PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - National Disability Insurance Scheme - reinstatement of application for review - application previously dismissed following withdrawal by the applicant under s 95 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 - applicant barred from applying under s 102(7) by operation of s 102(8) - whether application may be made under s 102(5) on the grounds of error - whether application was dismissed in error - no error in the relevant sense established - application for reinstatement refused

Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth)

National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth)

Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 367; (2002) 121 FCR 383

JTBJ and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] ARTA 464

Re Kalafatis and Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 150

Re Kabue and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 3753

Re Zablotsky and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] AATA 4367

1. Mr Hallam is a participant in the National Disability Insurance Scheme (the NDIS). On 27 May 2024, the National Disability Insurance Agency (the Agency) approved Mr Hallam's plan. Mr Hallam was dissatisfied with the supports funded in that plan. He sought internal review of the plan decision and, not being satisfied with the outcome of that review, applied to the Tribunal for review.
2. On 27 October 2025, Mr Hallam emailed the Tribunal and the Agency's representative indicating that he was considering withdrawing his application and 'leaving the NDIS'. He stated he would take a week to consider his position. On 2 December 2025, Mr Hallam emailed the Tribunal in terms that were clear and unequivocal. He wrote: 'I Robbie Hallam request to withdraw from this case, due to conflict of interest and no communication from the registry of ART.' A further email sent on 3 December 2025 stated: 'I feel unable to continue due to my mental health and well-being also.'
3. On 4 December 2025, the Tribunal wrote to Mr Hallam confirming that it had received his email advising that he wished to withdraw his application. The letter stated that, by operation of s 95(2) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (the ART Act), the application was taken to have been dismissed. The Tribunal also wrote to the Agency on the same date, informing it of the withdrawal, and that the application is, by operation of s 95 of the ART Act, taken to have been dismissed.
4. On 10 December 2025, Mr Hallam sent a series of emails to the Tribunal and the parties. He referred to being under tremendous stress, which affected his mental health and wellbeing. He referred to the passing of his nephew, and indicated that unless a lawyer was provided to assist him, he could not continue. On 12 December 2025, he sent a further email referring to his nephew and explaining why his mental health prevented him from proceeding. On 13 December 2025, Mr Hallam emailed the Tribunal requesting that his withdrawal be cancelled. He asked for a three-month extension to attend to his mental health and wellbeing.
5. On 16 December 2025, Mr Hallam emailed the Tribunal stating that on 13 December 2025 he had 'cancelled the withdrawal due to unforeseen circumstances.' He also nominated a support worker, Mr Craig Bounty, to assist him with his matter.
6. On 20 January 2026, the Agency's solicitor wrote to the Tribunal setting out the Agency's position. The Agency submitted that there was limited utility to a reinstatement where a postponement of the review was requested, and that Mr Hallam may be better served by conferring with the Agency in relation to a plan review due in March 2026. The Agency further noted that s 102(8) of the ART Act precludes an applicant from applying for reinstatement under s 102(7) where the application was dismissed under s 95.
7. The Tribunal listed the reinstatement application for an interlocutory hearing on 10 April 2026. Mr Hallam appeared for himself by video. Ms Cameron, solicitor, appeared for the Agency, with Ms Allsop attending as the Agency's case manager.

1. At the hearing, Mr Hallam confirmed that he wished to have the review application reinstated. He told the Tribunal that five days after withdrawing, he sent correspondence to the Tribunal asking that the matter continue. He said he had asked for a three-month delay. He confirmed that the three-month period had passed and that he was ready to proceed with the review if the matter were reinstated.
2. Mr Hallam said that he had lost family members and was under great stress at the time he withdrew the application. He said this was all occurring in the period leading up to his email withdrawing the application.
3. When his attention was drawn to the provisions of s 102 and the question of whether the application had been dismissed in error, Mr Hallam advanced two contentions. First, he said that when he sent the withdrawal email, he was not in his 'right mind'. Second, he said that the withdrawal was not in a formal document, that the Tribunal should have asked for a more formal form of withdrawal, and that failing to do was an error.
4. Ms Cameron submitted on behalf of the Agency that the Agency neither consented to nor opposed reinstatement, but had concerns about whether reinstatement was the most appropriate way forward and whether the legislative requirements for reinstatement were satisfied. The Agency observed that a plan review under s 48 of the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 (Cth) (the NDIS Act) had been commenced and that this process might better address Mr Hallam's evolving needs. Ms Cameron submitted that many withdrawals take the form of an email. Otherwise, I observe that the Agency did not itself apply for reinstatement of the application under s 102(7).

1. Section 95 of the ART Act permits an applicant to withdraw an application at any time by giving written notice to the Tribunal. Section 95(2) provides that if the applicant withdraws the application, the Tribunal is taken to have dismissed the application. The effect of the provision is that a withdrawal operates as a deemed dismissal by force of statute.
2. Section 102 of the ART Act governs reinstatement of applications that have been dismissed. It provides several pathways by which a dismissed application may be reinstated.
3. Section 102(5) provides that a party to the proceeding may apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement of the application on the grounds of error within 28 days after the party receives notice that the application is dismissed, or such longer period as the Tribunal, in special circumstances, allows. Section 102(6) provides that if a party applies under s 102(5) and the Tribunal considers that the application was dismissed in error, the Tribunal may reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to it to be appropriate in the circumstances.
4. Section 102(7) provides a separate pathway. Where an application is dismissed under s 95, s 99, or s 100, a party to the proceeding may apply to the Tribunal for reinstatement within 28 days after the party receives notice of the dismissal, or such longer period as the Tribunal, in special circumstances, allows. Section 102(9) provides that if a party applies under s 102(7) and the Tribunal considers it appropriate to reinstate the application, the Tribunal may reinstate the application and make such orders as appear to it to be appropriate in the circumstances.
5. Section 102(8) provides that, where an application is dismissed under s 95, the applicant cannot apply for reinstatement under s 102(7). The effect of this provision is that where an applicant has voluntarily withdrawn an application, only another party to the proceeding (and not the applicant) may seek reinstatement under s 102(7). The intention behind Parliament adopting such an approach is evident, namely that an applicant who has elected to withdraw should not be able to circumvent that choice by applying for reinstatement under the same provision. The extrinsic materials to the predecessor provision, s 42A(8) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), discussed by Senior Member Puplick in Re Zablotsky and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2019] AATA 4367, suggests that the purpose of the reinstatement pathway, which is now reflected in s 102(7), was enacted to avoid injustice to other parties affected by a withdrawal, not to provide a mechanism for the withdrawing applicant to reverse course.
6. However, s 102(8) is confined in its operation to applications made under s 102(7). It does not, in terms, preclude the applicant from making an application under s 102(5) on the grounds that the application was dismissed in error. The question under s 102(5) is different: it is not whether it is 'appropriate' to reinstate the application (the test under s 102(9)), but whether the application was 'dismissed in error' (the test under s 102(6)).
7. Mr Hallam's request for reinstatement, made on 13 December 2025, was made within 28 days of the dismissal on 4 December 2025. I accept that Mr Hallam has made an application for reinstatement within time under s 102(5) of the ART Act. The question I must determine is whether the application was dismissed in error within the meaning of s 102(6).

1. The concept of an application being 'dismissed in error' for the purposes of ss 102(5) and (6) has been the subject of consideration in a number of decisions. In JTBJ and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] ARTA 464 (JTBJ), Justice Kyrou, President, undertook a comprehensive review of the authorities and identified, at [46], the following categories of circumstances that have been recognised as circumstances where an application has been dismissed in error (citations in the original omitted):

(a) where an application for review is dismissed due to a significant procedural error, such as: > > > (i) a dismissal without notice to the parties when the statutory provision relied upon required notice to the parties; or > > > > (ii) a dismissal on the basis that particular information was not included in the application for review where that information is not necessary for the validity of the application for review. > > (b) where an application for review is dismissed on the basis that the applicant consented to the dismissal, when in fact: > > > (i) the applicant did not, in fact, consent; or > > > > (ii) the applicant communicated consent (including by requesting that the proceeding be withdrawn) in circumstances that objectively demonstrate that, at the time of the communication, the applicant so misunderstood the nature and consequences of that consent that it was not a true consent. This principle would not be engaged, for example, where the Tribunal or a representative of the applicant explained to the applicant the effect of a consent to dismissal or a request for withdrawal, or where the applicant simply changes their mind about whether to continue with the proceeding. > > (c) where an application for review is dismissed on the basis that the applicant did not appear at a Tribunal case event, and: > > > (i) the applicant did in fact appear; > > > > (ii) a notice of the case event was not received by the applicant and in the circumstances could not be deemed to have been delivered to the applicant; or > > > > (iii) a notice of the case event was received by the applicant but was defective.

2. I also note the observations of the President in JTBJ that, relying on Goldie v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2002] FCAFC 367; (2002) 121 FCR 383, the reinstatement power is not some sort of appeal procedure. It is a means of bringing a matter back to the Tribunal for reconsideration with a view to it being considered on the merits, in circumstances where the dismissal itself was the product of error. The concept of 'error' in this context refers to error in the process by which the application came to be dismissed, not to the applicant's subjective regret about having sought the dismissal.[1]

1. Mr Hallam contends that when he sent the withdrawal email on 2 December 2025, he was not in his right mind; he was experiencing significant personal difficulties, including the loss of family members, and was under considerable stress affecting his mental health and wellbeing. I accept that Mr Hallam was experiencing a difficult period in his personal life at the time he made the decision to withdraw. I acknowledge the deeply personal nature of those circumstances and the toll they took on him. It was clearly a difficult time for him.
2. The question, however, is not whether Mr Hallam now regrets his decision to withdraw, or whether he was under pressure when he made that decision. The question is whether the Tribunal dismissed the application in error. Mr Hallam's personal circumstances, however distressing, do not establish that the Tribunal was in error when it acted on his withdrawal to dismiss the application pursuant to s 95 of the ART Act.
3. Mr Hallam's emails of 27 October 2025, 2 December 2025, and 3 December 2025 reveal a considered, albeit evolving, process. On 27 October 2025, Mr Hallam indicated he was thinking about withdrawing and would take a week to consider his position. More than a month later, on 2 December 2025, he sent a clear and unequivocal request to withdraw. On 3 December 2025, he sent a further email providing additional reasons for the withdrawal. These communications were coherent, addressed to the correct parties, and expressed a clear intention to withdraw.
4. Assessed against the framework in JTBJ,[2] this is not a case where Mr Hallam did not consent to the withdrawal. He clearly did consent and conceded that he sent the email seeking to withdraw. Nor is it a case where Mr Hallam so misunderstood the nature and consequences of his consent such that it was not a true consent. His emails demonstrate that he understood he was withdrawing from the proceedings and communicated that intention deliberately.
5. As the President observed in JTBJ,[3] the principle is not engaged where an applicant simply changes their mind about whether to continue with the proceeding. I find that is what occurred here. Mr Hallam made a decision to withdraw, the Tribunal acted on that decision by dismissing the review application under s 95 of the ART Act, and Mr Hallam subsequently changed his mind and now applies for reinstatement.
6. I am not satisfied that the fact that Mr Hallam was under stress or experiencing mental health difficulties at the time he withdrew the application renders the Tribunal's dismissal an error. Even accepting that Mr Hallam was experiencing significant personal difficulties, the evidence before me does not objectively demonstrate that he so misunderstood the nature and consequences of his withdrawal that it was not a true consent. His emails show a clear understanding that he was bringing the proceedings to an end.
7. Mr Hallam also contends that the Tribunal should have required a formal document, rather than an email, before treating his communication as a withdrawal. He submits that the failure to do so was an error.
8. I do not accept this contention. Section 95(1)(a) of the ART Act provides that an applicant may withdraw an application by 'giving written notice to the Tribunal.' I find an email is a form of written notice.
9. There is no requirement in the ART Act that a withdrawal be in any particular form, that it be signed, or that it be made on a prescribed form. Mr Hallam's email of 2 December 2025, addressed to the Tribunal and copied to the other parties, constituted written notice of his intention to withdraw. Having received the email seeking to withdraw the review application, the Tribunal was entitled to act upon it.
10. Further, one of the objectives of the Tribunal, set out in s 9(b) of the ART Act, is to ensure that applications are resolved as quickly, and with as little formality and expense, as a proper consideration of the matters before the Tribunal permits. To require a formal document or prescribed form for a withdrawal, when the statute requires only 'written notice,' would be inconsistent with this objective. It would impose formality that Parliament did not require and that the Tribunal's objectives counsel against.
11. I am not satisfied that the Tribunal's acceptance of Mr Hallam's email as a valid withdrawal, and its consequent dismissal of the application under s 95, was an error.

1. I have considered Mr Hallam's application under s 102(5) and assessed whether the application was dismissed in error for the purposes of s 102(6). I have had regard to the categories of error identified by the President in JTBJ at [46] and the authorities there considered. I find that the application was not dismissed in error. Mr Hallam gave clear written notice of his withdrawal. The Tribunal acted on that notice in accordance with s 95 of the ART Act. The applicant's subsequent change of mind, however understandable in light of his personal circumstances, does not convert a lawful dismissal into one made in error.
2. Having regard to all of the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the application was dismissed in error.
3. As I am not satisfied that the application was dismissed in error, the condition for the exercise of the discretion to reinstate under s 102(6) is not met. I therefore refuse to reinstate the application.
4. I accept that Mr Hallam will be disappointed with this conclusion. However, he is not without recourse. Participants in the NDIS have evolving needs, and the scheme is designed to accommodate changes in a participant's circumstances and support requirements over time. Ms Cameron explained at the hearing that the NDIA was presently reviewing Mr Hallam's plan. As part of that process, Mr Hallam may provide any new or additional evidence he wishes, including the evidence he indicated at the hearing he would seek to provide in this review. If he is not satisfied with the outcome of any such reassessment, he may seek internal review of that decision. If he is not satisfied with the outcome of the internal review, he has the right to apply to this Tribunal for review of that decision.
5. Whilst I accept that the applicant would prefer to have the Tribunal make a decision in relation to his supports, I encourage Mr Hallam to engage with the Agency in relation to his current plan and the supports he considers are required. The pathway I have described provides a means by which his concerns can be addressed on their merits, with the benefit of up-to-date evidence reflecting his current circumstances and needs. It may be that having pursued that process, an application to the Tribunal is not necessary.

I certify that the preceding 36 (thirty-six) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of General Member Robertson

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[1] See also Re Kalafatis and Commissioner of Taxation [2012] AATA 150, [80]; Re Kabue and Minister for Home Affairs (Migration) [2019] AATA 3753, [23].

[2] JTBJ and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] ARTA 464, [46(b)].

[3] JTBJ and Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] ARTA 464, [46].