Gimenez v State of Queensland

Mann v Seafarms Queensland Pty Ltd [2025] QIRC 178

Transport Workers' Union of Australia, Union of Employees (Queensland Branch) v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2018] ICQ 001

Vermeer v Montague Fresh Qld Pty Ltd [2007] QIR Comm 38; 185 QGIG 220

• [1] Mr Sacha Gimenez commenced employment with the Queensland Police Service ('QPS') on 6 June 2016. He was employed as a Helicopter Line Pilot with the rotary wing.

• [2] Mr Gimenez resigned his employment, effective from 1 September 2024. At the time of his resignation Mr Gimenez had completed continuous service of 8 years and 3 months.

• [3] Following the tender of his resignation the QPS wrote to Mr Gimenez to ascertain, in more detail, the reasons for his resignation. The QPS contends that this was done to establish whether Mr Gimenez might have an entitlement to proportionate long service entitlements in accordance with the s 95(4)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 2016 ('the IR Act').

• [4] On 17 September 2024, after his resignation had taken effect, Mr Gimenz replied to the QPS via his lawyers. The reply included a comprehensively particularised draft Form 14 - Application for payment of proportionate long service leave.

• [5] The response with attached draft application is an important document in these proceedings. It represents a contemporaneous statement by Mr Gimenez, with the benefit of legal assistance, as to the reasons for his resignation.

• [6] Relevantly, the draft application extensively outlines innumerable grievances Mr Gimenez has with the QPS and certain managers over the last years of his employment. Mr Gimenez seeks in that draft (and his application and subsequently filed material) to weave these grievances into a narrative of personal financial pressure that (he says) compelled him to resign.

• [7] Importantly, while he makes passing reference to the emotional impact of these matters and his 'wellbeing' in the draft (and his application and subsequently filed material) Mr Gimenez has never contended that he resigned due to illness, nor has he submitted any independent evidence to support such a conclusion. In those circumstances, having had the benefit of legal advice in his initial response, and numerous opportunities to file material in his application, it can be safely concluded that the claim made by Mr Gimenez does not include a claim pursuant to s 95(4)(b)(i) of the IR Act that he resigned due to illness.

• [8] Mr Gimenez filed his application on 23 October 2024. The application filed was materially identical to the draft he had previously supplied to QPS via his lawyers.

• [9] In his application Mr Gimenez contends, in essence, that his resignation was prompted by domestic necessity within the meaning of s 95(4)(b)(ii) of the IR Act. He contends therefore that he is entitled to pro rata LSL which, in his case, is an amount of approximately $53500.00.

• [10] The QPS has refused to accept the asserted reason for resignation. In essence, the QPS contends that the real reason for Mr Gimenez's resignation was his ongoing dissatisfaction with the culture and conditions of the workplace. Further, while that dissatisfaction included dissatisfaction with his remuneration, that does not equate with the meaning of the term 'domestic necessity'.

• [11] Following the filing of Statements of Facts and Contentions by each party, and two affidavits by Mr Gimenez, the matter proceeded to a short hearing. The affidavit of Mr Gimenez and Ms Roxanne Gimenez were tendered as exhibits in the proceedings.[1] Ms Gimenez was not required for cross examination. No witnesses were called by the QPS.

• [12] Section 95 of the IR Act relevantly provides:

Entitlement - employees other than seasonal employees

(1) This section applies to an employee, other than a seasonal employee.

(2) The employee is entitled to long service leave, on full pay, of -

(a) if the employee has completed 10 years continuous service - 8.6667 weeks; and

(b) after 10 years service, if the employee has completed at least a further 5 years continuous service - a period that bears to 8.6667 weeks the proportion that the employee's further period of continuous service bears to 10 years.

(3) An employee who has completed at least 7 years continuous service is entitled to a proportionate payment for long service leave on the termination of the employee's service.

(4) However, if the employee's service is terminated before the employee has completed 10 years continuous service, the employee is entitled to a proportionate payment only if -

(a) the employee's service is terminated because of the employee's death; or

(b) the employee terminates the service because of -

(ii) a domestic or other pressing necessity; or

• [13] There is no dispute that Mr Gimenez has completed more than 7 years continuous service. The language 'because of' found at s 95(4)(b) of the IR Act compels an enquiry as to the reason Mr Gimenez terminated his employment, and whether that reason conforms to the notion of a 'domestic necessity'. It is that enquiry with which I am now tasked.

• [14] In a recent decision of Mann v Seafarms Queensland Pty Ltd Commissioner O'Neill summarised the relevant authorities on the meaning ascribed to 'domestic necessity':[2]

In Franks v Kembla Equipment Co, Sheldon J applied the following test when dealing with a case of "domestic necessity" as follows:

"The test, I would suggest, is whether there is a really serious problem in the home, although not necessarily a crisis. On the one hand, the colourable and frivolous should be rejected but on the other, over-exacting standards should not be adopted. After all, what is being dealt with is not a sphere-shaking issue but a reason for terminating employment and a material consideration must be whether the domestic situation is such that a reasonable man might feel compelled to seek its solution by terminating his employment. If a really sick spouse, coupled with economic worries and difficulty in coping with small children, falls short of creating a domestic necessity, then it is hard to imagine what domestic chaos must exist before the test is satisfied."

In Oscar Budai v Bartercard Australia Pty Ltd, Hart M. relevantly held that:

"... The authorities indicate that the concept of a domestic necessity is an extremely wide one. I am satisfied that the term "domestic or other pressing necessity" is even broader. It may be that the intention of the legislature was to ensure that the entitlement to long service leave would not be restricted to circumstances where the resignation was caused by purely domestic considerations without any regard to the workplace situation but to more complex circumstances, such as the circumstances of this case**, where the domestic difficulties are so intrinsically interlocked with workplace matters."**

In Ma'Aelopa v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service), Deputy President Hartigan accepted and applied the authorities excerpted in paragraphs [12] and [13]. Deputy President Hartigan confirmed that the terms 'domestic necessity' should not be conflated with 'other pressing necessity' and that it is not necessary to demonstrate that the domestic necessity is pressing or urgent.

The authorities confirm that the appropriate enquiry is whether the reason claimed by the employee for the termination is the reason upon which the employee placed the most weight in making the decision to terminate the employment.

In O'Keefe v Queensland Diagnostic Imaging Pty Ltd, the applicant resigned for two reasons, firstly, because of an inability to find day care for her then seven month old daughter, and secondly, to care for her mother-in-law who had been diagnosed with cancer. The applicant had provided information to the respondent about the first issue, but not the issues relating to her mother-in-law. Further, the applicant had not discussed her situation with management of the respondent before terminating her employment and in a short space of time had obtained other employment.

Industrial Commissioner Asbury (as her Honour then was) in allowing the applicant's claim, held that an employee's need to care for a child, in circumstances where childcare was not available was a "domestic or other pressing necessity". She further confirmed that childcare is a matter pertaining to household or household affairs.

Industrial Commissioner Asbury further noted that the need to provide care for a child was also a matter which could be described as "pressing", when a parent or parents are working.[18] Industrial Commissioner Asbury also confirmed that the applicant's need to provide support and care for her mother-in-law was also a "domestic or other pressing necessity" which satisfied the requirements of s 43(4)(b) of the Industrial Relations Act 1999.[19] In relation to the issue of the applicant failing to reveal the need to care for her mother-in-law, Industrial Commissioner Asbury noted:

... The failure of an employee to discuss issues which are later said to entitle the employee to payment for proportionate long service leave under s. 43(4)(b)(i) or (ii) may be relevant to whether or not those issues were genuine. However, the fact that an employee does not discuss an issue with his or her manager is not determinative. Issues which lead an employee to terminate employment because of domestic or other pressing necessity, or injury or illness, may be sensitive issues which that employee is reluctant or even embarrassed to raise with a manager. This does not make the issue which causes the employee to resign any less genuine. ...

In Simmons v Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Q.) represented by Uniting Care Health, Industrial Commissioner Power accepted that the definition of "domestic necessity" would reasonably include an employee terminating their employment in order to take care of a sick spouse or take care of children.

In Hoveydai v Nixon Pacific Pty Ltd, the applicant made a claim for pro rata long service leave on the basis of a "domestic or other pressing necessity" arising from the requirement to provide care for her elderly mother. In September 2023, the applicant's mother fell and was hospitalised. Following her discharge from hospital, the applicant provided around-the-clock care for her mother. The respondent's contention was that the applicant resigned simply to find another job, and this was reflected in her resignation letter.

Industrial Commissioner Pratt granted the application and accepted the applicant's evidence that at the time of her resignation, the main reason for resigning was to find work that better enabled the applicant to provide care and support to her mother. The Commission was also satisfied that the requirement to provide around-the-clock care for the applicant's mother was a pressing need. The Commission was further satisfied that the need to provide care to the applicant's mother was also a domestic need within the meaning of s 95(4)(b)(ii) of the IR Act.

• [15] The cases set out above demonstrate that there will often be multiple reasons proffered for the resignation. Some will be easily delineated while others may be intertwined. Whatever the case might be, the task is to ascertain which reason the applicant employee placed the most weight on when making their decision to resign.

• [16] Importantly, the enquiry of the Commission as to the reason for the resignation will go beyond merely accepting the statements made by the employee. In Transport Workers' Union of Australia, Union of Employees (Queensland Branch) v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd President Martin (as he then was) observed:[3]

What an employee might say to their employer, or even believe themselves, may be relevant to a question of causation. However, the extent of their relevance will depend upon the proper construction of the statute. In relation to s 43(4)(b)(i), they do not determine it. An employee's motivation or statements to their employer cannot be determinative of their entitlement under s 43(4)(b)(i) because they alone cannot prove the cause of the employee's termination.

If an employee resigns due to illness, but tells their employer they have done so to find a new line of work, the cause of the termination is the illness. Similarly, where an employee claims to have been suffering an illness, but is found to be healthy, that employee has not terminated their employment because of an illness. They may honestly believe that illness was the reason for their termination, but that will not render them eligible under the Act.

• [17] Mr Gimenez has been self-represented in these proceedings. It was noted that despite the comprehensive nature of the submissions annexed to his application, there was little in the way of evidence to support the contentions. It has therefore been necessary for the Commission to give express direction to Mr Gimenez to ensure adequate material was placed before the Commission to consider the claim.

• [18] On 25 March 2025 I directed Mr Gimenez to file a Statement of Facts and Contentions ('SOFC'). The direction expressly required Mr Gimenez to detail clearly and concisely the key facts upon which he relied. Mr Gimenez filed his SOFC on 22 April 2025. Following the filing of the SOFC it became apparent that Mr Gimenez had not filed any sworn evidence in the proceedings. Consequently, he was directed to file sworn evidence. Mr Gimenez subsequently filed two affidavits (one from him and one deposed by his wife) on 25 June 2025.

• [19] I have had regard to all of the material Mr Gimenez has filed but I do not intend to summarise each document individually. I will refer to the salient portions throughout my consideration later in these reasons.

• [20] With respect to the evidence and submissions of Mr Gimenez, suffice to say, there is a dominant theme running through all of it. Despite the narrow confines of relevant facts in this application, Mr Gimenez has taken every opportunity to repeatedly and extensively express his overwhelming dissatisfaction with the QPS and his managers.

• [21] The material filed repetitively lists the grievances particularised by Mr Gimenez about the attitude of his manager to permission to perform external work, covid related 'pay freezes' and the promise (and then withdrawal) of a cost of living allowance ('COLA'), all of which are then woven into the narrative of the financial pressure that these things caused him. By contrast, there is little to no particularisation of precisely what domestic factors were impacted by his financial situation.

• [22] The QPS filed a SOFC on 20 May 2025. Additionally, the QPS had earlier filed a response to the application of Mr Gimenez on 11 November 2024. Again, I have had regard to these materials, though I do not intend to summarise them in detail. The QPS did not file any sworn evidence.

• [23] In essence, the QPS contends that Mr Gimenez's dissatisfaction with his employment conditions is plainly evident from his material, that it was the real and motivating reason for his resignation, and that it does not equate to domestic necessity.

• [24] In Ma'Aelopa v State of Queensland (Queensland Police Service) Deputy President Hartigan summarised the authorities referred to above and considered an application pursuant to s 95(4)(b)(ii) of the IR Act by reference to four questions.[4] Those questions are:

1. Was the reason claimed for termination one which fell within the section?

1. Was such a reason genuinely held by the Applicant and not simply colourable or a rationalisation?

1. Although the reason claimed may not be the sole ground which motivated the Applicant in his decision, was it the real or motivating reason for it?

1. Was the reason such that a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the Applicant found himself placed might have felt compelled to terminate their employment?

Was the reason claimed for termination one which fell within the section?

• [26] The section refers to 'domestic or other pressing necessity'. It is important not to conflate the two concepts. In the circumstances of this case Mr Gimenez relies on domestic necessity.

• [27] While it is important not to take an overly narrow approach to this language, the term 'necessity' carries with it a connotation of something necessary or indispensable.[5] In the context of s 95(4)(b)(ii) of the IR Act, it is e.g. something that, if resignation does not occur, will cause some demonstrable disadvantage or undesirable circumstance to befall the employee or their family. In short, it must be something serious.[6]

• [28] Given the diversity of employment and domestic arrangements the possibilities for such a scenario arising are endless. Despite the expanse of possibilities, some limit to the application of the provisions of s 95(4)(b)(ii) of the IR Act must have been intended by the inclusion of the word 'necessity'. Many of the cases referred to above serve as examples of this. Resigning to attend to the needs of children or sick family members are the quintessential examples of domestic necessity. Moving to another town, city or State for these reasons or because e.g. a spouse has taken on new employment is another common example. Each of these examples demonstrate the inexorable link in the language between the term 'domestic' and 'necessity'.

• [29] Mr Gimenez now contends that his remuneration and other conditions of employment were causing him financial pressure such that he had to resign to better provide for his family. But was that the reason for resignation that he claimed when first asked?

• [30] On 17 September 2024, in response to a direct request from QPS for the reasons for his resignation, Mr Gimenez responded (via his lawyers) with a draft application for these proceedings. The draft application (which subsequently became his formal application) incorporated an annexure particularising (in great detail) all of the reasons for his resignation. I consider this document to be of significant probative value. It is relatively contemporaneous to the resignation. It was prepared in response to a request for reasons for resignation expressly for the purposes of consideration of entitlements under s 95(4) of the IR Act. It was prepared with the benefit of legal advice.

• [31] In the annexure to his application, Mr Gimenez addresses a great many grievances he held with QPS. But he also makes an express statement as to his reasons for resignation:[7]

I faced a situation where I felt I had to terminate my employment because of domestic and financial necessity because:

• I didn't have the option to increase my salary through negotiation with the Employer;
• My contract with the Employer didn't expire until June 2025;
• I was limited in the additional hours I could work with the Employer to earn more money due to Fatigue Management rules;
• I was denied the opportunity to undertake external work to supplement my income to financially support my family;
• I wasn't eligible for the COLA payment;[8]
• I was aware that the Employer attempted on several occasions to refuse or reverse my valid overtime payments.

The financial pressures I was facing at work was compounded by a progressively worsening workplace culture and morale.

These were the real and motivating reasons for my decision to resign from the Employer.

• [32] Every single reason listed by Mr Gimenez relates to significant dissatisfaction with his remuneration and other conditions of his employment. In his own words (with legal advice) he states that these are the 'real and motivating' reasons for his resignation. Save for his assertion of 'domestic and financial necessity' in the introductory sentence, there is not a single reference to any aspect of his domestic situation.

• [33] Mr Gimenez, like most employees, clearly aspired to higher remuneration. This aspiration was undoubtedly for reasons that included his desire to provide for his family. But what Mr Gimenez has failed to demonstrate, in either his submission or evidence, is why the increased remuneration was a necessity, either domestic or at all.

• [34] The 'badge' placed by an employee on the reason for resignation is not the reason.[9] The real and motivating reason, in his own words, is contained in his primary response on 17 September 2024. Mr Gimenez has written endlessly about his dissatisfaction with the QPS. His anger about his employment conditions is more than evident from the repeated airing of his grievances about the manner in which he was managed and how (he says) this financially disadvantaged him.

• [35] Having regard to his extensive list of complaints and to his 'real and motivating' reasons extracted above, the inescapable conclusion is that the reason for his resignation was a long-standing dissatisfaction with his employment conditions.

• [36] Mr Gimenez has produced no evidence to demonstrate how his financial aspirations were necessitated by domestic factors. It is entirely normal for any employee to aspire to a better income or standard of living. But aspirations based on personal values or expectations are not the measure of 'necessity'.

• [37] Mr Gimenez has had ample opportunity to elaborate on his assertions of 'domestic necessity' but has failed to produce any evidence to support such a conclusion. The most obvious reason for his resignation evident from the material he has placed before the Commission is his dissatisfaction with his employment.

• [38] In all of those circumstances I do not consider the 'real and motivating' reasons stated by Mr Gimenez fall within the section. On that basis his claim must fail.

• [39] However, in the event I am incorrect in this conclusion, I will address the remaining considerations.

Was such a reason genuinely held by the Applicant and not simply colourable or a rationalisation?

• [40] For all of the reasons in the immediately preceding paragraphs, I do not consider Mr Gimenez has demonstrated that domestic necessity was a genuinely held reason for his resignation. I consider that he makes this assertion in an attempt to rationalise his entitlement to pro rata LSL.

• [41] This is plainly evident not only from the 'real and motivating' reasons he outlines in his initial response to the QPS, but also from the stark absence of evidence or explicit particulars about domestic factors and also, from the tone of his material more generally.

• [42] There is a repeated but wholly superficial theme running through Mr Gimenez's material to the effect that he is the 'breadwinner' and that he has children etc. There is an extensive but again superficial account to the effect that his family were placed under financial pressure by the allegedly inadequate income received by Mr Gimenez.

• [43] Until the hearing of this matter, Mr Gimenez had not produced a single piece of evidence that informed the Commission what he was earning with QPS and why it was inadequate for his family needs. At the hearing Mr Gimenez confirmed that at the time of his resignation in 2024 he was earning approximately $183000.00 p.a.

• [44] In the absence of specific details to the contrary, there is nothing objectively problematic about being a single income household. Yet it is essentially that, and only that, which Mr Gimenez continues to refer to. The Commission has been given no other insight from Mr Gimenez about what it was about his domestic situation that gave rise to a necessity for him to earn more.

• [45] I can see no evidence anywhere in the material filed by Mr Gimenez of domestic necessity. I see evidence of a desire to be better remunerated, and I see an intense resentment directed at those who Mr Gimenez perceives were preventing him earning more. But in the absence of more evidence, it is not for the Commission to presume that a single income household including dependants is a domestic situation necessitating higher remuneration. I cannot simply assume it because Mr Gimenez asserts it.

• [46] Mr Gimenez has provided no evidence of the outgoings and costs of his household at the relevant time. His affidavit attaches three documents that purport to be screenshots of what is said to be his bank statement with Suncorp.[10] They are not statements. They are screenshots of the balances only. There is no evidence of spending or income included.

• [47] The screenshots purport to cover the balance of that account between April 2023 and June 2024 where the balance drops from $180875.87 to $69932.77. I note that the April 2023 balance is a result of a deposits of $241056.20 and withdrawals of $60180.33. I have no particulars about these figures.

• [48] At the hearing of this matter Mr Gimenez confirmed that these were the balances of an offset account through which his salary passed, as well as the proceeds of the sale of an investment property apparently sold to manage the (unparticularised) cost of living pressures he continues to allude to.

• [49] It is unclear what Mr Gimenez seeks to illustrate with this data. Objectively, in the absence of any other explanation, it can be concluded that there were substantial amounts of money available to Mr Gimenez in the 12 months prior to his resignation, reduced by expenditure over that time. The closing balance is still a substantial amount of cash to have on hand for any person, whether it be a line of credit or not. If the declining balance was due to domestic financial pressure there is no evidence from Mr Gimenez to that effect.

• [50] In the absence of a broader narrative, the bank statements are not evidence of domestic necessity. They are not evidence of anything that assists Mr Gimenez in this application.

• [51] Further, there is no evidence of other finances. I consider it highly unlikely that the account from which the screenshots came is the only account operated by Mr Gimenez. There is no evidence of mortgage or rental obligations. There is no actual evidence of other household income or expenses. The SOFC contains a mere a list of the outgoings for his household that resembles those of any family household, but with no amounts ascribed to the items on the list.

• [52] Further, Mr Gimenez has not alluded to any special needs or care giving responsibilities in respect to his spouse or children. It would appear that Ms Gimenez is the primary carer of the children, and her evidence filed in the proceedings makes no mention of any out of the ordinary pressures in respect of the children.[11]

• [53] I do not consider that the absence of this evidence is simply an oversight by Mr Gimenez. At a mention of this matter on 25 March 2025 I expressly explained to Mr Gimenez that the multiple grievances he had with the QPS were not directly relevant to a claim where he was alleging 'domestic necessity'. I invited Mr Gimenez to consider this when preparing his SOFC in the hope of seeing more information about his alleged domestic concerns.[12]

• [54] Instead of doing this Mr Gimenez filed a SOFC that extensively repeats his criticism of the QPS and his employment and remuneration conditions. While there are some statements about declining income and rising expenses, there are no specific particulars upon which a conclusion of domestic necessity can be supported.

• [55] The highest Mr Gimenez' SOFC gets is a list of household outgoings which is entirely typical in terms of the categories listed but, astonishingly, contains no accompanying amounts.[13] Mr Gimenez talks of his QPS wage being inadequate for these expenses but, until hearing of this matter, failed to include the details of what the wage was, how it did not meet his domestic expenses, what those expenses were, or how (if at all) his situation improved with his new employment.

• [56] It is for Mr Gimenez to prove domestic necessity. On the evidence he has put before the Commission he has not. Moreover, the evidence he has produced (including his initial response) plainly suggests that in all probability the real and motivating reason for his resignation was long term dissatisfaction with his wages and conditions with QPS.

• [57] It is clear from the material before me that, having been alerted by the QPS to the possibility of entitlement to pro rata LSL, Mr Gimenez has attempted to rationalise that entitlement into existence by weaving a narrative of domestic necessity into his long-standing grievances. While he is able to amply demonstrate the factors that were working against him being better remunerated with QPS, he has failed entirely to demonstrate with any particularity what domestic factors gave rise to a necessity for him to be better remunerated.

• [58] The lack of clear evidence of domestic factors necessitating the resignation in this case leaves me with the overwhelming impression that Mr Gimenez has simply attempted to reconstruct the narrative around his resignation to rationalise an entitlement. In those circumstances his claim must fail.

Although the reason claimed may not be the sole ground which motivated the Applicant in his decision, was it the real or motivating reason for it?

• [59] In this matter the Commission has the benefit of Mr Gimenez describing (in his own words) the 'real and motivating' reason for his resignation. I have already concluded that the reason falls outside those contemplated by the IR Act and alternatively, that the stated reason of domestic necessity is a mere rationalisation by Mr Gimenez to gain entitlement.

• [60] While I accept that domestic matters were a consideration for Mr Gimenez in his decision, for all of the preceding reasons I am not convinced they were the real or motivating reasons for his resignation. In my view the domestic factors are, at best, a sub-set to the real and motivating reasons that he carefully articulated in his initial response to the QPS. A less charitable view might be that they were an afterthought when he realised they might be a pathway to pro rata LSL.

• [61] For completeness I should also note that there are occasional references to the emotional impact of the workplace grievances on Mr Gimenez. He and his wife allude to impacts on his 'wellbeing' and the bulk of the evidence in his wife's affidavit addresses these matters.

• [62] Mr Gimenez has never, at any time, sought entitlement to pro rata LSL because of illness. There is no statement from Mr Gimenez or his wife overtly citing mental health issues as a reason for resignation, nor is there any independent evidence to that effect before me. In those circumstances I can only conclude that the references to his 'wellbeing' are not references to 'illness' within the meaning of s 95(4)(b)(i) of the IR Act or, to the extent they might be, that was not the real or motivating reason for resignation.

• [63] The real and motivating reasons for resignation were stated by Mr Gimenez in his contemporaneous response to the QPS in September 2024. None of them are reasons that entitle him to pro rata LSL. To the extent that either domestic or personal factors might have contributed to his reasons for resignation, they are plainly ancillary reasons at best.

Was the reason such that a reasonable person in the circumstances in which the Applicant found himself placed might have felt compelled to terminate their employment?

• [64] While my findings thus far make it unnecessary to consider this final question, for completeness I will briefly address it. I note further that the absence of proper particulars about domestic factors makes the 'reasonable person' assessment all but impossible.

• [65] Throughout his application, the SOFC, and affidavit material, Mr Gimenez has made references to his family and the need to provide for them. With no clear particulars, the most generous impression to be gained from Mr Gimenez's assertions about his domestic situation is that he experienced financial pressure arising from the impacts of the pandemic and cost of living pressures. It is trite to note that very few people were not affected by these factors, and many continue to be.

• [66] It is not enough for an applicant in such cases to simply recite the mantra of 'cost of living' as a purported justification for entitlement pursuant to s 95(4)(b)(ii) of the IR Act. The cost of living crisis means different things to each person. People are all affected differently, depending on their unique circumstances. For some it will mean postponing an overseas holiday or a new car. For others it will mean a genuine struggle to keep the power on at home or remaining housed.

• [67] The point where cost of living pressures reaches the requisite level of domestic necessity for the purposes of the IR Act lies somewhere within that spectrum. It is not measured on the subjective standards of the resigning employee. The unique facts of each case will be determinative, but 'necessity' must be demonstrated to an objective standard.

• [68] It is folly to attempt to definitively list domestic factors that will support a conclusion that a reasonable person would have resigned. The cases cited above give some guide. But the conclusion that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign cannot be reached purely on the assertion of an applicant.

• [69] In order to demonstrate the objective reasonableness of their compulsion to resign, an applicant must be able to clearly particularise the domestic factors contributing to their decision and, where possible, independent evidence supporting the assertion.

• [70] As I have already noted, aside from a very generalised assertion of financial pressure, Mr Gimenez has provided nothing in the way of precise particulars. I therefore cannot even begin to address this final consideration in respect of his claim.

• [71] There is scarcely a family of the same or similar dimensions to that of Mr Gimenez that does not experience financial pressure on a weekly basis. With respect to an objective consideration of the compulsion to resign, there is nothing about the material or evidence put before the Commission by Mr Gimenez that sets him apart from the common experience of most families.

• [72] By contrast, a defining and overwhelming feature of the circumstances leading to his resignation and his material before the Commission is his very evident prolonged sense of dissatisfaction with the QPS. While that is grounds upon which a reasonable person might resign, it is not a factor that entitles him to pro rata LSL.

• [74] In all of the above circumstances I make the following Order:

[2] [2025] QIRC 178 at [12] to [20].

[3] [2018] ICQ 001 at [17]- [18].

[4] [2024] QIRC 29 at [30]- [47].

[5] Vermeer v Montague Fresh Qld Pty Ltd [2007] QIR Comm 38; 185 QGIG 220.

[6] Franks v Kembla Equipment Co (1969) AR 17 at 19.

[9] Transport Workers' Union of Australia, Union of Employees (Queensland Branch) v Linfox Australia Pty Ltd [2018] ICQ 001 at [17]- [18].

[10] Exhibit 1, attachments 'SG 1', 'SG 2', 'SG 3'.

[13] SOFC filed 22 April 2025, at page 3.