Golar v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1688

The applicant satisfied the Australian study requirement in the period of 6 months immediately before the day the application was made.

1. The Australian study requirement was defined in reg 1.15F of the Regulations which relevantly provided as follows:

(1) A person satisfies the Australian study requirement if the person satisfies the Minister that the person has completed 1 or more degrees, diplomas or trade qualifications for award by an Australian educational institution as a result of a course or courses:

(a) that are registered courses; and

(b) that were completed in a total of at least 16 calendar months; and

(c) that were completed as a result of a total of at least 2 academic years study; and

(d) for which all instruction was conducted in English; and

(e) that the applicant undertook while in Australia as the holder of a visa authorising the applicant to study.

Note: Academic year is defined in regulation 1.03.

completed, in relation to a degree, diploma or trade qualification, means having met the academic requirements for its award.

Note: The academic requirements for the award of a degree, diploma or trade qualification do not include the formal conferral of the degree, diploma or trade qualification. Therefore, a person can complete a degree, diploma or trade qualification, for subregulation (2), before the award is formally conferred.

degree has the meaning given in subregulation 2.26AC(6).

diploma has the meaning given in subregulation 2.26AC(6).

trade qualification has the meaning given in subregulation 2.26AC(6).

1. In particular, the delegate found that, because the applicant had completed the Diploma of Hospitality more than six months before he had lodged his visa application, he could not satisfy the requirements of cl 485.221 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations (CB 46).
2. On 18 July 2018, the applicant applied to the Tribunal for review of the delegate's decision (CB 48-49). In that review application, the applicant nominated a registered migration agent as his authorised representative (CB 49).
3. On 17 February 2020, the applicant appointed a new migration agent to act as his authorised representative (CB 60-61).
4. On 29 June 2020, the applicant was invited (through his authorised representative) to attend a Tribunal hearing (by telephone) scheduled to take place on 15 July 2020 (CB 69-73).
5. On 14 July 2020, the applicant's authorised representative provided the Tribunal with additional documents in support of his review application, including a statement from the applicant, a letter from the applicant's course provider dated 7 June 2018 (confirming that the applicant had completed his Diploma of Business on 6 May 2018), and associated academic records (CB 78-81).
6. On 15 July 2020, the applicant and his authorised representative appeared at the Tribunal hearing (by telephone) to give evidence and present arguments in support of the applicant's review application (CB 82-85). That hearing was adjourned to allow the applicant's representative time to provide further written submissions (CB 84).
7. On 16 July 2020, the Tribunal wrote to the applicant's course provider to "confirm the dates when all formal classes and examinations were completed" for the applicant's Diploma of Business (CB 86-88).
8. Later that same day (being on 16 July 2020), the applicant's course provider responded to the Tribunal to advise that the applicant "completed his formal classes and coursework in the Diploma of Business...on the 2nd May 2018" and the applicant's "Confirmation of Enrolment (CoE) ended on 6th May 2018" (CB 89).
9. On 23 July 2020, the Tribunal invited the applicant (through his authorised representative) to comment on or respond to the information provided by his course provider in relation to his course completion date (the Tribunal's invitation to comment letter) (CB 90-93).
10. On 24 July 2020, the applicant was invited (through his authorised representative) to attend the resumption of the adjourned Tribunal hearing (by telephone) scheduled to take place on 29 July 2020 (CB 94-97).
11. On 29 July 2020, the applicant and his authorised representative appeared via telephone at the resumed Tribunal hearing. Following the resumed hearing, the applicant's representative was provided until 12 August 2020 "to respond to the information, and provide any other supporting evidence" (CB 99).
12. On 12 August 2020, the applicant's representative provided submissions to the Tribunal on behalf of the applicant (CB 101-102). Those submissions essentially stated that:

(a) the applicant had attempted to obtain records from his education provider but was advised that those records had been destroyed;

(b) the applicant's education provider changed the completion date from 6 May 2018 to 2 May 2018 when contacted by the Tribunal, demonstrating that "they do not have reliable records"; and

(c) the Tribunal should prefer the applicant's statement and oral evidence over the records provided by the applicant's course provider.

1. On 14 August 2020, the Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision refusing to grant the applicant the visa (CB 106-110).
2. On 16 September 2020, the applicant lodged an application for judicial review in this Court. That application seeks review of the Tribunal's decision pursuant to s 476 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (the Act).

1. To obtain assistance from this Court, the applicant must show that the Tribunal has fallen into jurisdictional error. It is thus useful to outline the Tribunal's decision in some detail.
2. The Tribunal began by identifying the visa under review, noting that the applicant had applied for the visa on 24 April 2018 and that a delegate of the Minister had refused to grant the applicant the visa on 28 June 2018. The Tribunal explained that the delegate had refused the visa on the basis that the applicant did not satisfy cl 485.221 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations. That is, at the time of the applicant's visa application, the applicant had not provided evidence of completion of his course of study (at [1]-[3]).
3. The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant appeared at a hearing before it on 15 July 2020 (with the assistance of his registered migration agent) and that, at that hearing, the applicant submitted that he had completed his course of study prior to applying for the visa, however the applicant's course provider had not responded to his request for confirmation that he had completed his course prior to 24 April 2018. The Tribunal noted that the hearing had been adjourned until 29 July 2020 to allow the Tribunal to contact the applicant's course provider. The Tribunal recorded that it had done so on 16 July 2020 and that the course provider had responded that same day advising that the applicant had completed his formal classes and coursework on 2 May 2018, however his Confirmation of Enrolment had ended on 6 May 2018. The Tribunal recorded that it had invited the applicant to comment on or respond to that information on 23 July 2020 and that the hearing resumed on 29 July 2020 (at [4]-[8]).
4. The Tribunal explained that the applicant had applied for the visa in the Graduate Work stream and noted that cl 485.221 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations required the applicant to have satisfied the 'Australian study requirement' in the period of six months immediately before his visa application was made. The Tribunal identified that the issue before it was whether the applicant met that requirement and it outlined the applicant's study history as follows (at [10]-[11]):

(a) Certificate III in Commercial Cookery from 29 June 2015 to 26 June 2016;

(b) Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery from 25 July 2016 to 22 January 2017;

(c) Diploma of Hospitality from 3 March 2017 to 6 August 2017; and

(d) Diploma of Business from 6 November 2017 to 6 May 2018.

1. The Tribunal recorded that the applicant claimed he had completed his Diploma of Business course in March 2018 but was not able to provide evidence to support that claim at the first Tribunal hearing, claiming that the course provider would not respond to his requests. The Tribunal noted that it had requested information from the course provider on 16 July 2020 in relation to the applicant's course completion date and received a response from the course provider the same day indicating that the applicant had completed the course on 2 May 2018. The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant was invited to comment on that information (at [12]-[13]).
2. The Tribunal confirmed that the applicant was provided with another opportunity at the resumed hearing on 29 July 2020 to make submissions regarding the information in the Tribunal's invitation to comment letter (that is, that his course provider indicated that the Diploma of Business course was completed on 2 May 2018). The Tribunal noted that it was obliged to accept the evidence of the course provider but acknowledged submissions from the applicant's representative regarding the course completion. The Tribunal explained that relevant case law from the Federal Court of Australia accepted that a course is complete when formal work, examinations and marking has been completed, rather than the administrative act of formal completion. On that basis, the Tribunal gave the applicant until 12 August 2020 to produce such evidence from the course provider (at [14]-[17]).
3. The Tribunal confirmed that, on 12 August 2020, the applicant's representative had provided correspondence sent to the applicant's course provider on 6 August 2020 but noted that, at the time of the Tribunal's decision, no response to that correspondence had been received. On the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal from the course provider, the Tribunal was satisfied that the applicant completed his Diploma of Business course on 2 May 2018. The Tribunal found that the applicant had therefore submitted his visa application prior to the completion of his nominated course of study and thus did not satisfy cl 485.221 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations (or the criteria for the grant of the visa) (at [18]-[21]).
4. The Tribunal affirmed the delegate's decision refusing to grant the applicant the visa (at [22]).

1. The application for judicial review filed by the applicant on 16 September 2020 contained two particularised grounds of review as follows (without alteration):
   1. The Tribunal should not have relied on material from the Australian Careers Education (ACE) in the circumstances.

Particulars

1. I explained that I had completed my course on 23 April 2018 and proceeded to lodge my 485 visa application on 24 April 2018.
2. There was no reason for me to lodge my application prior to completing the course.
3. ACE refused my oral and written requests for information on several occasions, stating that they had destroyed my records.
4. ACE changed the date of completion from 6 May 2018 to 2 May 2018 demonstrating that their records should not be relied on.
5. The Tribunal is not obliged to accept the date given by ACE in these circumstances.
6. If the Tribunal did not accept the date from ACE then it would have changed the decision

2. The Tribunal should have requested the final assignments from ACE.

Particulars

1. The Tribunal was aware that ACE had failed to give me any evidence of my completion of the course.
2. The Tribunal was aware that ACE had changed the completion date previously and that their records were not reliable.
3. The Tribunal therefore should have asked ACE for the evidence of their suggested completion date, including submitted assignments.
4. If the assignments were marked on an earlier date, it would mean I satisfied this requirement.

1. The applicant also filed an affidavit with that judicial review application, annexing copies of the delegate's decision and associated notification letter and the Tribunal's decision. That affidavit (affirmed by the applicant on 7 September 2020) also outlined some of the procedural history of this matter and largely echoed the concerns raised in the applicant's grounds of review (outlined above).
2. The applicant appeared before the Court on 5 September 2025 (by video link) without legal representation. The Court confirmed with the applicant that he had received a copy of the Court Book and the Minister's written submissions.
3. The materials before the Court include the application for judicial review and supporting affidavit filed by the applicant on 16 September 2020 (the affidavit being taken as read and in evidence at the hearing on 5 September 2025), a Court Book numbering 110 pages (marked as Exhibit 1 at the hearing), and written submissions filed on behalf of the Minister on 22 August 2025.
4. The applicant was not represented at the hearing and the Court was thus mindful of the comments of Colvin J in DQQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 784 at [8] and Feutrill J in BKT17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 384 at [55] that it is usually appropriate for an unrepresented applicant to be given an opportunity to explain orally the matters that are said to give rise to an appeal (or review). That sensible and appropriate course is now the standard procedure in this Court: see, by way of recent example, Kaur v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCA 931 at [10]. Accordingly, at the hearing of this matter, the applicant was invited to tell the Court what he believed to be wrong with the Tribunal's decision and/or procedure.
5. The Court also took some time to explain that it could not undertake a merits review of the Tribunal's decision (Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 (Wu Shan Liang) at 272) and could only consider whether or not the Tribunal's decision revealed jurisdictional error. The Court explained that in migration decisions such as the decision being challenged, common categories of alleged jurisdictional error include:

(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question (Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163 at 178 (Craig));

(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material (Craig at 178);

(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material (Craig at 178);

(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures (SAAP v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294 at 354-355);

(e) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias (SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs and Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80 at [2]); and

(f) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable (Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21 at 27-28; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611 at 648; Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332 at [26]- [28]; Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437 at 445).

1. However, it was also explained to the applicant that this was not an exhaustive list and he should attempt to tell the Court why he said the Tribunal had fallen into error.
2. Against this background, the applicant told the Court that he had spoken verbally with his course provider to let them know that he wanted to "fast track" his course completion and finish in mid-March. The applicant claimed that he had finished the course, however the course provider had "uploaded the results very late" and the applicant did not "have any proof of that".
3. The applicant's oral submissions, to the extent that they give rise to any issue of jurisdictional error, will be addressed by the Court below.

1. As outlined above, the application for judicial review contained two particularised grounds asserting jurisdictional error. Noting that the applicant was unrepresented in this matter, the Court has endeavoured to interpret the applicant's grounds as broadly as possible (as per the principles in MZAIB v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 239 FCR 158).

1. By ground one, the applicant claimed that the Tribunal erred by relying on the evidence provided to it by the applicant's course provider.
2. The Minister submitted that:

(a) the weight given to evidence is a matter exclusively for the Tribunal;

(b) the Court cannot engage with the Tribunal's factual findings as to whether the applicant's oral evidence ought to have been preferred over evidence from the applicant's course provider;

(c) the Tribunal misstated its statutory obligations in relation to its requirement to accept evidence from the applicant's course provider but was nevertheless obliged to have regard to that information and did so;

(d) the Tribunal also had before it a letter dated 7 June 2018, submitted by the applicant from the applicant's course provider, which indicated that the applicant's Diploma of Business course was completed on 6 May 2018 (CB 79); and

(e) it cannot be said that the Tribunal failed to consider the applicant's evidence in relation to the completion of his Diploma of Business course.

1. The Court agrees for the reasons that follow.
2. To the extent that the applicant suggested that the Court ought to engage with the Tribunal's decision to prefer the evidence provided by the applicant's course provider over oral evidence provided by the applicant, the Court considers this to be nothing more than a request to engage in impermissible merits review (Wu Shan Liang at 281-282).
3. Insofar as the applicant may have been raising concerns with the weight the Tribunal placed on the evidence given by the applicant's course provider, it is well established that the Tribunal may attribute such weight to the evidence before it as it considered appropriate and may also accept or reject any evidence before it (see, for example, Meerun v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FedCFamC2G 972 (Meerun) at [82], citing NAHI v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCAFC 10 (NAHI) at [11]).
4. As correctly identified by the Minister, the Tribunal did mischaracterise its statutory obligation in relation to the acceptance of the course provider's evidence. In this regard, the Court notes that the Tribunal stated as follows (emphasis added):
   1. At the resumed hearing on 29 July 2020 the Tribunal provided the opportunity for the applicant to make submissions concerning the information provided to the applicant in the Tribunal's correspondence of 23 July 2020 noting that the advice to the Tribunal, from the college, was that the Diploma of Business course was completed on 2 May 2018. The Tribunal noted that it was obliged to accept the evidence of the institution.
5. In this matter, the Tribunal chose to obtain information from the applicant's course provider and was entitled to do so pursuant to s 359 of the Act. At the time of the Tribunal's decision in this matter, s 359 of the Act relevantly provided as follows:

(1) In conducting the review, the Tribunal may get any information that it considers relevant. However, if the Tribunal gets such information, the Tribunal must have regard to that information in making the decision on the review.

....

1. As can be seen from the extracts above, the Tribunal was legislatively empowered to obtain information from the applicant's course provider it considered relevant to the review application before it. In this case, the Tribunal requested information relating to the applicant's course completion date and received a response from them. Having obtained such information, the effect of s 359(1) of the Act meant that the Tribunal was required to have regard to that information in making its decision. However, it was not obliged to accept that information.
2. The Court notes, however, that despite this misstatement on the part of the Tribunal, the Tribunal was nevertheless entitled to prefer (and, on that basis, accept) the evidence of the applicant's course provider. As submitted by the Minister, it can be inferred that the Tribunal did just that in this case. Essentially, the Tribunal considered that the documentary information from the applicant's course provider ought to be accepted over the oral evidence from the applicant (and in the absence of any contrary documentary evidence from the applicant).
3. The Court also notes that the applicant himself (through his representative) provided a letter from his course provider (dated 7 June 2018) to the Tribunal on 14 July 2020, together with copies of his Diploma of Business and associated record of results (CB 78-81). That letter stated that the applicant had commenced his studies with the course provider on 7 November 2017 and had completed the Diploma of Business on 6 May 2018 (CB 79).
4. As outlined above, the Tribunal was entitled to accept, reject or attribute such weight to the evidence before it as it considered appropriate (see Meerun at [82] and NAHI at [11]) and did so.
5. No jurisdictional error arises in relation to ground one.

1. By ground two, the applicant suggested that the Tribunal erred by failing to request the applicant's final course assignments from the applicant's course provider.
2. The Minister submitted that:

(a) the Tribunal is not obliged to investigate or conduct an inquiry but is simply required to review; and

(b) there was no obvious inquiry that the Tribunal failed to make in this case.

1. The Court agrees for the reasons that follow.
2. The Court notes that the duty imposed on the Tribunal is a duty to review and not a duty to make inquiries. Whilst a failure to make inquiries about a critical fact which can easily be ascertained may lead to a jurisdictional error in certain circumstances, there is no overarching duty on the part of the Tribunal to make inquiries (see Minister for Immigration v SZIAI [2009] HCATrans 165; (2009) 259 ALR 429 at [18]- [25]; Applicant VEAL of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2005] HCA 72; (2005) 225 CLR 88; and Prasad v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1985) 6 FCR 155).
3. It is also well established that the Tribunal is under no obligation to investigate or conduct an inquiry to determine whether an applicant's case might be "better put" or supported by additional evidence (Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v SZNVW [2010] FCAFC 41; (2010) 183 FCR 575 at [36] and [49]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v SGLB (2004) 78 ALJR 992 at [43]; Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v VSAF of 2003 [2005] FCAFC 73 at [20]).
4. In this case, the Tribunal requested information from the applicant's course provider (on 16 July 2020) in relation to the completion of the Diploma of Business course (CB 86-88). In particular, the Tribunal asked the course provider to provide the following information (CB 87):

As per telephone conversation on 15 July 2020 the Tribunal would like you to confirm the following:

• The applicant Mr Narinder Singh Golar claimed that he finished the course work for his Diploma of Business (BSB50215) in March 2018.
• Can you please confirm the dates when all formal classes and examinations were completed?

1. Later that same day (being on 16 July 2020), the applicant's course provider responded to the Tribunal's request as follows (CB 89):

Our records indicate that Mr Golar completed his formal classes and coursework in the Diploma of Business (BSB50215) on the 2nd May 2018. His Confirmation of Enrolment (CoE) ended on 6th May 2018.

1. The applicant was given opportunities to comment on or respond to that information before the resumed hearing (on 29 July 2020), at that resumed hearing, and following the resumed hearing. At no point did the applicant or his representative ask the Tribunal to request the applicant's final course assignments from the applicant's course provider, nor was there any obligation on the Tribunal to do so. Instead, the applicant's representative submitted that the Tribunal ought to "prefer the statement from [the applicant] dated 15 July 2020 and evidence given at [the Tribunal] hearing" over the information received from the applicant's course provider (CB 101).
2. As submitted by the Minister, having made inquiries of the applicant's course provider and obtained confirmation of the applicant's last date of enrolment and the date he completed his formal classes and coursework, nothing further was required for the Tribunal to be satisfied of the applicant's course completion date. This is particularly so in circumstances where the applicant (through his representative) was given multiple opportunities to provide documentary evidence to the contrary and did not do so.
3. As outlined above (in relation to ground one), the Tribunal was entitled to apportion weight to the evidence before it as it deemed appropriate, and did so in this case, preferring the documentary evidence before it from the applicant's course provider over oral evidence given by the applicant at the Tribunal hearings.
4. No jurisdictional error arises in relation to ground two.

Issue raised by the Minister - typographical error or misdescription by the Tribunal

1. In written submissions filed with this Court, counsel for the Minister, in line with his obligation to act as a model litigant, identified what it considered to be a "typographic error" in the Tribunal's reasons as follows (emphasis added) (CB 109 at [13]):

On 16 July 2020, the Tribunal requested the Australian Careers Education Pty Ltd to provide information to confirm when the applicant completed his Diploma of Business course and on the same day the college responded that the applicant completed the course on 2 May 2018. This information was provided to the applicant under s359(2) with the invitation to comment.

1. The Minister submitted that this was an error as the Tribunal had, in fact, written to the applicant pursuant to s 359A of the Act, however it did not constitute a jurisdictional error because:

(a) the letter from the Tribunal to the applicant was correctly sent pursuant to s 359A of the Act;

(b) it was simply a "mis-description by the Tribunal in the procedural recounting of the process" in its reasons;

(c) that misdescription did not alter the substance of the letter or the applicant's opportunity to comment and, as such, the Tribunal did not breach its procedural fairness obligations to the applicant; and

(d) the error did not deprive the applicant of the possibility of a successful outcome and thus cannot be said to have been material to the Tribunal's decision.

1. The Court agrees for the reasons that follow.
2. The Court is mindful of the observations made by Marshall J in Foroghi v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 1875 at [48]:

[...] Occasionally the [Tribunal], like other decision-makers, deliver reasons for decision without 100% proofreading. Occasionally mistakes are not discovered even when the best of proofreaders have examined draft reasons. The existence of a typographical error is best acknowledged rather than attempted to be exploited; see CCC v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 682.

1. This may happen more often in the context of "high-volume decision-making which confronts Tribunals" (EBQ20 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 369 FLR 123 (EBQ20) at [168]).
2. As explained by Judge Given of this Court in EBQ20, such errors have been considered in a number of cases in the migration jurisdiction (at [169]):

[...] While often broadly described as being "typographic" or clerical errors, they actually arise in a number of different ways and have included:

(a) the use of an unfortunate word with potentially racist connotations to test a non-functioning spellchecker, which was then not later manually identified and removed prior to the publication of reasons: see M257 of 2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2006] FMCA 131 at [34] to [51] per Riethmuller FM (as his Honour then was);

(b) Tribunal members using template paragraphs in respect of different applicants from similar countries of origin or who make similar claims, and then indiscriminately cutting and pasting into the decision of others without consideration or at the very least tailoring: see SZRBA v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 142 ALD 211 per Siopis, Perram and Davis JJ and MZZZW v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCAFC 133; (2015) 234 FCR 154 at [32(10)] per Tracey, Murphy and Mortimer JJ; alternatively, using template paragraphs which deal with similar issues but again failing to tailor them such that the Tribunal wholly mis-describes the applicant's country of origin: see SZTGE v Minister for Immigration and Anor [2014] FCCA 1458 at [22] to [26] per Judge Driver; and

(c) poor drafting/looseness of language and definitions in the written decision so that the Tribunal's reasoning process becomes difficult to discern: Davis v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Service and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 1368 at [30] to [43];

(d) leaving out a crucial word such as "not", leading to the opposite finding than was clearly intended from the context of the omission: see CCC v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 682 Marshall J at [27] to [29] and S14/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FCA 1153 at [34] per Moore J.

1. The Court also notes that "[c]are should be taken in not seeking to use the expression "typographic" in relation to any error just as a shorthand way of saying it is an error of little, or no, consequence" (CCN17 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2022] FedCFamC2G 678 at [57]).
2. As outlined above, the Tribunal properly invited the applicant (through his representative) to comment on or respond to information by way of the Tribunal's invitation to comment letter on 23 July 2020 (CB 90-93). The applicant was then invited to a resumed hearing which took place on 29 July 2020. At that resumed hearing, the applicant gave oral evidence in response to the invitation to comment (CB 101) and was given an extension of time within which to provide further information (CB 99-100). The applicant's representative ultimately provided a written response to the Tribunal by email on 12 August 2020 (CB 101-102).
3. Whilst the Tribunal did err in its description of the section of the Act under which the applicant was sent the Tribunal's invitation to comment letter, the Court is satisfied that the letter itself was properly sent in accordance with s 359A and s 359B of the Act (as were in force at the time of the Tribunal's decision). That is, the letter:

(a) invited the applicant to comment or respond (in writing) to information received from the applicant's course provider that the applicant had completed his formal classes and course work on 2 May 2018 and that his enrolment had ended on 6 May 2018 (CB 92): s 359A(1)(a) & (c) and s 359B(1) of the Act;

(b) explained why that information was relevant to the review and the consequences of the Tribunal relying on that information (noting that it appeared that the completion date of the applicant's Diploma of Business course was after the lodgement date of his visa application and that, if relied upon, it may form part of the Tribunal's reasoning that the applicant had not met cl 485.221 in Schedule 2 of the Regulations) (CB 92): s 359A(1)(b) of the Act;

(c) was sent to the applicant's representative via email (being a method specified in s 379A of the Act) at the last known email address provided in connection with the review: s 359A(2) of the Act; and

(d) gave the applicant 14 days within which to respond, being the prescribed period set out in reg 4.17(4) of the Regulations: s 359B(2) of the Act.

1. In circumstances where the applicant was properly invited to comment on or respond to information, and did so (through his representative), the Court is also satisfied that any misdescription in the Tribunal's reasons of the procedural recounting of the process did not deprive the applicant of any opportunity to comment or amount to any breach of the Tribunal's procedural fairness obligations.
2. No jurisdictional error arises in this regard.

1. The application for review has failed to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal. The Court is otherwise unable to identify any jurisdictional error on the part of the Tribunal.
2. Accordingly, the application for judicial review is dismissed.

I certify that the preceding seventy-six (76) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Gerrard.