The first criticism may readily be disposed of. It was that each imputation is ambiguous and should therefore be struck out as embarrassing. Authority was cited for the proposition that ambiguous imputations should be so treated ( Singleton v Ffrench (1986) 5 NSWLR 425; Amalgamated Television Services v Marsden (1998) 43 NSWLR 158).
31 I accept that, if it is correct that either imputation is ambiguous, it should be struck out. I do not, however, accept, in this case, that either imputation is ambiguous. The argument advanced was that the phrase "so deluded" is capable of suggesting either that Griffith is deluded because he claims to be greater than Jesus Christ (in imputation 11(a)) or to perform the role of the Holy Spirit (imputation 11(b)); or, alternatively, that he is deluded for some other reason and coincidentally makes the relevant claim.
32 In my opinion the meaning of each imputation is quite clear. Each contains within it the clear suggestion of a causal connection between the claim Griffith allegedly makes and the delusional state attributed to him. He is said to be "so deluded" that he makes a claim that, by implication, demonstrates the delusional state. I will not strike out either imputation for this reason.
33 That, however, does not dispose of these imputations. A further argument was that each imputation contained within it an un-stated premise which is false; and that, as a consequence, the meaning of the imputation itself is unclear, making it impossible for a jury to determine whether it was or was not conveyed by the matter complained of. In the case of imputation 11(a), the asserted unstated premise is that there is, objectively speaking, no greater figure than Jesus Christ, and that this is a truth so universally acknowledged as to make its contrary untenable and ludicrous. Accordingly, unless this premise is demonstrably correct, the imputation is logically flawed. The final part of the argument is that the premise is not, and cannot be shown to be, factually correct. After much deliberation, I have concluded that this argument should not be accepted. Its fallacy is to treat the reference to a figure greater than Jesus Christ too literally. The drafting of imputations is a difficult and sometimes complex matter, and it is not always easy to capture in words the message that a complained of publication conveys. A draftsperson may, on occasions, achieve that by the use of colloquial language. I appreciate that considerable care needs to be taken with the use of colloquial language in the drafting of imputations, but I do not consider that it is entirely forbidden. That is, in effect, what I think has been done here. I do not think the draftsperson intended that it should be assumed that to every ordinary reasonable reader it is axiomatic and factually incontrovertible that there is no greater figure than Jesus Christ (this in itself presupposes the existence of "Jesus Christ": a belief which is fundamental to many individuals, anathema to others, and immaterial to yet others;) in fact what the draftsperson has done is to use a figure of speech which is so well known as to have its own clear meaning. A claim to be greater than Jesus Christ might be made in a variety of ways: it might be made earnestly; it might be made flamboyantly; it might be made ironically. To say of a person that he or she claims to be "greater than Jesus Christ" is to say of that person that he or she is of overweening ego; to say that such a person genuinely believes that he or she "is greater than Jesus Christ" is tantamount to saying that that person is deluded. That is not because of an acceptance of the existence, or the greatness, of "Jesus Christ", but because the figure of speech is so well known that the meaning is clear even without literal acceptance of the underlying propositions of fact.
34 During the course of argument I put some of this to Mr Walker SC, who advanced the argument. Initially, I found his response persuasive. The response was, as I understood it, to draw a distinction between using the phrase "greater than Jesus Christ" as a figure of speech, comparable with "the best thing since sliced bead"; and using the phrase literally. Here, he contended, the phrase was not used in a way analogous with a phrase extolling the virtues of sliced bread, but one which was intended to be taken seriously and literally. In that sense, the imputation fails to make clear what it claims was conveyed by the publication.
35 On reflection, however, I do not think the distinction drawn by Mr Walker achieves what he seeks. It is to be remembered that all that is presently in issue is whether the imputation is sufficiently clear so that, if it goes to the jury, the jury will understand its meaning - its only meaning - in such a way as to avoid confusion. I am satisfied that the language is quite plain to an ordinary reasonable reader and to a jury. I will therefore not strike out imputation 11(a) on this ground.
36 The position is different, however, in relation to imputation 11(b). I do not think "the role of the Holy Spirit" commands the same public recognition as the phrase "greater than Jesus Christ". Indeed, if resort is had to what is contained in the various publications of which complaint is made, an explanation is forthcoming. Millikan explained that Christians believe that Jesus Christ forecast the coming of another who would, in plain words, speak the truth, and that this being would be "the Holy Spirit". It was from these premises that Millikan deduced that Griffith promoted himself as performing the role of the Holy Spirit. However, at this point of the argument the concern is not with how Millikan arrived at the conclusion that Griffith made such a claim; it is whether the expressions used in the imputation are clear enough to convey the meaning sought to be attributed to them. For this purpose the imputations must be examined in isolation from the matter complained of or any other material or explanation. In my opinion the meaning of imputation 11(b) is obscure and liable to cause confusion. For this reason if for no other, I propose to strike out this imputation.
37 The next argument advanced in relation to these two imputations is that they are not reasonably capable of arising from the first matter complained of. Of course, for the purpose of considering this argument, it is necessary to focus only upon that publication, and exclude reference to any of the other eleven publications the subject of the statement of claim.
38 There are two parts to each of these imputations. One is that Griffith makes the relevant claim - either (i) to be greater than Jesus Christ, or (ii) to perform the role of the Holy Spirit. Each of these is plainly capable of emerging from the matter complained of. Millikan is recorded as saying:
"And one of the things, he says himself, that, for example, he considers himself to be a greater figure than Jesus Christ. And even on one occasion when I was talking to him, he said to me you know Jesus Christ said that there was going to be one who would come after him who would speak the truth plainly and he believes that's him. … so in a way what he's saying is that he is, he performs the role of the Holy Spirit in contemporary society."