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[2007] NSWCCA 321
Court of Criminal Appeal (NSW)
2007-08-23
Giles JA, Howie J, Fullerton J, James J
Original judgment source is linked above.
The application for leave to appeal against sentence - preliminary 156 Section 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 provides - "61(1) A court is to impose a sentence of imprisonment for life on a person who is convicted of murder if the court is satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offence is so extreme that the community interest in retribution, punishment, community protection and deterrence can only be met by the imposition of that sentence." 157 By s 61(3), nothing in s 61(1) affects s 21(1) by which an offender liable to imprisonment for life may nevertheless be sentenced to imprisonment for a specified term. 158 The judge said in his remarks on sentence, under the heading "Decision" - "104 I have already made findings about the objective facts of the offences. These objective facts include the following:-
105 The prisoner committed three murders, killing his parents and his sister by assaulting them at close quarters. He had an intention to kill each of the victims. He killed the victims by stabbing them with a knife or, in the case of Clodine, striking her with a bat and strangling her, as well as stabbing her with a knife. There was a high degree of violence in all of the murders.
106 The killings were premeditated, the prisoner having had it in mind to kill his parents from the time he began researching poisons on the Internet some months before 10 July 2001. The prisoner gave poison to his mother about ten days before 10 July 2001, intending to kill her.
107 Although all three victims were killed in the course of one criminal episode, there were distinct intervals of time of an hour or more between the killing of Clodine and the killing of Mrs Gonzales and then between the killing of Mrs Gonzales and the killing of Mr Gonzales. The offences were not committed in one, uninterrupted, outburst of criminal conduct.
108 The motives for the killings were to prevent his parents withdrawing privileges they had extended to him and to obtain his parent's wealth, without delay and as their sole heir.
109 The prisoner was not at the time of committing the offences suffering from any mental illness or mental disorder or any mental state which would mitigate the criminality of his conduct.
110 I consider that the murders show features of very great heinousness and that there are no facts mitigating the objective seriousness of the murders and hence the murders fall within the worst category of cases of murder at common law.
111 I am also satisfied that the level of culpability in the commission of the offences is so extreme that the case falls within s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act .
112 It is, however, necessary for me to determine whether there are subjective features which at common law would mitigate the penalties to be imposed or which would result in my exercising in favour of the prisoner the discretion, which is preserved by s 61(3), to impose lesser sentences than life sentences.
113 I have already made findings about the subjective circumstances of the prisoner. In particular, I have noted that the prisoner did not plead guilty, that he did not provide any assistance to the authorities and, on the contrary, persistently endeavoured to mislead them, and that he has not shown any contrition.
114 I do not make any finding that the prisoner has no prospects of rehabilitation. However, I consider that there is a risk of the prisoner re-offending and that there is a risk of future dangerousness. I base this conclusion on the following matters among others:- The objective facts of the offences; that the prisoner pleaded not guilty; that more than three years after having committed the offences the prisoner continues to maintain his innocence and has not demonstrated any insight into the enormity of the offences he committed or any acceptance of responsibility for the offences; and the high degree of unscrupulousness and duplicity shown by the prisoner in the raising of the false alibis and the laying of the false trails.
115 I take into account the prisoner's young age at the time of committing the offences. He was twenty years old, approaching his twenty-first birthday, and he was in his third year as a university student. I also take into account the other subjective matters urged by his counsel. However, the conclusion I have reached is that the objective facts of the offences and the subjective circumstances of the prisoner are such that I should impose sentences of life imprisonment for the murders.
116 On the three charges of murder I sentence the prisoner to concurrent sentences of imprisonment for life, each to date from 13 June 2002." 159 It is convenient to deal first with Grounds 2 and 3, in which particular errors were asserted. Application for leave to appeal against sentence - Ground 2 160 The ground was - "In determining sentence for the applicant, the learned judge failed to have sufficient regard to all of the relevant features of the applicant's case for the purpose of sentence and in particular the age of the applicant and his prospects of rehabilitation in the future." 161 The applicant's submissions were confined to his age and his prospects of rehabilitation. The applicant was aged 19 at the time of the murders, and 24 at the time he was sentenced. He submitted that only in extraordinary circumstances was life imprisonment justified, and that it was common experience that with age came change; he said that fitness for release was a matter best left to the Parole Board. He referred to the dissenting judgment of Allen J in R v Crump (CCA, 30 May 1993, unreported) and the remarks on sentence of Adams J in R v Robinson [2000] NSWSC 972 at [42] in which Allen J's judgment was cited. The applicant also submitted that the judge had "effectively dismissed the issue of rehabilitation in the sentencing process" by finding risks of re-offending and future dangerousness. The submissions included that the judge did not sufficiently take the applicant's age into account when determining the level of culpability for the purposes of s 61(1). 162 The remarks in R v Robinson were directed to when it might be safe to release the offender, and do not displace other sentencing considerations. As the Crown pointed out, young offenders received life sentences in R v Fernando and Fernando (1997) A Crim R 533 (26 and 27 years), R v Glen [1999] NSWSC 1018 (19 years, a re-determination of a life sentence) and R v Valera [2002] NSWCCA 50 (19 years). In R v Leonard (CCA, 7 December 1998, unreported) McInerney J, with whom James and Bruce JJ agreed, said that - " … to sentence the applicant to imprisonment for the term of his natural life is a terrible punishment to impose on a young man aged twenty-four. However, as the Crown has pointed out, the legislature has seen fit to pass such legislation and it expects the Court to carry out the intention of the legislature should the situation call for such a sentence. We should not shirk from our responsibility in doing so, no matter how distasteful it may be." 163 Nor does some prospect of rehabilitation mean that a life sentence should not be imposed. In Knight v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 126 McClellan CJ at CL, with whom Latham J agreed, said - "[23] Section 61(1) has been the subject of consideration in a number of decisions. It is not necessary to analyse them for present purposes beyond a statement of the following principles: · the maximum penalty for an offence in the case of murder, life imprisonment, is intended for cases falling within the worst category of case for which that penalty is prescribed: Ibbs v R (1987) 163 CLR 447 at 451-452. · it is not possible to prescribe a list of cases falling within the worst category - ingenuity can always conjure up a case of greater heinousness: Veen v R (No 2) (1988) 164 CLR 465 at 478; R v Petroff (unreported, 12 November 1991 - Hunt CJ at CL). · a life sentence is not reserved only for those cases where the offender is likely to remain a continuing danger to society for the rest of his or her life or for cases where there is no chance of rehabilitation; the maximum may be appropriate where the level of culpability is so extreme that the community interest in retribution and punishment can only be met by a sentence of life imprisonment; R v Kalazich (1997) 94 A Crim R 41 at (50-1); R v Baker (unreported, CCA 20 September 1995); R v Garforth (unreported CCA 23 May 1994). · in many cases a two stage approach to the consideration of whether the maximum penalty should be imposed is appropriate. Firstly, consideration is given to whether the objective gravity of the offence brings it within the worst class of case and then consideration is given to whether the subjective circumstances of the offender require a lesser sentence: R v Bell (1985) 2 NSWLR 466; R v Valera [2002] NSWCCA 50. · it is the combined effect of the four indicia in s 61(1) which is critical: R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557. · the absence of any one or more of the indicia of retribution, punishment, community protection or deterrence may make it more difficult for a sentencing judge to reach the conclusion that a life sentence is required although will not be determinative: Merritt at 559.
[30] The applicant submitted that "it was not open to his Honour to find that the applicant was so dangerous that she could never be released." I do not accept this submission. It is now settled that the sentencing judge does not have to be satisfied of the risk of re-offending beyond reasonable doubt: R v SLD (2003) 58 NSWLR 589. To my mind there was more than sufficient evidence to justify his Honour's conclusion in this case. As his Honour found, the evidence reveals a pattern of violent and vengeful behaviour visited upon her previous partners and the deceased. This behaviour extended to engaging her nephew to assault the deceased and steal his motor vehicle. Dr Delaforce noted the applicant was herself fearful "that she would repeat her behaviour if released from prison" and concluded that she had a "continued high risk of violence to self and others, especially when relationships with males end, or are thought to be ending." Dr Delaforce is of the opinion that these personality traits would not change significantly in the future. Dr Milton concurred with Dr Delaforce.
[31] As I have indicated, in R v Garforth (unreported, NSWCCA, 23 May 1994) the court rejected the submission that it was only in a case where there was no chance at rehabilitation that the maximum penalty of life imprisonment should be imposed at [15]. Similarly, in R v Baker (unreported, NSWCCA, 20 September 1995) Barr J rejected the suggestion that a life sentence should never be imposed if there is some prospect of rehabilitation at [10]: 'An alternative way of putting such an argument would be to say that where a prisoner had some prospects of rehabilitation, his crimes could never be regarded as falling into the worst category of case. I would reject such an argument.'" 164 The judge took into account the applicant's young age at the time of committing the offences, stating the age. The applicant submitted that his Honour dealt with the applicant's age "by … dismissing it as a factor of any real significance in deciding sentence", and that it was of significance both as a subjective feature and as going to the culpability of the offending for the purposes of s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. 165 I do not accept that the judge dismissed the applicant's age as a factor of no real significance. He took it into account, and referred to it in connection with his conclusion as to both "the objective facts of the offences" and "the subjective circumstances of the prisoner", concluding that they were "such that I should impose sentences of life imprisonment for the murders". Nor was there error in the judge finding a risk of re-offending and future dangerousness, for which there was sound support in the evidence, or in imposing sentences of life imprisonment: notwithstanding that he declined to find that there were no prospects of rehabilitation. In my opinion, no error has been shown in the regard paid to the applicant's age and his prospects of rehabilitation.
Application for leave to appeal against sentence: Ground 3 166 The ground was - "In determining the only way the community interest could be met was by imposing a life sentence in each case, the learned judge failed to consider the role of the authority charged with the responsibility of determining whether in future the applicant should be released to parole". 167 The ground was related to Ground 2. The applicant relied on the judgment of Adams J in Knight v R. The offender had been sentenced to life imprisonment for murder. In his discussion of s 61(1) Adams J said - "55 It is obvious that such a punishment can only be justified for an offence that falls into the worst class of case. Furthermore, the circumstances must be such that the only way by which the relevant community interest can be met is by imposing a life sentence. Since s61(1) is part of a legislative scheme including, self-evidently, s54, this last sentence should be extended to read: the circumstances must be such that the only way by which the relevant community interest can be met is by imposing a life sentence without the possibility of being considered for release on parole . To ignore this aspect of the sentence would be to ignore its overwhelmingly most significant attribute.
62 I think, with respect, to disregard the functions of parole and the role of the Authority and the Council in considering the requirements of s61(1) is a fundamental error of principle. They comprise an integral and extremely important part of the legislative regime concerning the sentencing of offenders. The very nature of the exercise of the discretion prescribed in s61(1), positing the potential removal of the possibility of parole, demonstrates that this must be so." 168 These observations of Adams J were not taken up by the other members of the Court. His Honour had referred in R v Robinson to the role of the Parole Board in assessing change with age, but in the appeal against the sentence imposed this Court said (R v Robinson [2002] NSWCCA 359) - "39 In relation to the plea of guilty, and generally, his Honour had regarded the applicant as presenting a serious danger from which society should be protected, and he specifically stated that the requirements of the protection of the public (together with the gravity of the crime) called for a lengthy sentence. Yet he said that he could not confidently state that it will never be safe to release the applicant, and referred to the experience of reform of young offenders and to the part played by the Parole Board. The sentencing purpose of protection of the public is, of course, served by a sentence marking retribution, providing deterrence and assisting rehabilitation as well as by incarceration to prevent repetition, but his Honour seems to have focussed on incarceration to prevent repetition. The need for protection of society, in that sense, informed the sentence to be imposed, and that the Parole Board could assess any change in the applicant in 35 years time did not assist in determining whether the 45 years was appropriate because of the need for protection of society. What was the finding as to prospects of rehabilitation?" 169 It is not necessary to resolve this matter, and the submissions did not fully explore it. Assuming that the community interest in community protection, one of the matters referred to in s 61(1), can call for consideration of the role of the Parole Board, the role of the Parole Board does not mean the community interest is met by less than the imposition of a life sentence. The community interest in retribution, punishment and deterrence, and in community protection even taking account of the Parole Board, may be met only by the imposition of a life sentence. The judge would have been well aware that, if life sentences were imposed, there was no question of a parole period (see in particular R v Harris (2000) 50 NSWLR 409), and nonetheless came to the life sentences because of the objective seriousness of the offences and with regard to the applicant's subjective circumstances. His Honour found of a risk of re-offending and future dangerousness, the basis for which could not be controverted. While his Honour did not specifically refer to the possibility of being considered for release on parole, there is no reason to conclude that he failed to pay regard to it.
Application for leave to appeal against sentence: ground 1 170 The ground was - "The sentences of life imprisonment are in all the circumstances manifestly excessive and a lesser sentence is in each case warranted in law: s 6(3) Criminal Appeal Act 1912." 171 The applicant correctly drew attention to the nature of the appeal on this ground, as described by Wood CJ at CL (with whom Tobias JA and Hidden J agreed) in R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557 - "60 The position of this Court, in considering an appeal from such a sentence, is limited by the fact that it is a court of error: Regina v Vachalec [1981] 1 NSWLR 351. It is not sufficient for it to find that some other sentence might possibly have been imposed, or that members of the Court might have themselves imposed a different sentence: Skinner v The Queen (1913) 16 CLR 336 and Regina v O'Donoghue (1988) 34 A Crim R 397. Rather, it must be satisfied that the sentence was wrong, and that some other sentence was warranted and should have been imposed: s 6(3) Criminal Appeal Act , and see Regina v Cocking [1999] NSWCCA 311.
62 Additionally, while it is appropriate for the Court to correct a sentence which is out of line with the commonly accepted pattern: Regina v Visconti [1982] 2 NSWLR 104, there is limited utility in drawing any direct comparison with a sentence imposed upon another offender, simply because the two offenders appear to have similar characteristics, or to have committed similar crimes. What must be considered is whether the sentence is within the appropriate range, and in that respect, other apparently similar cases merely form part of that range: Regina v Morgan (1993) 70 A Crim R 368 and Regina v Salameh NSWCCA 9 June 1994." 172 The applicant submitted that the sentences were out of line with the commonly accepted pattern for sentencing in murder cases in two main respects. The first was in relation to sentences for murder of family members. The second was in relation to murder by an offender of approximately the applicant's age. (Again, the ground was related to Ground 2.) It was submitted that these respects should be seen not in isolation but in combination. 173 The applicant referred to a number of cases involving family or domestic murders, submitting that in most cases a determinate sentence was imposed even where there were multiple murders or significant planning and violence. With reference to a table, he said that out of seventy offenders sentenced for family murders only four were sentenced to imprisonment for life, and that in those cases the circumstances of the offending properly took them outside the pattern. He further submitted that it was rare for a sentence other than a determinate sentence to be imposed on an offender of the applicant's age, and that that was unsurprising when a young offender could spend more than 50 years in custody with no hope of release (other than by executive exercise of the prerogative of mercy) and without incentive to rehabilitate. Life imprisonment was a much harsher punishment for a young offender than for an older offender, and the punishment was "dependent upon the pure chance of the offender's age" (R v Denyer (1995) 1 VR 186 at 193). Again from a table, the applicant submitted that of fifty-seven offenders aged between 18 and 20 sentenced for murder only two received life sentences, one being the applicant and the circumstances of the other's offending being "unique". 174 The applicant submitted that determinate sentences should have been imposed. While recognising the limited utility of direct comparisons, he submitted that R v De Gruchy (2000) 110 A Crim R 271 showed that the sentences imposed on him were manifestly excessive. In that case the offender murdered his mother, sister and brother. The murders were planned, significant violence was used, and the offender sought to avoid detection. The offender was aged 18. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a non-parole period of 21 years and an additional term of 7 years. 175 I do not accept that a category of family or domestic murders should be devised (see also R v Whitmore [1999] NSWCCA 75 at [16]). The presently relevant categorisation is as a worst case or a case falling within s 61(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act. As has been seen, life sentences for murder have been imposed on young offenders, and what matters is the application of s 61(1) on the facts of the particular case. The same approach is to be taken as in determining whether an offence falls within a worst case category, as stated by Hislop J (Spigelman CJ and Sully J agreeing) in Adanguidi v R [2006] NSWCCA 404 - "34 … (iv) It is an incorrect approach to sentencing to compare the facts of the case at hand with other cases in order to determine whether it does or does not fall within the worst case category, deserving of the maximum sentence - each case must be determined upon its own facts - R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557 at 575 [65] and [67]. As Spigelman CJ observed in R v Mungomery (2004) 151 A Crim R 376 at 378 [5]: 'Prior sentences are in no way precedents that need to be distinguished. They may be relevant as a guide and issues of consistency are of significance. Nevertheless, the broad judgment required for the determination of an appropriate sentence turns on the facts of a particular case and the facts of other cases are virtually never so similar as to require detailed exposition.'" 176 In my opinion, it was well open to the judge to regard the murders as within the worst category of murders at common law and, for the purposes of s 61(1), at a level of culpability so extreme that the community interests there identified could only be met by the imposition of the life sentences.
27/11/2007 - typo - Paragraph(s) 89 27/11/2007 - - Paragraph(s) 28/11/2007 - non publication order - names removed - Paragraph(s) 118, 135,139,140, 141, 142, 143, 144
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Gonzales
Regina
CITATION: Gonzales v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 321 This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.
Adanguidi v R [2006] NSWCCA 404; De Gruchy v The Queen (2002) 211 CLR 85; Gallagher v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 392; Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216; Knight v R (2006) 164 A Crim R 126; Lawless v The Queen (1979) 142 CLR 659; Libke v The Queen (2007) 81 ALJR 1309; Livermore v R [2006] NSWCCA 334; Mickelberg v The Queen (1989) 167 CLR 259; Palmer v The Queen (1998) 183 CLR 1; Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297; Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Khosaba [2006] NSWCA 41; R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326; R v Booty (CCA, 19 December 1994, unreported); R v Buckley (2004) 149 A Crim R 122; R v Chai [2002] NSWCCA 512; R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52; R v Crump (CCA, 30 May 1993, unreported); R v De Gruchy (2000) 110 A Crim R 271; R v Denyer (1995) 1 VR 186; R v Fernando and Fernando (1997) A Crim R 533; R v Gapper[2007] SASC 119; R v GH (2000) 105 FCR 419; R v Gilbert (CCA, 10 December 1998, unreported); R v Glen [1999] NSWSC 1018; CASES CITED: R v Harris (2000) 50 NSWLR 409; R v Horton (1998) 45 NSWLR 426; R v Kaddour [2005] NSWCCA 330; R v Lawrence (1980) 1 NSWLR 122; R v Leak (1969) SASR 172; R v Leonard (CCA, 7 December 1998, unreported); R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180; R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547; R v Lyberopoulos [2002] NSWCCA 280; R v McCullough (1982) 6 A Crim R 274; R v Merritt (2004) 59 NSWLR 557; R v Praturlon (CCA, 29 November 1985, unreported); R v Reid [1999] NSWCCA 258; R v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 165; R v Robinson [2000] NSWSC 972; R v Robinson [2000] NSWCCA 359; R v Roulston (1976) 2 NZLR 644; R v Rugari (2001) 122 A Crim R 1; R v Slack (2003) A Crim R 314; R v Spathis and Patsalis [2001] NSWCCA 476; R v Taouk (2005) 154 A Crim R 69; R v Valera [2002] NSWCCA 50; R v Whitmore [1999] NSWCCA 75; Selsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262; Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365; Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657.
LOWER COURT MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: Regina v Gonzales [2004] NSWSC 822
(b) whether there was a reasonable excuse as to why a tape recording could not be made ("reasonable excuse": s 281(2)(b)). 22 The prior question is whether the admissions in the statement were inadmissible in the absence of an objection to their admissibility. R v Reid [1999] NSWCCA 258 was concerned with s 424A of the Crimes Act 1900, the predecessor to s 281 and although differently structured using the same key words that "evidence of an admission is not admissible unless … ". Spigelman CJ held at [5] that "is not admissible" should be construed as meaning "is not admissible over objection", saying that the usual course of proceedings in trials under the adversary system requires objection to be taken to evidence and that the usual practice was "part of the total context in which Parliament used these words". The reasons of Smart AJ were less explicit, but at [61] his Honour said that s 424A was "enacted against the long-standing and well-known practice of the Court generally not to reject evidence led by a party until a legitimate objection is taken by the other party"; his Honour went on to point out that the parties were generally left to conduct their own cases and they should know, which the Court did not, whether there was a reasonable excuse why a tape recording could not be made. Greg James J at [11] agreed with Smart AJ, and also with the "matters raised by the Chief Justice". 23 The status of evidence to which objection could successfully have been taken but which was not objected to is not entirely clear; see Weinberg, "The consequences of failure to object to inadmissible evidence in criminal cases" (1978) 11 MULR 408 and the discussion in Cross on Evidence, Australian ed, paras 1650-1680. The construction of "is not admissible" as proposed by the Chief Justice is generally in accord with principles whereby such evidence may be used in proof of an issue, at least in civil proceedings, by the operation of a doctrine of waiver. Criminal proceedings may be in a different position: for example in Shaw v The Queen (1952) 85 CLR 365 it was said at 381 (Dixon, McTiernan, Webb and Kitto JJ) that the failure of the accused's counsel to object to inadmissible evidence did not make it admissible. At least in criminal proceedings there may be occasions on which a trial judge is obliged to question the admissibility of evidence although no objection is taken, in the interests of ensuring a fair trial: R v Slack (2003) A Crim R 314 at [37] (Sheller JA, Wood CJ at CL and Smart AJ agreeing); R v Lewis [2003] NSWCCA 180 at [68] (Buddin J, Santow JA agreeing). Further, while leave under r 4 must be obtained it is not uncommon for a ground of appeal to be entertained that the trial miscarried because inadmissible evidence was admitted notwithstanding that no objection was taken to it, for example R v Chai [2002] NSWCCA 512 at [41] (Mason P, Sperling and Bergin JJ). 24 The prior question is not one of use of inadmissible evidence which was not objected to, but of construction of s 281. It does not concern s 281 alone. The Evidence Act 1995 uses the words "is not admissible" in relation to hearsay evidence (s 59), opinion evidence (s 76) tendency evidence (s 97), coincidence evidence (s 98), credibility evidence (s 102) and visual identification evidence (s114), amongst other provisions. The words are to be contrasted with "is not to be adduced" in ss 118 and 119 and similar directory words in other provisions. Strong forms of words are found in s 137, "must refuse to admit evidence", and s 138, "is not to be admitted". In Selsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness (2000) 49 NSWLR 262 Spigelman CJ said at [149] that ordinarily "not admissible" in the Evidence Act means "not admissible over objection". 25 On the other hand, s 190 of the Evidence Act (under the heading "Waiver of rules of evidence") provides for the court to dispense by order with the application of many provisions of the Act if the parties consent, which at first sight is not consistent with the provisions being inapplicable if they are not invoked by a party objecting to evidence. In particular, by s 190(c) in criminal proceedings a defendant's consent is not effective unless the defendant has been advised to consent by his lawyer or the court is satisfied that the defendant understands the consequences of giving the consent. 26 However, the Chief Justice's construction of "is not admissible" in R v Reid has been adopted in this Court in R v Spathis and Patsalis [2001] NSWCCA 476 at [416]-[417] (Carruthers AJ, Heydon JA and Smart AJ agreeing) R v Lyberopoulos [2002] NSWCCA 280 at [41] (Hulme J, Mason P and Simpson J agreeing) and R v Kaddour [2005] NSWCCA 330 at [62] (the Court). The appellant submitted that R v Reid should be reconsidered in the light of the rationale for equivalents to s 281 explained, and the purposive construction given, in some of the judgments in Kelly v The Queen (2004) 218 CLR 216 and Nicholls and Coates v The Queen (2005) 219 CLR 196, but the High Court was not concerned with the present question. In the absence of proper argument to the contrary, the decisions should be followed. Accordingly, the ground of appeal fails in limine because, in the absence of objection, the statement was not inadmissible and was not wrongly admitted. 27 It is nonetheless appropriate to consider suspicion and reasonable excuse. The absence of objection to the statement is material to these matters, because it meant that there was no occasion for the Crown to address either of them by evidence. 28 Detective Inspector Sheehy (then Detective Sergeant) was the officer in charge of the investigation of the murders. He went to 6 Collins Street at about 1 am on 11 July 2001. He spoke to police already at the scene, and spoke to the appellant and at the appellant's request called a friend to come and support him. He took the appellant to the Gladesville Police Station, where the appellant was placed in a victim room with relatives; they included his uncle, Joseph Claridades, and his aunt, Emily Luna. A little later he took the appellant to an interview room, where the appellant was accompanied by Joseph Claridades, and there took the statement from him. 29 The statement began that it accurately set out the evidence which the appellant would be prepared, if necessary, to give in court as a witness. It was in the form of a statement of a witness, not that of a cautioned suspect. It included, clearly enough prompted by enquiry from Detective Inspector Sheehy, that the appellant did not know of any person with ill feeling towards his family, or of any threats or violence towards any of the members of his family, save for a description of an incident of road rage the previous night when the appellant was driving and his parents were in the car; a passenger in another vehicle yelled out "Bloody Asians" and the other vehicle cut the appellant's car off and then followed it and stopped behind it. Nothing in the evidence of Detective Inspector Sheehy or in the statement itself suggested that the appellant was suspected of the murders or that there were grounds for such suspicion. Detective Inspector Sheehy gave evidence, and was not asked anything in cross-examination in relation to suspicion of the appellant. 30 The appellant submitted that it should nevertheless be found in this Court that the appellant was a suspect, it seems meaning either was suspected or could reasonably have been suspected, having regard to other of the evidence at the trial plus evidence tendered on appeal. He said also that the fact that the appellant was a suspect was supported by the Crown Prosecutor's cross-examination of him, in which it was put to the appellant in connection with the lies making up the first alibi that he believed from the beginning that he was a suspect (which the appellant denied). 31 The cross-examination can immediately be put to one side. The appellant's belief, if held, turned on what was in his mind and what was known to him, not what was in an investigating official's mind or what was known to an investigating official. Putting the belief to him does not support actual suspicion or reasonable grounds for suspicion by an investigating official. 32 The evidence at the trial on which the appellant relied was as follows. 33 Constable Luke Mulligan arrived at 6 Collins Street at about midnight on 10/11 July 2001. The appellant was in a distressed state and was crying and shaking. The appellant told him, amongst other things, that when the appellant came home he heard noises, one or two persons rushed past him and went out the front door, and he followed them but could not catch them. (A similar account was given in the statement of 11 July 2001). Constable Mulligan recorded this conversation in his notebook, and also recorded - "* I accompanied the dog handler after setting up a perimeter. * The son was very distressed & lying on the floor of the garage. * At times the story he was telling me changed. * About 12.25-12.30 am I accompanied Dog 514 and Sen Const Cornell in an attempt to find a trail. * Shortly before doing this a [sic] noticed a vehicle parked under a carport separate to the enclosed garage the number plate contained the letter [sic] SEF . * I felt the bonnet of the vehicle & there was no heat on the bonnet. I cannot recall the exact colour of the vehicle or if it was wet due to the inclement weather. * I accompanied the dog squad along Collins St & into Ryrie St travelling in a north & south direction. * I observed the dog & handler & no property, other exhibits or like were found. It appeared that no scent was found either." (Emphasis added) 34 Senior Constable Paul Cornale was the dog handler. He arrived at 6 Collins Street at about 12.15 am on 11 July 2001. He spoke to the appellant, who told him that he had heard the side gate close and had run after one or more persons. The appellant told him, in answer to his question, that the persons did not get into a vehicle. Senior Constable Cornale searched in the direction to which the appellant pointed, then "everywhere where someone could make an escape route", but his dog did not pick up a scent. He gave evidence to the effect that persons leaving as described by the appellant would definitely have left a scent which the dog would have picked up. He also gave evidence that after he had finished the search he heard the appellant tell another police officer that the persons had got into a white four wheel drive, which he said would have been material to his searching because "it would have changed the whole perspective of my job at the scene". 35 Senior Constable Cornale was not asked in cross-examination anything about suspicion falling on the appellant because his account of persons leaving was not borne out by finding a scent, and had changed in relation to the persons getting into a vehicle. Constable Mulligan was cross-examined to the effect that he had made up the conversation with the appellant as recorded in his notebook. The cross-examination included asking why he had not read to the appellant what he had recorded and asked him to initial it, and his response included his understanding that under police instructions that was to be done only if the officer believed that the person was a suspect. Implicitly, Constable Mulligan did not so believe, and the cross-examination did not extend to putting to him that he did. 36 The appellant submitted that the matters emphasised in the extract from the notebook of Constable Mulligan and the evidence of Senior Constable Cornale about lack of a scent and a changed account of the persons getting into a vehicle provided reasonable grounds for the appellant to have been suspected of having committed the murders. He submitted that it was not necessary that the police officer conducting the official questioning in the course of which the admissions were made, here Detective Inspector Sheehy, knew of the grounds. 37 The evidence tendered on appeal on which the appellant relied was contained in an affidavit of his solicitor sworn on 22 August 2007, the day the hearing in this Court commenced. The Crown had no prior notice of the tender of the evidence. From the affidavit in relation to extension of time, the appellant's solicitor and senior counsel had been retained for a considerable time prior to the hearing in this Court, and the written submissions in support of the grounds of appeal were dated in March 2007. It is unacceptable that reliance on this further material emerged only when the hearing of the appeal was in progress. 38 The affidavit annexed three documents. It was said that each had been served on the defence as part of the police brief of evidence. The documents were - (i) the transcript of a recorded forensic procedure at 4.27 am on 11 July 2001 of taking swabs of the appellant's hands for gunshot residues;
(b) that evidence relating to inquiries made by the appellant of Mr John Stafford should have been excluded pursuant to s 135 or 137 of the Evidence Act and evidence given by Mr Rolando Baros as to the size of the Gonzales estates should not have been admitted because it was irrelevant. 55 Section 135 of the Evidence Act, applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings, gives a general discretion to refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party. Section 137, applicable only to criminal proceedings, provides that the court must refuse to admit evidence adduced by the prosecutor if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant. This is akin to a discretion so far as it calls for evaluative judgment, see for example R v Blick (2000) 111 A Crim R 326 at [19]; R v Cook [2004] NSWCCA 52 at [38]; and in a different context, Perpetual Trustee Company Ltd v Khosaba [2006] NSWCA 41 at [39]-[40]. 56 The two grounds of appeal can conveniently be dealt with together. I will first describe the evidence and the use made of it. 57 Motive was important in the Crown case. Why would the appellant kill his parents and his sister? The Crown case included but was not confined to accelerated inheritance of the appellant's parents' wealth. 58 The significance of motive is reflected in the judge's findings in his remarks on sentence under the heading "Motive". The judge found that the appellant had been performing poorly in his university studies, to the disappointment of his parents who were ambitious for their children, and that his parents had discovered that he had falsified documents showing his university results. The parents had warned the appellant that if he did not do well in the next university semester his car, to which he was very attached, would be taken away from him. The judge continued - "35 At the time of their deaths Mr and Mrs Gonzales owned property in Australia and the Philippines worth about one and a half million Australian dollars. The consequence of the wills made by Mr and Mrs Gonzales and their deaths and the death of their only other child Clodine would be that the prisoner would succeed to all of his parents' property, unless, of course, he was disqualified from succeeding by reason of it being established that he had killed his parents and sister.
Conviction appeal: Ground 6 80 The ground was - "The trial proceedings miscarried by reason of the inflammatory and intemperate language used by the Crown Prosecutor in his cross-examination of the appellant and in his closing address to the jury, by using the descriptions 'pathetic' and 'absolutely pathetic' as expressions of the prosecutor's own opinion of the quality of the evidence given by the appellant and through deliberately conveying that opinion to the jury." 81 The ground rested on the uses of "pathetic" (three times) and "absolutely pathetic" (once). The appellant relied on R v Rugari (2001) 122 A Crim R 1, R v Liristis (2004) 146 A Crim R 547 (which he said was on all fours) and Livermore v R [2006] NSWCCA 334. Recent consideration of a Crown Prosecutor's conduct can be found in Libke v The Queen (2007) 81 ALJR 1309. 82 The appellant's examination in chief occupied less than two pages of the transcript. He said that he did not murder his parents and sister, that he left Teddy Gonzales' offices prior to 4 pm on 10 July 2001 and parked in the carport at 6 Collins Street and went by taxi to the brothel, returning by taxi to pick up his car and go to the city with his friend. He returned home sometime after 11.30 pm to find that his family had been killed. 83 The cross-examination extended over three days, and occupied over 160 pages of transcript. 84 The Crown Prosecutor used the description "pathetic" once in the cross-examination, in the penultimate question. The question was concerned with the emergency telephone call made to the Ambulance Service in which the appellant told the operator that someone had shot his parents and that there was a lot of blood; in fact the victims had not been shot. The question should be put in context. 85 In his statement to the police of 3 August 2001 the appellant had said that when returning home late on 10 July 2001 he slowed down in Wicks Road to see if there was anything strange. The Crown Prosecutor drew the appellant's attention to this, and over some two pages of the transcript pressed the appellant on whether he was expecting anything strange and put to him that he had expected that while he was away someone would try and ring his family, fail to get through and go to the house and discover the bodies. 86 The cross-examination continued - "Q. And I suggest to you that you never expected that you would have to be the one to discover the bodies? A. No sir. Q. And I suggest to you that when you came home finally, you had the difficult task of working out some story about how you discovered the bodies? A. No sir. Q. And I suggest to you that you only worked that out on the spot as it were, because you were pretty hopeful that someone else would discover the bodies? A. No sir. Q. And that is why you went out at 8 o'clock because you were hoping that somebody would go and discover the bodies? A. No sir. Q. You cut the telephone line? A. No I did not. Q. So nobody would be able to get through and there would be some disruption to the telephone service? A. No sir. Q. And that is why, I suggest to you, you made such a pathetic attempt at the triple-0 call? A. Excuse me sir? Q. I suggest that you didn't really have much time to prepare what you were going to say in the triple-0 call, and that is why you said at the beginning of the triple-0 call that your family had been shot; you didn't have much time to prepare it? A. I just said what I was feeling sir." (emphasis added) 87 In his address to the jury the Crown Prosecutor used the description "pathetic" once and the description "pathetic, absolutely pathetic" once. Again, it is necessary to put the uses in context. The use of "pathetic" was in relation to an e-mail dated 3 August 2001, and the use of "pathetic, absolutely pathetic" was in relation to an alleged attempt to gain entry to the appellant's apartment in May 2002. 88 On 20 August 2001 the appellant provided to the police an e-mail dated 3 August 2001. It became Exhibit AAN. It was partly in Tagalog and partly in English, and was to the effect that a Mr C (who was a wealthy Philippines businessman), had something to do with the murders because Teddy Gonzales "refused an illegal deal" and that the appellant had been an intended victim and was still at risk. The Crown case included that the appellant had sent the e-mail to himself. There was evidence that an early version of the e-mail was on the appellant's computer, together with programmes designed to disguise and create false e-mails. There was evidence from the "owner" of the e-mail address from which the e-mail had purportedly come that he had had nothing to do with it, and from Mr C that he did not know Teddy Gonzales. It was open to the jury to regard the e-mail as a false attempt to divert attention from the appellant, and to take this into account in coming to their satisfaction that he had committed the murders. 89 The appellant was cross-examined in relation to Exhibit AAN. He admitted that the e-mail "was my creation". The cross-examination continued - "Q. So you created a piece of false evidence which you gave to the police accusing of Mr C and his organisation of being responsible for the deaths in your family? A. Yes sir. Q. You were prepared to create false evidence implicating this man and his organisation in the deaths of your family, weren't you? A. The email was false. Q. You were prepared to create false evidence which implicated another person and his organisation in the deaths of your family, correct? A. The contents are not false, sir. Q. You were prepared to create false evidence in the form of this email implicating another man and his organisation in the deaths of your family, weren't you? A. Yes sir. Q. Did you know that it was illegal to create false evidence? A. Yes sir. Q. And you were prepared to do that? A. I felt I had no choice, sir. Q. You felt you had no choice because the police were onto your trail and you thought that you were going to be charged, didn't you? A. No sir." 90 In re-examination the appellant said that he had been told by family and friends of death threats not long before the murders, that some time after the murders he was told as well that there were media reports in the Philippines of contract killers, and - "I put together this e-mail because I was afraid that if it - the information came from me officially, that I would be in danger as well. I didn't see any harm in it because the information that I put in here were based on facts that I heard. I didn't make up what was in this e-mail, all that I attempted to make was that it was from someone anonymous." 91 In his address to the jury the Crown Prosecutor suggested that the appellant had no choice but to admit that he had created the e-mail himself, that he "had to admit that it was some false evidence that he had created", and - "His explanation for why he is prepared to create this false evidence is just pathetic . We submit that you would reject his explanation. He was trying to convince the police, trying to make it more convincing for the police, that they wouldn't believe him. He just told them that he heard it from his relatives. Ladies and gentlemen, that is just sheer desperation on his part." (emphasis added) 92 By May 2002 the appellant had been told that he was regarded as a suspect. On 30 May 2002 the appellant asked Detective Inspector Sheehy to come to his apartment. At the apartment the appellant said that he had received two threatening e-mails, one of which had self-destructed when he tried to save it. The other e-mail, dated 22 May 2002, told the appellant to "confess" but said, amongst other things, "you will probably be acquitted" and "you cause trouble for us we will kill you. You cannot bring back your family your father deserved to die". From other evidence in the Crown case, it was open to the jury to conclude that the appellant had sent the e-mail to himself. The appellant also told the police that he had heard a noise which led him to believe that someone had attempted to gain entry to his apartment at about 3 am earlier that day. 93 Detective Sergeant Leggat attended later on 30 May 2002 to investigate the attempt to gain entry, and was given a more full account of it which included being told of three gouge marks on the front door. On investigation, no occupant of surrounding apartments had seen or heard anything unusual, and there were no results from fingerprint examination of the front door. There was evidence at the trial from a forensic officer, with photographs and explanation, that the marks on the door were superficial scratches inconsistent with jemmy marks where inwards pressure is applied to the door and door jamb in an effort to defeat the locks or with an object being inserted between the door and the door jamb in an effort to manipulate the latches. 94 In his address to the jury the Crown Prosecutor suggested that, for reasons he put forward, the e-mail was a fake. He continued - "And on the same day that he gives it to the police he tells them about this attempted break-in. He heard the scratching noises at night, got up to see who was there, nobody was there, in the morning he gets up, there is these dreadful marks on his door and the police go and investigate, and you've seen the photographs. These little scratches there. Nobody was trying to break in. Pathetic, absolutely pathetic ." (emphasis added) 95 In Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657 at 663-4 Deane J stated the principles governing the conduct of a Crown Prosecutor - "Prosecuting counsel in a criminal trial represents the State. The accused, the court and the community are entitled to expect that, in performing his function of presenting the case against an accused, he will act with fairness and detachment and always with the objectives of establishing the whole truth in accordance with the procedures and standards which the law requires to be observed and of helping to ensure that the accused's trial is a fair one. The consequence of a failure to observe the standards of fairness to be expected of the Crown may be insignificant in the context of an overall trial. Where that is so, departure from those standards, however regrettable, will not warrant the interference of an appellate court with a conviction. On occasion however, the consequences of such a failure may so affect or permeate a trial as to warrant the conclusion that the accused has actually been denied his fundamental right to a fair trial. As a general proposition, that will, of itself, mean that there has been a serious miscarriage of justice with the consequence that any conviction of the accused should be quashed and, where appropriate, a new trial ordered." 96 Departure from the standards of fairness may occur by intemperate conduct by the Crown Prosecutor. In R v McCullough (1982) 6 A Crim R 274, in a passage taken up in R v Liristis at [94], it was said at 285 - "Counsel for the Crown is obliged to put the Crown case to the jury and, when appropriate, he is entitled to firmly and vigorously urge the Crown view about a particular issue and to test and, if necessary, to attack that advanced on behalf of the accused. But he must always do so temperately and with restraint, bearing constantly in mind that his primary function is to aid in the attainment of justice, not the securing of convictions." 97 It is, of course, a question of balance in the particular circumstances. In R v McCullough the Court continued, through a citation from R v Roulston (1976) 2 NZLR 644 at 654, that the prosecutor should not assume so emasculated a role that the prosecution's case is not adequately presented, and that the "feel and atmosphere of one trial may make it reasonable and even necessary for tactics to be employed that would seem out of place and disproportionate to the circumstances of another". 98 In R v Rugari Carruthers AJ, with whom Spigelman CJ and Sperling J agreed, emphasised that a criminal trial is of an adversary nature and said - "51 In Moss v Brown [1979] 1 NSWLR 114 at 126, the Court of Appeal (Moffitt P; Reynolds and Hutley JJA) said: "In any discussion of fairness, it is imperative to consider the position of all parties. It is sometimes forgotten that the Crown has rights and, as it has a heavy responsibility in respect of the invoking and enforcement of the criminal law, which includes seeing that the public revenue is not imposed upon, it is entitled to maintain those rights even if they may bear heavily upon some accused". 52 Thus although Crown Prosecutors are subject to considerable constraints, they must nevertheless discharge their obligations fearlessly in the interests of the Crown, acting on behalf of the community." 99 In Libke v The Queen Hayne J, with whose reasons Gleeson CJ and Heydon J agreed, referred at [71] to the central role of prosecuting counsel to ensure that the Crown case is presented with fairness to the accused, but observed at [72] that the prosecution case is to be presented in the context of an adversarial process in which each side is free to decide the ground on which it or he will contest the issue, the evidence which it or he will call, and what questions whether in chief or in cross-examination shall be asked; his Honour said that there were "boundaries to that process", with choices to be made subject to the rules of evidence, fairness and admissibility. His Honour said at [74] - [77] that, in the complaint in that case of unfairness in undermining the accused's credibility, it was an essential part of the prosecutor's function to test the credibility of the account he gave and that the question was whether that was done unfairly, and that where no objection had been taken at trial it was important to examine carefully what happened at the trial to see in what respect there was said to be an unfairness. The additional remarks Gleeson CJ at [2] included that the argument that the conduct of the prosecutor during his cross-examination of the accused resulted in an unfair trial, and a miscarriage of justice, involved a question of degree. 100 An important matter in considering unfairness is whether the Crown Prosecutor's conduct distracted the jury from rational consideration of the Crown case and the defence. As was said in R v Roulston at 354 - " … it is wrong for Crown counsel to become so much the advocate that he is fighting for a conviction and quite impermissible to embark upon a course of conduct calculated to persuade a jury to a point of view by the introduction of factors of prejudice or emotion." 101 In R v Rugari the Court considered that in his address to the jury the Crown Prosecutor exceeded the reasonable restraints imposed upon him. The excess was far beyond anything of which the appellant complains in the present case, involving putting matters which the accused was required to explain and thus reversing the onus of proof, summarising the accused's answers to questions in a mocking and ridiculing way, condemning the manner in which counsel for the accused conducted her cross-examination and calling it ridiculous, categorising the accused's defence as a cynical defence and expressing to the jury as the Crown Prosecutor's own view an opinion of the quality of the evidence given by the accused. 102 In R v Liristis it was though sufficient for unfairness that in his address to the jury the Crown Prosecutor had said - "Its really pathetic in some ways that you are - one wonders is the jury really being asked to accept what you have been asked for the accused? Look, am I really hearing this? I pinch myself to see whether my senses are telling me this is what the accused is saying whether he really thinks that you are going to accept this version of his."
"The line of cross-examination persisted. It was, I repeat, an infringement of a basic rule denying permissibility of cross-examination along these lines and must necessarily attract the greatest of concern. If I felt that there were the slightest basis for concern that the appellant may have suffered any prejudice as a result of this impermissible line of cross-examination, then I would unhesitatingly have said that the appeal should succeed. As it happens, notwithstanding her tender years, the girl Joanne was apparently proof against the oppression inherent in being confronted by the evidence of her three friends and the aura of a court hearing and forced in effect to repudiate what she was told had been their sworn evidence; she maintained throughout a negative attitude to the Crown Prosecutor's cross-examination. Although I have approached the answers that she gave with a strong predisposition towards finding in favour of the appellant that there might thereby have been worked some prejudice to him, I am unable to conclude that this was in fact so. I repeat, had there been the slightest basis for concern that he had suffered as a result of prejudicial evidence given by her in the face of such cross-examination, then I would have had no hesitation in proposing that the appeal should succeed. As it is I must content myself with a strong condemnation of this line of cross-examination having been pursued in this way and express the conclusion that it has not, in my view, led to any miscarriage." 147 The objection to such a cross-examination lies in the witness being asked "to express an opinion as to whether other witnesses are telling the truth", that is, to impugn their truthfulness. Whether what other witnesses have said is correct is a different matter. The distinction was made clear in R v Leak (1969) SASR 172, where the Court (Bray CJ, Hogarth and Walters JJ) said at 173-4 - "In our view a witness ought not to be asked whether another witness is telling lies or has invented something. Any witness, of course, can be asked if what another witness has said is true. He can be asked if he knows of any reason why the other witness should be hostile to him or should tell a false story about him. But if he says that what the other witness has said is not true, he should not be asked to enter into that witness's mind and say whether he thinks the inaccuracy is due to invention, malice, mistake or any other cause. To do so is to ask him for opinion evidence and in our view the normal objections to that type of evidence apply. It is for the jury to decide which witness is telling the truth and how far what they think to be an inaccuracy on the part of any witness is deliberate or otherwise and what effect such inaccuracy has on the rest of the witness's testimony. No attempt should be made by the cross-examiner to drive any witness, least of all the accused, into saying that any other witness least of all a detective, is a liar." 148 Whether the witness could be asked if he knows of any reason why the other witness should be hostile to him or tell a false story about him may no longer be correct, see Palmer v The Queen (1998) 183 CLR 1, but does not presently arise. 149 In R v Booty (CCA, 19 December 1994, unreported) Grove J, with whom Abadee and Simpson JJ agreed, said - "Counsel for the appellant next argued ground 9 which complained of impermissible cross examination by the Crown Prosecutor. Again without reciting the text of the cross examination the thrust of challenge was directed to the appellant's necessary contention that the complainant was lying. He could of course be asked if what the complainant said was true and he could be asked if he knew a reason why he should either be hostile to him or tell a false story about him and to the extent that the cross examiner put such matters I detect no error: R v Leak 1969 SASR 172. What is improper is for the witness to be asked in effect to enter the complainant's mind and say whether the false assertion is due to invention, malice, mistake or any other cause. What is impermissible is to put to one witness that his evidence is to the contrary to that of others and thus impliedly invite comment on the reasons for contradiction. Therein lies the vice of such questions as distinct from simple enquiry of one witness whether another is telling the truth: R v Praturlon unreported NSW CCA 29 November 1985; North Australian Territory Co v Goldsborough Mort and Co 1893 2 Ch 381." 150 In R v Rich (1998) 102 A Crim R 165 it was said at 169 that a witness should not be "invited to express an opinion about the truthfulness of another", referring to R v Leak and R v Praturlon, with risk of reversal of the onus of proof. (As to that risk, see also R v Gapper [2007] SASC 119 at [50]). In R v Gilbert (CCA, 10 December 1998, unreported) Grove J, with whom Levine and Dowd JJ agreed, said that the "essence" of the vice in such a cross-examination was as summarised in R v Leak, namely that the witness was invited "to enter the complainant's mind and say whether the false assertion is due to invention, malice, mistake or any other cause". In R v Buckley (2004) 149 A Crim R 122 at [9] the Court of Appeal in Victoria expressed the prohibition that a witness can not be asked in cross-examination "whether another witness is telling lies or has invented something". 151 I do not think that the cross-examination of which the appellant complained offended these principles. The appellant had not in his evidence in chief addressed the evidence tendered in the Crown case in any detail, and it was appropriate for the Crown Prosecutor to confront him with what had been said in evidence by or through Crown witnesses. Asking the appellant whether the witness was wrong was a permissible way of doing so, and I do not think the cross-examination trespassed into asking the appellant to express an opinion on whether the witnesses were lying or had invented their evidence or otherwise why their evidence was incorrect. 152 I should add that, if the line from permissible to impermissible cross-examination had been crossed, I consider that (like Joanne in R v Praturlon) the appellant was not prejudiced in his cross-examination and there was not unfairness bringing a miscarriage of justice. 153 This ground of appeal fails.
(2002) 211 CLR 85
(1986) 160 CLR 392
(2004) 218 CLR 216
(1979) 142 CLR 659
(2007) 81 ALJR 1309
(1989) 167 CLR 259
(1998) 183 CLR 1
(1999) 196 CLR 297
(1995) 1 VR 186
(2000) 105 FCR 419
(2000) 50 NSWLR 409
(1998) 45 NSWLR 426
(1980) 1 NSWLR 122
(2004) 59 NSWLR 557
(2000) 49 NSWLR 262
(1952) 85 CLR 365
(1983) 152 CLR 657
(2005) 219 CLR 196
(1987) 163 CLR 447
(1988) 164 CLR 465
(1985) 2 NSWLR 466
(2003) 58 NSWLR 589
(1913) 16 CLR 336