Grecia & Irma [2025] FedCFamC1F 751 | Case summary

FedCFamC1F|2025-10-24|Before: Smith J

FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 1)

Pursuant to s 65DAAA of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act"), it is appropriate for the prior 2020 Final Orders to be reconsidered.

The father shall have sole parental responsibility for the child and sole decision making authority in respect of all decisions concerning major long term issues as defined in s 4(1) of the Act affecting the child.
In making any decision about major long-term issues for the child;

(a) Except in situations of urgency, the father shall inform the mother MS IRMA [born 1987] in writing 14 days prior to any decision regarding major long-term issues, detailing the decision to be made, and shortly outlining his suggestions and if appropriate any reason for that suggestion;

(b) The mother will advise the father within 7 days of receiving the father's communication, of her view regarding the major long-term decision and her reasons for same;

(i) Any failure to respond to such communication shall be deemed acceptance of the decision.

(c) Within seven (7) days the father will advise the mother in writing of the decision made.

(d) The father's decision will be final and non-justiciable.

Child's time with the mother until 1 January 2028

Between the date of these orders and 1 January 2028, the child may only spend time with the mother as authorised by the orders.
The child may spend such time with the mother, in such circumstances and subject to such conditions, as the father determines from time to time in his absolute discretion in the exercise of parental responsibility, subject only to the following order.
Unless otherwise agreed between the parties, the child shall spend professionally supervised time with the mother for a period of two (2) hours each alternate Friday.

(a) That time is to be supervised at the B Contact Centre at Suburb C operated by D Family Service New South Wales, or

(b) If that Centre is unavailable for any reason, at any Professionally Supervised Contact Centre agreed between the parties in writing.

For the avoidance of doubt this time should continue in the current established pattern.
The father may change the day and time on which the time is to occur, which may be subject to the availability of the supervision centre and the child's extra-curricular activities, with the giving of 4 weeks' notice to the mother.
To give effect to these orders each party shall, if necessary:

(a) Do all acts and things necessary to complete the intake process with the D Family Service for the Children's Contact Centre at Suburb C, New South Wales;

(b) Attend and participate in that intake process as required by D Family Service;

(c) Comply with all reasonable rules, requests and directions of D Family Service concerning the use of the Children's Contact Centre for the purposes of these orders, including the nomination of the times and dates the Centre is available for the supervision of the Child's time with the Mother.

(d) Do the same things in relation to any other reasonably accessible supervision centre if B Contact Centre is unwilling to continue supervision for a further two year period.

The father will be liable for the costs of this paid supervision.
For the avoidance of doubt, the child may spend supervised time with the mother and F as arranged and paid for by the Department of Communities and Justice New South Wales if the father agrees.

Child's communication with the mother until 1 January 2028

Between the date of these orders and 1 January 2028, the child may only communicate with the mother as authorised by the orders.
The child may communicate with the mother, in such circumstances and subject to such conditions, as the father determines from time to time in his absolute discretion in the exercise of parental responsibility, subject only to the following order.
Regardless of any other communication that may be agreed between the parties, and in the absence of any contrary agreement, the father shall facilitate the child speaking with the mother by telephone each Wednesday from 5.00pm to 5.30pm, and the father shall do all things necessary to facilitate this communication.

Child's time and communication with the mother after 1 January 2028

From 1 January 2028, the child may only spend time with and communicate with the mother, in such circumstances and subject to such conditions, as the father determines from time to time in his absolute discretion in the exercise of his sole parental responsibility.

Unless otherwise agreed in writing, which may be by SMS, the parties shall only communicate by SMS.
For the purpose of this order each party will ensure the other party has their telephone number.
The parties shall only communicate about the implementation of these orders. All communication will be civil.
The parties may communicate by telephone in an emergency.
The father will notify the mother as soon as reasonably possible if there is any medical or other emergency involving the child.

Pursuant to section 68B of the Act for the protection of the child, the mother be restrained from

(a) approaching or communicating with the child other than in accordance with these orders;

(b) removing the child from the care of the father or of any third party, such as a school, without the father's prior written and continuing consent;

(c) failing to return the child to the father as and when agreed should the father consent to the child spending other time with the mother.

Pursuant to section 68B of the Act for the protection of the child, the mother be restrained from allowing the child to come into contact with, or communicate with:

(a) Mr H; or

(b) Mr G; or

(c) Mr J;

(d) Any other person without the written consent of the father excepting:

(i) F born 2022,

(ii) any person who has the permanent or temporary care of F,

(iii) any person who facilitates supervised time between the mother and F, including any officer of agent of the Department of Communities and Justice New South Wales.

The mother be restrained from consuming illicit substances (including prescribed Cannabis or Cannabis products) and/or opioid based medication within 48 hours of spending any time with the child.

(a) Discussing the other parent or events in the other parent's home in the presence or hearing of any of the child or permitting any other person to do so;

(b) Involving the child in decisions or discussions about the future living arrangements of the child and the amount of time they spend with the other parent or permitting any other person to do so;

(c) Criticising or making derogatory statements about the other parent, their partner or their family in the presence or hearing of the child or permitting others to do so;

(d) Allowing the child to be exposed to family violence as defined by section 4 Family Law Act 1975, during any time that they are in their care and shall immediately remove them from any environment where this is taking place.

Pursuant to section 111(1)(b) of the Australian Passports Act 2005 (Cth) MR GRECIA (born 1980) ('the father') (but not MS IRMA [born 1987]) is authorised to apply for and retain an Australian travel document, including an Australian Passport, for the child X born 2013, without the mother's written consent or approval and without the mother having to sign any documents.
Pursuant to section 65Y of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth), the father is at liberty to travel with the child outside the Commonwealth of Australia whether or not the mother has consented to such travel.

The father may provide a copy of these orders to any professional supervision centre, or educational institution, or extra-curricular activity or similar institution, which the child attends from time to time, and to any health care or similar practice which the child attends, for the purpose of informing them of the father's sole parental and decision making responsibility and of the injunctions against the mother removing the child.
The Court is to provide a copy of these orders, and the Written Reasons for Decision, to the Department of Communities and Justice New South Wales for their file only, on the basis that no request is made of, nor action is sought from them.

The mother may, at her own cost, obtain copies of all educational records usually provided to parents.

Recovery in the event of breach of s 68B injunction not to remove child

In the event that the mother removes the child from the father or any third party without the prior written consent of the father or fails to return the child as agreed, the following persons are authorised and directed to find and recover, by force if necessary, the child and return the child to the father and for that purpose each of those persons may stop and search any vehicle, vessel or aircraft or to enter and search any premises or place in which there is at any time reasonable cause to believe that the child may be found:

(a) The Marshall of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 1);

(b) All officers of the Australian Federal Police Force;

(c) All officers of the State and Territory Police Forces or services.

Any application for costs may be filed in accordance with the Rules.

Mr H, Mr G and Mr J are not parties to, and are not represented in these proceedings. The injunctions against the child coming into contact with or communicating with them are made by consent between the parties and without any findings being made in relation to them which may be taken as findings against them.

Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.

Note: This copy of the Court's Reasons for judgment may be subject to review to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 10.14(b) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 10.13 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).

Part XIVB of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) makes it an offence, except in very limited circumstances, to publish an account of proceedings that identify persons, associated persons, or witnesses involved in family law proceedings.

IT IS NOTED that publication of this judgment by this Court under the pseudonym Grecia & Irma has been approved pursuant to subsection 114Q(2) of the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth).

These are parenting proceedings to determine orders in the best interests of X (born 2013) now aged 12 ("the child") pursuant to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ("the Act").
The child is in year 6 at K School, City L. The child has no health issues, apart from complaints of stomach pain, and no major developmental, emotional or behavioural issues.[1]
The applicant father is Mr Grecia (born 1980) aged 44. He lives in a two-bedroom rental in Suburb M and works fulltime. He is not in a relationship. The child lives with him.
The respondent mother is Ms Irma (born 1987) aged 38. The mother resides in a three-bedroom property at Town N, she says alone. The property is rented from a Mr J. She says she is not in a relationship. The question of whether she is in a relationship with Mr J was an issue at trial. The mother has not worked since early 2022. She says she intends to "work at some point".[2]
The parents commenced a relationship in around September 2009, commenced cohabitation about 12 months later, had the child, and separated in around April 2016 when the child was approximately three.
Post separation the parties entered an equal time parenting plan.[3] The parties resolved property informally.[4] Both parties advised the Court Child Expert ("the expert") that despite the mother describing the father as controlling, family violence between them was not an issue requiring consideration,[5] and it was not a substantial issue in the trial.
Post separation the mother entered a relationship with a Mr O. The mother does not address this relationship in her affidavit. However, she told the expert that this relationship involved incidents of family violence, with an ADVO for her protection which was not made final.[6] In early 2020 the mother unilaterally relocated to Queensland with the child, apparently to escape that relationship.
On 4 March 2020 the father commenced proceedings. On 19 March 2020 a recovery order was made, and the child was returned to the father. Those proceedings resolved through final consent orders dated 25 September 2020 ("the 2020 orders").[7] The 2020 orders provided, amongst other matters, for equal shared parental responsibility, with the child to live with the father, and to spend each alternate weekend with the mother (from after school Thursday until the commencement of school Monday), on condition of the mother living in Region E. The orders also provided for the mother to spend additional time with the child, if agreed in writing. The parties followed the 2020 orders until about October 2023.
In about early 2021 the mother entered a relationship with Mr G now aged 41 ("Mr G"). The mother and Mr G have a child, F, (born 2022) now aged three and a half ("F"). That relationship was also marred by family violence. It ended in late 2023 following an incident which resulted in an ADVO for the protection of the mother from Mr G.[8]
In the context of separating from Mr G, in late 2023 the mother unilaterally collected the child from school and withheld her from the father.
In late 2023 the mother made allegations to the Department of Communities and Justice ("DCJ"), and to NSW Police, that the father may have sexually abused the child, had neglected the child, and was controlling and aggressive in the former relationship. The father was interviewed by DCJ and denied the allegations.
The sexual abuse allegations against the father were not pressed at trial. They clearly had no substance. I accept the closing oral submissions of the Independent Children's Lawyer's ("ICL") and find, giving the mother the benefit of any doubt, that these allegations were not malicious, but were a reflection of the extent of the mother's mental health impairment and lack of rational thinking at that time, in the context of her deteriorating relationship with Mr G.
On 13 November 2023 the father commenced these proceedings. On 27 November 2023 the matter was transferred to Division 1, allocated to the Magellan List and the ICL was appointed. A request pursuant to s 91B for DCJ to intervene was also made.
On 28 November 2023 a recovery order was made requiring the mother to deliver the child to the father on 30 November 2023. Orders were also made suspending the mother's time with the child under the 2020 orders, requiring the child to live with the father, and providing that the mother spend supervised time with the child for two hours each alternate Saturday, as well as requiring the mother to submit to hair follicle testing and for her to obtain a mental health care plan.
On 1 December 2023 F was removed from the care of the mother and Mr G and assumed into the care of the relevant State Minister pursuant to s 44 of the Children and Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998 (NSW) ("the Care Act"). F remains in the care of the Minister by order of the Children's Court of New South Wales.[9] F was placed with Mr G's parents.
F is not the subject of these proceedings. However, the child's ability to have a relationship with F, and the evidence which caused DCJ to remove F from the mother's care, and causes DCJ to continue to oppose re-instatement and insist on supervised time only between the mother and F are relevant.
DCJ declined to intervene in these proceedings as they assessed the child to be safe in the father's care. On 7 July 2025, just prior to the final hearing commencing, DCJ re-opened a case for the child for the purpose of providing this court with evidence of their involvement with the child, F, and the parents, and to assist the court to make an informed decision about the mother's parenting capacity. DCJ did not file their material, which included police and medical records relating to the mother and Mr J, until immediately before trial, and after the parties' trial affidavits were filed.

At trial, which ran over four days from 21 to 24 July 2025 and at which all parties were legally represented including by Counsel, the father read or relied upon the following:

(1) Amended Application for Final Orders filed 23 June 2025;

(2) Affidavit of the father, Mr Grecia filed 23 June 2025.

(3) Case outline and minute of order provided to Chambers on 18 July 2025.[10]

(1) Amended Response dated 21 May 2024;

(2) Affidavit of the mother, Ms Irma filed 27 June 2025.

(3) Case outline filed 21 July 2025.

(4) Amended further Minute of Order provided 24 July 2025.[11]

(1) Family Report dated 3 September 2024 prepared by Court Child Expert Mr Q ("the expert").[12]

(2) Case outline filed 18 July 2025.[13]

(3) The affidavit of Ms P, DCJ manager, sworn 21 July 2025, filed in court when formally adopted and read.

(4) Minute of order provided 24 July 2025.[14]

The father, mother, Ms P from DCJ and the expert gave oral evidence. Various documents were tendered into evidence and are referred to where relevant.
The major issues at trial remained those identified by the expert in the Family Report:[15]
1. Regarding the risk issues relating to the mother, DCJ's level of concern about the mother's mental health, substance use, and parenting capacity and ability to keep [F] (and [X]) safe from neglect and psychological harm, cannot be ignored.
The evidence at trial centred around the mother's current mental health status and substance use or misuse (including of alcohol, prescription and illicit drugs) and their impacts on her parenting capacity.
There was also evidence about the extent of family violence in the mother's prior relationships, her general parenting capacity including any history of neglect, in particular relating to school attendance.[16]
The mother's relationship with Mr J was also an issue at trial. The mother conceded in her oral evidence that she had been in a relationship with Mr J till shortly prior to the trial, something not addressed in her affidavit. The questions of whether that relationship involved family violence and continued a pattern of the mother entering violent relationships, and whether the mother was still in a relationship with Mr J, were also issues at trial.
Another major issue was each parents' capacity to co-parent and to promote the child's relationship with each other.
It is not in dispute, and I find, that there has been a significant change in circumstances within s 65DAAA of the Act since the 2020 orders, and that it is the child's best interests for the 2020 final orders to be reconsidered.
At the conclusion of the trial all parties submitted, consistent with the expert's opinion, that the child should live with the father. I agree. I make that order by consent.

From around the beginning of 2021 the mother commenced her relationship with Mr G, who she had known for about 5 years. Their pregnancy was unplanned but welcomed. They commenced cohabitation in about September 2021, after the maternal grandmother, with whom the mother was then living, committed suicide by hanging and was found by the mother on her return home from work.
The mother has a history of an autoimmune disease. She said this led her to use an illegal substance and to illicit use of cannabis during this relationship.[17]
The mother's evidence was that this relationship deteriorated when she became convinced Mr G was having an affair, and accused him of being lazy, and in response he carried out a single act of physical family violence in which he grabbed her by the neck and shook her while she was holding F. The child was not present. She says she has not seen Mr G since.[18]
While the mother implied in her evidence that it was only post separation she became aware of the child's exposure to family violence by Mr G,[19] it is clear from all of the evidence that the child was exposed to family violence when living with Mr G, and that the mother sought to minimise the extent of family violence to which the child was exposed in that relationship in her affidavit. The child's disclosure to DCJ in November 2023 that she believed Mr G was in goal because he pulled a knife out in front of her and F, for example, supports that finding.[20]
The father said he thought the mother's relationship with Mr G was stable.[21] On that basis, from about late 2021, to his credit, the father agreed to increase time between the child and the mother proving, in my view, his strong commitment to supporting the child's relationship with the mother.
Time increased again in early 2022, and by about September 2022 the child was spending up to six nights a fortnight with the mother. The father said he agreed to increased time as he believed the mother had found a stable relationship and accommodation, seemed to be getting her life together, and was able to provide consistent care for the child, including ensuring school attendance.
When the mother gave birth to F in 2022 the father said he also wanted the child to have a relationship with her half-sibling which contributed to his decisions around increasing time between the child and the mother, and F.
The father said that only subsequently did he learn about the family violence in that relationship, and that despite their separation he now believes Mr G was still spending time with the mother and child in a hotel.[22]
The father's evidence was that in the period from early 2023 he became concerned about the child's school attendance when in the mother's care, and formed the view that the mother was struggling to ensure attendance.
At about this time the evidence discloses that the mother was engaging in the abuse of prescription medication.[23] For example, in early 2023 the mother was prescribed 20 oxycodone from one doctor, two days later four oxycodone from the hospital and the following day, another 20 Oxycodone from another doctor.
The father was not aware of the prescription misuse, but based on his concerns, in about June 2023, he sent a text message to the mother saying he wanted to return to the 2020 orders. He says that occurred, with the child then spending four nights per fortnight with the mother.
In late 2023, shortly after separating from Mr G, the mother told the father that the child had disclosed that Mr G had spoken "unkindly to her and gave her a shove" and that she was taking the child to police.
Four days later the mother withheld the child from the father.
Between October 2023 and November 2023 F and the child were subject to eight Risk of Significant Harm (ROSH) reports. These included allegations of domestic violence between Mr G and the mother, including the final major incident which involved F. There were also reports detailing an alleged transmission of gonorrhoea to F and the child by Mr G, excessive disciple of the child, sexual abuse of the child by the father, negligent care, and reports that the mother was experiencing suicidal ideation.
In late 2023 caseworkers interviewed the mother and child. The child made no disclosures about the father.[24]
In late 2023 the child was interviewed by DCJ. It was reported that: [25]
1. During the interview, [X] disclosed that she had blood in her underwear on one occasion while she was in [Ms Irma] care, and that she had told her mother about this. However, [X] said that nobody has ever touched her and that she did not know why her mother was worried, as [X] knew that "nothing had happened".
A safety assessment completed that day marked the child as safe at that time.[26]
In late 2023, after DCJ had received multiple reports of the mother acting in an 'erratic', 'manic, or 'chaotic' manner, including sending erratic text messages, and displaying illogical behaviour indicative of a steep mental decline, and hard learnt that the mother had been evicted for non-payment of rent, a DCJ safety assessment resulted in F and the child being deemed unsafe in the mother's care due to her worsening psychological condition.
The child was not taken into the Minister's care by DCJ as, after two safety assessments conducted at the father's household, the child was deemed safe in the father's care.[27]
In late 2023 DCJ received material from NSW Health indicating that the mother has presented to hospital on several occasions between 2018-2023 for a variety of physical and mental health concerns, including both auditory and olfactory hallucinations, having had an apparent dissociative episode and burning CDs on a gas stove.[28]
The mother's hospital records for early 2019, which only became available to the parties and court through DCJ's late involvement, recorded, inter alia, that:[29]

Psych

has lost her job in last 14 months "due to illness"

GP recently commenced on cymbalta 18 weeks)

Describes 'mood swings' and hallucinations since commencement of medication (Auditory / olfactory) ...

Partner is concernced about [arrow pointing upwards] aggression and agitation

?episode last night

Loss of memory

Erratic behaviour reported by her partner

Turning lights on and [word illegible] at 2am

Burning CDs and [word illegible] over gas stove

She has no recollection of this, teary + apologetic this am.

3 x beer last pm

...

Insight & judgment - poor, but willing to engage help

...

D/W psych - ? dissociative episode

Unlikely caused by cymbalta

At trial the mother tendered the related discharge summary in closing.[30] That document identified the mother as being on Tapentadol, a well-known strong pain medication, and Duloxetine (a brand name for Cymbalta). It confirmed the clinical notes history that:[31]

Whilst discussing the history her partner describes witnessing some erratic and unusual behaviour last night.

He describes [Ms Irma] burning CD's and cardboard over the gas stove top, turning music up loud and acting unlike herself, all of which she has no recollection of this am.

[Ms Irma] states that since starting Duloxetine she has felt 'off', with mood swings and olfactory and auditory hallucinations. Denies any mood disturbance at time of RIV, and MMSE is normal with good engagement and rapport. No observed to be reacting to any unseen stimuli.

Kindly R/V by psych - dissociative episode ?medication induced (?Duloxetine ?Tapentadol)

Happy for D/C

...

This is a significant post-separation mental health history which the mother did not disclose at any time in these proceedings. I find that she intentionally failed to disclose her full mental health history as she was aware it would, or could, be detrimental to her case.
Information provided to DCJ from October 2023 suggested that the mother was using marijuana and that this use coincided with a deterioration in her mental health status. On 15 December Mr G informed DCJ that he had been purchasing the mother marijuana, he said because he and the mother were concerned the mother was becoming addicted to oxycodone. Mr G said the mother ceased paying rent to pay for marijuana. The mother denied marijuana use and agreed to undergo drug testing. Contrary to her denials a late 2023 hair follicle test, reported in early 2024, recorded positive for cannabis.[32]
There is evidence, from Mr J's statements to police, that he and the mother commenced their relationship 18 months prior to April 2025. I give weight to that evidence, there having been no reason for Mr J to make a false statement at that time and noting the other evidence I will consider elsewhere, including the mother's concessions in oral evidence. I find that the mother commenced a relationship with Mr J in about November 2023.[33]
In early 2024, a Summary of Proposed Plan (SOPP) for F was prepared by DCJ. It was filed with the Children's Court on in early 2024 and provided to the mother the following month.[34] The DCJ assessment was that the mother's mental health "significantly impacted" her parenting capacity and had influenced her concerns that the child had been sexually abused by the father. The plan involved the mother undergoing a comprehensive mental health assessment to be organised and funded by DCJ, to then engage in reasonably recommended treatment, to undertake drug testing as requested by DCJ, and to be clinically assessed for substance misuse. There were also requirements around parenting and domestic violence education. This plan was put in place 18 months prior to the trial in these proceedings.
On 13 February 2024 the mother was accompanied to a visit with F by her stepfather Mr H, with whom she was living. Mr H has been convicted of various violent offences, including sexual intercourse with a child. Despite this, the mother denied to the expert that there were any issues of risk for the child or F in relation to Mr H.[35]
Between March and 5 July 2024, the mother attended only 2 of 4 scheduled visits with F, saying on 5 April 2024 that there was not enough notice and she had prior appointments, noting that she was not working and it is not clear what appointments she had which she considered took priority. On 5 July 2024 the mother completed a drug screen which came back positive for oxycodone and cannabis metabolites. Between that date and 23 August 2024, the mother attended only 1 of 6 organised visits with F due to "illness".[36]

On 27 August 2024 the mother, father and child attended the Family Report interviews. The child was living with the father and spending supervised time with the mother consistent with the November 2023 interim orders. The mother was living with Mr H.[37]
The expert explored the major issues with the mother. He recorded that "the mother does not accept that her mental health and substance use has ever been of concern and does not believe she has ever posed a risk to her children, including currently" which "raises concerns about the mother's level of insight and parental reflective functioning regarding the issues of concern that ultimately led to both of her children no longer living with her currently."[38]
The totality of the evidence makes it clear the mother minimised both her mental health and substance misuse history when speaking with the expert. While it may be that she really has no insight into these issues, the totality of the evidence satisfies me that the likelihood is that the mother understands the relevance of these issues, and has intentionally sought to hide and minimise the extent of her mental health and substance misuse from the court and parties, so they would not adversely affect her prospects of obtaining the orders she seeks in these proceedings.
The expert considered the evidence of risk of sexual harm from the father, which was effectively the same evidence as at trial. The expert stated that "there does not appear to be any information considered as part of this assessment which evidence that X has been sexually harmed or is at risk of sexual harm".[39]
The expert explored with the mother her belief around whether the father had sexually abused the child, and considered she continued to hold some concerns around possible physical or sexual abuse of the child by the father.[40] When directly asked if she believed the child had been sexually abused by anyone the mother told the expert the child "should not have blood in her underwear", adding that she does not believe the father would do "that" but that 'weird things happen'", stating she was unsure if the father presented a risk.[41]
The expert noted that the lack of disclosures made by the child:[42]
1. ...raises questions about how or why the mother appears to have come to a previously firm belief that the father had sexually abused [X], which ultimately led her persistence in taking [X] to speak with and be assessed by medical professionals, police, and ultimately DCJ and this writer...
The potential ramifications for the child of the mother maintaining, and conveying to the child a false belief that she had been sexually abused by the father, were also considered by the expert:[43]
1. There are also concerns about the mother posing a risk of emotional and psychological harm to [X]. This is based on her previous apparent firm belief that [X] (and [F]) had been sexually harmed despite no clear indicators or disclosures of this, and her having exposed [X] to health and other services regarding her concerns (including taking [X] to hospital seeking for [X] to be forensically examined for sexual abuse). Thus, if the mother maintains a firm belief that [X] has been physically or sexually harmed by the father and makes future reports about this based on her previous concerns (notwithstanding any new concerns that may arise), there is a future risk of emotional or psychological harm to [X] in circumstances where there are future parenting choices ( e.g. withholding [X] from the father, from school) and/or allegations of harm made by the mother which may lead to [X] being exposed to further investigations by systems such as health, child protection, police, and/or this Court.
Although the allegation was not pressed at trial, the mother's evidence[44] of her reasoning processes as set out in her affidavit do not allay my concerns that the mother may still harbour unfounded concerns, which may be conveyed to the child if the mother is suffering poor mental health.
The child described "being exposed to and being conscious of the mother's anxiety".[45] The expert said:[46]
1. ... [X] appears well aware of the mother's concerning presentations and behaviours. It could be said that [X's] caring nature and care and consciousness of the mother's wellbeing caused [X] to have sought to remain with the mother previously to ensure that she could support the mother (and [F]). This could be described as [X] presenting with indicators of being emotionally and psychologically impacted by her exposure to the mother's presentation during October/November 2023, if not prior, as [X] appears to have felt the need to assume the role of a responsible parent for [F], if not also for the mother at times. If [X] continues to be exposed to concerning presentations by the mother, [X's] own emotional and psychological wellbeing may be adversely impacted as she herself may experience exacerbated issues of emotional dysregulation and acute issues of mental health as she grows older.

The expert identified at [143] that:
1. ...[i]f the mother's reporting of family violence and abuse is accurate (including as reported to DCJ), it could also be said that [X] has been subject to emotional and psychological harm by directly and indirectly experiencing incidents of family violence and abuse in the mother's previous relationships, including with [Mr G]...
The mother told the expert she was not in a relationship. I find that was a knowing lie, told by the mother in circumstances where she did not want her relationship with Mr J to be disclosed to the court or other parties, and in circumstances where she was aware that her history of involvement in relationships marred by family violence was a relevant, and negative, factor in her case.
The child told the expert that she wanted to live with both parents "equally", would be "sad" if she only spent time with the mother under the then current arrangement, which was supervised time, and that it would be "nice" if she got to spend slightly more time with the mother.[47] That was in the context of the child's comments about being happy that the father "won" the dispute about who she would live with.[48] The expert noted that "[c]onsistent with X's expressed wishes, both parents report believing that X would want to be able to spend more time with the mother."[49]
I consider that the expression of the child's view must be considered in context of her then age, and of the expert's opinion that the child had "sought to remain with the mother previously to ensure that she could support the mother (and F)" and "appears to have felt the need to assume the role of a responsible parent for F, if not also for the mother at times." This is relevant noting the child's significant change of view since that time, discussed elsewhere.
The expert identified at [145] of the Family Report that:
1. In addition to the aforementioned issues of risk, other issues needing consideration when determining parenting arrangements for [X] include the parents' respective capacities to: consistently promote and encourage [X's] view of and relationship with the other parent; promote [X's] sibling relationship with [F] overtime; make consistently child-focused parenting choices (e.g. to ensure [X's] regular and timely school attendance, to not unilaterally remove [X] from the other parent, to not unilaterally relocate a distance away from the other parent with [X]); and provide [X] with the most stability, routine and predictability in her living environment and engagement in the community.
The expert noted that his opinion was subject to the caveats that there was no information available from NSW Police prior to May 2024, no independent material regarding the mother's engagement in psychological therapy nor in relation to her current substance use. [50] Subject to those caveats, the expert said:[51]
1. Regarding [X's] time with the mother, consideration needs to be given to: the level of risk of emotional and psychological harm that the Court finds the mother poses to [X]; to what extent the mother may undermine [X's] relationship and primary living arrangement with the father; the mother's capacity and willingness to encourage and promote [X's] view of and relationship with the father; and [X's] clear wish to be able to spend regular and substantial time with the mother. If the Court holds concerns for [X] regarding the mother, the Court may wish to consider whether any risks can be mitigated by [X] spending more limited time with the mother (say up to 2-3 nights each alternate weekend) and if such concerns can be sufficiently countered by [X's] primary living arrangement and the quality of [X's] relationship with the father.

In summary, the expert's then recommendation was that the child live with the father, spend two to three nights each alternate weekend with the mother, with restraints on the mother being able to remove the child from the father's care or another place or exposing the child to family violence including from future partners, and on both parents from initiating discussion with the child about these proceedings, adult issues, or the child's wishes.[52] There was also a recommendation around spending time with F and for engagement with counselling.
I give significant weight to the expert's opinion that if the child continues to be exposed to the mother's "concerning presentations" the child's "own emotional and psychological wellbeing may be adversely impacted".

On 28 August 2024, the day after the Family Report interview in which she denied being in a relationship, and made no mention of Mr J, the mother asked the DCJ caseworker if her "friend" Mr J could attend her scheduled visit with F. The caseworker advised the mother that Mr J was known to DCJ and had substantiated child protection concerns, and therefore was not allowed to attend the visit.[53]
On 2 September 2024 the mother cancelled her scheduled visit with F without explanation. Between 2 September 2024 and 18 November 2024 the mother cancelled or did not attend 11 out of 17 scheduled visits with F. Between 24 December 2024 and 22 January 2025 the mother did not attend any scheduled visits with F.[54]
In early 2025 the mother signed a residential tenancy agreement with Mr J in relation to a property he owns, and which she allegedly rents for $560 cash per fortnight. The agreement for three months until mid-2025, and has expired.
Two days after signing that residential tenancy agreement, a caseworker attended the mother's home to develop a Family Act Plan for Change ("FAP"). The FAP was in similar terms to the January 2024 SOPP which had not been complied with by the mother.
The FAP included a similar requirement for mental health assessment, engagement with therapeutic supports, as well as engagement with a pain management clinic, and the mother giving undertakings to attend scheduled visits with F, noting that F had become upset when she did not attend as scheduled, and undertakings to undertake training to recognise and avoid relationships with domestic violence.
During that meeting the mother again asked if Mr J could attend during family time. This was despite being previously advised of the reason why this was not permitted. The mother said that Mr J was a family friend who helps her stepfather with his business. She again denied being in a relationship with Mr J.[55]
I find that the mother's false denial of a relationship with Mr J to DCJ shows she understood that being in a relationship with Mr J would be considered a negative factor in her dealings with DCJ, and in her attempts to obtain restoration of F. I find that she told a calculated lie to hide the truth from DCJ, and that she sought to introduce Mr J into F's life despite being aware that he was considered unsuitable by DCJ due to substantiated child protection concerns. This reflects adversely not only on her credit, but is another example of her prioritising her relationships with violent partners over her children's safety.
The mother undertook a course recognising family violence,[56] in early 2025. She relied on this as evidence of her learning information about avoiding relationships with men who pose risks of family violence. I give no weight to this where, at the same time, she remained in a relationship with Mr J marred by family violence, which relationship she sought to hide from DCJ and this court. I also consider this evidence that she viewed her compliance with the FAP as a performative "box-ticking" exercise.
In early 2025 the mother cancelled her family time with F indicating that she was in hospital.[57]
In early 2025 DCJ scheduled appointments for the mother with a company named R Mental Health Service for a mental health assessment.
In early 2025 the mother told DCJ she had commenced counselling.[58]
Records obtained by the Court and parties in the days prior to trial, due to DCJ's intersession, included police records.
In early 2025, police recorded an incident between Mr J and his young adult son, Mr S, to which the mother was a witness.[59]

The victim [Mr J] is the father of the POI [Mr S]. Both reside together at [redacted]

[In early 2025] the victim and POI were both at home consuming an unknown amount of alcohol. A argument occurred resulting in 000 being called by [redacted] witness [Ms Irma].

Police attended and spoke to the victim who was unwilling to provide details about what occurred. A broken window was observed. When asked about this the victim stated he had done it earlier when he was upset and home alone. The victim declined to speak about this further and did not meet the criteria for a section 22.

Police were refused entry into the house by the victim however spoke to the POI through his bedroom window. The POI told police to, "Fuck off".

Police spoke to the witness over the phone who provided several varying versions which were not consistent. The witness declined to see police or provide further details.

[redacted] yelling from all persons at the location. Nil clear offences [redacted] It is not clear as to who is the aggressor in this incident.

Police are unable to identify any dv offences.

The victim states the POI is suffering from mental health issues however no further details are known.

In early 2025 neighbours of the mother telephoned NSW Police after the mother was seen knocking on people's doors visibly under the influence.[60]
The police records early 2025, in which the mother is the "VIC" or victim and Mr J the "POI", recorded.[61]

The VIC and POI have been in a relationship for over 18 months and recently the VIC has moved in with the POI. The POI has been assisting the VIC as she is going through a tough separation with her ex-partner and trying to sort out the custody of her children from this prior relationship. The VIC does not currently have any custody of her children. The VIC has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression and is currently receiving treatment for this howeverit (sic) has caused strain on her relationship with the POI.

[In early] 2025 the VIC and POI consumed a few drinks in the afternoon having made plans to go out to one of the local pubs that night. The VIC's behaviour then changed as the symptoms of her mental health get worse when she consumes alcohol. This has caused the VIC to have an escalation of emotions and try to have an argument with the POI. The POI has then calmed the VIC down and they went and attended the [redacted]

After some time at the pub [redacted] the POI decided he wanted to go home and the VIC joined him. They remained at home until around 9pm when the VIC decided she wanted to go out and continue drinking. The POI did not want to do this and the VIC left the house advising that she was going to the [redacted]. The POI then went to bed and did not hear from the VIC for the rest of the night.

Around 5am [on a day in early] 2025 police received several calls about the VIC walking around [redacted] and knocking on doors asking for help. All calls advised that the VIC appeared to be highly intoxicated and that she had made vague comments about having been involved in some sort of DV altercation.

Around 6am police attended [redacted] in [redacted] and located the VIC on the owners couch in their garage. Police activated their BWV and attempted to raise the VIC who was in and out of sleep. Police attempted to ask the VIC questions and get her to sit up and the VIC responded with grunts or ignoring police entirely. NSW Ambulance then also arrived and were able to raise the VIC and have some sort of communication with her but ultimately determining that the VIC was highly intoxicated and potentially under the influence of some kind of drug.

Neither police or ambulance were able to locate any signs of a physical altercation on the VIC and the VIC was not able to verbalise to police that any incident had actually occurred. Ambulance then spoke with the VIC again who advised she wanted to go to the hospital. Ambulance then conveyed the VIC to [redacted] hospital to be monitored for her level of intoxication.

Police then attended [redacted] and spoke with the POI on BWV. The POI provided the above version and advised that the VIC would not have taken any drugs. Police did not disclose to the POI where the VIC had been taken as the VIC was not in a state to speak with police and provide a version of events. The POI advised that he was happy for the VIC to return to their house when ever she was ready to do so.

Police do believe based on previous interactions with both parties that the version provided by the POI is plausible. Police will re attend the location later in the day to speak with the VIC and see if she would like to provide police with a version once she has the capacity to do so.

(Bold emphasis added)

The police material further noted in early 2025:[62]

Around 2:45pm police contacted [redacted] Hospital to follow up on the VIC. [redacted] she had been discharged from the hospital around 1:50pm. Police to attend [redacted] again to speak with her.

At around 3:30pm police re attended [redacted] where the VIC and POI were both sitting on the front steps of the house. Police activated BWV and spoke with the VIC without the POI present. The VIC provided a version of the night before that was the same as what the POI had already told police. The VIC advised that she doesn't normally drink so alcohol effects her a lot and that she is dealing with anxiety and depression issues at the moment and that drinking only made that much worse. The VIC stressed no incidents had occurred between herself and the POI, saying that he had tried to calm her down early in the night and she didn't want to listen.

The VIC stated that she had gone to the [redacted] with [redacted] that she didn't know super well and she had too much to drink. [redacted] who was out with them took both [redacted] and the VIC home but the VIC doesn't like staying anywhere except home and she freaked out thinking she was being forced to stay at this persons house. The VIC advised she did not remember anything after that but had been told that she had knocked on some doors and then spoke with police before going to the hospital.

Police are satisfied that no DV incidents occurred and the VIC was simply mixing bad mental health with alcohol which she agreed was a bad decision.

Police material included the following for early 2025.[63]

The VIC and POI both reside together at [redacted] with their 20 year old son. Both the VIC and POI are known to police mainly for regular domestic violence incidents.

About 11pm on [a day in early] 2025 the VIC and POI have been involved in a verbal argument at [redacted]

About 11pm [a day in early] 2025 police attended the location and spoke with the VIC and POI. Both provided the same version that they had a verbal argument only. Nil assault or other offences were disclosed.

Police hold no concerns for the safety/welfare of either party.

(Bold emphasis added)

None of this was disclosed by the mother, who was aware it was relevant, and would not have formed part of the evidence in these proceedings but for DCJ's involvement.
In her oral evidence, when confronted by the police records, the mother did not dispute the substance of the events as recorded in these documents. The mother said that as F's birthday was four days earlier, she noticed she was very emotional and distressed not having seen F. She said she started drinking in the afternoon and her emotions let loose. She became completely intoxicated. She said that although Mr J tried to calm her down, she made the decision to go and keep drinking.
It was submitted for the mother this oral evidence was evidence of her honesty; I reject that submission. If the mother had voluntarily disclosed the incident to the court, it would have been evidence of candour. Conceding the inevitable in the witness box in the face of overwhelming evidence is not honesty.
The mother attended one part of the Oracle assessment scheduled in April 2025 but did not attend the second part, which was a multi-part assessment to be conducted on one day.[64] She says she failed to attend because she broke her finger and could not attend.
On 16 June 2025 the mother cancelled her visit with F saying she had gastro.[65]
On 17 June 2025 the mother swore her trial affidavit. She was aware that her mental health status and substance use history were significant factors, as was her relationship status and the DCJ proceedings relating to F. She addressed each of these. At that time the DCJ, police and medical material referred to above was not available to the other parties or the court, but was all factual material within her knowledge.
In relation to substance use the mother's evidence was that early in the proceedings she had conceded marijuana use, but had not used medicinal or other cannabis for 12 months and that "I do not use illicit substances, and I drink occasionally but never to excess",[66] and noted an upcoming appointment with City L integrated pain management clinic in August 2025 and again said "I do not use any illicit drugs and would only take those medications that are prescribed to me when my doctor sees fit. I am currently medication free. I rarely drink alcohol and never to excess." [67] That last statement was a calculated, intentional and blatant lie made on oath with the intention of deceiving the court.
In relation to her mental health the mother's evidence was that she had been diagnosed with workplace anxiety, which she was able to manage on a daily basis with routine. She said that in 2014 she commenced seeing a psychologist after finding a dead body at work but stopped after about two years. She said she recommenced seeing the same psychologist in mid-2024 but stopped after three appointments due to cost. She said she had been seeing Ms T, a psychotherapist, through NSW Victim Services since March 2025 and provided a letter confirming that engagement. The mother's evidence was that "[w]hilst I feel that is helpful, I do not believe that I have any significant mental health issues and that I have done everything that I can to address those that may exist."[68] She said she is not currently medicated.[69]
The mother made no reference to the events in early 2025. I find this was a frank and intentional omission, which when read with her denials of mental health or substance use issues renders her sworn affidavit evidence concerning her substance use and mental health misleading and deceptive.
The mother provided a letter from Ms T [dated mid-]2025. That short note merely says Ms T "provided counselling and psychotherapy services to [the mother] since [early 2025] to address symptoms consistent with post-traumatic stress-disorder."[70] It is not known whether Ms T has a full history, or what her opinion of the mother's current mental health status is. This evidence illuminates nothing and does not assist the court.
The mother's evidence in relation to F was that she had a bedroom ready for him "when he is restored to my care"[71], that "I see [F] every Monday and Wednesday for two hours at a play centre in [Town U]", that she was seeking restoration and that "[t]here has been a clinic assessment undertaken in the course of these proceedings and the recommendation of the clinician is that [F] be restored to my care". She said "[i]t is unclear at this point whether the matter will need to be determined at a final hearing. I have no intention of conceding that there is no realistic possibility or restoration to my care."[72]
That evidence was misleading, including as to her actual time spent with F. There is no evidence of a recommendation that F be presently restored to her care, she was aware DCJ were opposed to restoration and not presently planning for it, and indeed that DCJ presently insist on supervised time only.
In mid-2025 DCJ arranged a Family Group Conference. The mother sent a text message to the appointed Family Group Conference facilitator on that day indicating that she would not be in attendance at the meeting that day.[73] She stated that she was aware that "discussions are only taking place for long term care arrangements" and asked for the minutes of the meeting.[74]
The mother's affidavit evidence was that she was "not in a relationship".[75] She made no mention of a relationship with Mr J, whose existence as a partner and not merely a landlord only became known due to DCJ's involvement, and their direction of the court and parties to, the police records.
When confronted with the police material the mother did not dispute having been in a relationship with Mr J but said that she had separated from Mr J in the period between those records and trial, so that by implication her present tense statement in her affidavit concerning her relationship status was truthful.
In oral submissions the mother said that she was looking to move from her current premises as immediately, so that Mr J would not be a factor. However, this means that for the purposes of making orders the mother's residential status, including whether she is presently homeless, is entirely unknown. That, apart from any other matter, presents an insurmountable obstacle to the orders for overnight time the mother seeks.
In mid-2025 DCJ re-opened the case for the child to allow them to put information before the court.
On 8 July 2025 a request was made by text message for the mother to complete a urinalysis test within a 24-hour period. The mother did not complete the test or provide a response.[76] The mother denies receiving this text. Given the significant issues with the mother's credibility little reliance can be placed on her evidence in that regard. In any event, given the mother's clear history of substance misuse, the absence of testing evidence does not advance or assist her case.
On 12 July 2025 the ICL spoke with the child in person. When asked what she wanted the child responded that she did not want to move from the supervision service, but did want to see the mother with F. The child noted that she wanted weekly visits at the centre, one with F and one with just the mother and "[d]oesn't want to hurt M feelings."[77]
In a follow up telephone call on 21 July 2025 the meeting notes record:

Ok, for me to tell them - supervised time once per week, one a month with [F] as well if he can. Likes the supervised time with [Ms V]. - Yes that's ok.

Ok, think mum and dad and judge need to know what she is feeling. Yes that's ok. Comfortable with that.

Confirm wishes - 1 per week with M, at CCS (with [Ms V]) and 1 per month with [F] and Mum, but not extra one, one of the weekend ones. - Yes thats right.

(As per the original)

This was a significant change of expressed views.
The affidavit of Ms P of DCJ was served in draft a few days before the trial and was affirmed on 21 July 2025 at the commencement of the trial. It contained the medical, police and DCJ material set out above.
Ms P's evidence was that, based on their involvement with the mother, DCJ held significant concerns in relation to the mother having unsupervised contact with the child, and in particular circumstances where Mr J may be present.[78]
The child's school reports, including historical attendance, were tendered.[79] The absence reports show significant unjustified absences and late attendance when in the mother's care. The current school and attendance reports reflecting the child's time living with the father are, as the ICL submitted, exemplary.

The mother's closing oral submissions included a submission that an order for supervised time was tantamount to an order for no time. That was a submission in two parts; firstly, that the current low-cost centre presently undertaking supervision would not continue to offer its services after final orders were made, and secondly that the parties cannot afford to fund professional supervision services outside of that low-cost environment.
There is no evidence in support of the first proposition. While experience informs the court that many supervision centres will not provide indefinite or long-term supervision, this court and other courts dealing with children regularly make orders for long term supervised time and it is not clear that this never occurs in low cost contact centres. There is also no evidence of what the position might be in relation to a final order requiring supervision to continue for another 12 or 24 months for example, rather than indefinitely. The mother bears the evidentiary onus on that issue and has not established this proposition.
In relation to the second proposition, it was submitted that the hourly cost of private supervision was approximately $120 per hour. Again, there is no evidence of that, but private supervision is generally more costly than through a supervision centre and this figure is not inconsistent with common experience.
I accept that the father, who has the financial burden of the child's care, could not reasonably afford the cost of private supervision.
The mother told the expert she could not work due to her commitment to supervised visits with F during the week, and that being a strata manger requires availability for fulltime employment, although the expert noted the inconsistency of that statement with evidence of an offer of casual employment from her prior employer.[80]
In her affidavit the mother said she last worked in a managerial role around April 2022 and that it was her intention to return to work "at some point". She denies any current relevant physical health impairments.[81] She denies any current mental health impairments which would restrict her capacity to work. There are no other apparent barriers to re-entry to the workforce, other than workforce absence, in relation to which three years is at the lower end of the range and should not provide a real hurdle to obtaining a job. She said it was her "intention to return to work at some point".[82] The point in time was not specified.
No cogent reason is provided in the mother's case for why she cannot currently work full time, either in a managerial role, administration roles, or at least in an entry level role such as working in hospitality, an occupation she has previously worked in.[83]
However, the mother's mental health and substance misuse is likely to have had a similar significant impact on her earning capacity, in terms of her consistency and reliability, to that it has had on her parenting capacity. Her inability to regularly attend organised time with F once a week, which presumably she would want to do, despite having no other work or parenting obligations, suggests a minimal capacity to regularly attend on and reliably carry out employment. This would make it difficult, if not impossible, to hold a job.
Accordingly, I find that the mother's current mental health impairment and substance misuse are such that she is probably unable to maintain even minimal casual employment and so is unable to pay for supervised time and in particular not for private supervision.
Thus, I find that if a supervision centre is not available, then an order for private supervision is likely to be equivalent to an order for no-time but note that it is possible that the mother will regain sufficient capacity to obtain and hold down a job, at some unknown point of time.

The expert was provided with Ms P's affidavit, and the police and medical records referred to elsewhere, before he gave his oral evidence. He was cross examined for the ICL, father and mother. He provided generally consistent answers, though at times formulated differently because of the assumptions and premises put to him.
The expert said his recommendations for the child to spend time with the mother set out in the Family Report were based on the then available material, and subject to the caveat in the report about new material, and based on an implicit assumption that there was no unacceptable risk of harm to the child from unsupervised time with the mother.
He said, in cross examination for the father, that the additional information was very concerning, and that his recommendation for regular unsupervised overnight time with the mother did not stand given that new information.
The expert did not offer an updated recommendation. He said the new information weighed against overnight time, and that the appropriateness of unsupervised short stints of daytime only time was a matter for the court, based on the court's assessment of the extent of the current risks, and whether any proposed injunctions would sufficiently or adequately mitigate those risks.
The expert said that the risks associated with the mother's mental health and substance misuse, identified in the Family Report, and confirmed to be current by reason of the events of early 2025, would probably, on the available evidence, still be present in twelve months or two years' time. While it appears the mother is now engaging with the DCJ recommendations, he stated it was not known when, or if, her condition or capacity would improve. He confirmed he maintained concerns about the mother's level of insight, as set out in the Family Report.[84]
Given the absence of recent drug testing, or evidence from a mental health practitioner about the mother's current mental health condition, and given the recency of the mother's last known serious incident in early 2025, I give significant weight to, and accept, the expert's opinion that these risks are likely to be present for at least two years.
I consider and find that orders must therefore be formulated on the basis that there is a real risk that the mother may, on any given day, turn up for time with the child in the state in which she was found by police and ambulance officers in early April 2025.
The expert also raised a concern about why there was an apparent difference between the consistency of the mother's time with the child and the inconsistency of her attendance at time with F. He was not able to do more than raise that issue.
I refer to the incidents in early 2025 as the mother's last known incident, as there may have been other relatively recent and similarly serious incidents not attended by police or ambulance. It is clear that if there were other incidents the mother would not have disclosed and would have sought to conceal these. This means that the frequency of such events cannot be known. However, the mother's repeated failures to attend supervised time with F raises concerns that these events may be relatively frequent. The uncertainty is a result of the mother's lying to the court about her mental health and substance misuse.
The expert also agreed with the father's proposition that the mother's history of breaching court orders raised concerns about her capacity to comply with court orders. He noted the mother's demonstrated pattern of responding poorly to difficult situations, including to declines in her mental health.
It is clear, and I find, that when impaired by poor mental health and or substance misuse, the mother has demonstrated a pattern of poor decision making including breaching court orders. Her capacity to abstain from substance abuse appears particularly limited when under emotional stress, which she blames for the events of early 2025. Further, the fact that on one occasion in early 2025 she continued drinking in the face of Mr J trying to stop her, indicates the extent of her substance misuse problems.
Considering all the evidence I am satisfied that I can have no confidence in the mother's willingness or capacity to consistently comply with court orders, including with any injunctions around substance use.
In cross examination for the father the expert also confirmed that should the mother continue to hold, or hold at a later time, baseless concerns about the child's safety from sexual harm in the father's care, that would raise concerns for the child's psychological well-being.[85]
The expert said he had a concern about the child visiting the mother's current home, given the evidence concerning Mr J.
The expert was pressed at length about a progression to unsupervised time with the mother, on behalf of both the mother and the ICL.
In summary, given his view that the current mental health and substance misuse risks are likely to continue for one or two years, and that it was not known if or when the mother's circumstances or capacity would improve, the expert said he would support a progression to unsupervised time, such as day-time only time, if the court formed the view that the identified risks could be adequately mitigated. That "if" is the critical issue.
The expert specifically stated that restraints and injunctions are only words on a piece of paper, and are only effective if complied with, and that the likelihood of the mother's compliance was a matter for the court.
The expert repeatedly stated that the assessment of current risk was for the court, who has heard the whole of the evidence at trial, and that it was a matter for the court to consider whether the mother has developed insight, and was likely to comply with any proposed injunctions and restraints, and then whether any such injunctions would sufficiently ameliorate the risks to make unsupervised time appropriate.
The expert accepted there was a degree of artificiality to indefinite supervision. He considered it likely, accepting that the supervised time with the child was going well as indicated in the supervision reports, which were not in contest at trial, that the child is at an age and developmental stage where she has probably already recognised that two hours a fortnight in a supervised environment is not a normal way of maintaining a relationship with a parent.
The expert accepted the ICL's proposition that "an indefinite continuation of supervised time" based on the present interim orders would likely become onerous to the child as she aged, but did not specify an age between 12 and 18 at which he considered it would become onerous.
He later said, in cross examination for the mother, that supervision was not realistic and would not work from age 15 or 16 and certainly not at age 18, but also spoke of the child still being a child and requiring the parents to take responsibility for making decisions about her safety even at ages 13 and 14. He rejected the proposition that there could be no benefit to ongoing supervised time from right now, but accepted that as the child gets older, if there was no change and the child did not feel the supervised time was enough to maintain the relationship, the child may go around the supervision order.
In terms of the balance the expert identified the two key factors as the risks posed by the mother, and their capacity to be mitigated, balanced against the child's maturation and development of self-protective capacity.
The time at which supervision will become onerous and ineffective will depend on each child, however, I give weight to the expert's opinion that it will be ineffective from age 15, and to his rejection of the proposition that there would be no benefit to supervised time even now, noting the child is still 12.
In response to the proposition for the mother that, given the child is aware of the mother's anxiety, even now the child would have the self-protective capacity to remove or withdraw herself if the mother was under the influence of substances, the expert accepted that she might, but did not think he could comment on whether, if the child was given a phone pre-programmed with the father's or the police's number, she would today have the maturity to call that number if the mother was acting erratically or posed a clear threat to her.
However, the expert pointed out that even if the child has the emotional intelligence and maturity and capacity to remove herself from situations of obvious danger, such as if the mother was substance impaired when she turned up for time, he considered that this responsibility should not be put on the child even at 13 or 14.
The expert said, I and entirely agree, that it is for adults to take responsibility for making difficult decisions about the child's safety, and that the psychological and emotional burden of deciding whether the mother is safe to spend time with on each occasion should not be put on the child. That may change at 15 when the child enters a different phase of development.
Further, the expert pointed out that if the mother was suffering poor emotional health when she attended for time, but was not presenting an obvious threat of danger through clear substance misuse impairment, even if the child was able to recognise that, the child might not remove herself from the situation, but might feel the need to take the responsibility for her mother's wellbeing, and to take on a caring role for the mother rather than remove herself from the situation. That risk is a real risk where that is a role the child has previously adopted.
Significantly, the expert would not accept the proposition, put for the ICL, that it was "imperative" that the child's relationship with the mother be maintained through "in person contact". He said the child was caring and empathic and valued her relationship with both parents, and that it would be of benefit to the child to maintain a relationship with the mother, whether through in person contact or through "other communication means".
In relation to the child's views, the expert was first taken to his summary of the child's views in his report, and said he understood the child was expressing a desire to return to spending regular time with both parents, in a similar arrangement to that she had previously done. [86]
The expert was shown the ICL's record of the child's recently expressed views.[87] When asked whether the change of view caused him any concerns, the expert said it would depend on the circumstances, and that he would need more context to express an opinion, given he was not the person the views were expressed to. He ultimately said he was not able to offer an opinion on the issue.
Having said that, the expert did say that a failure to make orders in accordance with the child's views would need to be considered in the context of an appreciation of why the child had expressed her current views.
He said that any order for unsupervised time, contrary to the child's wishes, would need consideration, noting that she has apparently adjusted to the current regime, which might explain why she is seeking ongoing supervised time.
The expert considered the child had achieved a degree of emotional maturity and is of an age and developmental stage where she may be recognising and reflecting on her past experiences. He said this may have influenced the progression of her stated views from seeking unsupervised and overnight time in August 2024 to her current view seeking only supervised time.
I give weight to this evidence. While I cannot know what has caused the child's change of view, the child may have reached a developmental stage where she is able to appreciate that she has suffered family violence and neglect as a result of the mother's conscious decisions to repeatedly prioritise her own emotional needs over the child's basic need for safety.
For example, the child may have worked out that if the mother had prioritised the child's safety, she would have had the child live with the father, not exposed her to repeated instances of family violence by different partners, and maintained her relationship with the child by meeting her without the involvement of those partners, instead of lying to the father, exposing the child to family violence, and neglecting her education and welfare. If she has not worked that out yet, it is likely she eventually will.
If the child has worked this out, then the child's stated view that she only wants supervised time with the mother would be a mature and entirely rational response to past events, indicate a good understanding of the significant risks the mother presently poses, as I find them, and fully explain the child's change of view between August 2024 and July 2025.
In line with this possibility, the expert also said, that the child had an element of emotional intelligence and reflective capacity and maturity, and that he did not think she would put herself in situations of danger and would say something or remove herself from such situations.
If the child has come to realise how dangerous the mother is, and how neglectful she has been, consistent with that she may have has now told the ICL to convey to the court her wish to remove herself from the risk of unsupervised time which she may, quite rightly, perceive to be a situation of grave potential danger as a self-protective act.
If that is why the child has expressed a desire for supervision, as a rational self-protective mechanism, then that is not only reasonable, it is an indication that the child, being aware of the risks the mother poses, may experience significant psychological stress from the imposition of unsupervised time which she now reasonably fears, and that her fear of something happening, even if nothing actually happens, would constitute a form of significant stress and ongoing psychological or emotional harm.
Where the child's views are, on their face, entirely rational and consistent with the court's assessment of risk, and where not acting in accordance with those views may expose the child to significant emotional stress and distress, I consider those views should be given weight.
That would be a consistent approach with the expert's opinion that, even at age 13 or 14, it is not appropriate to place the child in the position where she is required to make decisions about whether or not to proceed to spend time with the mother by making her own risk assessment of the mother's apparent capacity each time they meet.
In relation to long term decision making and parental responsibility, the expert was taken to his opinion in the family report that:[88]
1. The parents will need to recommence communicating, even if initially in written form, if they are to effectively share major long-term decisions for [X] as they propose to do. To assist with this, the parents may benefit from utilising a free co-parenting app such as AppClose.
The expert was informed of the evidence at trial that, at present, all communication between the parties is by SMS, with no telephone calls or in person contact, and of the father's evidence of his significant distrust given the events of the last two years and his unwillingness to work collaboratively with the mother on major long-term issues. Given that evidence, the expert again said it was for the court to consider whether both parents have the child's best interests at heart and are able to co-operate without their distrust getting in the way. However, he considered that if major decision making was to be allocated to one parent, the other parent should have the opportunity for input.
The expert also said that a no-time or no-relationship order would have negative long-term psychological impacts, however, on no proposal or possible set of orders is that anticipated, given the child is likely to spend supervised time with the mother and F paid for by DCJ and or supervised by F's grandparents, and that communication orders are appropriate.

All parties submitted it is in the child's best interests to live with the father. I agree and make that order by consent. Implicit in this is an acceptance that the father does not pose an unacceptable risk of harm to the child.
On the issue of parental responsibility and long-term decision making, the ICL's final proposal was for equal shared parental responsibility, with the father to have sole decision-making responsibility for all major long-term decisions subject to an obligation to inform the mother and consider her views and then notify his decision.[89]The ICL sought this order on the basis that sharing long term decision making was untenable.
The father's final proposal was for sole decision-making authority for major long-term decisions, again on a similar basis to the ICL's proposal. [90]
The mother's final proposal was for equal shared long-term decision making. [91]
The father and mother did not specifically address the distinction between parental responsibility and responsibility for major long-term decision making.
The ICL submitted there were a raft of risks of harm posed by the mother which were significant. These arose from her unclear mental health status and history of substance misuse, noting the recent events of April 2025 establish these are current, not historic, risks. The ICL also pointed to risks of neglect, including in relation to education, and through exposure to family violence, including potentially of exposure to Mr J, or a future partner.
The ICL submitted the Court would be concerned about the mother's substance misuse given her history and in particular the recent events of early 2025, and cautious about accepting her sworn evidence that she is now abstinent when she has not been candid with the Court.
A similar submission was made concerning the mother's mental health status. It was submitted her unwillingness to accept she has mental health problems would lead to a concern about her level of engagement with treatment. Further, the fact that counselling is occurring does not mean it is having any effect, and there is no medical material to give the Court comfort that the mother's mental health is no longer of concern.
The ICL submitted that taken together these risks cumulatively rendered the mother an unacceptable risk of unsupervised time to the child,[92] absent ameliorating orders[93].
The father's submissions largely adopted or mirrored the ICL's submissions as to risk.
The mother did not directly address these risk issues, and her principal position appears to be that unsupervised time with her does not pose an unacceptable risk of harm to the child, but she has proposed restraints on herself addressing her substance use and mental health to allay concerns.
On the issue of what time the child should spend with the mother, and whether it should be unsupervised, the ICL's proposal, which is inconsistent with the child's stated views, took into consideration the mother's submission that an order for supervised time was, or could be, tantamount to an order for no time.
The ICL's submission was that the unacceptable risk could be made acceptable by the imposition of orders other than supervision. The ICL's proposed restraints and orders on directed to the mother were:

(1) against taking or preventing the child from accessing her mobile phone,

(2) against consuming illicit substances including opioid based medications whilst the child is in her care or for 48 hours prior to that,

(3) against allowing the child to be in the presence of a drug affected person,

(4) against being above a blood alcohol reading of 0.05 within 24 hours of the child coming into her care,

(5) against taking the child outside the City L Local Government area without the father's prior agreement, and

(6) against allowing the child to be in the company of anyone else, without the father's prior written consent, except:

(a) F,

(b) F's carers,

(c) persons facilitating supervised time between the mother and F at the direction of DCJ.

(7) requiring she continue to engage with all treating mental health providers, as self-sourced or directed by Department of Communities and Justice and follow all treatment directions.

The ICL also proposed standard restraints on both parents against:

(1) discussing the other parent or events in the other parent's home in the child's hearing

(2) involving the child in decisions or discussions about her future living and time arrangements; and

(3) criticising or making derogatory statements about the other parent or their households; and,

(4) allowing the child to be exposed to family violence.

On that basis the ICL proposed the child spend unsupervised time with the mother on a two-week rotating schedule, from Friday at the conclusion of the school day (or 3.00 pm) to 6.00 pm in week one, and from Saturday 10.00 am to 2.00 pm in week two, with daytime special occasion times of up to five hours on Christmas day, Mother's Day and the mother's birthday, with suspension of the mother's time for the father's special occasions.
The proposal was submitted to flow from the expert's evidence that supervision was unnecessary, if the appropriate restraints were in place sufficient to mitigate the assessed risks, which the ICL submitted these restraints were.
It was submitted this proposal would facilitate meaningful unsupervised time between the child and the mother, noting the expert's evidence about the artificiality of supervised time, the child's age and her growing autonomy, emotional intelligence and maturity, and avoid the significant risk of a de-facto no-time order being made with the likely significant psychological and emotional harm the ICL submitted the child would likely suffer from a cessation of in person time with the mother.
The father's submission was that the mother could not be relied upon to comply with any restraints, and that orders predicated on an assumption that she will comply are not adequate to ameliorate the risk of her turning up to unsupervised time in the state in which she was found in early 2025.
The father pointed to the same factual material as the ICL, and submitted that the factors which make the mother an unacceptable risk of unsupervised time, and in particular her lack of insight into, or denial of, any issues with substance misuse or poor mental health, as establishing the court could have no confidence the mother would comply with the ICL's proposed restraints. Further, compliance with those restraints or conditions would not necessarily address her mental health issues, or guarantee that she will not be psychologically impaired when she turns up for unsupervised time, even if unimpaired by recent substance misuse.
On that basis, the father submitted the ICL's proposed restraints would not be sufficiently effective to ameliorate the identified unacceptable risks and to allow the unsupervised time proposed by the ICL.
The father submitted the court would find that the father's history establishes his commitment to facilitating the child's relationship with the mother when safe to do so.
The father also proposed a progression to unsupervised time, but conditional on compliance with a more onerous set of pre-conditions, in particular relating to hair follicle testing. The father did not concede that an order for supervision on the current basis would be the equivalent of a no-time order or that the court was faced with a choice between no time or unsupervised time.
His proposal was that the child spend supervised time with the mother each alternate Friday for a period of two hours at a professionally supervised contact centre. In effect, a continuation of the current orders, with the father agreeing to pay for visits at the supervision centre. He did not concede that the supervision centre would not continue supervision based on final orders, or that an order for ongoing supervision was tantamount to a no-time order.
The father's proposal for a progression to unsupervised time is contingent on the mother complying with the pre-conditions his proposed order 12.
The first set of conditions are directed to her substance use. They require that within 7 days of the court's orders the mother be required to undertake hair follicle testing for drugs and alcohol.
In the event the test returned a positive for any drugs, or excessive alcohol consumption, the mother would be required to submit for further testing each six months until such time as she returns a negative result with the mother responsible for the cost of future testing. As clarified in oral submissions, the intention is that a positive test result would be required before unsupervised time would commence.
The second set of conditions are directed to the mother's mental health. They require the mother to attend upon a GP to obtain a mental health care plan and a referral to a psychologist, to provide a copy of that mental health plan to the father, and to obtain an appointment with a psychologist. The mother would then be required to engage with the psychologist until such time as the mother is discharged from the psychologist's care, and the psychologist provides a written report to the father as to the reasons for the discharge.
If the above pre-conditions are complied with, the father proposed that the mother spend time with the child each alternate Saturday from 10.00 am until 2.00 pm or at such other times as agreed. The father submitted that this should be restricted to time in a public place and not involve the mother taking the child elsewhere, in particular not to her accommodation wherever that might be.
The father's position it is that, if the mother cannot pass the hair follicle test, and if supervised time is not available for the reasons the mother submits, if the unacceptable risk is not ameliorated by the mother acting to abstain from substance misuse and to engage in ongoing mental health treatment, unfortunately, a no-time order is required to protect the child from these unacceptable risks.
The father submitted that would be the case until the child is old enough to take self-protective actions, such as refusing to go with the mother, without suffering undue psychological stress, or the risk of physical abduction which at present she may be too young to resist. The father said that would be when the child reaches age 15, effectively adopting the expert's opinion.
The mother proposed unsupervised time each alternate weekend from 3.00 pm or after school Friday until 5.00 pm Sunday, as well as half school holidays, and special occasions.
The mother proposed restraints against each party exposing the child to family violence, a restraint on herself from consuming alcohol or any illicit drugs within 24 hours of the child coming into her care, and restrains on her from on her bringing the child into the contact with Mr H, Mr G and Mr J, or taking the child to Mr J's house at W Street Town N or any other house owned by Mr J, to address the risk issues around Mr J without admission that there is such a risk issue.
In oral submissions the mother objected to the father's proposed hair follicle testing regime on the grounds that it is likely to come back positive, at least in the timeframes the father proposed. The mother would be best placed to know the likely results. The mother's submission was that the father's proposal for testing would effectively result in a supervised time order for at least the next six months, which on the mother's case is then in fact a no-time order for that period, and then an ongoing no-time order because she submitted she would not have the funds to pay for the further hair follicle testing the father's orders propose as a pre-condition to the eventual commencement of unsupervised time.
Whilst that was a pragmatic point for the mother to raise, so that an order she knows she cannot comply with is not made due to her silence, and on one view may only relate to the know events of early 2025, it provides the court with no comfort that the mother is not engaged in ongoing substance misuse, nor that a hair follicle testing condition will provide a mechanism to ameliorate that risk in a way which will allow the child to safely have time with the mother.
In oral submissions, addressing the risk issues with requiring a 12 year old in sixth grade, contrary to her expressed views, to make the decision about whether or not to take self-protective actions and refuse to spend time with the mother at change over, potentially placing the child in a position of significant psychological strain, and the risk of her going with the mother when the mother is not well because the child does not have an adult's judgment making capacity or feels that she needs to be protective of the mother, it was submitted for the mother that the court should remember that changeovers "do not happen in a vacuum", and that the father was aware of the issues, and that if the mother turned up at a change-over affected by substances or acting erratically, or if Mr J was with her, the father could simply take the child home.
This attempt to address the issue of the risks associated with the mother not complying with the proposed restraints, or experiencing poor mental health despite complying, and attending unsupervised time with the child in a state which would poses risks to the child, goes to the heart of the problem.
Although not put as an alternative proposal, it raises the possibility of orders which require unsupervised time and the child's attendance, but which would include a provision permitting the father to assess the mother's well-being on a real time basis, so that obligation would not be imposed on the child. Time could proceed when it was clear to the father that the mother was well, and alone, but not if the father assessed otherwise.
When asked how the orders could be structured to protect the father from a contravention application if a factual dispute arose as to whether the mother had been impaired, no positive submissions were made for the mother. I did not take this as a withdrawal from the mother's primary position.
In relation to the child's relationship with F, the evidence is that F presently spends time with the mother in the community funded by DCJ, noting DCJ will not agree to unsupervised time deeming the mother an unacceptable risk but also noting F is an infant. The ICL's proposal, at order 15.5, permits the child to spend time with the mother when the mother is with F and F's supervisor, taking advantage of DCJ funding to promote supervised time with both F and the mother. This proposed order permits that time, but the Court has no jurisdiction over F nor DCJ.
In relation to communication the ICL proposed that the father would provide the child her own phone and provide the mother with the phone number so as to allow the child to facilitate communication at her discretion, but subject to the father being able to monitor the communication. It is not clear how the father could monitor electronic communication if the child has her own phone for that purpose.
The mother proposed electronic communication on a "liberal and flexible basis" but no less than each Wednesday from 5.00 pm till 5.30 pm, facilitated via the app 'kids messenger'. The expert explained that whilst this was the child's account the parent would get a copy of each message. That would require an internet enabled smart phone. The ICL did not specify whether the phone should be internet capable, however, given ongoing concerns about children and unsupervised access to the internet it may be that a non-internet mobile phone would be appropriate and sufficient if a phone is to be provided. The downside of that is the inability to as readily monitor the communication.
The father also proposed restraints in relation to Mr H and Mr G, not having been aware of Mr J at the time he filed his proposal, and on the mother from removing the child from his care or the care of any other person except in accordance with these orders. That last order is sought on the basis that the mother has unilaterally removed the child from his care on two prior occasions.[94] He seeks an order that a warrant lie ready for execution if the mother does remove the child.
The ICL proposed standard orders for communication about illness, accidents and health, keeping current as to addresses and contact details, and also requiring the provision of the full name and address and date of birth of any person each parent is in an "intimate relationship" with or who ordinarily resides with them, including working with children check numbers for people residing with them, and further a requirement that the mother inform the father of being admitted to hospital for acute mental health issues.
The mother further proposed orders requiring the parties to provide to each other up-to-date contact details, and an order that she continue to attend upon her counsellor (which would only be effective if it were a condition precedent to the child's time with her), and that each party do all things to ensure that the child attends upon her GP to obtain a mental health care plan and a referral to a psychologist/counsellor (and that all parties ensure the child attends upon any appointments and follows all reasonable recommendations of any psychologist/counsellor). If there is face to face time, the mother proposed changeovers at McDonald's Y Street City L. The ICL indicated in oral submissions they did not oppose this.
The ICL and father proposed standard passport and international travel orders for the father, but not the mother.

I find the mother to be an unreliable witness. Her affidavit evidence was designed to mislead the court in relation to her substance misuse, mental health history and current status. She lied to DCJ, and by omission in her affidavit to the court, to hide her relationship with Mr J knowing the truth would likely harm her case. She lied to this court about the regularity of her time with F. Nothing she says can be taken as true unless independently supported.
I find the father was an honest witness.
I find the father poses no risks to the child and is a highly child focussed parent. To the extent the allegation the father engaged in excessive physical discipline of the child was maintained,[95] noting he was cross examined on the issue, I accept his evidence that he lifted the child and carried her to her room when she was younger and ignoring his instructions.[96] I find this was reasonable discipline.
I am required to consider the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs, which are for a safe and secure environment in which she can develop through her teenage years, and also the capacity of each person who has or is proposed to have parental responsibility for the child to provide for the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs.
The father has demonstrated an excellent capacity to provide for all the child's needs. In particular, after the execution of the recovery order and the entry of the 2020 orders, the father demonstrated admirable flexibility and child focused care in supporting the child's increased time with the mother, in particular to foster the child's relationship with F, based on his then belief that the mother was doing well, and his assessment that it would be in the child's best interests to increase her time with the mother. Unfortunately, the father was not aware of the domestic violence in the mother's relationship with Mr G, and the risks this posed to the child. Nevertheless, this is clear evidence that the father has consistently prioritised the child's needs.
While the parties agree the child should live with the father, there was also an issue raised in the proceedings about the father's response to the child's statement to the expert in the Family Report interviews where she "expressed feeling that she would benefit from an opportunity to engage with a 'therapist' so that she can express her feelings."[97] The father's evidence was that after consultation with the child, friends and family he decided not to action that, noting the child did not have ongoing engagement with the school counsellor, inferentially at the child's choice.
The expert was asked whether this raised any issues about the father's capacity to recognise and promote the child's developmental needs. The expert said it was dependent on how the child had progressed, but that if the father, and school, did not identify anything about the child's presentation that required therapeutic assistance, it was a matter for the court whether this might indicate poor parenting. I accept the father's evidence that as the child appeared to be doing well, he did not consider a therapist was required. To the extent an order was sought requiring the father to engage the child with counselling, I do not consider this an appropriate parenting order to make. I am satisfied the father will do so if necessary, in the exercise of his parental and decision-making authority. I am satisfied the father has the capacity to meet all the child's needs.
There is no doubt the father harbours a high degree of mistrust of, and has a degree of animosity towards, the mother. His mistrust is founded on her repeated deceptions of him which exposed the child to family violence and harm which the child never needed to experience. It was doubtless compounded by the dishonest way in which she conducted these proceedings, not disclosing the critical information about her status, which only came to light because of DCJ's decision to assist the court and which otherwise would have been unknown. His mistrust is both rational and reasonable.
The father's animosity arises from the fact that the child has suffered as a consequence of the mother prioritising her own emotional need to have the child live with her over the child's basic need for safety. I find that the mother could have placed the child to live with the father and maintained her relationship with the child through time spent with the child away from her violent partners and that she instead exposed the child to family violence and neglect by prioritising her own emotional needs over the child's needs. I find the father's animosity therefore, while unfortunate, is based on solid factual grounds and reasonable. I find that his ongoing concerns about the risks the mother poses to the child are reasonable, sensible and child focussed.
I find that the father has always supported, and continues to support, the child's relationship with the mother, despite his well-founded concerns. I find that the father, being child focussed, is highly likely to continue to support the child having a relationship with the mother to the extent it is safe for the child to do so. That is because he is aware of the significant psychological trauma the child would suffer should that relationship be terminated. For that reason, I find that the father will likely continue to prioritise the child's psychological and emotional need to maintain a relationship with the mother over his own animosity towards, and distrust of, the mother.
The maintenance of the sibling relationship with F is in the child's best interests. It necessarily involves an aspect of the maintenance of the child's relationship with the mother, particularly when the child spends time with F and the mother. The evidence is clear that the father has continued to support that relationship, and I find the father is highly likely to continue to support the child's relationship with F as it is in her best interests to do so.
While this court has no jurisdiction over F, I consider it likely that DCJ, whose obligations to F include maintaining his relationship with the child, and who have facilitated that sibling relationship and also shown an admirable interest in advancing the child's best interests by voluntarily engaging with these proceeding, are likely to facilitate the child spending time with F, and with the mother when F has his supervised time with the mother. I find that this will possibly, and indeed probably, allow some supervised time to occur between the child and the mother regardless of the orders I make concerning time, and will contribute to the child's capacity to maintain her relationship with the mother.
I am required to and have considered the view of the child. I have considered the child's change of view. I am satisfied that it is unlikely the father influenced the child's views about supervision, to the extent that argument may have been suggested by the mother. While I cannot know the reasons for the change of view, I consider one possible reason for the child's change of view, and for her current expressed preference for weekly supervised time, is her growing appreciation of the risks the mother poses, and an appreciation of the psychological benefits she obtains from being able to spend time with the mother without being on guard against these risks, and without being at risk of being required to take on a parentified role.
Therefore, I also take into account that, if that is the reason for the child's current view, the making of orders inconsistent with that view may expose the child to ongoing serious psychological harm through the stress of being required to spend unsupervised time which she fears. It may also cause her psychological harm through knowing that her attempts to protect herself, by communicating her self-protective wish for supervision to those whose job it is to protect her from harm, have been ignored. If the latter is the case, failing to respect the child's views may also reduce her trust in the father for not keeping her safe, and negatively impact her relationship with him, and reduce her trust in adults generally for the same reason.
A central consideration is the making of orders that promote the child's safety. That includes safety from being subjected to, or exposed to, family violence, abuse, neglect, or other harm, as well as the safety of each person who has care of the child, whether or not a person has parental responsibility for the child.
I find the mother poses serious risks to the child if they spend unsupervised time together, arising from the interrelated issues of the mother's mental health and her substance misuse, and the mother's resultant behaviours when affected by one or both of these issues or impairments.
I find the risks are exemplified by the mother's behaviours in early 2025. I find that these risks are current, and that the mother could turn up to unsupervised time in the state in which she was found by neighbours, police and ambulance at that time.
I find this involves both physical and psychological risks. While I accept and find that the mother would not intentionally harm the child while unaffected by these issues, I find that when in a state such as she was in early 2025, if allowed unsupervised time with the child, the mother might seek to remove the child by force, and for example go to Queensland again, accidentally harming the child in the process, or might try to drive with the child whilst substantially impaired so placing them both at a grave risk of serious or mortal physical harm, and further that the child would be exposed to significant psychological trauma by being exposed to the mother acting in those ways, even if no physical harm eventuated.
I find that even if the mother does not attend unsupervised time in such a florid state, there is a risk she will attend suffering from poor mental health in a way which causes her to engage with the child in inappropriate ways, including by discussing inappropriate matters, or act in a manner which might cause the child to feel obliged to take on a parenting role, contrary to the child's best interests.
Noting that the mother has only this year commenced engaging with the various processes she first agreed to undertake with DCJ in the SOPP in early 2024, and noting the expert's opinion, I find that the likelihood is that these behaviours and associated risks are likely to be present for at least another two-year period. I find that, even then, it cannot be said whether these behaviours and risks will lessen or be removed after two years.
I also find that the mother poses risks to the child of unsupervised time of introducing her to people, including potential future partners, who pose a risk to the child. Her attitude to the risks posed by Mr H, and by Mr J, noting her repeated attempts to introduce Mr J into F's life in supervised time despite the information provided by DCJ indicating substantiated risks, establishes in my view that the mother has no current protective capacity in relation to the issue of introducing the child to potentially dangerous people.
I do not need to make a finding concerning whether the mother remains in a relationship with Mr J given the consent to injunctions about him, and the orders I intend to make, and so will not address that issue further.
I accept the submissions of the ICL and father and find that the mother poses an unacceptable risk of harm to the child of spending any unsupervised time with the child. The issue is whether the risk factors that render the mother an unacceptable risk can be ameliorated by the imposition of the proposed restraints and safety measures.
I also find that the mother has little current capacity to meet any of the child's developmental, psychological, emotional and cultural needs.
It follows that the mother's proposals for time are untenable. That finding is bolstered by the fact that, on her case in closing, she was moving to a yet known address.
I am required to consider the benefit to the child of being able to have a relationship with her parents, and other people who are significant to the child, where it is safe to do so.
The expert noted that the child was comfortable engaging with and being in the presence of both parents, who were both clearly very important to the child, and that it appeared the child loved both parents.[98]
There is a clear benefit to the child in having a relationship with the father, and F, and also in being able to maintain a relationship with the mother, for the child's emotional well-being, so long as that can be achieved safely.
I find that given the child's age and developmental status, and the deep existing connection, it is not imperative to the maintenance of this relationship that there be in person time, although I accept that it would be preferable for in person time to occur if it can be achieved safely, as it doubtless can be, and has been to date, through professionally supervised time.
That would be the obvious restraint to impose and is the restraint which the father effectively seeks till the child attains age 15, given that the mother says that the testing regime he proposes as a pre-condition to unsupervised time cannot in fact be put into effect, partly because of her recent substance use and partly also due to lack of funds.
The mother has asserted but has not established though she bears the evidentiary burden, that supervision through the existing low cost centre could not continue for another two years if ordered on a final basis.
If find that such ongoing paid professional supervision is the most suitable and appropriate ameliorating measure and the one that the court can be, relatively certain will adequately provide for the child's safety.
However, as there is a possibility that an order for ongoing supervision at the centre may not be able to be complied with if the centre will not consent, and if no other centre can be found who will carry out the time, and given that formal proposals were made for unsupervised time by the ICL and mother, it is necessary to also consider whether the restraints proposed by the ICL and or the mother would adequately ameliorate the risks.
Starting with the ICL's proposed restraints, I am not satisfied they adequately ameliorate the risks of unsupervised time where they substantially depend on the mother voluntarily abstaining from the use of substances without a mechanism for ensuring compliance, and where the mere engagement with mental health services will not guarantee that the mother does not suffer from poor mental health. The father's proposal for mental health reviews suffers the same problems. He requires a report, but a report that said the mother was unwell and posed a grave risk to the child would still meet the stated requirements and facilitate unsupervised time.
I make a similar finding in relation to the mother's proposed restraints for the same reason, which is that her current history of untreated substance misuse, and her dishonesty and or lack of insight into these issues and the risks they represent to the child, provides no evidence on which it can reasonably be inferred or found that she will likely comply with these injunctions.
As the expert said, restraints are merely words on paper unless they are likely to be complied with, or as the father seeks to have, unless there is a clear and reliable monitoring mechanism.
In relation to the mother's submission that the child is already old enough to remove herself from situations of danger if the mother attends in an impaired manner, I accept and agree with the expert's opinion that it would be inappropriate to place the psychological burden of the obligation to make a safety assessment each time there is a meeting with the mother on the child, currently aged 12 and in sixth grade. I consider and find that this approach would remain inappropriate next year when she reaches 13 and is in year 7, and even when she attains age 14 in year 8. I find that is particularly so where the child has requested supervision.
However, when she is approaching age 15 and entering year 9, I find that the balance is likely to change, that supervised time would likely become ineffective and that other orders may need to be made.
I have considered the risks that the orders I intend to make for supervised time only for the next two years may result in a de-facto no-time order if professional supervision is in fact not available for the reasons the mother submitted. I accept that, though not established, it is a possibility that must be weighed.
Given the gravity of the risks I find the mother poses of unsupervised time, and taking into account my finding that there is likely to be supervised time on a regular basis with F and the mother, and that the relationship is likely to survive two years of electronic communication only, I find that the child's best interests and in particular safety are served by orders that require supervision even if that means that there is no in person time between the mother and the child for the next two years other than such time as may, or I accept may not, be provided by DCJ.
In that context I have also considered the mother's informal submission about the organising of time on the basis that the father could exercise his parental responsibility to not allow time to proceed if he assessed the mother as impaired at a change-over.
This was not a formal proposal. In any event, it would not in my view be an effective order. The father would, on the mother's proposal, prima facie be in contravention of orders each time he exercised a discretion not to permit time. He might need to establish reasonable grounds or excuse for each occasion in response to contravention applications. I do not consider this a viable approach or in the child's best interests.
The child is not Indigenous, and I have considered issues of family violence elsewhere.
There is no prospect of the parties effectively co-parenting, and in any event, I am not satisfied the mother presently has the capacity to make decisions in the child's best interests. In these circumstances I do not consider the ICL's proposal to leave parental responsibility as it is, and to only make an order concerning long-term decision making to be in the child's best interests.

Objects of Pt VII of the Act are to (a) to ensure that the best interests of children are met, including by ensuring their safety; and (b) to give effect to the Convention on the Rights of the Child done at New York on 20 November 1989 (s 60B).
The paramount consideration is the best interests of the child per ss 60CA and 65AA. The parties seek parenting orders (s 64B), which the court has power to make (s 65D(1), within the context of the objects and the requirement that the child's best interests is the paramount consideration having regard to the mandatory criteria (s 60CC).
The parties agree, and I find, that the 2020 orders require reconsideration in the child's best interests and that the child should live with the father. I make these orders by consent.
There is no possibility of the parties working together to make decisions in the best interests of the child. The father mistrusts the mother, for good reason. The mother is focussed on her own emotional needs and not the child's best interests. In these circumstances I am satisfied that the father should exercise sole parental responsibility and sole decision-making responsibility with the requirement to notify, consult and inform proposed.
Given I find that absent professional supervision the proposed restraints will not be sufficient to ameliorate the grave risks the mother poses to the child of unsupervised time, I find it is in the child's best interests, until 1 January 2028, at which time she will be 14 going on 15 and heading into year 9, unless the father otherwise agrees in writing in his absolute discretion, that the mother shall only spend time with the child under professional supervision, for two hours once a fortnight, effectively continuing the present interim orders. The father will pay for the supervision, as pro-offered, to ensure it occurs.
The father may change the day and time per fortnight considering, for example, the child's extra-curricular activities. I will order fortnightly, rather than the child's preferred weekly time as in the longer term I consider that more realistic noting the child may become more interested in time with peers than family as high school progresses.
If the current supervision centre will not offer the service, the parties are to make best efforts to find a reasonably accessible alternative similar cost supervision centre who will.
As I have said, I find that the risks of unsupervised time outweigh the potential risks of the loss of, or diminution of, the child's relationship with the mother, or the psychological harm the child will suffer if there is no in person time.
I make a similar order in relation to communication, given my concerns that the mother's mental health and substance misuse mean that unrestricted communication may lead to the mother calling the child when the mother is highly emotional and has impaired judgement. I will order once per week communication on a Wednesday at 5.00 to 5.30pm as proposed by the mother, with the father again allowed to facilitate additional communication if he deems it appropriate.
I note that the father may, in the exercise of his sole parental and long-term decision-making authority, enter into any arrangement he sees fit for the child to spend time, including unsupervised time, with and to communicate with the mother beyond the mandated times I have ordered. In those circumstances, the parties would also be free to agree not to continue the paid professional supervision.
From 1 January 2028 I consider it unreasonable to attempt prescriptive orders. I have contemplated an order that the child be permitted to spend time and communicate with the mother in accordance with her wishes but ultimately consider that still places too great a burden on her.
Given that supervised time will become onerous by age 14-15, and that compelled weekly communication may also become onerous and counter-productive at that age and noting my findings about the father's consistent child focus, I consider the most appropriate order to be that time and communication shall be at the discretion of the father from 1 January 2028.
The parties are to communicate by SMS, except in cases of emergency, and are to communicate only about the orders and the child.
I will make the agreed restraints on the mother allowing the child to come into contact with Mr H, Mr G or Mr J. The restraint regarding Mr G is particularly important given the possibility of ongoing contact through F. I will make a notation, so it is clear there are no specific findings against them as they are not parties or represented.
I will impose s 68 restraints on the mother approaching or communicating with the child outside of these orders or removing the child from the father or any third party such as a school, or on failing to return the child should the father permit unsupervised time. I will also make a standing recovery order, as sought by the father, to support instant action should the mother breach these injunctions and remove or withhold the child. I consider that appropriate given her history of relocating with the child when suffering significant stress.
I make standard mutual non denigration restraints and restraints in relation to family violence as proposed by the ICL, a standard passport and international travel order for the father, an order that the orders be provided to school and medical providers who need to know about the father's sole parental responsibility and the injunction against the mother removing the child, and a copy of this judgment and orders to DCJ for their file, noting no action is requested of them, and with the court's thanks for their engagement with these proceedings.
The mother will be permitted to obtain the usual information from any school at her own cost.
If there is an application for costs it may be filed pursuant to the Rules.
These are my reasons and orders.

I certify that the preceding two hundred and seventy-six (276) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Smith.

[1] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 3.

[2] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 7.

[3] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 55 and Annexure A.

[4] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 54.

[5] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 39.

[6] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 40-41, 47-49.

[7] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 74 and Annexure C.

[8] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 40, 44.

[9] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 36-39.

[15] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 138.

[16] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 66.

[17] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 83.

[18] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraphs 76-95.

[19] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraphs 121-124.

[20] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 46.

[21] Father's affidavit filed 23 June 2025, paragraph 31.

[22] Father's affidavit filed 23 June 2025, paragraphs 31-42.

[23] Exhibit ICL 10, PBS Patient Summary dated 20 May 2024.

[24] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 13-27.

[25] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 32.

[26] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 31-34.

[27] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 36-39.

[28] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 42.

[29] Exhibit ICL 3, Z Hospital records dated 18 March 2019.

[32] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 43-44; 46-47 and Annexure MB1.

[34] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 48-52 and Annexure MB1.

[35] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 76.

[36] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 51-58; 61-64 and Annexure MB1.

[37] Family Report dated 3 September 202, paragraph 8.

[38] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 139.

[39] Family Report dated 3 September 202, paragraph 135.

[40] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 37.

[41] Family Report dated 3 September 202, paragraphs 61 and 63.

[42] Family Report dated 3 September 202, paragraph 136.

[43] Family Report dated 3 September 202, paragraph 141.

[44] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraphs 123-176.

[45] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 111-112.

[46] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 142.

[47] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraphs 121-123.

[48] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraphs 114-115.

[49] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 103.

[50] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 132, 155-156.

[51] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 147.

[52] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 151,152 and 158.

[53] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 65-66.

[54] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraphs 67-69.

[55] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 71, Annexure MB1.

[57] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 73.

[58] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 72; 74-75.

[60] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 76.

[64] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 77.

[65] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 78.

[66] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 12.

[67]Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 108.

[68] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraphs 111-114 and Annexure E.

[69] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 108.

[70] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, Annexure E.

[71] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 5.

[72] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraphs 98-102.

[73] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 79-80.

[75] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraphs 5-6 and Annexure M1.

[76] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 81.

[78] Affidavit of Ms P filed 21 July 2025, paragraph 82.

[80] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 8.

[81] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraphs 10-11.

[82] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 1-8.

[83] Mother's affidavit filed 27 June 2025, paragraph 18.

[84] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 139.

[85] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 141.

[86] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 121-123.

[88] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 150.

[93] Stott and Holgar [2017] FamCAFC 152 at [37].

[94] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 73.

[95] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 58.

[96] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 67; Father's affidavit filed 23 June 2026, paragraph 105.

[97] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraph 124.

[98] Family Report dated 3 September 2024, paragraphs 31 and 99.

Young Persons (Care and Protection) Act 1998

Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Family Law) Rules 2021

(2022) 65 Fam LR 288

(1986) 11 Fam LR 765

Grecia & Irma [2025] FedCFamC1F 751 (24 October 2025)

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (148 paragraphs)

Legislation Cited (4)

Cases Cited (2)