GRE25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship

1. On 23 January 2026, the Applicant applied to this Court for review of the exercise of a Registrar's power, being a decision made by a Judicial Registrar on 18 December 2025 to dismiss the Applicant's application for reinstatement of a judicial review application.

1. The Applicant is a citizen of India and arrived in Australia on 25 October 2019 on a visitor visa.
2. On 19 November 2019, the Applicant applied for a Protection (subclass 866) visa. This application is at pages 1 to 22 of the Court Book ('CB').
3. On 29 November 2019, the Department of Home Affairs ('the Department') sent the Applicant a letter by email acknowledging a valid application for the visa (CB24).
4. On 5 September 2023, the Department sent a letter to the Applicant's nominated email address inviting the Applicant to respond in writing to "unfavourable information" within 28 days of receiving the letter. The "unfavourable information" in question was that the Applicant's protection visa application used wording and phrases that was identical to those used in several other applications received by the Department (CB 34-35). The Applicant did not respond to the invitation within the specified 28 days.
5. On 6 December 2023, the Department notified the Applicant by email that the application for a Protection visa had been refused (CB39-42).
6. On 31 December 2023, the Applicant filed an application in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ('the Tribunal'), as it then was, for review of the Delegate's decision to refuse his Protection visa application ('review application') (CB51-58).
7. On 12 March 2025, by email, the Tribunal invited the Applicant to an in-person hearing which was scheduled for 7 April 2025 (CB80-82).
8. The Applicant did not appear at the hearing on 7 April 2025 (CB92) and the Tribunal dismissed the review application (CB98).
9. The Applicant was notified of the Tribunal's decision by email the following day, 8 April 2025 (CB96).
10. On 22 May 2025, the Tribunal affirmed the decision of the Delegate and notified the Applicant of its decision by email on the same date (CB101).
11. On 12 June 2025, the Applicant applied to this Court pursuant to s 476 of the Act for judicial review of the decision of the Tribunal ('the judicial review application').
12. On 7 November 2025, a callover hearing ('the callover hearing') took place in respect of the judicial review application. The Applicant failed to attend the callover hearing and a Judicial Registrar dismissed the judicial review application for non-appearance pursuant to r 22.04(1)(a)(i) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2025 (Cth) ('the Rules').
13. On 19 November 2025, the Applicant filed an application in a proceeding seeking an order that the judicial review application be reinstated ('the reinstatement application').
14. On 17 December 2025, the reinstatement application was heard by the same Judicial Registrar.
15. On 18 December 2025, the Judicial Registrar dismissed the reinstatement application and ordered that the Applicant pay the First Respondent's costs in the amount of $1,500.
16. It is this decision that the Applicant now requests this Court to review.

1. Pursuant to r 3.05 of the Rules, a party may apply for review of the exercise of a power by a Registrar.
2. An application for review is heard as a hearing de novo, which means the Court is not reviewing the decision of the Registrar for error, but is considering afresh the application that was before the Registrar.
3. By r 3.08(2), the Court must receive as evidence any affidavit or exhibit that was tendered before the Registrar and, with leave, may also receive further evidence and a transcript of the proceeding before the Registrar, or an affidavit about the evidence adduced at the hearing from a person who was present.
4. In the instant case, the application for review of the exercise of the Registrar's power was filed outside the 21-day timeframe for filing, as provided by r 3.06 of the Rules. Thus, the Court also needs to determine whether an extension of time should be granted.

(a) Whether an extension of time for the filing of the application for review filed on 23 January 2026 should be granted; and

(b) If an extension of time is granted, whether the judicial review application should be reinstated.

1. At the hearing on 20 February 2026, the material listed below was before the Court.
2. The Applicant relied on the following material:

(a) The Court Book which was tendered and marked as Exhibit C-1;

(b) Application for Review filed on 23 January 2026;

(c) Affidavit of GRE25 filed on 23 January 2026;

(d) Outline of Submissions filed on 6 December 2025;

(e) Interlocutory Application filed on 19 November 2025;

(f) Affidavit of GRE25 filed on 19 November 2025;

(g) Originating Application filed on 12 June 2025; and

(h) Affidavit of GRE25 filed on 12 June 2025.

1. The First Respondent relied upon the following material:

(a) The Court Book which was tendered and marked as Exhibit C-1; and

(b) Outline of Submissions filed on 15 December 2025.

1. A Punjabi interpreter appeared via Webex at the hearing to assist the Applicant. I am satisfied there were no technical issues with the electronic link, and the Applicant and interpreter were able to see and hear each other and communicate effectively.
2. The Applicant was given the opportunity to make oral submissions in support of the interlocutory application as well as in reply to the submissions made by the First Respondent.
3. I have read and had regard to the material relied upon by both parties in determining this matter as well as the further oral submissions made at the hearing.

SHOULD AN EXTENSION OF TIME BE GRANTED FOR THE FILING OF THE APPLICATION FOR REVIEW?

1. On 23 January 2026, the Applicant made an application pursuant to s 256(1) of the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) for review of a Judicial Registrar's decision delivered on 18 December 2025.
2. The time for filing an application of this nature is provided by r 3.06 of the Rules and is as follows:

(1) The application for review of the exercise of a power by a Registrar must be made within 21 days after the day on which the power is exercised.

(2) The applicant must serve a sealed copy of the application on each other party to the proceeding within 7 days after the application is filed.

(3) The application must be listed for a hearing as soon as possible and, unless it is impracticable to do so, within 28 days after the date of filing.

Note 1: Documents marked with the stamp of the Court are as valid and effectual as if sealed with the seal of the Court (see subsection 179(2) of the Act).

Note 2: A person may apply for an extension of time within which to make an application for review (see rule 1.15).

1. The application for review was filed 35 days after the date of the Judicial Registrar's decision. In accordance with r 3.06(1), it should have been filed within 21 days, that is, by 8 January 2026.
2. The Court is empowered to extend the time for filing on any terms that it thinks fit or with the consent of the parties. The Applicant did not formally request an extension of time but, when asked at the hearing, said he wanted an extension of time. The Minister opposes any grant of an extension of time.
3. The principles regarding applications for extensions of time have been considered in a number of cases: see BTI15 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FCAFC 49 ('BTI15') and Tu'uta Katoa v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] HCA 28; (2022) 276 CLR 579 ('Katoa').
4. In BTI15, as per Jagot and Halley JJ, it was stated at [40] that the Court is required to:

... evaluate all of the relevant circumstances and to decide if the Court is satisfied that the extension of time is necessary in the interests of the administration of justice.

1. See also Katoa at [12] per Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ.
2. The following matters are relevant when considering whether to grant an extension of time:

(a) the extent of the delay and the explanation for it;

(b) any prejudice;

(c) the impact on the applicant if the time is not extended;

(d) the interests of the public at large; and

(e) the merits of the substantive application: see BTI15 at [25]-[26] per Logan J, and Katoa at [40] per Gordon, Edelman, and Steward JJ.

1. By his application for review, at Part D, the reason the Applicant gave for his delay in filing the application for review was because he "is self-represented and was under a genuine but mistaken belief of misreading of the Court's sealed order and lack of legal advice, that the timeframe for filing was 35 days."
2. He gave a further reason that "The Applicant acted promptly upon realizing the correct timeframe and is filing this application with minimal delay".
3. In oral submissions at the hearing, the Applicant stated when asked by the Court why the application for review was filed late, that he was discussing it with friends and then got sick. He said he realised it had not been filed on time "one or two days late" and then submitted the application immediately.
4. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that the Court should refuse to grant an extension of time for the following reasons:

(a) No reasonable or adequate explanation has been provided for the delay in filing the application;

(b) While the First Respondent would not face significant prejudice personally by the grant of an extension of time, the absence of prejudice does not, without more, suffice to justify the grant of an extension: see BYF16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2019] FCA 2023 at [18] per Beach J;

(c) There is a significant public interest in the timely and effective disposal of litigation particularly in public law where delays in dealing with applications for visas are to be avoided if possible: see Iyer v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 929; (2001) 64 ALD 9 at [62] per Gyles J; and

(d) The substantive application for judicial review has no reasonable prospects of success.

1. The Applicant is an unrepresented party; however, it can be inferred he understands the importance of complying with timeframes and prosecuting his application as he had both his review application in the Tribunal and his judicial review application in this Court dismissed for non-appearance. As such, I conclude that the Applicant would have had a reasonable understanding of the need to comply with the filing timeframe provided in r 3.06(1) of the Rules.
2. To the extent that the Applicant may have been unaware of the time limit attached to the filing of the review from the Judicial Registrar's decision to refuse reinstatement, an unrepresented litigant's ignorance of a time limit is not, without more, a satisfactory explanation for delay: see SZNYE v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2010] FCA 500 at [8] to [9]; SZSDA v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2012] FCA 1319; (2012) 135 ALD 17 at [38].
3. The Applicant's oral submission is that he was sick, and this prevented him from filing the application for review on time. However, he did not provide a medical certificate to support the contention that he had been unwell. Furthermore, this is contradicted by the earlier explanation contained in his application filed on 23 January 2026, that he thought the timeframe for filing was 35 days and that was why he filed late.
4. I therefore conclude that the Applicant has not given a compelling explanation for the delay in filing the application for review of the Judicial Registrar's decision.

1. The First Respondent has acknowledged that it would not face significant prejudice if an extension of time is granted. In this regard, I note that the application was filed two weeks and one day after the date it should have been filed, so the delay was not extensive and there were also some intervening Christmas public holidays during the period concerned.

1. If time is not extended, the impact on the Applicant is that his application for review of the Registrar's decision is dismissed, and consequently the Tribunal's decision stands.
2. However, the Applicant himself has to bear some responsibility for the procedural history of the matter and his failure to attend the initial Court event.

1. There is a significant public interest in the timely and effective disposal of litigation, particularly in the area of migration law where delays in dealing with visa applications should be avoided if possible.
2. There have been significant delays in the finalisation of the Applicant's visa status due to his own actions in failing to attend the hearing before the Tribunal and then failing to attend the callover hearing to progress his judicial review application.

1. The application that was determined by the Judicial Registrar on 18 December 2025 was the application for reinstatement filed on 19 November 2025. It is this application that the Court is required to consider de novo if an extension of time is granted.
2. Rule 24.04(a) of the Rules empowers the Court to set aside an order after it has been entered if it was made in the absence of a party. In this case, if the order is set aside, it would reinstate the Applicant's application for judicial review.
3. Rule 24.04 is as follows:

24.04 Varying or setting aside a judgment or order after it has been entered

The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order after it has been entered if:

(a) it was made in the absence of a party; or

(b) it was obtained by fraud; or

(c) it is interlocutory; or

(d) it is an injunction; or

(e) it does not reflect the intention of the Court; or

(f) the party in whose favour it was made consents; or

(g) there is a clerical mistake in a judgment or order; or

(h) there is an error arising in a judgment or order from an accidental slip or omission.

1. Whether or not to accede to a reinstatement application is a discretionary power which requires the Court to consider whether or not it is in the interests of justice to reinstate the application: FBS18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 196 ('FBS18') at [50].
2. The factors the Court has often considered in determining reinstatement applications, including in MZYEZ v Minister for Immigration & Citizenship [2010] FCA 530 (which was cited with approval by the Full Court in FBS18) and BQS17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 13 (when considering the analogous power in the previous 2021 rules), include the following:

(a) Whether there is a reasonable excuse for the party's absence at the hearing in which the orders in issue were made and a reasonable excuse for any delay in seeking reinstatement;

(b) The existence and nature of any prejudice that might flow to the other party from the reinstatement, and how any such prejudice may be alleviated; and

(c) Whether the application for reinstatement has a reasonable prospect of success in the substantive proceeding, with the grounds to be taken at an impressionistic level.

1. The matters referred to above are not a definitive list but are consistently considered in the exercise of the Court's broad discretion to reinstate.

Explanation for non-appearance and any delay in seeking reinstatement

1. The Applicant filed the reinstatement application promptly, less than two weeks after his originating application was dismissed for non-appearance.
2. The Applicant's explanation for his non-appearance at the callover hearing on 7 November 2025 is in his Application in a Proceeding filed on 19 November 2025, in which it states (verbatim):
   1. I did not appear at the hearing on 7 November 2025 because I was unaware the hearing was listed on that date.
   2. From approximately 17.10.25 until 25.10.25 I was suffering from a Coivd-19 medical condition and was thus quarantined myself. This illness left me bedridden and incapable of attending to my normal affairs, including checking my email account at [redacted].
   3. I was physically and mentally incapacitated during this period and could not access a computer or my phone to check communications from the Court or my email.
   4. I had no knowledge a hearing had been scheduled. I did not receive any notice from the Court because it was sent to my email, which I could not access and after recovering, I access my email but somehow missed the mail regarding the scheduled hearing.
3. As was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent, the Applicant has not provided to the Court a medical certificate or any other evidence that he was ill and physically and mentally incapacitated, such that he could not check his emails.
4. At the hearing on 20 February 2026, the Applicant was asked why he did not attend Court on 7 November 2025, which was the date the Judicial Registrar dismissed the judicial review application. The Applicant stated that, because he had Covid-19, he did not check his emails.
5. The Applicant was then asked when he had Covid-19 and whether he obtained a medical certificate. The Applicant stated that he was unwell with Covid-19 from 25 October 2025 to 7 November 2025. He said he did not obtain a medical certificate because he was not aware he needed one.
6. The Applicant was asked whether he did not attend the hearing because he was sick. He initially said he did not check his emails and was not aware of the Court date. He then said he later found out about the missed Court date because his friend checked his phone and told him the case was dismissed.
7. When asked if the friend was checking the Applicant's emails, he said that his friend was checking his phone, but not every day and "if there is something important then he tells me."
8. It was raised on behalf of the First Respondent that the Applicant's oral statements at the hearing as to when he was sick with Covid-19 differed from the evidence he had given in his affidavit filed on 19 November 2025.
9. In that affidavit, the Applicant stated at [4] (verbatim):

...

From approximately 17.10.2025 until 25.10.2025 I was suffering from a Coivd-19 medical condition and was thus quarantined myself. This illness left me bedridden and incapable of attending to my normal affairs, including checking my email account at [redacted].

1. It was put to the Applicant that his statement in the hearing that he was sick from 25 October 2025 until 7 November 2025 was different to the dates he deposed to in his affidavit.
2. The Applicant did not come to Court with any of the documents he had filed in the proceedings and so, at that point, the matter was stood down for the Court to provide him with printed copies of his documents.
3. When the matter resumed, the Applicant was referred to paragraph [4] of his affidavit dated 19 November 2025. He was asked what he meant by quarantining himself and he said that he was on medication, was vomiting and stayed in the room the whole time.
4. It was then put to the Applicant once more that the dates he said he was sick in the affidavit were different to the dates he had just told the Court he was sick. The Applicant stated he was confused about the dates. When asked when he stopped quarantining, he said he did not know.
5. The Applicant was then asked if he had prepared the affidavit filed on 19 November 2025. The Applicant stated that he discussed it with two well-educated, English-speaking people who prepared it for him but that his English is not good, and he did not recall reading it. He confirmed it was his signature on the document and that he had signed it before a Justice of the Peace at a local police station, without having read it and without the assistance of an interpreter.
6. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that the Applicant's evidence was contradictory and thus unreliable in that the dates he told the Court he was sick during the hearing differed from those in his affidavit and which he gave to the Judicial Registrar at the reinstatement hearing.
7. Further, it was submitted that the Applicant's claim in this Court that a friend was checking his phone and emails for him was not advanced at all by the Applicant at the hearing before the Judicial Registrar. It was submitted that this was 'a new invention' by the Applicant.
8. The Court considers the explanation given by the Applicant for why he did not attend the Callover hearing on 7 November 2025 to be unreliable in circumstances where there has been a significant change to the dates he said he was unwell. Further, as was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent, 'a new invention' was given at this hearing for why the Applicant had not checked his emails and was unaware of the Court date.
9. The Applicant was aware he had provided no explanation at the reinstatement hearing for why he did not check his emails between 25 October 2025 and the callover hearing date of 7 November 2025. In this Court he then changed the dates he claimed to be sick to include that period and provided a new excuse that someone else was checking his emails for him during that time.
10. For the reasons referred to above, I find the Applicant's evidence and explanation for non-attendance at the listing on 7 November 2025 wholly unreliable, particularly in circumstances where the Applicant has changed his evidence in this Court from that he gave to the Judicial Registrar and where the Court cannot be satisfied the evidence in the affidavit is actually the Applicant's. Further, the Applicant did not provide any corroborating evidence that he was actually unwell.
11. For those reasons, I conclude that no weight can be placed on the Applicant's explanation for non-attendance at the callover hearing which therefore weighs against the exercise of the discretion to reinstate.

1. It was acknowledged on behalf of the First Respondent that it would suffer no prejudice, other than costs, if the judicial review application is reinstated.
2. However, it was further submitted that the absence of prejudice is not of itself sufficient to support a conclusion that an order for reinstatement should be made: see AHN17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1598, at [34] per McKerracher J. This is particularly so in circumstances where the First Respondent contends the underlying application is without merit.
3. As the reinstatement of an application involves the further expenditure of public funds, I will ascribe neutral weight to the question of prejudice when considering whether to permit reinstatement.

Merits of substantive application for judicial review

1. The Court must also consider the merits of the underlying judicial review application in deciding whether to reinstate it.
2. In considering the merits of the application for judicial review, it is not necessary that the Applicant positively establishes that the application will succeed at a final hearing: see SZTES v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 719, at [48] and [102] per Wigney J. Rather, the grounds of the application should be examined in a reasonably impressionistic manner.
3. In assessing the prospective merits of the underlying application, the Court is not determining whether or not a jurisdictional error is present, but rather whether the grounds are "arguable", "reasonably arguable", "sufficiently arguable" or have "reasonable prospects of success'. All that is required is a consideration of what might be advanced at a final hearing. The Court is not required to undertake a full consideration of all the arguments and the hurdle to overcome is relatively low: see DHX17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 127; (2020) 278 FCR 475 at [76].

1. The Tribunal's decision is at pages 98-99 of the Court Book.
2. At [1] of the decision, the Tribunal noted that it had sent two SMS reminders about the hearing to the Applicant on 31 March 2025 and 4 April 2025.
3. When the Applicant failed to appear on 7 April 2025, the Tribunal satisfied itself that the Applicant had been properly invited to a hearing in accordance with s 379A(5) of the Act.
4. The Tribunal noted at [3] of its decision that the email address employed by the Tribunal was the one provided by the Applicant and that the Applicant had communicated with the Tribunal using that address prior to the hearing.
5. The Tribunal was therefore satisfied that the Applicant had received appropriate notice of the date, time and place of the hearing (see [4] at CB99) and decided to dismiss the application.
6. The Tribunal sent a copy of its decision to the Applicant on 8 April 2025, to the email address provided by the Applicant and previously used by him. The letter stated that the Applicant may apply for reinstatement of the application by 6 May 2025 with reasons for the non-appearance.
7. The letter also clearly stated that if the Applicant fails to apply for reinstatement by 6 May 2025, it must confirm the decision to dismiss the application.
8. On 22 May 2025, the Tribunal confirmed its decision and noted in the decision record at [4] that the Applicant did not apply for reinstatement within 28 days. Accordingly, the application was dismissed and the decision under review was affirmed.

1. The Applicant's nine proposed grounds of review are set out in the judicial review application filed on 12 June 2025 as follows (verbatim):

Ground One

1. That the decision of the Tribunal is against the principle of Audi Alteram Partem that no one should be condemned unheard as has been held in Kioa vs West that natural justice and fairness are to be equated.

Ground Two

1. That the failure by an applicant to appear at a scheduled hearing does not absolve the Tribunal of its statutory obligation to review the primary decision under ss. 348(1) or 414(1).

Ground Three

1. The power to make a decision on the review or to dismiss proceedings for non-appearance only arises if the hearing invitation complied with the relevant statutory requirements. However the invitation sent by the Administrative Review Tribunal did not comply with the provisions of ss.379A or 441A that the prescribed period of notice of the relevant day time and place of the scheduled hearing has been given and whether a statement to the effect of ss 362B and 426A must also appear in the invitation to hearing if the hearing invitation did not comply with the statutory requirements then the power to proceed to a decision pursuant to ss 362B/426A is not valid.

Ground Four

1. That the Tribunal while exercises its discretion in ss 362B or 426A to make a decision on the review or to dismiss proceedings for non-appearance, it must exercise that power reasonably. The Tribunal's reasons should provide a justification for the exercise of the discretion to proceed however such reasoning is missing in the decision of the tribunal as per the judgement in MIBP v SZVFW

Ground Five

1. If the Tribunal dismisses an application pursuant to ss 362B(1A)(b) or 426(1A)(b) it must set out the decision and the reasons for the decision under ss 362C(2)/426B(2)

Ground Six

1. In SZLCG v MIAC the Court observed that a failure by the Tribunal to recognise that it had discretion whether or not to reschedule the hearing and a failure to exercise it by proceeding to a determination without reference to the discretion, would amount to jurisdictional error

Ground Seven

1. That the Tribunal refused to entertain the review application on technical grounds against the decision of the visa officer who had completely misconstrued the risk and fear of significant harm to the applicants as set out in S. 36(2A) of the Migration Act 1958. The visa officer erroneously (and narrowly) the existence of risk to life and fear of significant harm to the applicants upon their return to India especially in view of latest circumstances after Conviction of Dera Sect

Ground Eight

1. The second respondent failed to comply with the mandatory requirement under section 424A (read with section 424AA) of the Migration Act to give the applicant clear particulars of information it considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review to ensure the applicant understood why that information was relevant to the review and the consequence of its being relied upon and to invite the applicant to comment upon or respond to that information

Particular: The Tribunal did not issue any written invitation under section 424A of the Act and made no attempt to, and did not, comply with the requirement set out in section 424AA of the Act.

Ground Nine

1. The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to make the said decision because its "reasonable satisfaction" was not arrived in accordance with the provisions of the Migration Act

1. At the hearing, it was explained to the Applicant that the Court also had to consider whether the grounds in the underlying judicial review application filed on 12 June 2025 were reasonably arguable or have reasonable prospects of success.
2. The Applicant was asked whether he had prepared the application and he said no. He said that friends helped him prepare it and they talked about it together.
3. The Applicant was asked whether he told the friends what to put in the document and he said they have lawyers with similar cases, suggesting the grounds of review had been provided by the friends. The Applicant stated he did not read the grounds of review. He said the grounds were explained to him verbally in Punjabi after the document was prepared.
4. As the Applicant had not prepared the judicial review application, the Court deemed it necessary to facilitate the Applicant providing submissions as to the merits of the underlying application. The Court did this by asking the Applicant to first explain his understanding of what was intended by each ground and then the Court asked him questions connected with each ground of review and invited the Applicant to respond to those questions and provide any further detail he wished to.

1. By this ground, the Applicant appears to contend that the Tribunal breached the common law principles of natural justice by determining the application without him being heard.
2. Section 357A of the Act states that the relevant provisions of the Act are taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule.
3. Section 99 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) ('the ART Act') provides that the Tribunal may dismiss an application without further consideration of the merits if an applicant does not appear at a Tribunal case event.
4. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that the hearing invitation complied with the Tribunal's obligations pursuant to the ART Act and the Act and that the Tribunal was simply not required to take additional steps or make further enquiries to ensure the Applicant was aware of the hearing or to enable him to appear: see Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SZFHC (2006) 150 FCR 439; [2006] FCAFC 73, at [39] per Spender, French and Cowdroy JJ.
5. I accept this submission and also note that the Tribunal went further by sending two SMS reminders to the Applicant in the week prior to the hearing. The Applicant had previously engaged with the Tribunal via the email address the invitation was sent to, and additionally, had the opportunity to seek reinstatement within the prescribed 28-day period. As the Applicant did not seek reinstatement, the Tribunal was obliged to confirm the decision.
6. I am therefore not satisfied that the proposed Ground One has sufficient merit even at an impressionistic level such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By Ground Two, the Applicant appears to contend that the Tribunal should have conducted a merits review of the Delegate's decision, notwithstanding his failure to appear at the hearing.
2. The Tribunal had options which included adjourning the hearing or proceeding to consider the application on the information available to it. The Tribunal was however also entitled to dismiss the application for non-appearance, which is what it did.
3. Following the dismissal, the Applicant could have filed a reinstatement application within the prescribed 28-day period but did not do so.
4. Accordingly, the Tribunal had to confirm its dismissal decision as it was the only decision legally open to it: see HAI25 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1846 at [26].
5. I am therefore not satisfied that Ground Two has sufficient merit even at an impressionistic level such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By Ground Three, the Applicant alleges the hearing invitation did not comply with the relevant statutory requirements.
2. The sections of the Act referred to by the Applicant were repealed in 2024.
3. The invitation to attend a hearing and the attached factsheet (CB80-87) clearly set out the date, time and place of the hearing, provided a timeframe for the Applicant to provide any further information they intended to rely upon and set out the potential consequences of not appearing at the hearing, including dismissal for non-appearance.
4. The Tribunal went further, in that it also sent two SMS reminders to the Applicant in the week prior to the hearing. However, the Applicant did not attend the hearing.
5. There is no basis for this complaint, and it lacks sufficient merit such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By Ground Four, the Applicant contends the decision of the Tribunal was unreasonable and it did not provide adequate reasons for proceeding to make a decision in his absence.
2. For a decision to be legally unreasonable, it must be "lacking in a rational foundation"; "plainly unjust"; "arbitrary"; "capricious"; or "lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of power": see Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Stretton [2016] FCAFC 11; (2016) 237 FCR 1 ('Stretton'), at [11] per Allsop CJ.
3. As already articulated herein, the basis of the Tribunal's decision was that the Applicant failed to appear at the hearing of his matter, and the Tribunal exercised its discretion to dismiss the application for review pursuant to s 99 of the ART Act. It was reasonable for the Tribunal to do so rather than adjourn the application as it had complied with its obligations to notify the Applicant of the hearing, had been in recent contact with the Applicant via his nominated email address, and also sent two SMS reminders to him before the hearing.
4. When the Applicant failed to apply for reinstatement of his application, the Tribunal was then obliged to confirm the dismissal decision.
5. The Tribunal clearly explained in its initial decision, and in its subsequent confirmation decision, the reasons for dismissing the application. Nothing more was required, and it was reasonable for the Tribunal to proceed straight to dismissal of the application.
6. This ground lacks sufficient merit such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By this ground, the Applicant repeats the contention that the Tribunal did not provide reasons. The Court has already found in considering Ground Four, that the Tribunal provided reasons for its decision.
2. Accordingly, this ground lacks merit such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By Ground Six, the Applicant contends that the Tribunal fell into error by not recognising it had a discretion to reschedule the hearing when the Applicant failed to appear.
2. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that while the Tribunal was not prohibited from rescheduling the hearing or delaying its decision to enable the Applicant to appear before it, it was not required to do so.
3. In NBBL v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2006) 152 FCR 592; [2006] FCA 1045, at [21] Greenwood J stated that:

... There seems to me to be no obligation falling upon the Tribunal to make any inquiry as to the failure on the part of the appellant to appear. In MIMIA v SZFHC, the applicant for a Protection Visa said that the Tribunal was on notice that he may not have received the invitation letter to attend before the Tribunal for the purposes of ss 425 and 425A because the 'Response to Hearing Invitation' form was not returned to the Tribunal because the letter addressed to the applicant's residential address was returned unclaimed and, in those circumstances, he did not appear at the hearing. Applicant SZFHC contended that in those circumstances an obligation fell upon the Tribunal to 'find another method of contacting the respondent' [38]. Their Honours Spender, French and Cowdroy JJ at [39] said '... it is clear that ss 425 and 425A of the Migration Act are to be read together. Accordingly, the Tribunal, having complied with one of the methods prescribed in s 425A (in fact, two), was under no further obligation to search the papers lodged with it to discover if there might be some other avenue of communicating with the applicant'.

... Otherwise, as a matter of practical reality, every time an applicant for review fails to attend a Tribunal hearing having expressed an intention to appear, the Tribunal must, as a function of procedural fairness, on the appellant's contention, reschedule the appellant's appearance before it. What is important is that the Tribunal only proceed to make a decision on the review pursuant to s 426A in circumstances where there has been compliance by the Tribunal with ss 425 and 425A thus affording the appellant an opportunity to give evidence and present arguments relating to the issues arising in relation to the decision under review.

1. As referred to earlier, the Tribunal had complied with its obligations to notify the Applicant of the hearing, had had recent contact with him and sent two reminders shortly before the hearing.
2. Accordingly, the Tribunal was not required to take any additional steps to enable the Applicant to appear at a hearing.
3. I therefore find that this ground lacks sufficient merit such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By Ground Seven, the Applicant contends that the Tribunal was in error for not considering the merits of his protection claims.
2. The Applicant stated orally that the Tribunal was in error for not asking him anything. However, he conceded that the Tribunal could not do so because he failed to appear.
3. If the Applicant had attended his hearing, the Tribunal would have been obliged to consider the Applicant's protection claims. However, the Tribunal was not required to do so in circumstances where the Applicant failed to appear at the hearing and did not seek reinstatement of his application.
4. I therefore find that this ground lacks sufficient merit such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By Ground Eight, the Applicant contends that the Tribunal failed to comply with certain sections of the Migration Act. However, as was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent, those provisions were no longer in force at the time the Tribunal made its decision as a result of the Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No. 1) Act 2024 (Cth) which repealed all of Part 7 of the Act on 14 October 2024.
2. The Applicant was unable to proffer any facts or submissions in support of this ground. The Court attempted to facilitate the Applicant making a submission about this ground by asking him questions however, he stated that he did not understand it and could not offer any further comment.
3. In respect of any alleged denial of procedural fairness, Division 4 of Part 5 of the Act was in force at the time of the hearing. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that s 357A of the Act states that the relevant provisions of the Act are taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule.
4. In this ground, the Applicant makes reference to the Tribunal having an obligation to provide him with "clear particulars of information it considered would be part of the reason for affirming the decision under review to ensure the applicant understood why that information was relevant to the review and the consequence of its being relied upon and to invite the applicant to comment upon or respond to that information."
5. The relevant section that was in force at the time of the hearing was s 359A of the Act. The obligation in section 359A applies to information that would be the reason, or part of the reason, for affirming the decision under review per s 359A(1) of the Act.
6. The obligation does not apply to information that is not specifically about the applicant; that the applicant gave for the purpose of the review application or the process leading to the decision under review; that is non-disclosable information; that was included in the written statement of reasons under review; or that is prescribed: see subsection 359A(4) of the Act. It is also relevant that subsection 359A(5) expressly provides that:

A reference in this section to affirming a decision that is under review does not include a reference to the affirmation of a decision that is taken to be affirmed under subsection 368C(6).

1. The Tribunal did not engage in a merits review of the decision under review because the Applicant failed to attend the hearing and, instead, the Tribunal dismissed the application pursuant to s 99 of the ART Act. Therefore, there was no information that could have attracted the requirements of s 359A of the Act.
2. The Tribunal then affirmed the decision of the Delegate as it was obliged to do under s 368C(5) of the Act when the Applicant did not seek reinstatement of his application.
3. I therefore find that this ground lacks sufficient merit such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. By Ground Nine, the Applicant seems to be contending again that the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable.
2. For a decision to be legally unreasonable, it must be "lacking in a rational foundation"; "plainly unjust"; "arbitrary"; "capricious"; or "lacking common sense having regard to the terms, scope and purpose of the statutory source of power": see Stretton at [11] per Allsop CJ.
3. In its decision, the Tribunal clearly articulated the steps taken to comply with its obligations to notify the Applicant of the hearing date. Once it exercised its discretion to dismiss the application, it had to then confirm the decision as the Applicant took no steps to seek reinstatement.
4. The Tribunal was not obliged to engage with the merits of the Delegate's decision and was entitled to proceed to dismissal as already articulated herein.
5. I therefore find that this ground lacks sufficient merit such that reinstatement would be warranted.

1. It was submitted on behalf of the First Respondent that the underlying judicial review application raised no arguable issues of jurisdictional error and that the Applicant's evidence over time has changed and has been contradictory such that it cannot be relied upon.
2. It was therefore submitted that the extension of time should be refused and, as a consequence, the application for review dismissed.
3. In CAL15 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 1344 at [4] the Court stated that:

... It is not fair to exercise a discretion [to reinstate] favourably to an applicant if the Court is not satisfied there is an arguable case, because it can create false hopes in an applicant and an expectation, not grounded in law and reality, that her or his application may be successful.

1. In the instant case, the delay in filing the application for review was not excessive and any prejudice to the First Respondent could be ameliorated by a costs order.
2. However, the Applicant's evidence and reasons for failing to attend the Callover hearing on 7 November 2025 are wholly unreliable and militate heavily against reinstatement. Further, the underlying judicial review application lacks any reasonably arguable ground of review.
3. Accordingly, I conclude that it is not in the interests of the administration of justice to grant an extension of time and the application for review filed on 23 January 2026 will accordingly be dismissed.

1. The First Respondent sought costs fixed in the amount of $1,200, which is below the scale amount in Sch 2, Pt 3 of the Rules for a proceeding that has concluded at an interlocutory hearing.
2. The Applicant did not object to this amount or make any submissions in respect of costs when invited to do so.
3. As the Applicant has been unsuccessful, and noting the irregularities in his evidence and documents relied upon, the quantum of costs sought is reasonable and I will order costs in that amount accordingly.

I certify that the preceding one hundred and fifty-two (152) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Leishman.