, was capable of being characterised as comment. The following submission was put: (PS: para [320])
"320. … It is submitted that, in the context of the matter complained of, the only aspect of the imputation that may amount to comment is the question of standard as discussed in the matter complained of by Professor Flannery. In relation to the issues of support and whether the standard of the work has resulted in a lack of support the imputation arises from express statements of fact made by either Dr Millikan or Mr Macartney-Snape. In these circumstances, in the context of the matter complained of, imputation 5(a) does not amount to a comment."
802 I accept that the imputation was a comment. Professor Flannery's contribution, incidentally, went further in my view than simply providing an opinion on the standard of Mr Griffith's published work. As a scientist, and a person of some standing in the scientific community, he plainly did not support Mr Griffith's published work as science.
803 Moving to the second and third requirements, the defendants must show that the comment was based upon a proper foundation, that is, based upon "proper material" (s 30). The facts which form the basis for the comment must be set out in the matter complained of. Alternatively, they must be sufficiently identified to be ascertainable by the viewer, or a matter of notoriety (cf PS Reply: para [193]). The viewers are thereby put in the position of being able to judge for themselves the extent to which the publisher's opinion is well founded (Kemsley v Foot [1952] AC 345 at 356; Pervan v North Queensland Newspaper Co Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 309 at 327). The facts as stated or identified must (in the context of this case) also be substantially true.
804 The defendants in the Amended Defence identified the material in the programme which formed the basis for the comment ("the proper material for comment"). The Amended Defence was in these terms:
"10.1 Imputation 5(a) …
(a) The Defendants contend that it is a fact that the First Plaintiff holds himself out as a scientist.
(b) The Defendants contend that it is a fact that the First Plaintiff is the author of a book titled Beyond the Human Condition . This fact was set out in the matter complained of at line 258.
(c) The Defendants contend that it [is] a fact that the First Plaintiff has actively sought support from the scientific community for his work. This fact was set out in the matter complained of at lines 976 to 980.
(d) The Defendants contend that it is a fact that almost all of the scientists from whom the First Plaintiff has sought support for his work have declined to offer such support. This fact was stated by the Third Plaintiff and set out in the matter complained of at lines 997 to 999.
(e) The Defendants contend that it is a fact that the prominent scientist Tim Flannery has described the First Plaintiff's book, Beyond the Human Condition , as 'a pretty poor book about the subject' which 'fails to take into account the various points of views, or differences in points of views'. Dr Flannery's account of the First Plaintiff's work was set out in the matter complained of at lines 986 to 994.
(f) The Defendants contend that each of the matters set out in paragraphs 10.1(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) above are proper material for comment."
805 The defendants assert, and I accept, that each of these matters has been established by the evidence (DS: para [1.232]). Indeed, paragraph (d) of the Amended Defence is expressed in terms of "almost all … scientists". The case made out, however, went further. There was, in my view, no relevant support from any scientist, including those scientists identified by the plaintiffs as having provided support (supra paras [678]ff). Such "support" as scientists provided to Mr Griffith did not extend to support for the science of his thesis, or even an important aspect of it.
806 The plaintiffs made the following submission: (PS: para [324])
"324. In circumstances where:
(a) the defendants interviewed three (3) scientists and during those interviews positive comments were made about Mr Griffith's work (Ex A(70));
(b) the defendants failed to interview scientists whom they knew were supportive of Mr Griffith's work (discussed under 'Defendants' Conduct', above);
(c) Professor Flannery has no expertise in relation to most of the areas of science covered by Mr Griffith's work (Ex 16; T965.2); and
(d) Dr Millikan sought to influence Professor Flannery's opinion by informing him that Mr Griffith was running a cult and ruining families (T971.50),
the single statement made by Professor Flannery cannot amount to proper material for comment."
807 The basis for that submission is not entirely clear. Certain paragraphs appear to be relevant rather to the issue of whether, given the asserted facts, the defendant, its servant or agent, honestly held the opinion provided by the comment (cf s 32(2), s 33(2)). Other paragraphs may be suggesting that the factual material presented to the viewer was not proper material, because it was incomplete (O'Shane at para [51]). Each aspect has been considered (supra paras [624]-[627], [768]ff)). I reject the submission. The material was, I believe, proper material for comment. It was substantially true. It was, I believe, sufficiently identified.
808 Moving to the fifth element, the defendants submitted that the comment was made by the defendant, its servant or agent, Dr Millikan and Ms Liz Jackson. According to the defendants, there was no basis upon which it could be said that the opinion was not honestly held by each (DS: para [1.236]). Additionally, the defendants suggested that the defence of comment of a stranger had application (s34), the strangers being Professor Tim Flannery (EX N(2): lines 986-993) and Mr Macartney-Snape (Ex N(2): lines 997-1002) (DS: para [1.240]). In each case it was said that their comments "did not purport to be the comments of the defendants or its servant or agent" (DS: para 1.239). There was no basis, it was said, upon which it could be suggested that the requirements of s 34(2) had not been satisfied.
809 The plaintiffs, responding to these submissions, drew attention to the fact that neither Ms Jackson nor Dr Millikan had given evidence (PS: para [327]). For a number of reasons, it was said, the Court would not be satisfied that either honestly held the opinion represented by the comment. Dr Millikan could not honestly have held that opinion because he was aware that Professors Birch and Morton supported Mr Griffith's work. He also knew that Professors Groves and Davies had earlier provided support (PS Reply: para [202]). More than that, Dr Millikan was aware, according to the plaintiffs, that Professor Robertson agreed with, and supported, aspects of Mr Griffith's work (PS Reply: para [203]). The Court should infer from Dr Millikan's failure to give evidence, that his evidence would not have assisted him.
810 Again, I have, in the context of qualified privilege, earlier dealt with the suggestion that Dr Millikan did not honestly believe Imputation 5(a) (supra para [766]). In my view, the evidence established that he did. Ms Liz Jackson, on the evidence, was not involved in the making of the programme. It appears that she was brought in to provide an introduction (Ex N(2): lines 35-51) and a conclusion (Ex N(2): lines 1172-1178). I infer that she did so based upon her viewing the programme and access to the script. I also infer that, upon the basis of that material, she held the opinion expressed.
811 Turning to the suggestion that the comment may be characterised as the comment of a stranger, based upon the words of Mr Macartney-Snape and/or Professor Flannery, the plaintiffs made the following submissions: (PS Reply: paras [218]-[220])
"218. It is submitted that the words spoken by Professor Flannery in the matter complained of only give rise to a portion of imputation 5(a) - namely, the question of standard: Ex N, lines 986-993. The remainder of the sting was conveyed by words spoken by Dr Millikan and Liz Jackson - both servants and agents of the ABC: [319] Ps' subs.
219. Similarly the statement made by Mr Macartney-Snape could only possibly rise to one aspect of the imputation: Ex N, lines 997-1002.
220. In circumstances were neither of the statements made by Professor Flannery or Mr Macartney-Snape is congruent with the imputation in question, then the defendants cannot rely on the defence of comment of a stranger in relation to either of these statements."
812 I accept these submissions. The comment cannot, in my view, be characterised as the comment of a stranger in terms of s 34 of the Act. It was, relevantly, the comment of the defendant, the ABC, by its servant or agent. Subject to what follows concerning "malice", I believe the defence of comment in New South Wales has been established.
813 Since the issue under ss 32 and 33 concern the defendant's real opinion, or that of its servant or agent, malice is relevant in the sense that it may warp or distort judgment (cf Nicholas J, Brett May v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd & Ors [2007] NSWSC 760 at para [21]). In Cawley v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd [1981] 1 NSWLR 225, Hunt J said this: (at 237)
"I conclude that the concepts and principles of the common law do apply to the defence of statutory fair comment provided by the Codes, so that, although proof of malice or absence of good faith in the publication of the comment is not a conclusive answer to that defence, malice is nevertheless relevant (once more leaving to one side any question of onus of proof) as one of the elements to be considered and weighed in determining whether the comment was or was not in fact the commentator's real opinion and whether it has been distorted in the sense that the malice warped his judgment."
814 Here, for the reasons given in the context of the plaintiffs' case on malice (supra paras [421]-[490]), I do not accept that the judgment of those making the programme, including Dr Millikan, was distorted or warped by an improper purpose. On the contrary I accept, as I have said, that the imputation represented the opinion of Dr Millikan. It also represented, if it be relevant, the opinion of Ms Jackson.
815 Although there are differences in the statutory provisions in those States and Territories which have replaced or supplemented the common law, the position is broadly the same. The defendants have established, in my view, the defence of comment in each such jurisdiction.
816 Let me turn to the common law. The elements of fair comment were considered by the Victorian Court of Appeal (that being a state where the common law applied) in Herald & Weekly Times Ltd & Andrew Bolt v Popovic [2003] VSCA 161, where Gillard AJA said this (Winneke ACJ and Warren AJA agreeing): (at para [259])
"259. The defence of fair comment has in the past been somewhat complex because of the differing views as to what constitutes the essential elements of the defence. However, in my opinion, over the last 25 years, the elements of the defence have been settled. In Duncan and Neill on Defamation , the elements are stated as follows --
'(a) The comment must be on a matter of public interest;
(b) the comment must be based on fact;
(c) the comment, though it can consist of or include inferences of fact, must be recognisable as comments;
(d) the comment must satisfy the following objective test: could any fair minded man honestly express that opinion on the proved facts?'"
(footnotes omitted)
817 A useful elaboration upon this terse statement of the elements (also adopted by Gillard AJA in Popovic), was given by Lord Nicholls in the Court of Final Appeal in Hong Kong in Cheng v Tse Wai Chun Paul [2000] 3 HKLRD 418. Lord Nicholls said this: (Popovic para [263])
"First, the comment must be on a matter of public interest. Public interest is not to be confined within narrow limits today.
Second, the comment must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact …
Third, the comment must be based on facts which are true or protected by privilege … If the facts on which the comment purports to be founded are not proved to be true or published on a privileged occasion, the defence of fair comment is not available.
Next, the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, what are the facts on which the comment is being made. The reader or hearer should be in a position to judge for himself how far the comment was well founded.
Finally, the comment must be one which could have been made by an honest person however prejudiced he might be, and however exaggerated or obstinate his views."
818 In Popovic, again adopting Duncan and Neill, Gillard AJA said that the defence of comment was defeated at common law if the defendant was actuated by express malice (Popovic para [260]). The plaintiffs, in helpful written submissions, suggested that the real matter of defeasance at common law, was the absence of belief in the truth of the comment (PS: para [A45]). Again, a useful elaboration on that issue was provided by Lord Nicholls in Cheng's case, where he said this: (at 438)
"… To summarise, in my view, a comment which falls within the objective limits of the defence of fair comment can lose its immunity only by proof that the defendant did not genuinely hold the view he expressed. Honesty of belief is the touchstone. Actuation by spite, animosity, intent to injury, intent to arouse controversy or other motivation, whatever it may be, even if it is the dominant or sole motive, does not of itself defeat the defence. However, proof of such motivation may be evidence, sometimes compelling evidence, from which lack of genuine belief in the view expressed may be inferred. Proof of motivation may also be relevant on other issues in the action, such as damages.
It is said that this view of the law would have the undesirable consequence that malice would bear different meanings in the defences of fair comment and qualified privilege, and that this would inevitably cause difficulty for juries. I agree that if the term 'malice' were used, there might be a risk of confusion. The answer lies in shunning that word altogether. Juries can be instructed, regarding fair comment, that the defence is defeated by proof that the defendant did not genuinely believe the opinion he expressed. Regarding qualified privilege, juries can be directed that the defence is defeated by proof that the defendant used the occasion for some purpose other than that for which the occasion was privileged. This direction can be elaborated in a manner appropriate to the facts and issues in the case."
819 Adopting the formulation of the elements of the common law by Lord Nicholls, and for the reasons already stated, I believe the defendants have established comment in respect of those jurisdictions where the common law applies.
820 The defendants have, therefore, in my view succeeded in establishing a number of defences to imputation 5(a). In respect of those defences that may be defeated by malice, I am not satisfied that malice towards Mr Griffith has been demonstrated on the part of either defendant. I will not, in these circumstances, assess damages in respect of that imputation, unless directed by the Court of Appeal to do so.
821 I turn now to the imputations relating to the third plaintiff, Mr Macartney-Snape.
4. THE MACARTNEY-SNAPE IMPUTATIONS