austlii:cth/FedCFamC2G/2025/1302
General information, not legal advice.
FedCFamC2G
2025-08-15
Original judgment source is linked above.
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA (DIVISION 2)
Note: The form of the order is subject to the entry in the Court's records.
Note: The Court may vary or set aside a judgment or order to remedy minor typographical or grammatical errors (r 17.05(2)(g) Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth)), or to record a variation to the order pursuant to r 17.05 Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth).
(1) allocated to the Court as presently constituted on 14 April 2025,
(2) listed for final hearing on 11 June 2025, and
(3) heard on 6 August 2025 in person at the Court's Melbourne Registry.
(a) General English;
(b) IELTS Foundation;
(c) Certificate III in Commercial Cookery;
(d) Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery; and
(e) Diploma of Hospitality Management.[3]
(1) stated that his intention to apply for a Student Visa "emerged suddenly" after experiencing Australian hospitality culture;
(2) acknowledged that similar courses exist in Nepal, but claimed that Australia offered better practical training;
(3) expressed a desire to return to Nepal after his studies and work in tourism or hospitality; and
(4) stated that he resided with his sister in Melbourne, while his wife and other family remained in Nepal.
(1) timing of the Applicant's Student Visa application (lodged shortly after his arrival on a Visitor Visa) suggested an intention to prolong his stay in Australia[11];
(2) Applicant's personal ties to Nepal (primarily his wife and his family) were not a sufficiently strong incentive for him to return home following the completion of his studies;[12]
(3) Applicant's claimed career goals (to open a restaurant in Nepal) lacked a credible plan and was inconsistent with the Applicant's previous study and work experience;[13] and
(4) Applicant had not provided a clear explanation for undertaking the proposed study in Australia rather than in his home country or another country.[14]
(1) the education system in Nepal lacked practical training and comparable Australian qualifications are more valuable;[17]
(2) the Applicant only has one sister residing in Australia and maintains strong family ties in Nepal;[18]
(3) the Applicant had thoroughly researched his proposed course and had genuine post-study plans to return to Nepal and work in hospitality;[19] and
(4) it is not uncommon for students to change their intended course of study.[20]
(1) enrolled in a registered course of study; and
(2) a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student, consistent with the requirements of cl.500.212 of the Regulations and Direction Number 69 - Assessing The Genuine Temporary Entrant Criterion for Student Visa And Student Guardian Visa Applications (Direction 69).
(a) General English (25 May 2020 - 11 October 2020); [25]
(b) Certificate III in Commercial Cookery (15 November 2020 - 14 November 2021); [26]
(c) Certificate IV in Commercial Cookery (15 December 2021 - 15 September 2022); [27] and
(d) Diploma of Hospitality Management (15 October 2022 - 22 January 2023).[28]
11. With regard to the applicant's circumstances in his home country, the Tribunal:
(a) found the applicant had not demonstrated that the benefits to be gained by studying the proposed course outweighed the financial outlay, time investment and disruption required to study in Australia,
(b) found the applicant had not established that his family ties in Nepal presented a significant incentive for the applicant to return to his home county, having regard to the applicant's wife's presence in Nepal and his proposed stay in Australia until January 2023, and
(c) found the applicant did not have strong economic or financial ties to return to his home country
With regard to the applicant's potential circumstances in Australia, the Tribunal:
(a) had regard to the applicant's evidence that his sister lived in Australia, and found that his family ties to Australia may constitute a disincentive to return to his home country,
(b) found the applicant did not have an economic incentive to remain in Australia, given his lack of work history, and
(c) was unable to conclude that the applicant had undertaken any genuine research into his proposed course, course content, education provider or educational objectives as would be expected of a genuine student.
13. With regard to the value of the course to the applicant's future, the Tribunal:
(a) found the applicant's claim that he wished to pursue hospitality as a career to be vague and lacking substance or detail,
(b) accepted that the applicant's proposed courses were a progression from his previous study and the knowledge would generally be of benefit to his career. The Tribunal found the benefit did not outweigh the time, expense and disruption required to study in Australia, and
(c) found the applicant had not provided any detailed or compelling evidence as to his career plans and was unable to conclude whether there was any connection between genuine career goals and his current course of study.
14. With regard to the applicant's immigration history, the Tribunal:
(a) had regard to the evidence that the applicant arrived in Australia on a visitor visa and applied for a student visa very shortly after and found the conduct evidenced the applicant was not a genuine student and an intention to use the student visa program to circumvent the migration program, and
(b) The Tribunal was not satisfied the applicant intended genuinely to stay in Australia temporarily and found he did not meet cl 500.212(a). Accordingly, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant was a genuine applicant for entry and stay as a student as required by cl 500.212.
Particulars
(a) The matters mentioned as being required to be considered in paragraphs 9(b), 9(c) and 14(a)(i) of Direction 69, made pursuant to section 499 of the Migration Act.
(b) S 499(2A) of the Migration Act makes the matters dealt with in Direction No. 69 a relevant consideration in the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Anor v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Ors [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 sense. That is, in respect of section 499 the word "must" imposes an imperative duty upon the Delegate. With that in mind it is useful to reflect on the matters that the Delegate did not consider. The First Applicant submits there are as follows:
(i) The extent of the applicant personal ties to Nepal, including the fact that he has a career in Nepal upon his return and his extended family.
(ii) Whether there were some economic circumstances which may have acted as an incentive not to return, including relative circumstances in Nepal as compared to Australia. This was required to be considered pursuant to Clause 9(c) of direction No. 69. Had the delegate considered such circumstances it may have concluded that the Applicant may have been more comfortable in Nepal, as compared with Australia, given the evidence of his career as a marketing officer in Nepal.
(iii) In addition, it is submitted that the Applicant explained in details as to why the course that he had chosen to undertake would assist him in his proposed future career with his business. The Applicant submits that the Delegate was required under s 5 of the Migration Act to read with section 55 to have regards to that information. The Applicant contends that it is abundantly clear that the assessment of the value of the course to his future in Nepal indicates that the Delegate had no regard for it or Alternatively its regards is limited. Indeed, the Applicant suggests that the value of the commercial cookery course would appear to be entirely consistent with his proposed future employment. The Delegate bas therefore failed to take relevant considerations into account.
The delegate failed to comply with section 54 of the Migration Act
Particulars
(a) Failure to consider the reasons why the Applicant wanted to study in Australia and why he said that his proposed course of study would assist him in his future employment in Nepal. The Applicant submits paragraph 1 (b)(i), (ii), (iii) of Grounds of Applicant in support of this Ground.
The first and second Respondents erred in construing cl. 500.212 (l)(a) of Schedule 2 of the Regulations.
Particulars
(a) The Respondents erred in construing that clause by requiring that the Applicant would leave Australia, or intended to do so, after the completion of the period for which temporary student visa had been granted.
(b) The expression "to...temporarily" was to be construed as being related to the fulfilment of the specific but passing purpose for which the stay in Australia permitted by the visa was intended. Direction No. 69, when read as a whole, indicated the purpose of cl.500.212 (l)(a) is to requires an applicant to have the capacity to undertake the study proposed and to use the time in Australia granted under the visa primarily to undertake study. The Applicant submitted that there was no bias to conclude the Applicant would not make good and proper use of the visa which he had sought, arguing that his study history showed that he had made effective use of his previous student visas. He submits that the observance of the Primary purpose of the visa ought to prevail over other "uses" of the visa, such as looking at future job opportunities
(c) the Applicant submit that any intentions held by the Applicant to attempt to stay lawfully in Australia at the end of his student visa period was not inconsistent with cl500.212 (1)(a)'s requirement that he intend to stay temporarily. In this contention the Applicant refers to Khuna & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1971 where Judge Manousaridis held that an intention to remain in Australia if qualified to do so that the end of a student visa does not necessarily amount to lack of an intention to stay temporarily. The Applicant submits that the Applicant ought to be understood to have indicated that he would only have sought to remain in Australia if he could have do so legally and that his lawful intentions could have been inferred from his visa history and conduct.
(1) the Applicant file and serve any amended application, written submissions and further evidence 28 days before the final hearing date; and
(2) the Minister file and serve any written submissions and further evidence 14 days before the final hearing date.
(1) CoE in General English sent to the Tribunal on 21 May 2020;
(2) s 359(2) Response sent to Tribunal on 30 August 2020; and
(3) revised s359(2) response sent to Tribunal on 31 August 2020.
(a) the application for judicial review filed 15 September 2020;
(b) a Court Book numbering 148 pages filed 21 April 2021 (marked as Exhibit R1);
(c) Affidavit of Jeremy Hutton filed 26 May 2025 (marked as Exhibit R2); and
(d) written submissions filed by the Minister on 27 May 2025.
(a) where the decision-maker identifies the wrong issue or asks the wrong question;[35]
(b) where the decision-maker ignores relevant material;[36]
(c) where the decision-maker relies on irrelevant material;[37]
(d) where the decision-maker fails to follow mandatory procedures;[38]
(e) where the decision-maker shows actual or apprehended bias;[39] and
(f) where the decision is illogical, irrational or unreasonable.[40]
THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
(1) why they believed the Tribunal made a jurisdictional error; and
(2) each of the three grounds of review.
*** The delegate failed to take relevant considerations into account.**
Particulars
(a) The matters mentioned as being required to be considered in paragraphs 9(b), 9(c) and 14(a)(i) of Direction 69, made pursuant to section 499 of the Migration Act.
(b) S 499(2A) of the Migration Act makes the matters dealt with in Direction No. 69 a relevant consideration in the Minister for Aboriginal Affairs & Anor v Peko-Wallsend Ltd & Ors [1986] HCA 40; (1986) 162 CLR 24 sense. That is, in respect of section 499 the word "must" imposes an imperative duty upon the Delegate. With that in mind it is useful to reflect on the matters that the Delegate did not consider. The First Applicant submits there are as follows:
(i) The extent of the applicant personal ties to Nepal, including the fact that he has a career in Nepal upon his return and his extended family.
(ii) Whether there were some economic circumstances which may have acted as an incentive not to return, including relative circumstances in Nepal as compared to Australia. This was required to be considered pursuant to Clause 9(c) of direction No. 69. Had the delegate considered such circumstances it may have concluded that the Applicant may have been more comfortable in Nepal, as compared with Australia, given the evidence of his career as a marketing officer in Nepal.
(iii) In addition, it is submitted that the Applicant explained in detail as to why the course that he had chosen to undertake would assist him in his proposed future career with his business. The Applicant submits that the Delegate was required under s 5 of the Migration Act to read with section 55 to have regards to that information. The Applicant contends that it is abundantly clear that the assessment of the value of the course to his future in Nepal indicates that the Delegate had no regard for it or alternatively its regard is limited. Indeed, the Applicant suggests that the value of the commercial cookery course would appear to be entirely consistent with his proposed future employment. The Delegate bas therefore failed to take relevant considerations into account.
*** The delegate failed to comply with section 54 of the Migration Act**
Particulars
(a) Failure to consider the reasons why the Applicant wanted to study in Australia and why he said that his proposed course of study would assist him in his future employment in Nepal. The Applicant submits paragraph 1 (b)(i), (ii), (iii) of Grounds of Applicant in support of this Ground.
*** The first and second Respondents erred in construing cl. 500.212 (l)(a) of Schedule 2 of the Regulations.**
Particulars
(a) The Respondents erred in construing that clause by requiring that the Applicant would leave Australia, or intended to do so, after the completion of the period for which temporary student visa had been granted.
(b) The expression "to...temporarily" was to be construed as being related to the fulfilment of the specific but passing purpose for which the stay in Australia permitted by the visa was intended. Direction No. 69, when read as a whole, indicated the purpose of cl.500.212 (l)(a) is to requires an applicant to have the capacity to undertake the study proposed and to use the time in Australia granted under the visa primarily to undertake study. The Applicant submitted that there was no bias to conclude the Applicant would not make good and proper use of the visa which he had sought, arguing that his study history showed that he had made effective use of his previous student visas. He submits that the observance of the Primary purpose of the visa ought to prevail over other "uses" of the visa, such as looking at future job opportunities
(c) The Applicant submit that any intentions held by the Applicant to attempt to stay lawfully in Australia at the end of his student visa period was not inconsistent with cl500.212 (1)(a)'s requirement that he intend to stay temporarily. In this contention the Applicant refers to Khuna & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2015] FCCA 1971 where Judge Manousaridis held that an intention to remain in Australia if qualified to do so that the end of a student visa does not necessarily amount to lack of an intention to stay temporarily. The Applicant submits that the Applicant ought to be understood to have indicated that he would only have sought to remain in Australia if he could have do so legally and that his lawful intentions could have been inferred from his visa history and conduct.
(1) it had not made a decision about his application;
(2) the Minister is seeking costs in the event that it is successful;
(3) in deciding the question of costs, the Court is required to consider:
(a) whether it is appropriate that the Applicant should pay any costs at all, noting that the usual rule in courts in Australia is that an unsuccessful party pays the party/party costs of the successful party; and
(b) if the Court is so satisfied that the Applicant should pay costs, what is the reasonable quantum.
I certify that the preceding seventy-five (75) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of Judge Johns.
[31] CB 103-117, Annexure 'JH-2'of Exhibit R2.
[32] CB 118-133, Annexure 'JH-3'of Exhibit R2.
[35] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.
[36] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.
[37] Craig v State of South Australia [1995] HCA 58; (1995) 184 CLR 163, 198.
[38] SAAP v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs & Anor [2005] HCA 24; (2005) 228 CLR 294, [207]-[208].
[39] SZRUI v Minister for Immigration, Multicultural Affairs & Citizenship [2013] FCAFC 80, [2].
[40] Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v SZMDS (2010) 240 CLR 611, [131]; Minister for Immigration & Citizenship v Li [2012] HCA 61; (2013) 249 CLR 332, [26]-[28]; Minister for Immigration & Border Protection v Singh [2014] FCAFC 1; (2014) 231 FCR 437, [44].
[41] Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, 272.
[42] [2019] FCA 600 at [7].
[44] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.
[45] Djokovic v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs (2022) 289 FCR 21, [17] (Allson CJ, Besanko and O'Callaghan JJ).
[46] Plaintiff S157/2002 v Commonwealth [2003] HCA 2; (2003) 211 CLR 476.
[47] LPDT v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 12; (2024) 418 ALR 152, [3] ('LPDT').
[48] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 2006 CLR 323, [82].
[50] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf (2001) 206 CLR 323 at 351, [82].
[52] MZAPC v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2021) 273 CLR 506, [38] (Kiefel CJ, Gageler, Keane and Gleeson JJ).
[53] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80, [33] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson JJ).
[54] Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Eshetu [1999] HCA 21, [40].
[55] Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476(2)(a), 476(4).
[63] Khuna v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCCA 1971.
[64] Federal Circuit and Family Court (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) sch 2 pt 2 div 1.
Giri
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FedCFamC2G 1302
(2022) 289 FCR 21
(1996) 185 CLR 259
(1999) 197 CLR 611
(1995) 184 CLR 163
(2024) 98 ALJR 610
(2014) 231 FCR 437
(2013) 249 CLR 332
(2010) 240 CLR 611
(2005) 228 CLR 294
(1986) 162 CLR 24
(2003) 211 CLR 476
(2024) 418 ALR 152
(2001) 2006 CLR 323
(2001) 206 CLR 323
(2021) 273 CLR 506
(2022) 276 CLR 80