Gibson v Gold Coast City Council Animal Management [2026] QCAT 169

Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 19, s 20, s 24

Allen v Gold Coast City Council [2025] QCAT 555

Barclay v Gold Coast City Council [2026] QCAT 25

Brisbane City Council v Roy [2020] QCATA 147

Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58

Lee v Brisbane City Council [2012] QCA 284

Sarkis v Morrison [2013] NSWCA 281

Mr Lester Soloai (Supervisor, Animal Management Gold Coast City Council Community Compliance)

[1] The Applicant, Mr Ian Edward Gibson ("Mr Gibson"), is the owner of Tyson, a de-sexed male, brindle-coloured Staffordshire Bull Terrier. Tyson is a rescue dog, and thus of an uncertain age.

[2] By means of an Application to review a decision filed in the Tribunal on 15 July 2025, Mr Gibson seeks review before the Tribunal of an internal review decision made by Mr Lester Soloai in his capacity as Supervisor, Animal Management Gold Coast City Council ("the Council").

[3] Mr Soloai's decision had been to confirm an earlier decision of the Council, made on 30 April 2025, to declare Tyson a "regulated dangerous dog" pursuant to sections 89 and 94 of the Animal Management (Cats and Dogs) Act 2008 (Qld) ("the Animal Management Act").

[4] The decision to declare Tyson dangerous arose following an incident that had taken place at about 4:45pm on 2 March 2024, between Tyson and a male de-sexed Maltese terrier, aged about five years, named Oreo. During the incident Oreo was bitten by Tyson, thereby sustaining injuries of sufficient magnitude that ultimately, Oreo needed to be euthanised. Oreo's owner - a Mr John Horne - was also allegedly bitten during the same incident.

[5] What transpired during the incident is best understood from the recollections of the only two eyewitnesses, Ms Karen Turra, and Oreo's owner, Mr John Horne.

[6] Ms Karen Turra is a former neighbour of the Gibson family. Ms Turra likes to walk for exercise yet prefers to do that as part of some broader purpose. In these circumstances, Ms Turra and Mr Gibson had come to an arrangement whereby Ms Turra would collect Tyson and take him walking with her, on most afternoons.

[7] In her evidence when before the Tribunal, Ms Turra said that she estimates that she had walked Tyson on more than 20 prior occasions, always along the same route, and always without incident. In Ms Turra's experience, Tyson had always proven to be an entirely placid, eminently agreeable walking companion, and had never displayed any indicia of aggression, to either humans, or other animals.

[8] On 2 March 2024 Ms Turra had been walking with Tyson along their usual route together. This took them along Riverleigh Drive, heading in the general direction of 'the Palladium' on Hope Island.

[9] Ms Turra says that at about 4:45pm, she and Tyson had just walked by the house that is now known to be the home of Mr John Horne and his family. At that moment Mr Horne had also happened to be outside the front door, watering some pot plants. Oreo the Maltese terrier had also been outside, nosing about at Mr Horne's feet.

[10] At a point at which Ms Turra recalls having already walked many metres further beyond the property boundary for the Horne residence, Ms Turra says that she became aware of a small white dog, barking angrily, and quickly bearing down on her and Tyson, from behind.

[11] Ms Turra says that the small white dog started snapping angrily at Tyson's hindquarters, whereupon Tyson instantly turned, and promptly clamped his jaws around Oreo's body; lifting the much smaller dog off the ground, in the process. Tyson then stood there, holding Oreo in his jaws, motionless like a Sphinx.

[12] By now, Ms Turra says that Oreo was yelping in obvious distress, such that she reacted by hauling on Tyson's leash, in an effort to make Tyson release the smaller dog. In the next instant Ms Turra says that she also became aware of the presence of a male person, at that time unknown to Ms Turra, yet whom she now knows to have been Mr Horne. Ms Turra says that Mr Horne had come running on scene from the same direction as that from whence Oreo had arrived, momentarily beforehand.

[13] According to Ms Turra's statement (and as confirmed during the giving of her oral evidence), events in the next instant unfolded as follows:

I was pulling hard on Tyson's leash and yelling Tyson's name at him. Despite my best efforts, and that of the white dog's owner who came running from two doors behind us, it was extremely difficult to free the small dog. The owner kicked and hit Tyson, while I pulled hard on Tyson's leash, even sitting on Tyson, in an attempt to get him to release the dog. Eventually, Tyson let go of the white dog, and the owner rushed him home.

...

During the incident, Tyson showed no aggression toward the other dog or its owner, or me. Tyson did not growl, or shake the other dog about, in fact, after taking hold of the other dog, Tyson did not move at all. Even after letting go of the other dog, Tyson remained where he was, just panting heavily.

[14] As may be expected, Mr Horne's own recollection of the details of the incident differ in some respects from those as now recalled by Ms Turra. Mr Horne told the Tribunal that he had been outside his front door watering his pot plants, and had been accompanied by Oreo at the time, who had been nosing about, nearby. Mr Horne had been pre-occupied by the gardening task immediately at hand, such that he had not even been aware that Ms Turra and Tyson had just passed by on the footpath. Mr Horne says that he only became alerted to the presence of another dog in the vicinity after Oreo had suddenly shot off across the driveway, barking. A split second after this Mr Horne says that he heard Oreo squealing, in obvious distress. Upon hearing that, Mr Horne says that he immediately turned and raced after his little dog, and quickly came to observe Oreo firmly clamped within the jaws of another, much larger dog on a leash:

A lady was on the ground pulling on the dog's lead. Oreo was squealing in severe pain inside the dog's mouth. I jumped on the dog's body and started punching and kicking the dog. I got hold of the dog's mouth and tried to pry it open, and was able to, just a fraction enough to let Oreo out of its mouth. The dog then redirected and bit and released me on my left forearm. I ran after Oreo to see how he was, but couldn't find him. I shouted to my wife who was vacuuming inside the house at the time. She came to the front door and saw my arm and the blood coming from the bite and she immediately [took] a photo with her handphone.

[15] Eventually, Mr Horne and his wife found Oreo, who by this stage had taken refuge, cowering inside their laundry. Mr Horne says that Oreo was also very obviously wounded, given that his white fur was covered in blood, and given that Oreo had also lost control of his bowels.

[16] Next, and with some considerable difficulty, Oreo was loaded into a car by Mr Horne and taken to the Animal Emergency Service, located at Carrara. Veterinary surgery was performed on Oreo later that same evening. After leaving Oreo at the vet surgery, Mr Horne took himself off to the doctor, to have his own wounds examined and cleaned.

[17] In relation to Mr Horne's injuries, a report dated 2 March 2024 from the 'Walk In Specialist Emergency Clinic' at the Robina Town Centre records the following:

Breaking up dog fight this afternoon, and a dog bit John's L. forearm

3 puncture wounds to L. forearm

2x punctures from incise's [sic] 5mm long, and 1 crush from molar - oozing.

[18] The Tribunal accepts the medical report now excerpted (above), as showing that Mr Horne sustained puncture wounds on his left forearm in consequence of a dog bite on 2 March 2024. Puncture wounds as described meet the legal definition for 'bodily harm'.

[19] Unfortunately, at about 5:20am on 3 March 2024, Mr Horne was contacted by the overnight staff at the Animal Emergency Service at Carrara, only to be informed that, even notwithstanding the emergency surgery, Oreo's condition was steadily deteriorating. Oreo was not expected to recover. The expert veterinary advice given at that point was that Oreo needed to be put beyond suffering and needed to be euthanised. Understandably, Mr Horne accepted that advice.

[20] A report from the Animal Emergency Service at Carrara dated 2 March 2024 records, inter alia:

Crush type bite wounds over back with puncture wounds over the lateral and ventral abdomen - concern for wounds extending into abdomen. Punctures on dorsal and ventral of the neck.

Surgery:

10cm x 5cm defect in right caudo-dorsal abdominal wall with large pocket extending to through sc and to skin - necrotising. Involving right ureter, multiple large blood vessels and nerves, extending to vertebral column. No tissue available to close and not in a position were [sic] mesh is an option.

Entire mesentery haemorrhagic, multiple rents in mesentery with areas on SI going dark purple due to disruption of blood supply.

A factually contested matter: Did Tyson also bite Mr Horne?

[21] Although readily agreeing that Oreo ended up being bitten and held in the jaws of Tyson, Ms Turra says that she did not observe Tyson also biting Mr Horne; and that she had been most surprised when informed about that by Mr Horne on the following day. Mr Gibson now speculates that, rather than his having been bitten by Tyson, Mr Horne may have instead been bitten by Oreo - probably at some point after the primary incident - and potentially during the process of Mr Horne attempting to load Oreo into his car, to take Oreo to the vet.

[22] Yet, Mr Horne said in his own evidence when before the Tribunal that he was very definitely bitten by Tyson, and that he was not at any time bitten by Oreo, notwithstanding the trouble it had taken to load Oreo into his car, in the aftermath of the incident with Tyson. Mr Horne says that he had not been aware of the fact of his having been bitten by Tyson at the time of the bite and had not been aware that he had personally sustained an injury until the point when his wife had informed him that his arm was bleeding, immediately after Mr Horne had called out for his wife to come and help him find Oreo.

[23] Given the distress and confusion attending this incident, it is entirely conceivable that Ms Turra may not have observed (or may now not recall) Tyson also biting Mr Horne, and Mr Horne also not being initially aware that he had sustained an injury.

[24] On the particular issue as to whether Mr Horne was also bitten by Tyson, the Tribunal prefers the evidence of Mr Horne, when he says that he was bitten by Tyson immediately after Tyson having released his grip on Oreo. The Tribunal concludes, on the balance of probabilities, that at this point Tyson had turned, and momentarily latched onto Mr Horne's forearm immediately after releasing Oreo. This appears probable, particularly given that Mr Horne had - at that stage - been in the process of trying to forcefully prise open Tyson's jaws, thus placing his own hands and forearms near Tyson's mouth and teeth.

[25] Although Ms Turra and Mr Horne also have differing recollections regarding the precise location upon Riverleigh Drive at which the incident is claimed to have transpired, very little now turns on that. Ultimately, it does not matter whether the incident happened 'just beyond the property line' (as now recalled by Mr Horne), or whether it transpired 'several metres further up the road' (as now recalled by Ms Turra), as each of them are consistent in recalling the essential aspects of this incident - which entail Oreo barking and rushing at Tyson; Tyson responding by lifting the smaller dog up off the ground in his jaws; and Mr Horne intervening in an effort to try and rescue Oreo.

[26] On 16 March 2024 Mr Gibson was issued by the Gold Coast City Council with a notice of proposed dangerous dog declaration for Tyson, pursuant to section 90 of the Animal Management Act.

[27] For what follows, it is necessary to set out sections 89 and 90 of the Animal Management Act. These provisions provide:

(1) Any local government may, by complying with the requirements of this part -

(a) declare a particular dog to be a declared dangerous dog (a dangerous dog declaration); or

(b) declare a particular dog to be a declared menacing dog (a menacing dog declaration).

(2) A dangerous dog declaration may be made for a dog only if the dog -

(a) has seriously attacked, or acted in a way that caused fear to, a person or another animal; or

(b) may, in the opinion of an authorised person having regard to the way the dog has behaved towards a person or another animal, seriously attack, or act in a way that causes fear to, the person or animal.

(3) A menacing dog declaration may be made for a dog only if a ground mentioned in subsection (2) exists for the dog, except that the attack was not serious.

(4) The declaration may be made even if the dog is not in the local government's area.

(5) A declaration under this section is a regulated dog declaration.

(6) In this section -

animal has the meaning given by section 191.

seriously attack means -

(a) in relation to a person - attack the person in a way that causes the death of, or grievous bodily harm or bodily harm to, the person; or

(b) in relation to an animal - attack the animal in a way that causes the death of the animal, or maims or wounds the animal.

1. Notice of proposed declaration

(1) If a local government proposes to make a regulated dog declaration it must give any owner of the dog a notice (a proposed declaration notice) stating -

(a) the following details for the dog -

(i) breed;

(ii) colour;

(iii) sex;

(iv) any other noticeable distinguishing features or marks; and

(b) the local government proposes to declare the dog to be a regulated dog; and

(c) the type of regulated dog declaration proposed to be made; and

(d) the reasons for the proposed declaration; and

(e) an owner of the dog may make, within a stated period, written representations to show why the proposed declaration should not be made.

(2) The stated period must end at least 14 days after the proposed declaration notice is given.

(3) The proposed declaration notice may be accompanied by a written opinion from a veterinary surgeon or other evidence about the dog's breed.

[28] On 26 March 2024, and in the manner provided for by section 90(1)(e) (above), Mr Gibson wrote to the Council and advised of his intention to object to the proposed declaration; also requesting that the proposed declaration be stayed, pending his obtaining further legal advice; as well as the results of a Right to Information application that had by this stage been initiated on the Council.

[29] Thereafter, Mr Gibson experienced several months of frustration and delay, given that the Council would only provide documents in response to his Right to Information request that had been so heavily redacted that these were essentially indecipherable.

[30] On 11 April 2025 Mr Gibson made further written representations to the Council, consistent with his rights under section 90(1)(e), setting out the reasons why it was submitted that Tyson should not be declared to be a dangerous dog.

[31] On 30 April 2025 a regulated dog declaration was made by the Council, thereby declaring Tyson a 'dangerous' dog.

[32] On 13 May 2025 Mr Gibson sought an internal review of the declaration made on 30 April 2025.

[33] On 17 June 2025, Mr Lester Soloai acting as the Council's internal review officer, affirmed the original 30 April 2025 decision to declare Tyson dangerous ("the internal review decision").

[34] On 15 July 2025 Mr Gibson applied to the Tribunal for an external review of the internal review decision.

[35] Section 188 of the Animal Management Act provides:

A person who is given, or is entitled to be given, a review notice for a decision under part 1 may apply, as provided under the QCAT Act, for an external review of the decision.

[36] A 'decision under part 1' as referenced in section 188 is a reference to an internal review decision made pursuant to Chapter 8, Part 1 of the Animal Management Act. Mr Soloai's decision dated 17 June 2025 qualifies as a decision under Part 1 for purposes of section 188.

[37] Any review of the internal review decision by the Tribunal is governed by Part 1, Division 3 of Chapter 2 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld) ("the QCAT Act"). In exercising its review jurisdiction, the Tribunal:

(a) must decide the review in accordance with the QCAT Act and the Animal Management Act (being the enabling Act under which the reviewable decision was made);

(b) may perform the functions conferred on the Tribunal by the QCAT Act or the Animal Management Act; and

(c) has all the functions of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision being reviewed.[1]

[38] The purpose of the Tribunal's review is to produce the 'correct and preferable decision'.[2] The Tribunal must hear and decide a review of the Decision by way of a fresh hearing on the merits.[3] When so doing, the Tribunal may:

(a) confirm or amend the decision;

(b) set aside the decision and substitute its own decision; or

(c) set aside the decision and return the matter for reconsideration to the decision-maker for the decision, with the directions the Tribunal considers appropriate.[4]

[39] The Tribunal's decision pursuant to each of s 24(1)(a) and 24(1)(b) is taken to be a decision of the decision-maker for the reviewable decision except for the Tribunal's review jurisdiction or an appeal under part 8 of the QCAT Act.[5]

[40] The Tribunal is not required to identify an error in either the process or the reasoning that led to the decision being made, and there is no presumption that the decision is correct.[6]

[41] Already, sections 89 and 90 of the Animal Management Act have been set out at paragraph [27], above.

[42] Section 94 of the Animal Management Act provides:

(1) The local government must consider any written representations and evidence accompanying them within the period stated in the proposed declaration notice.

(2) If, after complying with subsection (1), the local government is satisfied that the relevant ground under section 89 still exists, it must make the regulated dog declaration for the dog.

[43] In submissions made to the Council on 11 April 2025 in furtherance of his rights under section 90(1)(e) of the Animal Management Act Mr Gibson contended (here summarising):

(a) The need for an objective assessment of this incident should not be overshadowed by the fact that, ultimately, Oreo needed to be euthanised. All of the circumstances need to be considered, particularly the role of Oreo as the instigator of the encounter between the two dogs.

(b) Tyson had only acted in self-defence, by way of his seizing Oreo in his mouth, and holding Oreo, to prevent further attack. Tyson did not shake, growl at, or maul Oreo.

(c) The fact of Tyson having bitten Mr Horne is refuted, there being no observed evidence of either injury, or blood, on Mr Horne, and given the fact that Mr Horne did not report having sustained an injury to Ms Turra, at the time of the incident.

(d) Oreo should be assessed as the aggressor, and regard needs to be had to the fact that Mr Horne had allowed his dog to be unrestrained in the front yard, thereby allowing Oreo unfettered access to other dogs in the street.

(e) It is probable that Mr Horne's own actions in jumping on Tyson (in an effort to rescue Oreo) had unintentionally caused considerable downward pressure on Tyson's jaws, thereby causing any resultant puncture wounds to Oreo.

[44] In further written submissions made to the Tribunal[7] Mr Gibson submitted (again summarising):

(a) For purposes of section 89 of the Animal Management Act, the Council has not established that Tyson attacked either Oreo or Mr Horne "in a way" causing either the alleged bodily harm to Mr Horne, or the death of Oreo.

(b) The term "attack" in section 89 of the Animal Management Act is not defined and thus should be afforded its ordinary, dictionary-derived meaning. The dictionary meaning of attack suggests an element of intention to cause a particular result. The Council has failed to adduce evidence to show that Tyson acted aggressively, forcefully, or violently in a way that suggests any intention on the part of Tyson to cause either injury or death.

(c) Mr Horne has failed to identify which dog caused his own injury. Consideration should be given to the possibility that Mr Horne was bitten by his own dog Oreo, particularly in light of the veterinary report which records that Oreo had attempted to bite attending veterinary staff when they were treating Oreo's wounds.

(d) It is purely speculative to suggest that Tyson caused Oreo's internal injuries, especially in circumstances in which Mr Horne admits having punched and kicked at Tyson. It is 'probable' that Mr Horne's force, in the form of upward and downward kicks and punches directed at Tyson were responsible for causing the more serious injury to Oreo.

(e) Tyson did not "attack" Oreo, rather Tyson reacted to an attack instigated by Oreo, and Tyson's reaction was not in a way that caused Mr Horne's injury or the puncture wounds to Oreo's abdomen.

[45] In final submissions[8] made to the Tribunal at the conclusion of the hearing on 2 February 2026 Mr Gibson essentially repeats those matters previously submitted and as now summarised above, and also referred the Tribunal to a recent prior decision of the Tribunal in Allen v Gold Coast City Council ("Allen").[9]

[46] In addition, Mr Gibson again complains - in strong terms - about the quality of the Council's investigation, and the extent to which the Council had redacted documents released to him in response to his 'Right to Information' request.

[47] As a preliminary matter, the Tribunal records that Mr Gibson has very good reason to complain about the extent to which the Council documents released to him pursuant to a Right to Information request had been redacted.

[48] Examination of the unredacted originals of these documents - which were only finally produced by the Council during the Tribunal hearing at the insistence of the Tribunal - leads the Tribunal to conclude that these had been excessively and quite unnecessarily redacted. To have taken that step serves only to engender distrust and suspicion on the part of ratepayers, and it is decidedly unhelpful to this Tribunal when seeking to exercise its statutory review functions. Redactions of this kind are inimical to open government, such that the Gold Coast City Council really needs to recalibrate its approach.

[49] Although another case in which criticism had been directed at the Gold Coast City Council in dog management matters, the reference by Mr Gibson to the Tribunal's decision in Allen v Gold Coast City Council is ultimately of no assistance, as Allen is factually distinguishable.

[50] Allen was a case in which the Gold Coast City Council had purported to issue a dangerous dog declaration under section 95 of the Animal Management Act together with a destruction order pursuant to section 127A against an American Staffordshire named 'Honey'. This arose in the aftermath of Honey having bitten an eight-year-old child, AYB. Mrs Allen had been walking Honey on a Gold Coast City Council footpath, and AYB had been riding his bicycle on that same footpath, and had attempted to overtake Mrs Allen from behind, without first announcing his intention. AYB's bicycle became entangled in Honey's leash, thereby spooking Honey, who reacted by biting AYB.

[51] On review, Mrs Allen did not seek to challenge the correctness of the dangerous dog declaration, pressing only for a review of the concurrent destruction order. Ultimately, the Tribunal - per Member Taylor - determined that upon the correct construction of the Animal Management Act it was not open to the Council to purport to issue a destruction order under section 127A in circumstances in which an information notice had been issued under section 95.[10] The Tribunal also determined that it much preferred the evidence given by Mrs Allen over that given by AYB, and pointed criticism was made of the Gold Coast City Council by the Tribunal regarding the manner in which statements of evidence had been 'pre-drafted' by Council Officers for adoption by AYB. In short therefore, although Mr Horne has referred the Tribunal to the decision in Allen, there are no matters of specific relevance for the present case arising out of Allen.

[52] Some of the other matters submitted by Mr Gibson, (for example, any contribution made by Mr Horne in causing or worsening the injuries to Oreo when trying to retrieve Oreo from Tyson's jaws), are entirely speculative, and are completely unsupported by any evidence. The Tribunal will put these matters to one side. So too, the Tribunal has already determined that it is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Tyson did also bite Mr Horne, in addition to his having bitten Oreo.

[53] As to the remainder, when distilled to its essence, Mr Gibson seeks to argue that it is inapposite to say that Tyson had attacked Oreo in circumstances in which Tyson had merely responded to an attack commenced by Oreo rushing at Tyson, angrily yapping from behind. Although that argument is one that has a superficial attraction, unfortunately, it is also one that has been previously rejected by the Queensland Court of Appeal in Lee v Brisbane City Council,[11] ("Lee") a decision which is now binding on this Tribunal.

[54] In Lee, a German Shepherd named "Rox" was declared dangerous by the Brisbane City Council, after an incident wherein "Monty", a Cavalier King Charles Spaniel had rushed through an open gate, and had started barking at Rox. Although Monty was the initial attacker, Rox thereafter responded by seizing Monty in his mouth, before also shaking Monty. In the process, Monty sustained puncture wounds, and subsequently required emergency surgery. Ultimately, Monty died from injury complications, about one month later. Upon review before the Tribunal it was determined that Rox had "seriously attacked" Monty, such that the Brisbane City Council decision that Rox should be declared to be a dangerous dog was confirmed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal decision at first instance was subsequently appealed to the QCAT Appeal Tribunal. The Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal, finding that the fact that Monty had first attacked Rox did not preclude the possibility of a factual finding that any response by Rox could also amount to an 'attack', for purposes of the Animal Management Act.

[55] The Appeal Tribunal decision was then taken on further appeal, this time to the Queensland Court of Appeal, where it was again argued that it could not be concluded that Rox had "attacked" Monty, given the circumstances. In rejecting that argument, Holmes JA (as her Honour then was), and with whom each of the other Justices of Appeal (White JA and Applegarth J) concurred, said:

...But as a matter of law, there is nothing in s.89 which precludes a finding of attack where the behaviour of the dog in question is a response to aggression from its victim. To put it another way, it is not a pre-requisite to a finding of serious attack by one dog on another that there be a finding that the second dog has itself done nothing which could be described as an attack.

There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the appeal tribunal's approach in regarding the proposition that the spaniel might first have attacked as not precluding a finding of serious attack by the German Shepherd involved in the incident. There was evidence to support a finding that the German Shepherd had committed an attack of that kind.[12]

[56] The decision of the Court of Appeal in Lee now serves as binding authority for the proposition that a finding of attack upon another dog is not precluded in circumstances of the other dog having initiated their altercation. Yet, Lee does not deal with the precise meaning of the word "attack" when it is used within the expression "to seriously attack" in section 89 of the Animal Management Act.

[57] In these circumstances, Mr Gibson seeks to argue[13] that the word "attack" should be understood by recourse to its conventional dictionary definition, now citing the Britannica Dictionary which defines an attack as "to act violently against (someone or something) to try to hurt, injure, or destroy (something or someone)", or "to set upon in a forceful, violent, hostile, or aggressive way".

[58] Mr Gibson submits that both expositions upon the meaning of "attack" in the Britannica Dictionary reveal a requirement for an element of intent to cause the resultant injury or harm; and in this case there is simply no evidence that Tyson had intended to cause any harm to Oreo.

[59] Unfortunately, this line of argument has also been recently considered and ultimately rejected - by Member Lumb - in the recent Tribunal decision in Barclay v Gold Coast City Council ("Barclay").[14]

[60] In Barclay, Member Lumb followed the reasoning of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Sarkis v Morrison,[15] which had determined that the expression "caused by the dog wounding or attacking that person", as used in section 25(1)(a) of the Companion Animals Act 1998 (NSW), should be understood as covering conduct involving either an element of aggression or "other deliberate conduct" directed towards that person by the dog. In the delivery of his reasons, Member Lumb had observed that section 89 of the Animal Management Act is contained within Chapter 4 of the Animal Management Act, and the purposes of Chapter 4 are set out in section 59, as being to protect the community from damage or injury (or risk of same) from regulated dogs, with these purposes "achieved primarily by means of the statute providing a regime for local governments to declare dogs to be either dangerous or menacing dogs". In that context, Member Lumb held:

Given that the purposes include protection of the community from damage or injury, or risk of damage or injury, from regulated dogs, and to ensure regulated dogs are not a risk to community health or safety, I am of the view that an "attack" does not require an act of hostility or aggression on the part of a dog. However, I consider that, adopting the language in Sarkis, an attack requires conduct involving an element of aggression or other deliberate conduct directed towards that person by the dog.[16]

[61] The Tribunal considers that the prior reasoning by Member Lumb in Barclay is correct, such that it should now be followed. Thus, it may be reasoned that, although Tyson may not have engaged in an act of aggression specifically intending either the wounding or death of Oreo, his conduct - in the form of his holding Oreo within his jaws - cannot be categorised as either "accidental" or "unintentional" conduct. Furthermore, if the word "attack" - as used in the expression "seriously attacked" in section 89(6)(b) of the Animal Management Act - is for the purposes of this analysis - substituted by the expression "deliberate conduct" - as endorsed for use by Member Lumb in Lee - it may be seen that Tyson has engaged in deliberate conduct in the form of having picked Oreo up in his jaws, in a manner that has caused wounds to Oreo, and ultimately, that has caused the total circumstances resulting in the death of Oreo. Accordingly, the Tribunal is satisfied, for purposes of section 89(2) of the Animal Management Act, that Tyson has "seriously attacked" Oreo. For completeness the Tribunal also records that in light of the veterinary evidence now excerpted at paragraph [20] above, the Tribunal is also satisfied that Tyson's serious attack has at least "maimed" or "wounded" Oreo. In all the circumstances the requirement in section 89(6)(b) of the Animal Management Act has been satisfied.

[62] By parity of reasoning, and for purposes of section 89(2)(a) - and by reason of the Tribunal having already previously found[17] that Tyson bit Mr Horne in a way that caused Mr Horne bodily harm - the Tribunal records that it is also satisfied that Tyson "seriously attacked" Mr Horne.

[63] Once the decision-maker is satisfied about the factual matters in section 89(2) of the Animal Management Act; and has issued a Notice of Proposed Declaration under section 90, the recipient of that Notice is entitled[18] to make written representations to show why the proposed declaration should not be made.

[64] Thereafter, section 94 of the Animal Management Act provides:

(1) The local government must consider any written representations and evidence accompanying them within the period stated in the declaration notice.

(2) If, after complying with subsection (1), the local government is satisfied that the relevant ground under section 89 still exists, it must make the regulated dog declaration for the dog.

[65] In relation to section 94(2), the QCAT Appeal Tribunal in Brisbane City Council v Roy[19] observed that use of the word 'must' in section 94(2) indicates that the power to make a regulated dog declaration is required to be exercised, and there is no discretionary element involved, save that the decision-maker must be satisfied that the relevant ground under section 89 has been made out. As indicated, the Tribunal is satisfied that the relevant ground under section 89 has been made out. Mr Gibson's written submissions and other evidence has been considered by the Tribunal in the manner required by section 94(1), and having now done so and for purposes of section 94(2) the Tribunal is satisfied that the relevant grounds under section 89 still exist. In these circumstances there is no legal alternative other than to affirm the correctness of the dangerous dog declaration.

[66] The internal review decision of the Gold Coast City Council made on 17 June 2025 confirming the decision to declare Tyson to be a declared dangerous dog is again confirmed by the Tribunal.

[6] Kehl v Board of Professional Engineers of Queensland [2010] QCATA 58, [9].

[7] Submissions received on 31 October 2025.

[11] [2012] QCA 284.

[13] Submissions received by the Tribunal on 4 November 2025.

[14] [2026] QCAT 25, [31] - [39].

[15] [2013] NSWCA 281.

[17] See paragraphs [21]-[24], above.

[19] [2020] QCATA 147, [56].