Gribble v ESSENTIAL ENERGY trading as Essential Energy

Legislation Cited: Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) s 10A
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 15.19(1)

Cases Cited: Habib v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 231
Habib v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 231; 198 A Crim R 219
Harris v 718932 Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 38; 56 NSWLR 276
Lazarus v Deutsche Lufthansa AG (1985) 1 NSWLR 188
Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26
May v Costaras [2025] NSWCA 178
Nash v Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) [2023] WASCA 75
Speight v Gosnay (1891) 60 LJQB 231
Valu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 95; 386 FLR 365

Texts Cited: District Court General Practice Note 2 - Generative AI Practice Note
Supreme Court Practice Note SC Gen 23 – Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence

Category: Procedural rulings

Parties: Plaintiff:
Joshua Gribble
Defendant:
Essential Energy trading as Essential Energy

Representation: Counsel:
Plaintiff: Mr J Gribble (Self represented)
Defendant: Mr T Senior
Solicitors:
Defendant: Norton Rose Fulbright

File Number(s): 2025/00188274

Publication restriction: Nil

Judgment

The application before the court

1. The plaintiff, by statement of claim filed on 16 May 2025 as amended on 25 July 2025 (the second further amended statement of claim, hereafter “2FASOC”) brings a claim for defamation for three publications, namely two slanders published during phone calls on 16 and 20 May 2025 and one email dated 17 May 2025.

2. Each of these publication were between the same two persons, namely Mr Leman, an employee of the defendant (“Essential Energy”) and Ms Schlosser, an employee of another company (“Greenwood”). The first matter complained of is a phone call between Mr Leman and Ms Schlosser, the second is an email in response and the third is a phone call between Mr Leman and Ms Schlosser.

3. There has been an extensive exchange of correspondence between the parties and the plaintiff, who is self-represented, has provided a series of amended pleadings. The defendant, dissatisfied with this process, now seeks orders striking out the matters complained of and imputations and asks the court not to grant leave to replead.

4. The plaintiff opposes the application and says he has provided enough information to the defendants to enable them to file a defence. The defendants have foreshadowed seeking a preliminary hearing on serious harm pursuant to s 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) but complains that, until there is certainty as to the contents of the matters complained of, this issue cannot be addressed with any certainty.

5. I heard submissions from both parties as to the issues in contention in relation to the pleading of the matters complained of and particulars provided. These are my reasons for the orders I made today.

The plaintiff statement of claim

6. The difficulties confronted by the defendants in these proceedings is best illustrated by reproducing the relevant portions of the statement of the 2FASOC setting out the matter complained of.

First Matter complained of

7. The contents of the first matter complained of is set out in paragraph 1(b) of the 2FASOC:

“b. On 16 May 2024 at approximately 4:47PM, Mr Leman participated in a phone call with Ms Marie Schlosser of Greenwood which lasted 18 minutes. During this call, Mr Leman made statements to the effect that the Plaintiff was "challenging to work with" and suggested that Greenwood may wish to consider alternate Accredited Service Providers (ASPs), such as Reg Latter Electrical ("RLE"). The Plaintiff pleads these statements as "words to the effect" under the principles established in *M1 v R1 & Ors [2022] NSWDC 409 at [25] and relies upon contemporaneous written confirmations of the substance of the conversation.”

8. For reasons which are unexplained, this conversation is then re-pleaded in paragraph 2(b)(2):

“2. On 16 May 2024, Mr Glenn Leman, acting in the course of his employment with the Defendant, made oral statements with “words to the effect” of to Ms Marie Schlosser of Greenwood Solutions during a phone call which commenced at approximately 4:47 pm and lasted 18 minutes (Annex A2).

(a) “Josh is challenging to work with” as a verbatim oral comment by Mr Leman during the 16 May 2024 phone call; Cite Mr Leman’s 17 May 2024 email as an express admission of its prior oral delivery

(b) Words to the effect “That it is likely impossible for Josh Gribble to obtain a certified design without significant assistance from the distributor”

(c) Words to the effect “That Josh Gribble is incapable of understanding the design review comments and will likely need significant one on one assistance to get him across the line.””

9. This publication is then asserted to give rise to the imputations pleaded in paragraph 2(c)(7):

“7. Phone call of the 16th May 2024 @ 4.47pm lasting 18 minutes

(a)Imputation 1.1 – That the Plaintiff is difficult and uncooperative to work with Glenn Leman’s direct replication of comment from the phone call: “As per our phone call I would say (off the record) that Josh is challenging to work with.”

Substance: Attacks professional conduct and interpersonal suitability.

Derivation - Glenn Leman’s direct replication of comment from the phone call: “As per our phone call I would say (off the record) that Josh is challenging to work with

(b)Imputation 1.2 – That the Plaintiff requires management oversight or intervention to function effectively Implied from Leman’s follow-up proposals (e.g. team meetings, certifier support).

Substance: Alleges the Plaintiff cannot operate autonomously in a regulated design role.

Derivation - Email from Maria Schlosser, referring to the phone call, stating that Greenwood “have discussed both options internally within Greenwood (persisting with Josh Gribble or requesting Reg Latter Electrical to assist with a resolution).

(c)Imputation 1.3 – That the Plaintiff was subject to undisclosed and off-the-record criticism “Without mentioning any of our conversations” indicates non-transparent reputational discussion.

Substance: Alleges procedural unfairness and covert disparagement

(d)Imputation 1.4 – That the Plaintiff’s conduct was sufficiently concerning to justify a reputational warning to Greenwood The phone call formed the basis of Glenn’s email warning.

Substance: Constitutes the publication act and implies reputational risk.

(e)Imputation 1.5 – That the Plaintiff was under consideration for replacement due to professional shortcomings. Greenwood’s follow-up email confirms Essential Energy's input prompted two internal options: continue with you or seek someone else.

Substance: Indicates Essential Energy viewed the plaintifffyou as possibly unsuitable for the role.

(f)Imputation 1.6 – That Essential Energy did not support the Plaintiff’s continued engagement. Greenwood deferred their decision to Essential Energy’s position — implying Glenn communicated hesitancy or disapproval.

Substance: Suggests you the plaintiff lacked the capability and did not receive endorsement from the network operator.”

Second Matter complained of

10. This publication is asserted to be an email, but the text is not set out in full. Instead, a summary is set out at paragraph 1(c)-(g):

“c. On 17 May 2024 at 3:20PM, Ms Schlosser emailed Mr Leman referring to their phone discussion, stating Greenwood had "discussed both options internally... (persisting with Josh Gribble or requesting RLE to assist)". At 3:43PM the same day, Mr Leman replied to Ms Schlosser and confirmed, in writing, the substance of his earlier phone call. His email stated, inter alia:

d. "As per our phone call I would say (off the record) that Josh is challenging to work with..."

e. "It would appear that it is not impossible to get Josh across the line in the next 4 weeks."

f. "I offer up meeting times and one-on-one time with our certifying officer if Josh was unsure how to progress."

g. "I would suggest we persist with Josh."”

11. This is then repeated in a slightly enlarged version in paragraph 2(b)(3):

“3. On 17 May 2024, Mr Leman sent a follow-up email restating and expanding upon the defamatory remarks. Defamatory text has been reproduced below and the email is in full at Annex A0,A1-.

i. “As per our phone call I would say (off the record) that Josh is challenging to work with, however”

ii. “after talking with my team it would appear that it is not impossible to get Josh across the line in the next 4 weeks ()”.

iii. “I have spoken to Josh (without mentioning any of our conversations) and he is keen to work with myself and the team.”

iv. “I offer up meeting times and one on one time with our certifying officer if Josh was unsure how to progress with review comments/requirements. Josh did say it would take him around 2 weeks to complete the current amendments, before we can review the submission again.”

v. “So with that all said, I would suggest we persist with Josh.”

vi. “I will commit to working with him to get a certified design done ASAP. “

vii. “I think it would be beneficial to get (RLE)to review the current design and provide comments so we can consider them as part of this review”.”

12. This is asserted to give rise to the following imputations pleaded in paragraph (2 (c)(10)):

“10. Email from Glenn Leman to Maria Schlosser on 17th May 2024 @ 3.43pm

(a)Imputation 2.1 – Professional Conduct

That the Plaintiff is difficult and uncooperative in a professional context, such that engaging with him poses interpersonal or management challenges.

Substance: Targets the Plaintiff’s personality and relational conduct in a work setting.

Derivation: “Josh is challenging to work with” (para [1])

(b) Imputation 2.2 – Technical Capability

That the Plaintiff is incapable of producing a certifiable design without substantial oversight or intervention from Essential Energy staff.

Substance: Concerns the Plaintiff’s core technical competence to meet regulatory or certification standards.

Derivation: “Not impossible to get Josh across the line…”; “I offered up meetings and one-on-one time…” (paras [2], [4])

(c) Imputation 2.3 – Inferiority to Competitor

That the Plaintiff’s work is of such a standard that it requires review and validation by a competitor, suggesting inferiority to alternative providers.

Substance: Casts the Plaintiff as professionally subordinate to Reg Latter Electrical or other ASPs.

Derivation: “It would be beneficial to get RLE review the current design…” (para [7])

(d) Imputation 2.4 – Reputational Risk or Liability

That the Plaintiff is a professional liability whose involvement on the project is a reluctant compromise, and whose continued participation carries implied risk.

Substance: Suggests ongoing reputational or operational risk, even if his engagement is tolerated.

Derivation: “I would suggest we persist with Josh”; overall tenor of “managing” the situation (paras [1], [5], [6])”

Third Matter complained of

13. This publication is set out in paragraph 1(i):

“On 20 May 2024 at approximately 3:38PM, Mr Leman again participated in a 13-minute phone call with Greenwood. The Plaintiff alleges that this call further reinforced the previously published concerns and criticisms regarding the Plaintiff's work. This resulted in Greenwood’s internal statements by 23 May 2024 that “Essential Energy have raised similar concerns... this behaviour has put both Greenwood and Power Design & Energy NSW’s reputation at risk.”

14. A second version of this publication is set out at paragraph 2(b)(4):

“4. On 20 May 2024, Mr Glenn Leman, acting in the course of his employment with the Defendant, made oral statements to Ms Marie Schlosser of Greenwood Solutions during a phone call which commenced at approximately 3:38 pm and lasted 13 minutes.(A3)

(a) Words to the effect - That Josh Gribble’s professional behaviour will place Greenwood’s project completion aspirations at risk

(b) Words to the effect - Josh Gribble’s ability to complete the required design changes, and the additional ones suggested by RLE are a significant risk to the project.”

15. This publication is asserted to give rise to the imputations pleaded in paragraph (2 (c)(12)):

“12. Phone call of the 20th May 2024 @ 3.38pm lasting 13 minutes

(a) Imputation 3.1 – That the Plaintiff fails to deliver work on time

That the Plaintiff is incapable of meeting reasonable project timelines or commercial delivery schedules, leading to operational concerns for project partners.

Substance: Targets professional reliability and punctuality.

Derivation: ““Essential Energy have raised similar concerns and this behaviour has put both Greenwood and Power Design Energy NSW’s reputation at risk.” Lahiru Sendapperuma by email 23/5/24

(b) Imputation 3.2 – That the Plaintiff delivers work of substandard or insufficient quality That the Plaintiff’s ASP3 design work does not meet expected technical or quality benchmarks, risking certification delays or client dissatisfaction.

Substance: Alleges technical inadequacy, distinct from conduct or cooperation.

Supported by: “and of the required quality…” Essential Energy, a key project stakeholder in the project recommended that the design undergo review by the proposed ASP1 subcontractor to ensure its suitability and safety in design. Essential Energy suggested this could expedite the certification process.” (15/5/24 written statement provided by Greenwood under Adjudication in May 2025)

(c) Imputation 3.3 – That Essential Energy, as a network authority, considers these shortcomings genuine and material That Essential Energy had formally communicated or endorsed those concerns to Greenwood, giving them institutional weight and legitimacy.

Substance: Elevates the reputational damage by linking it to a government entity’s position.

Supported by: Greenwood Correspondence- “Essential Energy have raised similar concerns…” & “Essential Energy was concerned that Greenwood may miss the energisation date due to the time it would take in undertaking the required changes to the design documents supplied by PDEP and completing the ASP3 design by PDEP.” & “Essential Energy also expressed concerns about meeting the projects energisation timeframe due to the length of time in design amendments needed.” (15/5/24 written statement by Greenwood provided under Adjudication in May 2025)

(d)Imputation 3.4 – That the Plaintiff’s conduct poses a reputational risk to others That the Plaintiff’s continued involvement harms the commercial reputation of Greenwood Solutions and Power Design Energy NSW.

Substance: Transcends personal criticism — implies third-party harm caused by association.

Supported by: “This lack of engagement from your end has further elevated the concerns on both my side and Greenwood as a whole regarding your ability to commit to timely delivery and of the required quality. Essential Energy have raised similar concerns and this behaviour has put both Greenwood and Power Design Energy NSW’s reputation at risk. (Lahiru Sendapperuma 56/5/24 3.08pm.”

16. Each of these publications was made to the same person, Ms Schlosser. It is then asserted that there was republication by Greenwood as follows:

17. “2 (b)(14)

“14. Republication by Greenwood Solutions – Derivative Liability

The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant is responsible not only for the primary publications made by Mr Glenn Leman to Greenwood Solutions on and around 16–17 May 2024, but also for the foreseeable republication of those defamatory statements by Greenwood to:

(a) Reg Latter Electrical (RLE), to whom Greenwood conveyed the substance of Mr Leman’s statements as justification for terminating the Plaintiff’s design engagement and requesting competitor review of the Plaintiff’s certified design submission, in direct reliance on Mr Leman’s 17 May 2024 email recommendation.

(b) Other ASP3 industry participants, including Accredited Service Providers, designers, certifiers, and third-party consultants associated with the Hay, Hilston, Kootingal, and Gunnedah Solar Farm projects, to whom the substance of the defamatory matter was discussed or relayed, whether through informal industry conversations, technical review requests, or discussions concerning the Plaintiff’s exclusion from project (c) Personnel within Greenwood Solutions, including other project managers, design engineers, and commercial decision-makers responsible for project delivery and client liaison, who were informed of the Plaintiff’s alleged shortcomings in the course of internal project reviews and commercial decision-making regarding the Plaintiff’s removal and replacement.

The Plaintiff pleads that:

I. These republications were the natural and probable consequence of the Defendant’s original publications;

II. Mr Leman, in his role as Manager of Contestable Design at Essential Energy, knew or ought to have known that the statements would be relied upon and shared within Greenwood and among project stakeholders;

III. Mr Leman actively encouraged Greenwood to consult RLE, thereby inducing dissemination of the defamatory content beyond the initial recipient;

IV. The Defendant is accordingly derivatively liable for such republication under the principles outlined in:

o Webb v Bloch (1928) 41 CLR 331;

o [REDACTED FALSE GEN AI CASE NAME] at [54]–[58]; and

o [REDACTED FALSE GEN AI CASENAME] at [35]–[37] (Gibson DCJ), which confirm that a defendant is liable for republication where it is reasonably foreseeable or induced by the original publication.”

The proper manner for pleading the publications sued on

18. As to the two oral publications, namely the first and third matters complained of, Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (“UCPR”) r 15.19(1)(a) requires the statement of claim to include particulars which identify, verbatim, the matter complained of in full.

19. Where the matter complained of is in written form, it should be attached in accordance with the requirements of this rule. A summary of the document is no substitute for production not only of the matter complained of but, in appropriate cases, reproduction of the contents with line numbers.

20. Where the publication in question is oral, such as the contents of a telephone call, the plaintiff must set out verbatim the words of that conversation in such a manner to identify the whole of the oral publication of the alleged defamatory material. This must include not only the time and place with the defamatory words were said to have been spoken and the persons to whom they were spoken but also the words relied upon as conveying the defamatory meaning in their proper context. In general terms, this requires the setting out of as much of the conversation as is relied upon to be set out in the appropriate question and answer, or conversational, format. Failure to set out all these matters in relation to a pleaded slander may result in the proceedings being struck out, as the contents of the publication and the identity of the publishes are essential not only to the establishment of a cause of action but also to the defences pleaded: Lazarus v Deutsche Lufthansa AG (1985) 1 NSWLR 188 at [192] per Hunt J (as his Excellency then was).

21. The plaintiff has now provided the text of the second matter complained of, but that creates further difficulties, in that it is difficult to reconcile the contents of that document with the imputations pleaded. It may be that some of the imputations would be capable of arising if extrinsic facts were pleaded, as there appears to be a degree of common expertise in relation to the subject matter, but that is merely surmise.

22. It is clear from the summaries given of the conversations that the plaintiff is simply guessing at words that might have been spoken, instead of setting out what was said in an orderly fashion.

The pleading of republication

23. The plaintiff appears to be claiming that unspecified statements made by Mr Leman in each of the publications were republished by Greenwood to another electrical company, as well as to the plaintiff’s competitors, and to unspecified members of the “ASP3 contestable design community”.

24. Republication can only expose the original publisher to further liability where that republication was the natural and probable result of the original publication, either as a fresh cause of action (in other words, in relation to liability) or as a basis for claiming increased damages on the original cause of action: Habib v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd [2009] NSWCA 231; 198 A Crim R 219; Speight v Gosnay (1891) 60 LJQB 231; Harris v 718932 Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 38; 56 NSWLR 276.

25. The plaintiff is entitled to particulars of each alleged act of republication of defamatory material sufficient to enable the relevant publication to be identified, in accordance with UCPR r 15.19(1)(a) and (b). It is necessary to set out the circumstances in which the republication occurred, the identity of each person or persons alleged to have published or republished the statements, and how and when they were alleged to have been published or republished and to whom.

26. In addition, for the reasons made clear in Habib v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd, the plaintiff must make it clear whether these republications are relied upon for damages only, or as a cause of action for which the defendant is asserted to be liable.

27. In addition, when providing all such particulars, the plaintiff should take care to ensure that he sets out the basis upon which he asserts that the defendant is liable for the statements made by Mr Leman.

28. There was some discussion in the course of the application to the difficulties caused by the fact that it was not the plaintiff personally has suffered the financial losses occasioned by reason of the loss of the contract, as these contracts were in fact tendered for by his company. This is an issue which the plaintiff should consider when redrafting the statement of claim.

The orders to be made

29. The pleading in its current form is hopeless. It should be struck out as a whole, given the nature and extent of the errors, which permeate every aspect of the pleading.

30. Mr Senior submits, and I agree, that unless the plaintiff is able to set out verbatim the words he alleges were spoken to Mr Leman during each of these two phone conversations, these paragraphs should be struck out.

31. The sole issue upon which I do not accept Mr Senior’s submissions is that I consider leave should be given for an amended statement of claim to be filed. I propose to grant leave, but the plaintiff has been warned that this is almost certainly his last chance. He does not yet face a self-executing order, but this is likely to be the next step taken by the defendant.

32. In addition, the plaintiff should pay the defendant’s costs of this argument and today.

Use of Gen AI

33. Many applications come before me in the Defamation List for rulings, and, as a general rule, although I usually provide reasons, I rarely publish them on Caselaw. I have done so in this case, not because the issues of pleading discussed above relate to any issue of significance, but because the pleading shows clear evidence of use of Generative Artificial Intelligence (“Gen AI”). This misuse of Gen AI is becoming an increasingly serious problem for the courts, to which the proliferation of recent judgments referring to its use attests. It is the second time this year that Gen AI has been cited to me by a litigant in person, and it is a practice that must be stopped.

34. It was to prevent this misuse of Gen AI that, on 18 December 2024, the District Court adopted the Supreme Court Practice Note SC Gen 23 – Use of Generative Artificial Intelligence. There is thus a consistent requirement in New South Wales (see paragraphs 7 – 25), not only for legal practitioners but also unrepresented parties to comply with its contents when presenting affidavits, submissions and expert reports to the court. Paragraph 16 sets out restrictions in relation to written submissions and summaries of argument, to the effect that the author must verify, in the body of the submissions, that all citations, legal and academic authority and case law and legislative references not only exist but are accurately summarised.

35. The District Court General Practice Note 2 - Generative AI Practice Note commenced 3 February 2025 and has been operational at all relevant times for this litigation. The plaintiff has in fact stated in the opening paragraphs of his affidavit that Gen AI was not used to generate his affidavit and any annexure/exhibit to his affidavit.

36. it is not clear how much of the plaintiff’s pleadings and submissions have been prepared using Gen AI. The most telling example is the reference to a wholly imaginary judgment for which the plaintiff claims that I am the author. Not only does the plaintiff provide a completely false case name, but he claims it reflects a principle of law which is equally imaginary. He cites a similarly false case name for a judgment in another court which he claims reflects the same imaginary principle of law.

37. Following the practice recommended by the Court in Luck v Secretary, Services Australia [2025] FCAFC 26, I have not repeated the name and reference of the wholly imaginary judgment in question. I will identify the parties as being “Trkulja v Yahoo!7 Pty Ltd” but I have redacted the 2013 Caselaw reference. It is a genuine reference, but for a decision of another judge of this court, on an issue wholly unrelated to defamation law. I have also redacted the name of another judgment referred to by the plaintiff in his pleading, in a different court, as it does not appear to be genuine either.

38. Although a litigant in person, the plaintiff is well aware of his obligations in relation to the use of Gen AI, as he swore an affidavit in these proceedings in which he stated that he had not used Gen AI. When I asked him where he had found this reference to a judgment purportedly authored by me with this case name, and drew his attention to Mr Senior’s submissions as to the nonexistence of this judgment and of the principles for which it was asserted to be the law, he told me he would have to look into the issue and get back to me. That is not an answer to his credit. He did however later concede that he had used Gen AI.

39. Misuse by legal practitioners of Gen AI has been viewed as a serious matter and may lead to disciplinary action (Valu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs *(*No 2) [2025] FedCFamC2G 95; 386 FLR 365 at [14] – [38]). Misuse by litigants in person has not been the subject of similar concern. In in Nikolic v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2025] VSCA 79, Beach J ignored the submissions in question. A similar approach was taken in Nash v Director of Public Prosecutions *(*WA) [2023] WASCA 75 (at [9]) and Luck v Secretary, Services Australia at [14]. More recently, in May v Costaras [2025] NSWCA 178, Bell CJ referred to the use of Gen AI by the respondent in the appeal, a litigant in person, although without referring to other Australian appellate courts and how they have dealt with this increasingly difficult problem.

40. The censure expressed in Valu v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs *(*No 2) has much to commend it. The difficulty is, that if practitioners are expected to keep to the proper standards, what should be the standards applied to litigants in person?

41. This is an issue to which greater consideration should be given. Unfortunately, cases of this kind tend to occur in courts of inferior jurisdiction, and the policy of appellate courts is not to refer to the judgments of inferior courts. It might be said that it would be desirable for appellate courts to refer to similar decisions of appellate courts in other jurisdictions, but this is again not a commonly occurring event, where issues of this non-regional kind arise.

42. What should be the course to take when a litigant in person refers to imaginary cases and misconceived legal principles asserted to be derived from them? There is much to be said for the approach taken by Beach JA in Nikolic v Nationwide News Pty Ltd, namely to take a robust approach which may include rejection of consideration of the arguments, on the basis that it is not in the interests of judicious case management for judges to be obliged to find the correct authority, or to seek to interpret what the litigant in person was saying.

43. Even a consideration of the false authority and the asserted principles said to emerge in these cases is dangerous, as they risk repetition in other Gen AI sources. For this reason, when referring to the hallucinatory false judgment, it is wiser not to cite the decision in full. In Luck v Secretary, Services Australia at [14], the Court stated:

“The case referred to in the first paragraph of this extract does not exist. The judgment with the medium neutral citation referred to is a completely different matter which did not involve Rofe J. We apprehend that the reference may be a product of hallucination by a large language model. We have therefore redacted the case name and citation so that the false information is not propagated further by artificial intelligence systems having access to these reasons.”

44. It may also be desirable for litigants in person to be required to provide verified pleadings which include a paragraph confirming that Gen AI has not been used, although that would require amendments to the UCPR.

Orders

1. Strike out the second further amended statement of claim with leave to replead, such leave to include, inter alia, the full text of the first and third matters complained of and to exclude all information obtained through Gen AI.
2. The plaintiff is to file the third further amended statement of claim by 28 September 2025.
3. Matter stood over for directions on Thursday 2 October 2025 at 9am.
4. The plaintiff is to pay the defendant's costs of the argument today.

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