GRD Minproc Limited v Shanghai Flying Wheel Non-Ferrous Company

6 Ms Sun, it is said, never told GRD that the respondents did not agree with the terms of the Settlement Agreement or that they resiled from the effect of the negotiations, the Settlement Representations and the SFW Claim Representation. She is said thereby to have represented that the Settlement Agreement would be approved as a matter of course. These representations, by silence, are designated the 'Approval Representations'.

7 Between October 1999 and November 2000, SFT acted as if it had agreed to be bound by the Settlement Representations, the SFW Claim Representation and the Approval Representations (SC 19). It also acted as if it had agreed to, or would agree to, the terms of the Settlement Agreement (SC 19.2). Collectively these representations are designated the 'SFW Representations'. The conduct particularised and relied upon is expressed in terms of various omissions and silences. Further and alternatively, SFT acted over the same period as if it had agreed to be bound, or would agree to be bound, by the various representations and would agree to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. These representations are titled the 'SFTC Representations' (SC 20). Again, the particulars relied upon are by way of silences and other omissions.

8 On 14 November 2002, a solicitor acting for the respondents sent a letter of demand to GRD claiming damages for breach of the contract in the sum of $US8.5 million (SC 21). This was denied by GRD in a fax dated 17 December 2002 on the basis that the dispute had been settled (SC 22). On 31 January 2003, the respondents requested arbitration in the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SC 23).

9 GRD alleges that the respondents have engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in the making of the various representations on their behalf by Ms Sun. There are some aspects of this part of the pleading which are less than satisfactory. When a representation is pleaded that is said to be misleading or deceptive it is generally necessary to plead a falsifying fact. The pleading filed on behalf of GRD seems to fall short of that requirement at times.

10 The Settlement Representations, attributed to the respondents in par 9 of the statement of claim, were to the effect that they agreed to settle the claim on a certain basis. It was not part of the representations that Ms Sun had the authority to make them. Yet the falsifying plea in par 24 is that Ms Sun did not have authority to settle the claim on the basis proposed.

11 The SFW Claim Representation was a representation said to have been made by Ms Sun on behalf of the respondents that the claim by SFW for compensation for breach of the contract sent on 8 November 1999 was sent without her knowledge, was not authorised to be sent on behalf of the respondents and should be ignored by GRD. This representation is said to be falsified by the respondents' request that their claim be referred to arbitration. That conduct may be evidence of a falsifying fact. It is not of itself a fact which falsifies the alleged representations. They would be falsified by a plea that a claim for compensation was authorised to be sent by or on behalf of the respondents.

12 The Approval Representations are said to have been falsified by SFT's current statement that it has rejected the Settlement Agreement and was proceeding with the arbitration request. The conduct relied upon does not, in terms, falsify the Approval Representations. A promise or prediction which is broken or not fulfilled is not thereby misleading or deceptive.

13 GRD sets up an alternative plea in par 27 that the SFW Representations and the SFTC Representations were false and misleading in that the respondents had no intention of agreeing to the terms of the Settlement Agreement. It also relies upon s 51A of the Trade Practices Act in relation to the various pleaded representations on the basis that they were all representations as to future matters (SC 28). These pleas appear to be viable.

14 GRD says it relied upon the representations and acted as if the claim had been resolved in terms of the Settlement Agreement. On that basis it did not notify its insurers of the claim and did not pursue payment of the outstanding moneys due from the respondents (SC 30).

15 An estoppel plea is set up on the basis that the respondents were aware that GRD was conducting itself as if the Claim had been resolved and that it acted to its detriment in reliance upon that belief induced by the respondents' conduct.

16 Finally it is put that the Contract involved the transhipment of goods from Australia to Shanghai by sea (SC 37) and that by reason of s 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act the proper forum to hear any dispute under the contract is Australia.

Statutory Framework - Rules for Service out of the Jurisdiction 17 Order 8 of the Federal Court Rules provides for service of originating process outside the Commonwealth. Order 8 r 1 provides that subject to rule 2 and Divisions 2 and 3 of the order, originating process may be served outside the Commonwealth in a number of cases including: '(a) where the proceeding is founded on a cause of action arising in the Commonwealth; ... (c) where the proceeding is founded on a breach, wherever occurring, of an Act, and is brought in respect of, or for the recovery of, damage suffered wholly or partly in the Commonwealth;' Order 8 rule 2 provides, inter alia: '(1) Service outside the Commonwealth of originating process is not valid under this Order unless - (a) the service is in accordance with the prior leave of the Court given under sub-rule (2); (b) the Court confirms the service under sub-rule (4); or (c) the person served waives objection by entering an appearance. (2) The Court may, by order, give leave to serve originating process outside the Commonwealth in accordance with Division 2 or 3 of this Order or, subject to subrule (2B), on such terms and conditions as it considers appropriate, if the Court is satisfied that: (a) the Court has jurisdiction in the proceeding; and (b) rule 1 applies to the proceeding; and (c) the party seeking leave has a prima facie case for the relief sought by the party in the proceeding.' Statutory Framework - Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth) 18 Section 11 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1991 (Cth) provides, inter alia: '(1) All parties to: (a) a sea carriage document relating to the carriage of goods from any place in Australia to any place outside Australia; or (b) a non-negotiable document of a kind mentioned in subparagraph 10(1)(b)(iii), relating to such a carriage of goods; are taken to have intended to contract according to the laws in force at the place of shipment. (2) An agreement (whether made in Australia or elsewhere) has no effect so far as it purports to: (a) preclude or limit the effect of subsection (1) in respect of a bill of lading or a document mentioned in that subsection; or (b) preclude or limit the jurisdiction of a court of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory in respect of a bill of lading or a document mentioned in subsection (1); or (c) preclude or limit the jurisdiction of a court of the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory in respect of: (i) a sea carriage document relating to the carriage of goods from any place outside Australia to any place in Australia; or (ii) a non-negotiable document of a kind mentioned in subparagraph 10(1)(b)(iii) relating to such carriage of goods. (3) An agreement, or a provision of an agreement, that provides for the resolution of a dispute by arbitration is not made ineffective by subsection (2) (despite the fact that it may preclude or limit the jurisdiction of a court) if, under the agreement or provision, the arbitration must be conducted in Australia.' Whether the Criteria for the Grant of Leave Are Made Out 19 The first requirement for the grant of leave set out in O 8 r 2(2) is that the Court is satisfied that it has jurisdiction in the proceeding. In this case, the proceeding is brought in part on the basis of contraventions of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act in respect of which the Court has jurisdiction pursuant to s 86 of that Act and s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth). The estoppel plea would appear to invoke the accrued jurisdiction of the Court. Further, the Court's jurisdiction in matters arising under laws made by the Parliament is invoked in the reference to the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 20 The second requirement is that O 8 r 1 applies to the proceeding. GRD relies upon the contravention of s 52 of the Trade Practices Act which, it says, was committed in the Commonwealth as the implied representations were contained in facsimiles and telephone conversations received in Australia - Paper Products Pty Ltd v Tomlinsons (Rochdale) Limited (No 2) (1993) 44 FCR 485; Bray v F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 1 at [147] per Merkel J. I accept that on the face of this pleading, O 8 r 1 does apply. 21 The question that follows is whether there is a prima facie case for the causes of action relied upon. The applicant relies upon affidavit material, including affidavits sworn by Louis Mostert on 28 October 2004 and Matthew Knox sworn on 10 December 2004. Mr Mostert is an in-house counsel employed by GRD. Mr Knox is a solicitor employed by the solicitors for the applicant. Mr Knox's affidavit exhibits statements by officers of GRD lodged in the jurisdictional hearing of the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the auspices of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. I take those statements into account. Without going through the detail of the affidavits and the statements to which I have referred, it is sufficient to say that I am satisfied that there is at least a prima facie case in respect of some of the causes of action pleaded under s 52. The estoppel plea appears to set up an estoppel based upon the failure of the respondents to disabuse GRD of its belief, known to the respondents, that the dispute over the Contract had been settled. Given the reliance and detriment claimed, it is arguable that, if the facts pleaded were made out, it could be regarded as unconscionable for the respondents to depart from the assumptions said to have been induced by the conduct and that this may support the grant of injunctive relief. This could perhaps be made clearer on the pleadings however. I am also satisfied that there is enough to arguably support a claim for injunctive relief based on the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act. 22 These conclusions are in a sense provisional. They have nothing to say about the strength of the case, nor about the sufficiency of the pleading were it to be the subject of a strike out motion. The Proposed Orders 23 The orders proposed in the motion are in the following terms: '1. That pursuant to Order 8 rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules, the Applicant have leave to serve: (a) the Application dated 28 October 2004; (b) the Statement of Claim dated 28 October 2004; (c) this motion; (d) the affidavit of Louis Mostert dated 28 October 2004 in support of this motion; (e) the supplementary affidavit of Louis Mostert dated 10 December 2004 in support of this motion; (f) the affidavit of Matthew William Knox dated 10 December 2004 in support of this motion; (g) the supplementary affidavit of Matthew William Knox dated 13 December 2004 in support of this motion; (h) the supplementary affidavit of Matthew William Knox dated 27 January 2005 in support of this motion; and (i) any orders made by the Court on hearing this motion, outside the Commonwealth upon: (a) the First Respondent care of its solicitors Sten Gisselberg, Garde Wesslau, Advokatbyra, via facsimile number +46 8 587 240 01; ;and (b) the Second Respondent care of its solicitors John Huang, Allbright Law Offices, via facsimile number +86 21 5049 8947 alternatively (c) by employing a private agent in China to personally serve: (i) the First Respondent at 2 Shenguang Road, Chunshen Village, Xinqiao Town, Songjiang District, Shanghai, 201612; and (ii) the Second Respondent at No 85 Lou Shan Guan Road, Changning District, Hongqiao Zone, 200336. 2. The First Respondent and Second Respondent file an appearance 3 weeks after being served with the documents referred to in paragraph 1 above. 3. A directions hearing be held at the next available date after the First Respondent and Second Respondent has filed an appearance. 4. Such further and other orders as the Court deems fit.' 24 These orders do not appear to take into account the procedures referred to in the Commonwealth Attorney-General's website exhibited to the affidavit of Mr Mostert. Those procedures include the following advice: 'Service of Process Abroad - China There is no Convention in force between Australia and China relating to the service of documents. China is a party to the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters 1965, however, Australia has not acceded to that Convention because some Australian Courts have not made the necessary Rules of Court. According to the law of the People's Republic of China, no foreign organisation or individual may themselves serve documents issued by foreign courts within the territory of the Republic. Where a party in Australia wishes to serve a party in China with documents issued by an Australian court in civil proceedings, a formal request by the Australian court should be sent through the diplomatic channel seeking the assistance of Chinese authorities in serving the documents as a matter of comity. The request for service should be sent by the Australian court to the Attorney-General's Department in Canberra (for service of process issued by Commonwealth courts) or to the relevant State or Territory law Department (for service of process issued by State or Territory courts). The request for service should: . be addressed to the "Appropriate Court of China"; . set out the name of the requesting court; . set out the names and descriptions of the parties; . set out the name, sex, age, nationality and address of the person to be served; . set out the nature and quantity of documents to be served; . state that Australian government will reciprocate in assisting with the service of documents from Chinese judicial authorities; . state that the party in Australia seeking service of the documents will reimburse Chinese judicial authorities for the costs incurred in serving the documents; . be sealed by the requesting court; . be accompanied by translations in full character Chinese of the request for service and the documents to be served; the translations should bear the signature of the translator attesting to the authenticity of the translation.' 25 The requirements of service in non-Convention countries were considered by RD Nicholson J in The Swan Brewery Co Ltd v Atlee [1998] FCA 277. In the circumstances, I do not think that I should make any orders as to service until I have further submissions as to the form of orders that should be made compatibly with the provisions of the rules relating to non-Convention countries. In addition I think it would be useful if the applicant were to take advantage of the opportunity provided by that additional time to review the statement of claim in particular in relation to the pleading of the s 52 causes of action and to also make clearer the bases upon which its claim for injunctive relief in relation to the estoppel plea is made.

I certify that the preceding twenty-five (25) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice French.

Counsel for the Applicant: Mr SR Adams and Mr M Knox

Solicitor for the Applicant: Corrs Chambers Westgarth