1. The Tribunal has jurisdiction to determine this aspect of the application pursuant to s 72T of the R&C Act.[3]
2. However, as the Applicant accepts, that jurisdiction does not extend in this matter to considering the merits of:

(a) Child Support's calculation of the maintenance liability, save to the extent that the Applicant can demonstrate that he has no liability, so as to engage s 17I(1)(a); or > > (b) Child Support's decision to issue the DPO.

3. That is because, pursuant to s 12 of the Administrative Review Tribunal Act 2024 (Cth) (ART Act), read in conjunction with s 72T, the Tribunal's jurisdiction is limited to considering the decision before it, which in this respect is the decision not to revoke the DPO.
4. The issues in respect of this aspect of the applications are whether the DPO must or should be revoked because the Applicant satisfies subsection 72I, in that, relevantly:

(a) He no longer has a child support liability, pursuant to s 72l(1)(a); or > > (b) He has made satisfactory arrangements to wholly discharge his child support liability, pursuant to s 71l(1)(b); or > > (c) The child support liability is completely irrecoverable, pursuant to s 72l(1)(c); or > > (d) It is desirable to do so, pursuant to s 72l(3).

Does the Applicant have a child support liability?

1. In the FCFCOA appeal, the Applicant contended that Child Support had no statutory mandate to collect maintenance in respect of an adult, and that any liability raised prior to Mr J's 18th birthday was settled on a final basis when the initial DPO was revoked. The argument proceeded that Child Support was prevented by estoppel from reversing the final settlement in respect of the initial DPO or had waived its right to do so.
2. Those arguments were rejected by the dismissal of the appeal. The Applicant no longer agitates those arguments.
3. Before me, the Applicant argues that, because Ms A was an Australian resident from 2012, Child Support was precluded from registering the 2009 Order.
4. For the purposes of understanding his argument in that regard, certain uncontroversial facts are relevant:

(a) There was no Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Order (REMO) from the United Kingdom to Australia in respect of the 2009 Order; and > > (b) As stated above, Ms A has been habitually resident in Australia since 2012.

5. The Applicant relies on an interpretation of various sections of the R&C Act to support his contention.
6. Firstly s 4 provides that, relevantly:

overseas maintenance liability' means a liability that arises under: > > (a) a maintenance order made by a judicial authority of a reciprocating jurisdiction; or > > (b) a maintenance agreement registered by a judicial or administrative authority of a reciprocating jurisdiction; or > > (c) a maintenance assessment issued by an administrative authority of a reciprocating jurisdiction. > > resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction' means a person who is habitually resident in the reciprocating jurisdiction.

25 Application for registration of registrable maintenance liability > > (1) The payee of a registrable maintenance liability that is not registered under this Act may apply to the Registrar, in the manner specified by the Registrar, for the registration of the liability under this Act. > > (1A) If:

(a) the payee is a resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction; and

(b) the registrable maintenance liability is a registrable overseas maintenance liability that arises under an order made by, or registered in, a court of the reciprocating jurisdiction; an application for the registration of the liability:

(c) made by the payee and given to the Registrar by an overseas authority of the reciprocating jurisdiction; or

(d) made by such an overseas authority on behalf of the payee; is taken to be an application under subsection (1) if the Registrar is satisfied that it is appropriate to do so.

(1B) If:

(a) the payee is a resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction; and

(b) the registrable maintenance liability is a registrable overseas maintenance liability that does not arise under an order made by, or registered in, a court of the reciprocating jurisdiction; an application for the registration of the liability is not taken to be an application under subsection (1) unless it is:

(c) made by the payee and given to the Registrar by an overseas authority of the reciprocating jurisdiction; or

(d) made by such an overseas authority on behalf of the payee.

(1C) If either the payer or the payee of a registrable maintenance liability that is not registered under this Act is a resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction, the payer may apply to the Registrar, in a manner specified by the Registrar, for the registration of the liability under this Act.

1. The Applicant reads s 25(1) as, in effect, an introduction to the provision, with the qualifying criteria to make an application for registration of the liability being restricted to those set out in ss 25(1A), 25(1B) and 25(1C).
2. In other words, because Ms A was habitually resident in Australia at the relevant time, and not resident in a reciprocating jurisdiction, the Applicant posits, correctly, that neither ss 25(1A) nor 25(1B) could be engaged to allow for registration of the liability.
3. The Applicant then submits that s 25(1C) could not be an appropriate basis for registration of the liability to apply, as he did not apply for registration as the payer. As a result, the Applicant submits that the Respondent had no authority to register the maintenance liability.
4. On first reading of the provision, the argument in respect of s 25(1C) holds some attraction. However, I am satisfied those submissions proceed on a misunderstanding.
5. Firstly, it is apparent that s 25(1) of the Act has its own work to do. It provides the general authority for the Respondent to register an otherwise unregistered maintenance liability on the application of a payee, so long as the payee 'appl[ies] to the Registrar, in the manner specified by the Registrar'. That is its plain textual meaning, and it is not otherwise displaced by the context in which it appears. Were it to be construed otherwise, it would lead to the absurd result that only applications for registration that fall within the terms of ss 25(1A), (1B) or (1C) could be registered for collection, thereby defeating the purpose of the legislative scheme in respect of the vast majority of maintenance liabilities the scheme is intended to provide for, where neither the payer nor payee live in a reciprocating jurisdiction.
6. My interpretation is further reinforced by the reference in s 25(1A) to an application that engages that section being 'taken to be an application under subsection (1)'.
7. Section 25(1A) is facultative in respect of s 25(1). It provides a qualified dispensation from the requirements of s 25(1), where a payee lives overseas in a reciprocating jurisdiction. In doing so, it dispenses with the requirements of s 25(1) that the payee apply directly 'to the Registrar' (ss 25(1A)(c) and 25(1A)(d)) and that they do so 'in the manner specified by the Registrar', so long as the liability stems from 'an order made by, or registered in, a court of the reciprocating jurisdiction' and the application is passed on to the Respondent, or made, by an overseas authority. In those circumstances, there will be clarity as to the nature and extent of the liability.
8. Section 25(1B) qualifies the deeming aspect of s 25(1A) where the liability does not arise under an order made by, or registered in, a court of the reciprocating jurisdiction. In those circumstances, there must be direct engagement with the Registrar by an overseas authority for an application that does not meet the terms of s 25(1) to be taken as being accepted under s 25(1). The apparent intent of that section is to ensure that the Respondent has sufficient clarity as to the nature and extent of the liability before an application by a payee can be accepted as an application under s 25(1). This would limit the scope for dispute with the payer as to the nature and extent of their liability and allow the Respondent to ensure the register is correct.
9. To read s 25(1C) it in the manner the Applicant suggests, whilst textually available, does not best construe it in context.
10. In my view, s 25(1C) provides a standalone power to the Respondent to register a liability on the application of a payer, and it is not a further qualification to the provisions of ss 25(1A) and (1B).
11. It is important to note that s 25(1C) is the only provision that allows a payer to make an application for registration of the liability. In doing so, it returns to the language of s 25(1), in that it requires an application to the Registrar in the manner specified by the Registrar. The only other qualification it places on the application is that 'either the payer or payee' are a resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction.
12. Nor does s 25(1C) refer back to, or seek to qualify, the application of s 25(1).
13. As stated by Gordon, Edelman, Steward, and Gleeson JJ in ENT19 v Minister for Home Affairs[4] at [87], with citations omitted:

...legislation must be construed on the prima facie basis that its provisions are intended to give effect to harmonious goals. As expressed by Gageler J in SAS Trustee Corporation v Miles, "statutory text must be considered from the outset in context and attribution of meaning to the text in context must be guided so far as possible by statutory purpose on the understanding that a legislature ordinarily intends to pursue its purposes by coherent means". Where conflict appears to arise in construing an Act, "the conflict must be alleviated, so far as possible, by adjusting the meaning of the competing provisions to achieve that result which will best give effect to the purpose and language of those provisions while maintaining the unity of all the statutory provisions", and this "will often require the court 'to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other'". Ultimately, the task in applying the accepted principles of statutory construction is to discern what Parliament is to be taken to have intended.

14. I am satisfied that Parliament's intent was that s 25(1) provide the general mechanism for a payee to make an application for registration of a maintenance liability, and that s 25(1C) provides the only mechanism for the payer to do so. It would not represent 'coherent means' to enact a provision that meant, where the payer and not the payee lived overseas in a reciprocating jurisdiction, only the payer could apply to register the liability.
15. I am satisfied that the Registrar had the authority to register the maintenance liability, on the application of Ms A under s 25(1). The Applicant's challenge to the existence of a registered liability fails on that basis.
16. Whilst the Applicant did not otherwise assert that he had no child support liability, I will briefly deal with the other relevant provisions.
17. The meaning of 'child support liability' for the purposes of the provisions of the R&C Act is separately defined.
18. Section 72E provides that a person has a child support liability where:

(a) The person has a registerable maintenance liability; > > (b) The amount payable under the registerable maintenance liability is a child support debt; and > > (c) The debt is due and payable and remains unpaid in whole or in part.

19. The liability under the 2009 Order is an overseas maintenance liability as defined under s 18A and was registered under s 24.
20. Once it was registered, the maintenance liability under the 2009 Order became a debt due to the Commonwealth under s 30 and, on non-payment of the liability, it became a child support debt as defined under s 4.
21. Whilst the Applicant also relied on unchallenged evidence from a solicitor in the UK to the effect that, under the laws of the UK a maintenance liability that is more than 12 months old cannot be collected without leave of an appropriate court, I agree with the Respondent's submission that this does not fetter Australia's ability to make binding laws that are not impacted by that position, including the provisions under consideration here.
22. Nor do I think it appropriate to otherwise look behind the certificate of debt provided by the Respondent. In that respect, I agree with the comments of Senior Member Bean of the AAT in O'Neill and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 545, at [17]-[18],[5] that:

Having regard to the terms of s 72E and the matters to which a decisionmaker is required to have regard in s 72D and s 72I, in my view the legislative framework also does not contemplate that a decision-maker will embark upon an investigation of the correctness of assessments which have been made under the Assessment Act for the purposes of determining the reliability of these in the context of considering whether it is desirable to revoke a DPO. Rather, the legislative framework contemplates that debt issues will be dealt with under the Assessment Act but that in the context of applying s 72D and s 72I, the currently applicable child support assessments will be regarded as 'final' for the purposes of applying those provisions. > > For these reasons I have concluded that it is not open to this Tribunal in the context of the current application to 'look behind' the child support assessments which have been made....

23. The certificate as to the amount of the debt provided by the Respondent is, under s 116(2), prima facie evidence of the child support liability due and payable by the Applicant. [6] Other than by mounting his challenge to the lawfulness of the registration of the liability, the Applicant did not challenge the accuracy of the certificate.
24. The Applicant cannot satisfy s 72I(1)(a), as he currently has a child support liability.

Has the Applicant made satisfactory arrangements for his child support liability to be wholly discharged?

1. The Applicant has not made any payments toward his child support liability since 9 February 2022. As of 22 July 2025, the Applicant owed $357,693.21 in child support, including penalties of $72,709.92. He has made no arrangements to discharge his liability, meaning the terms of s 72I(1)(b) are not met.

Is the child support liability completely irrecoverable?

1. In Naboush and Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 930 at [15], then Deputy President Tamberlin of the AAT found, in comments I agree with, that:

The word 'irrecoverable' is a word of wide import, and this width is expanded by the use of the word 'completely'. Whilst ever there is some reasonable prospect of recovering money from the Applicant, the DPO should not be revoked.

2. The Respondent acknowledges that, as the Applicant resides overseas, it may be difficult to enforce the obligation to pay child support.
3. However, the Respondent submits that, given the Applicant's ability to satisfy the debt that led to the initial DPO, it should not be assumed that the current debt is irrecoverable.
4. In evidence before me is a statement showing that, in 2021, the Applicant declared an income of over $66,000 per month when making an application for a home loan. In 2024, he was the joint mortgage holder in respect of loans exceeding $2,000,000 on a property located in Australia. That evidence shows that the Applicant has a capacity to generate significant income. The Applicant provided no other relevant evidence as to his financial position. In those circumstances, there is nothing before me upon which I could be satisfied, even by drawing an appropriate inference, that the debt is irrecoverable. In any event, the Applicant made no such assertion.
5. I am not satisfied the debt is completely irrecoverable. The terms of s 72I(1)(c) are not met.

1. In Shahani and Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 312 at [14], Senior Member Letcher of the AAT recorded that:

In relation to s 72I(3), this is a provision requiring the exercise of a discretion as to whether it is 'desirable' to revoke or vary a DPO. It is a well-established principle of law that such a discretion is to be exercised not entirely at large, but taking account of the purpose and objects of the legislation (Whittaker v Child Support Registrar [2010] FCA 43; 2010 264ALR 473 at 291 per Lindgren J; Re O'Neill and Child Support Registrar [2010] AATA 545 and see Kevin Lui and Commissioner Taxation [2009] AATA 626 per Buchanan J at [23-24, 26]).

2. The principal object of the Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (Cth), which forms part of the same statutory scheme, is set out in s 4 and is 'to ensure the level of financial support to be provided by parents for their children is commensurate with each parent's capacity to pay'.
3. Section 3 of the R&C Act states that its principal objects are, in part, to ensure that children receive a proper level of financial support from their parents and that child support is paid on a regular and timely basis.
4. Whilst Mr J has now reached the age of majority, the 2009 Order requires that his maintenance continue. Evidence before me indicates that he was enrolled in tertiary education before turning 18.
5. In Whittaker v Child Support Registrar,[7] Lindgren J stated in respect of making a DPO that:

...While a DPO is not security in a propriety sense, it is security in a broader sense of a procedure designed to prevent recovery being frustrated. > > It may be that the present submission is intended to distinguish between a purpose of preventing a particular imminent departure from Australia and a more general prevention of any departure from Australia. In my view even the latter is within para (b) of s 72D(1). That is to say, that paragraph is satisfied if the Registrar believes on reasonable grounds that it is 'desirable' to make the DPO for the purposes of "ensuring" (a strong word: see Troughton v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2008] FCA 18; (2008) 166 FCR 9 at [20]) that the person does not depart at any time in the future from Australia for any foreign country without first discharging the child support liability, or making arrangements satisfactory to the Registrar for its discharge.

6. In Onder & Child Support Registrar and Sari (No. 2) [2011] FMCAfam 430, Monahan FM held at [78] and [91] that:

There is merit in the submission from the CSA Registrar that if s. 72D of the Collection Act is given 'its literal effect, which is consistent with its purpose', then 'the desirability of using the DPO to "secure civil debt"' is not an irrelevant consideration by the CSA Registrar. > > ... > > ... it is clear to the Court that the CSA Registrar formed the view that the issue of a DPO against the Father was likely to act as an incentive for him to pay the child support liability.

7. I agree with the Respondent's submission that the security provided by the DPO is equally relevant to a consideration of whether it is desirable to revoke a DPO where the liability remains outstanding.
8. There is nothing to indicate that Mr J is no longer in need of support, or that the Applicant cannot make his contribution to that support.
9. Other than through his challenge to the lawfulness of the registration of the maintenance liability, and the injustice he feels that it, and the retrospective addition of CPI increases in the debt work on him, the Applicant did not seek to establish that it was otherwise desirable to revoke the DPO.
10. I have found the former concern to be unmeritorious and the latter can only be properly challenged if I go on to grant an extension of time to do so and the Applicant demonstrates that it was improper. However, even if he succeeds in that respect, the CPI component is only a small proportion of the overall debt, and therefore unlikely to have any material bearing on whether a DPO is warranted.
11. I am not satisfied that it is desirable to revoke the DPO. As such, there is no basis on which the DPO can, or should be revoked. I will affirm the DPO decision under review in this respect.

THE APPLICATIONS TO EXTEND TIME TO REVIEW THE OBJECTION DECISIONS

1. I have jurisdiction to conduct a second review of these decisions pursuant to ss 131(C)(c) and 131(D)(1) of the ART Act.
2. The general provisions relating to time in which to apply for review in the Tribunal are contained in s 18(1) of the ART Act and r 5(3) of the Administrative Review Tribunal Rules 2024 (Cth).
3. However, s 90 of the R&C Act provides that a resident of a reciprocating jurisdiction has 90 days to lodge their application.
4. Section 91 relevantly provides:
   1. If the period for applying for ART review has ended, a person may make an application for ART review that includes a written application (the extension application) requesting the ART to consider the application for ART review despite the ending of the period.
   2. The extension application must state the reasons for the person's failure to apply for the review within the period.
   3. Section 19 (ART may extend period for making application) of the ART Act does not apply in relation to extensions of time for the making of applications for ART review.
5. Subsection 92(1) of the R&C Act then relevantly provides:

If a person makes an extension application under section 91 in relation to an application for ART review, the ART must:

(a) consider the extension application; and

...

(c) if the extension application is granted - deal with the application for ART review.

1. There is no dispute, and I am satisfied, that the objection decision applications were made well out of time. Even in the absence of direct evidence as to when the objection decisions were received by the Applicant, rebuttable statutory presumptions dictate when service will be taken to have been effected.[8] As a result of the application of those presumptions, and where no evidence to the contrary has been provided by the Applicant, it is presumed that he was served with a copy of the objection decisions on or about 17 January 2023. Ninety days from 17 January 2023 is 17 April 2023, meaning the objection decision applications to the AAT were lodged more than 16 months out of time.
2. The overarching principle to be applied where an extension of time is sought, and the relevant legislation provides no explicit mandatory considerations that determine the exercise of the discretion, is that the Tribunal should consider any pertinent factors to determine 'what the justice of the case requires'.[9]
3. The starting position where the law provides a fixed period of time to make an application, subject to extension, is that proceedings commenced outside the statutory time limit will not be entertained: Lucic v Nolan [1982] FCA 217. There is no onus of proof upon an applicant for an extension of time, and special circumstances need not be shown, but the Tribunal will not grant the application unless positively satisfied it is proper to do so.
4. The Tribunal is only required to conduct a preliminary assessment of the apparent merit of the substantive applications, not to fully hear and determine them.
5. In considering extensions in respect of applications of this nature, the Tribunal has commonly drawn on a line of authority that includes Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen (Hunter Valley)[10] and Englezos v Secretary, Department of Social Services.[11] Those decisions provide guidance by the Court on extensions of time to appeal from the former AAT to the Court.
6. Some care must be taken when transposing such guidance to a different context, to ensure that it is not considered to fetter the exercise of the discretion, or to raise permissible considerations to the status of being mandatory. However, I agree that the considerations set out in those decisions are all permissible, and commonly relevant considerations in respect of applications of this nature. They include:

(a) Whether the substantive applications have reasonable prospects of success: Hunter Valley at [22]. > > (b) The length of the delay: Ralkon v Aboriginal Development Commission [1982] FCA 153; (1982) 43 ALR 535 at 550; > > (c) The explanation for the delay: Hunter Valley at [18], Doyle v Chief of Staff [1982] FCA 124; (1982) 42 ALR 283 at 287. (The inclusion of s 91(2) indicates that the 'reasons for the person's failure to apply for the review within the period' are a mandatory consideration in the context of this application); > > (d) Any prejudice to the parties or persons affected by the decision: Hunter Valley at [20]; and > > (e) The public interest: Brisbane South Regional Health Authority v Taylor (1996) 186 CLR 541.

7. Further, I agree with comments made by Senior Member O'Donovan of the former AAT in NLLQ and Child Support Registrar[12] at [3]-[4]:

...In particular, it is worth noting that delay in resolution of child support issues can, at least in terms of practical enforcement, have an impact on the timing of payments for the support of a child. The expenses which must be met by the other parent are not delayed, but the payment of child support can be. > > In this particular statutory context, the reasons for delay and the effect on the orderly payment of child support should be scrutinised very closely. It should also be noted that a statutory context where multiple opportunities are given to address the merits of a decision is very distant from a first instance application to a court on a question of the lawfulness of conduct.

The apparent merit of the substantive applications

1. Further to his arguments as to the invalidity of the assessment raised above, the Applicant also submits that the liability was extended to Mr J's university study without procedural fairness to him, because he was not provided with evidence that Mr J was in university.
2. This issue can be quickly disposed of, as this is a merits review and not an appeal. In these proceedings, the Applicant has been provided with evidence that Mr J was enrolled to commence in university when the decision to record the ongoing liability was made. This argument does not assist the Applicant.
3. Nor does another argument, raised by the Applicant, that Child Support was required to make a fresh determination that Mr J was re-enrolled in university each semester. In that regard, I note that the 2009 Order is problematic, in that it does not require, in terms, that Mr J had been enrolled in university when he turned 18 years old in order for the maintenance liability to continue. Nor does it strictly require that he remain continuously at university until he completes his 'full-time tertiary education to first degree level.' However, I will proceed on the basis that this is how the order should be interpreted, as it was the likely intent of the parties and the Court.
4. Even viewed in that light, however, I am not satisfied that the Respondent was required to make a new decision each semester. If that were so, then why would it not apply on a more frequent basis? Rather, I think the better view is that the Respondent was required to make a determination when he was advised that Mr J had commenced full-time tertiary study, and will be required to make another determination if advised, or on becoming aware, that Mr J has completed his first degree level of study or has ceased full time tertiary study towards it. More fundamentally, though, even if such regular decisions were required, none are before me to consider, and they do not assist in explaining the Applicant's delay in seeking review of the decisions that are.
5. The Applicant's references to s 26, and the requirement on the Respondent to record particulars of the liability in the Register, take the issue no further.
6. The Respondent submits that, under s 18A(2)(b), a liability is a registerable overseas maintenance liability if it is an overseas maintenance liability. A liability is also a registrable maintenance liability if it is an amount that is in arrears under a liability mentioned in s18A(2).
7. An overseas maintenance liability is defined under s 4 as a liability that arises under:

(a) a maintenance order made by a judicial authority of a reciprocating jurisdiction; or

(b) a maintenance agreement registered by a judicial or administrative authority of a reciprocating jurisdiction; or

(c) a maintenance assessment issued by an administrative authority of a reciprocating jurisdiction.

1. The Respondent contends that the liability under the 2009 Order is an overseas maintenance liability because it is a maintenance order made by a judicial authority of a reciprocating jurisdiction.[13]
2. The Respondent notes that there is no requirement under the legislation for the maintenance order to have been registered with the overseas authority for it to be able to be registered with Child Support.
3. I agree with the Respondent's submissions in this regard. This aspect of the objection decision applications to extend time has little apparent merit.

The backdated addition of CPI to the liability

1. Whilst the Applicant expressly abandoned his claims that the Registrar was estopped from taking this action, being an argument that failed to persuade the FCFCOA, he did not otherwise expressly address why the objection decision as to this issue was incorrect, beyond the effect of his other arguments as to the legitimacy of the re-registration of the liability, which I have addressed above. I consider this aspect of the application to have little apparent merit.

1. The length of the Applicant's delay is very significant. This weighs heavily against an extension of time.

1. The Applicant says that the delay was caused, in part, by his misunderstanding of the child support system, which he says was contributed to by officers of Child Support in discussions he had with them. This contributed to him focussing on the FCFCOA proceedings, rather than exercising his rights to administrative review. He notes that he was in regular contact with Child Support throughout the relevant period in respect of attempting to have the assessment revoked.
2. He also says that he wasn't told the provision under which the objection decisions were made.
3. The Respondent contends that a misunderstanding of a decision does not justify the Applicant's significant delay. Instead, it would usually be a reason why a person would challenge a decision. I accept that submission.
4. The Respondent points to the fact that the Applicant was specifically informed of his right to seek a review in the (then) AAT, in the objection decisions, and notes that this has been held this to be a factor weighing against an extension of time.[14]
5. Whilst it is not a prerequisite to the favourable exercise of the discretion to grant an extension, I am satisfied that the Applicant's explanation of his delay is not only a mandatory, but also a weighty consideration in the assessment of his applications for an extension of time.
6. Not only was the Applicant informed of his rights to seek review, and of the relevant time limit, but he also has a long history of engagement with Child Support. He was not, at the relevant time, a naïve or disengaged party to the assessment. He was also legally represented in the FCFCOA proceedings, from which I infer he had ready access to independent legal advice about his review rights, should he have sought it.
7. I do not consider that the Applicant's explanation for his delay is satisfactory, such that it could weigh in his favour.

Any prejudice to the parties or persons affected by the decision

1. There is obvious prejudice to the Applicant if extensions of time are not granted. The Respondent acknowledges that there is no prejudice to him if the extensions are granted but points out that there would be prejudice to Ms A if the extensions are granted, because she would then be a party to the substantive applications and there would be consequent uncertainty as to the assessment.
2. On balance, taking into account the prejudice to the Applicant and Ms A, this consideration weighs against an extension of time

1. The Respondent submits that the public interest weighs against an extension of time, noting that the 90-day time limit that applied to the Applicant is prescribed by legislation and indicates Parliament's intention that there ought to be finality in government decisions.[15]
2. The Respondent further submits that the public has an interest in reviews of decisions made by the Respondent being performed in a timely fashion and in a manner that ensures all applicants are treated fairly and equally.
3. The Respondent submits that the public interest, and the interests of those applicants who comply with the prescribed time limits, are unsettled by perceptions of unfairness and uncertainty if an extension of time is granted where the justice of the case does not permit that this should occur.[16]
4. The Applicant did not address this submission. I agree with the Respondent that it weighs against the extensions of time.

Conclusion as to the objections decision applications to extend time

1. Weighing the considerations I have identified separately in respect of each application; I am not satisfied that I should exercise my discretion to grant either extension of time.

1. The Tribunal affirms the decisions under review.

I certify that the preceding 112 (one-hundred and twelve) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision herein of Senior Member Suthers

............[SGD]............................................................

[1] Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 29; Child Support (Registration and Collection Act) 1988 (Cth), s 90(2) (R&C Act).

[2] Administrative Review Tribunal (Consequential and Transitional Provisions No.1) Act 2024 (Cth).

[3] For simplicity, further reference to legislative provisions in this statement of reasons will be to provisions of the R&C Act, unless otherwise stated.

[4] [2023] HCA 18.

[5] Applied in Naboush and Child Support Registrar [2014] AATA 930 at [16] and Ahiyar and Child Support Registrar [2023] AATA 4241 at [22]- [23].

[7] [2010] FCA 43, [291]-[292].

[8] Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth), s 29(1); Child Support (Registration and Collection) Regulations 2018 (Cth); Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), s 163.

[9] Brown v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1999] FCA 563, [59].

[10] [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344.

[11] [2023] FCA 31.

[12] [2023] AATA 867

[13] The United Kingdom is a reciprocating jurisdiction under sch 2 of the Child Support (Registration & Collection) Regulations 2018 (Cth).

[14] Re Grafton and Commonwealth (1988) 16 ALD 533; Re Romeo and Secretary, Department of Social Security (1992) 26 ALD 248; and Re Civic Tavern Pty Ltd and ACT Liquor Licensing Board (1993) 32 ALD 381.

[15] Re Commonwealth of Australia; Ex Parte Marks [2000] HCA 67, [16] (McHugh J).

[16] David and High Court of Australia [2009] AATA 448; Paino and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2006] AATA 951.