(a) Eight bags of methylamphetamine in the top drawer of a bedside table.

(b) A 10g weight in a black shoulder bag.

(c) Three mobile phones in the top drawer of the bedside table.

(d) Two clear resealable bags containing methylamphetamine in a chest of drawers.

(e) $8,610 cash in a hidden compartment in the chest of drawers.

(f) Four clear resealable bags containing methylamphetamine in the hidden compartment in the chest of drawers

(g) Two knuckle-duster extendable flick knives in the hidden compartment in the chest of drawers (summary charge 8 - possess prohibited weapon).

(h) Three vials containing a total of 28.4g of testosterone and trenbolone (and/or their derivates) in the hidden compartment in the chest of drawers (charge 3 - possession of a drug of dependence).

(i) Assorted hard drives and USB sticks in the hidden compartment in the chest of drawers.

(a) A money counting machine.

(b) A security camera hard drive with memory cards.

1. In the kitchen, in a hidden compartment under the kitchen counter:

(a) Two zip lock backs containing two 3D printed firearms.

(b) A zip lock bag containing 3D printed firearm components.

(c) Two gold zip lock bags containing methylamphetamine.

(d) Six clear resealable bags containing methylamphetamine.

(e) Two black bags each containing a large amount of cash.

1. In the two black bags found in the kitchen, police found:

(a) $153,000 cash.

(b) A semi-automatic handgun (charge 2 - possessing a firearm contrary to a firearm prohibition order).

(c) A metal silencer.

(d) Various magazines, boxes and rounds of ammunition (summary charge 13 - possess cartridge ammunition).

(a) A plastic receptable and bags containing rubber bands.

(b) A glass beaker.

(c) A magnetic stirrer.

(d) A box containing self-sealing currency straps.

(e) A currency binding machine.

(f) Two mobile phones located in the applicant's vehicle.

1. In total 290.5g of methylamphetamine (charge 1 - trafficking in a drug of dependence, commercial quantity) and $161,610 cash (charge 4 - dealing with proceeds of crime) were located during the search. With the exception of one 14.4g quantity and one 30.7g quantity, the methylamphetamine fell between 81 per cent and 88 per cent. Accordingly, the applicant was in possession of about four times the commercial quantity by pure weight and also over the 250g mixed weight commercial quantity threshold.
2. When asked by police, the applicant refused to provide the passcode for the mobile phones (summary charge 10 - fail to comply with direction to assist).
3. In a police interview the same day the applicant admitted that the searched residence was his address, he lived alone and both that he had received service of the Firearm Prohibition Order and knew it was valid for 10 years. When asked about the items found at his residence the applicant gave no comment answers.
4. On 15 January 2024 the applicant declined to be formally interviewed in relation to the items found at his residence.

1. In his Reasons the judge noted the applicable maximum penalties and summarised the applicant's offending.[9] The judge termed the offending 'undoubtedly serious[10] and referred to the applicant's 'highly relevant'[11] criminal history and that previous custodial sentences for drug trafficking had failed to deter him.[12]
2. The applicant's background was summarised as follows. His parents separated when the applicant was three years of age. He lived initially with his mother who had alcohol issues. The applicant was exposed to violence from some of his mother's new partners. He and his younger half siblings were removed from her care. The applicant then lived with his father, but did not have a strong relationship with him. He absconded from home and commenced drug use at an early age. The applicant attended several different schools and struggled academically. He had a patchy employment history. He commenced an intimate relationship when he was 19 years old. That relationship produced two daughters, aged 14 and 16 years at the time of sentence. Although the applicant was separated from their mother, he had contact with his children. The applicant had a long-standing drug problem. Although he suffered from periods of depression, the Verdins[13] principles had no application.[14] The judge accepted from character references authored by the applicant's sister and mother that the applicant was a good father. [15]
3. The judge accepted that the applicant's background enlivened the general application of the Bugmy[16] principle that dysfunction and instability in an offender's formative years produces social disadvantage that does not diminish with time. The judge considered the reduction in the applicant's culpability to be 'very modest'.[17] The judge said that there was nothing in the psychological report of Dr Matthew Bart, tendered on the applicant's behalf, to reduce his moral culpability for the offending.[18]
4. The matters relied on by the applicant in mitigation of penalty were then considered by the judge. His plea of guilty was made very early and was of utilitarian value.[19] There was evidence of some remorse.[20] The applicant was burdened by his separation from his teenage daughters.[21]
5. The applicant's prospects of rehabilitation were described as 'not strong' and 'really quite poor.[22]
6. Turning to the offending, the judge said that the trafficking charge was based on possession for sale on a single day and, referring to the currency counter, currency binding machine and the $160,000 cash the subject of the proceeds of crime charge, said the applicant's motive was to make sizeable amounts of money.[23] The judge noted the weight of methylamphetamine possessed as an important consideration.[24] The judge said that the applicant's moral culpability for the trafficking offence was high. [25]
7. The proceeds of crime offence was described by the judge as 'a serious enough'[26] example of the offence. The drug possession charge and the summary offences were less serious.[27] The firearms offence was 'a serious example of an inherently serious offence'.[28] The judge said that the applicant deliberately flouted the Firearms Prohibition Order. The firearm was secreted with more than $50,000 cash, loaded magazines and a silencer. The offending was not spontaneous.[29]
8. The judge said that the relevant purposes of sentencing were rehabilitation, just punishment, denunciation, community protection and both specific and general deterrence.[30] The judge had regard to current sentencing practices.[31] Parsimony[32] and the principle of totality[33] were also considered.

1. The applicant submits that the judge referred at length to Gregory (a pseudonym) v The Queen.[34] The applicant refers to the subsequent decision of Lytras v The Queen[35] which noted that Gregory was decided prior to DPP v Dalgliesh (a pseudonym)[36] and that the prospective sentencing practices referred to in Gregory could not be regarded as a controlling factor in the imposition of a just sentence. The applicant contends, by reference to a table of cases, that post Gregory there has only been one other sentence for trafficking greater than that imposed on him.[37] That includes cases involving larger commercial or large commercial quantities in which the duration of offending spanned months and the offender ran a trial.
2. Accordingly the applicant submits that the sentence imposed on charge 1 is manifestly excessive.

1. The applicant contends that there is a spectrum of seriousness for the offence of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm. He had a single firearm which was in his home in a hidden compartment rather than with him at the time of his arrest. The applicant submits that the sentence on charge 2 is manifestly excessive by reference to the contention that individual sentences for firearm offences have only matched or exceeded 5 years' imprisonment in cases where the offending comprised discharging, importing or possessing a traffickable quantity of firearms.

Ground 3 - total effective sentence, non-parole period and orders for cumulation

1. The applicant contends that the 'stern' (but not manifestly excessive) sentence on charge 4, in combination with the manifestly excessive sentences on charges 1 and 2 and the orders for cumulation on charges 2 and 4 contributed to the manifestly excessive total effective sentence and non-parole period.
2. The applicant accepted that ground 3 could not succeed unless grounds 1 and 2 were successful.

1. The respondent contends that the sentence imposed on charge 1 is not manifestly excessive. The gravity of the offending was high. That the charge was for single date trafficking is unimportant given that the applicant was involved in a significant, sophisticated commercial drug operation. The respondent further argues that gravity of the offending and the applicant's moral culpability were appropriately balanced by the judge with the modest factors upon which he could rely in mitigation of penalty.
2. As to the judge's references to Gregory, the respondent notes that in DPP v Condo[38] this Court observed that there was no tension between what was said in Gregory (and Fernando v The Queen[39]), concerning the need for an uplift in current sentencing practices for offences of trafficking in commercial quantities of drugs, and what was said in Dalgliesh about the need for individualised sentencing.[40] The respondent further contends that it is clear from the sentencing remarks that the judge did sentence the applicant by considering all known aspects of him as an individual and the crime he actually committed.[41]
3. The respondent further contends that to the extent the applicant's argument relies upon the use of comparable cases, that is limited by his very relevant criminal history and associated poor prospects for rehabilitation.

1. The respondent contends that the evidence before the judge demonstrated that the applicant's possession of the firearm was for the purpose of criminal activity and therefore demanded a more severe sentence.[42] Further, the applicant's relevant criminal history was a matter a matter of some significance in the sentencing exercise.
2. The respondent also contends that the sentencing remarks, by their reference to the relevant authorities, demonstrate the judge understood and applied the correct principles.[43] Further, the judge articulated his reasons for the order for cumulation on charge 2.[44]

Ground 3 - total effective sentence, non-parole period and orders for cumulation

1. The respondent contends that the total effective sentence, non-parole period and orders for cumulation are not manifestly excessive.
2. The respondent argues that in addition to the appropriate individual sentences imposed on charges 1 and 2, those on the remaining charges were also well within the available range. In his remarks the judge considered the principle of totality at length[45] and the modest orders for cumulation demonstrate its application. Further, the judge balanced all relevant factors in arriving at the non-parole period.

1. A ground of appeal alleging manifest excess is difficult to establish. An applicant for leave must establish that the impugned sentence is wholly beyond the range of sentences reasonably available to the sentencing judge in the sound exercise of his or her discretion.[46] Such a ground does not advance that there is an identifiable sentencing error but does contend that the impugned sentence is sufficiently excessive as to bespeak underlying sentencing error.
2. In this case the applicant seeks to do so through comparison with other cases coupled with frequent reference by the judge in his sentencing remarks to Gregory to argue that the judge failed to accord individualised justice to the applicant, the need for which was emphasised in the post Gregory decision of Dalgliesh.
3. The applicant's contention cannot be accepted.
4. First, as recognised by the judge, comparison with other cases has inherent limitations.[47] Current sentencing practice is a relevant consideration but does not create the outer boundaries of the appropriate range of sentence for any particular offence.[48]
5. Second, while it is perhaps easier to directly compare certain aspects of the subject offending with that in other cases, such as the quantity and purity of the illicit drugs, other aspects are more difficult. In particular, where trafficking is based upon possession, the nature of the drug trafficking enterprise is to be determined from the all the circumstances of the possession and not its duration.[49] Here the applicant was engaged in a sophisticated drug enterprise clearly designed to produce substantial profit. That he was charged with single date trafficking is immaterial in comparing the gravity of his conduct with that of others charged with between dates trafficking. Where comparison with other cases becomes particularly fraught, however, is with respect to the characteristics of each offender, which necessarily give rise to different emphases in the weight given to deterrence, both general and specific and the need for community protection and also to the assessment of the prospects of rehabilitation of an offender.
6. The applicant had two prior convictions for drug trafficking. In 2013 he received a total effective sentence of five years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and nine months for charges of trafficking in a drug of dependence, possessing a drug of dependence, knowingly dealing with the proceeds of crime, dealing with property suspected to be proceeds of crime, possessing an unregistered handgun and possession cartridge ammunition without a licence. In 2019 the applicant received a total effective sentence of four years' imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years and six months for charges of trafficking in a drug of dependence and possessing a drug of dependence. The offending relevant to the 2019 sentence commenced within months of the applicant's release from prison after serving the 2013 sentence. The instant offending, committed proximate to the applicant's last release from custody, not only forms part of the continuum of his drug offending over a decade whenever at liberty in the community, but is an escalation of it. The offending was very grave. The applicant's moral culpability for it was very high.
7. The judge was correct to characterise the applicant's prospects of rehabilitation as poor and to emphasise both specific deterrence and protection of the community as sentencing purposes.
8. Further, the principles in Verdins had no application to the applicant and it is not argued that the judge was incorrect to give a 'very modest' reduction to the applicant's moral culpability as a result of his disadvantaged background.
9. These matters in combination make direct comparison with the sentences imposed in the cases upon which the applicant relies of limited utility.
10. Third, on a fair reading of the sentencing remarks, the judge's references to Gregory do not indicate that the judge allowed the call for uplifted sentences in that decision to override the need for individualised justice. Rather, the judge sought to explain the much greater sentence imposed on the applicant for the instant offending than the 2013 and 2019 sentences in part by the fact that Gregory was either not decided or inapposite to them. The judge recognised both that, post Dalgliesh, uplifted sentencing practices remains a relevant factor in the sentencing exercise for offences of trafficking commercial quantities of drugs of dependence and that this factor is not a controlling one.[50] That observation was made in both Condo[51] and Lytras.[52] Thus the judge said

My task is to sentence you for your crimes. That is not a mathematical or a statistical task or one where the outcome is driven by what has happened in another case or cases, or even the outcomes in your past appearances before this Court. Those appearances were for offending committed when you were younger, when you were 26 and had no prior convictions at the time of the first appearance. Neither of those appearances related to commercial quantity amounts. They each had therefore the much lower maximum penalty. The statements from the case of Gregory apply to my sentencing task. That case was not in play at all on those earlier occasions, it had not even been decided until 2017, and had no application to the 2019 sentencing exercise give the charge that you then faced.[53]

1. Putting aside the comparative mechanism by which the applicant seeks to demonstrate that the sentence on charge 1 is manifestly excessive, it must be remembered that ultimately manifest excess is a conclusion

... which does not depend upon attribution of identified specific error in the reasoning of the sentencing judge and which frequently does not admit of amplification except by stating the respect in which the sentence is inadequate or excessive.[54]

1. In all the circumstances of this case as described, I am unable to conclude that it is reasonably arguable the sentence imposed on charge 1, although stern, was wholly outside the range of sentences available to the judge. The applicant came before the court as an entrenched drug trafficker. Significant terms of imprisonment had failed to deter him from like offending. He had limited matters upon which to rely in mitigation of penalty. The nature of the methylamphetamine trafficking enterprise was sophisticated. It produced large profits.
2. Ground 1 must fail.

1. Like with respect to many offences, the approach to the assessment of firearm possession exists on a spectrum. This Court has observed that

[i]n assessing the criminality of the offence of being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm, at one end of the spectrum is possession of a weapon unrelated to other criminal activities, and at the other end of the spectrum is the use of a weapon in the commission of another offence. Possession of a weapon in the course of committing other criminal activity, but without the actual or threatened use of the weapon, falls towards the higher end of the spectrum.[55]

1. In this case the weapon was found with loaded magazines and a silencer. It was part of the accoutrements of the applicant's significant drug trafficking enterprise. The criminality involved fell towards the higher end of the spectrum.
2. Although, as argued by the applicant, Berichon and Acciarito do not establish a prescriptive framework or fixed sub-categories for offending of this nature[56] and each case must be assessed on its facts as to the objective seriousness of the offending behaviour and the circumstances of the offender, the applicant not only had relevant prior convictions for possession of firearms but that possession was in the context of his prior drug trafficking. This factor alone is severely limiting of the utility of the cases relied upon by the applicant as comparators. Also, a number of those authorities are complicated by the fact that the offender was also sentenced for discharge of the firearm.
3. Further, the matters discussed generally under cover of ground 1 are relevant to the analysis of this ground. In particular, the judge was correct to emphasise the need for specific deterrence of the applicant in relation to the prohibited possession of firearms as well as drug trafficking. The judge noted the observations of this Court to that effect in DPP v Kumas.[57] By reference to Bruce v The Queen[58] the judge further noted the seriousness of a breach of a Firearms Prohibition Order. In that case it was observed that Firearms Prohibition Orders are issued to promote community safety by ensuring that weapons do not fall into the wrong hands and, therefore it is of

... the first importance that the sentences imposed for possessing firearms in breach of [a Firearms Prohibition Order] are set at a level which will send a strong message to others who might be tempted to disregard [a Firearms Prohibition Order] to which they are subject.[59]

1. In all the circumstances I am unable to conclude that it is reasonably arguable that the sentence imposed on charge 2 is manifestly excessive.

Ground 3 - total effective sentence, non-parole period and orders for cumulation

1. Despite the applicant's concession that ground 3 cannot succeed if grounds 1 and 3 do not, I note the following.
2. The total effective sentence of 13 years and 6 months' imprisonment was achieved by an order for cumulation of 1 year and 9 months of the sentence on charge 2, 1 year of the 3 year sentence on charge 4, 1 month of the 3 months sentence on summary charge 8 and 2 months of the 5 month sentence on summary charge 10.
3. When considering the application of the principle of totality the judge explained these orders.[60] The judge recognised the temporal relationship between the offences and the need to guard against the imposition of a crushing term of imprisonment.[61]
4. The judge said that charge 1 was the most serious offence but that charge 2 was serious 'in its own right'.[62] He had not treated possession of the firearm as aggravating the trafficking charge as there was 'a discrete and serious prohibition created by the Firearms Prohibition Order'.[63] The judge said that significant cumulation was required because the order was breached deliberately by possession of a firearm and not a 'related item'.[64] Earlier the judge had said that possession of the firearm cannot have been spontaneous, as it was found in a backpack with more than $50,000 cash, loaded magazines and a silencer in a hidden compartment in the applicant's premises.[65] Those observations are correct. I am unable to conclude that it is reasonably arguable that the order for cumulation on charge 2 was manifestly excessive.
5. The judge said that there must be 'meaningful cumulation'[66] on charge 4 as it was not connected to either the trafficking or the firearms offence as the trafficking was evidenced by possession for future sale. The proceeds of crime in this case were $161,610 cash. While I am of the view that the order for cumulation on this charge was stern, in all the circumstances I am unable to conclude that, when the sentence is considered as a whole, it is reasonably arguable that the order was manifestly excessive.
6. On any view, the orders for cumulation with respect to the summary offences were moderate.
7. Further, the non-parole period was well within the range open to the judge. It reflects that appropriate weight was given to the matters upon which the applicant could rely in mitigation of penalty as well as to the purposes of sentencing.
8. Ground 3 must fail.

1. The application for leave to appeal against sentence will be refused.

[1] DPP v Gioffre [2025] VCC 269 (Judge Tinney) ('Reasons').

[2] Contrary to s 71AA(1) of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981.

[3] Contrary to s 112B of the Firearms Act 1996.

[4] Contrary to s 73(1) of the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act.

[5] Contrary to s 194(2) of the Crimes Act 1958.

[6] Contrary to s 5AA of the Control of Weapons Act.

[7] Contrary to s 465AAA of the Crimes Act.

[8] Contrary to s 124(1) of the Firearms Act.

[13] R v Verdins (2007) VR 269; [2007] VSCA 102.

[16] Bugmy v The Queen (2013) 249 CLR 571; [2013] HCA 37.

[34] (2017) 268 A Crim R 1; [2017] VSCA 151 ('Gregory'). Reasons, [95]-[100].

[35] [2020] VSCA 150 ('Lytras').

[36] (2017) HCA 41; [2017] 262 CLR 428 ('Dalgliesh').

[37] Obian v The King (2023) 69 VR 553; [2023] VSCA 18 ('Obian').

[38] [2019] VSCA 181 ('Condo').

[39] (2017) 268 A Crim R 26; [2017] VSCA 208.

[40] Condo [2019] VSCA 181, [20] (Maxwell P, T Forrest and Weinberg JJA).

[42] Berichon v R (2013) 40 VR 490; [2013] VSCA 319 ('Berichon').

[46] Clarkson v The Queen [2011] VSCA 157; (2011) 32 VR 361, 384 [89] (Maxwell ACJ, Nettle, Neave, Redlich and Harper JJA); [2011] VSCA 157; DPP v Karazisis [2010] VSCA 350; (2010) 31 VR 634, 662-3 [127] (Ashley, Redlich and Weinberg JJA, Warren CJ and Maxwell P agreeing at [1]); [2010] VSCA 350; R v Boaza [1999] VSCA 126, [42] (Chernov JA, Winneke P agreeing at [1], Phillips JA agreeing at [54]); Dalgliesh [2017] HCA 41; (2017) 262 CLR 428, 434 [7] (Kiefel CJ, Bell and Keane JJ); [2017] HCA 41.

[48] Nguyen v The Queen [2016] VSCA 198; (2016) 311 FLR 289, 309 [74] (Redlich JA; Tate JA agreeing at 330 [155], Whelan JA agreeing at 355 [230]); [2016] VSCA 198.

[49] Quah v The Queen (2021) A Crim R 136 , [47] (Maxwell P and Beach JA); [2021] VSCA 164.

[50] Lytras [2020] VSCA 150, [58].

[51] Condo [2019] VSCA 181, [20] (Maxwell P, T Forrest and Weinberg JJA).

[52] Lytras [2020] VSCA 150, [58].

[53] Reasons, [105] (emphasis in original).

[54] Dinsdale v The Queen [2000] HCA 54; (2000) 202 CLR 321, [6] (Gleeson CJ and Hayne J); [2000] HCA 54; See also Leimonitis v The Queen [2018] VSCA 198, [32] (Priest JA, Weinberg JA agreeing at [38]).

[55] Acciarito v The Queen [2019] VSCA 264, [55] (Niall and Ashley JJA) ('Acciarito'). See also Berichon [2013] VSCA 319, [26] (Redlich JA); [2013] VSCA 319; (2013) 40 VR 490.

[56] Sultan v The King [2022] VSCA 205 (Kennedy and Kaye JJA), [39].

[57] [2021] VSCA 215, [54]-[56] (Maxwell P, T Forrest and Walker JJA).

[58] [2022] VSCA 100 ('Bruce').

[59] Bruce [2022] VSCA 100, [39] (Maxwell P and Kennedy JA).