austlii:cth/ARTA/2025/2196
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2025-10-21
Original judgment source is linked above.
(1) Subject to subsection (1A), the Secretary must waive the right to recover the proportion of a debt that is attributable solely to an administrative error made by the Commonwealth if the debtor received in good faith the payment or payments that gave rise to that proportion of the debt.
Note: Subsection (1) does not allow waiver of a part of a debt that was caused partly by administrative error and partly by one or more other factors (such as error by the debtor).
(1A) Subsection (1) only applies if:
(a) the debt is not raised within a period of 6 weeks from the first payment that caused the debt; or
(b) if the debt arose because a person has complied with a notification obligation, the debt is not raised within a period of 6 weeks from the end of the notification period;
The ordinary or usual interpretation of the phrase "attributable solely to" is that it refers to the single or sole cause of the relevant act or event. The word "attributable" means "capable of being attributed". It involves an objective assessment of causation. The words "a debt attributable solely to an administrative error" can be paraphrased as meaning that the only cause that objectively can be ascribed to the relevant debt is an administrative error.
(a) the debt did not result wholly or partly from the debtor or another person knowingly:
(i) making a false statement or a false representation; or
(ii) failing or omitting to comply with a provision of this Act, the Administration Act or the 1947 Act; and
(b) there are special circumstances (other than financial hardship alone) that make it desirable to waive; and
(c) it is more appropriate to waive than to write off the debt or part of the debt.
The concept of special circumstances is broad. A constellation of factors, including financial circumstances, may fall within it. The express exclusion of financial hardship alone as a special circumstance is an indicator that it would otherwise be included. This gives some measure of the range of circumstances which will qualify as special....
The evident purpose of s 1237AAD is to enable a flexible response to the wide range of situations which could give rise to hardship or unfairness in the event of a rigid application of a requirement for recovery of debt. It is inappropriate to constrain that flexibility by imposing a narrow or artificial construction upon the words...But to anticipate the limits of the categories of possible cases by imposing on the language of the section a fetter upon its application which is not mandated by its words, is to erode its useful purpose.
The first matter is financial hardship. It is true that s 1237AAD(b) refers to special circumstances "other than financial hardship alone", but that does not mean that the existence of financial hardship, or its severity in a particular case, is an irrelevant consideration for the purposes of waiver.... [The Respondent] is experiencing financial hardship of a severe or extreme nature.
The second matter is that administrative errors by Centrelink have contributed to any debt amount. To illustrate, [the Respondent] reported $170 and $1000 of income for her first two newstart allowance periods respectively. Yet, Centrelink calculated [the Respondent's] newstart allowance payments for those instalment periods on the basis that her fortnightly income amounts were $0.18 and $0.16 respectively. It is not possible to know how widespread such administrative errors were throughout the Relevant Period, as the Secretary has not produced records of [the Respondent's] reported income in each instalment period, nor correspondence confirming the income amount that her payments were based on in each instalment period. But there is sufficient material before the Tribunal to infer that the error occurred on several occasions.
The third matter is delay. The Relevant Period commenced on 11 March 2015 and ended on 20 May 2017. Centrelink did not make any subsequent enquiries as to [the Respondent's] earnings until February 2018, and did not first raise the debt until April 2018. The ARO's decision to confirm the debt was not made until September 2018. As such, the debt was not conclusively imposed on [the Respondent] for three and a half years after the Relevant Period commenced. Moreover, the Secretary is still seeking to defend the debt decision in these proceedings, which will be heard in May 2025, more than a decade after the Relevant Period commenced. The protracted nature of this case...is not only likely to have caused [the Respondent] significant distress and uncertainty, but to have undermined her ability to clearly recall facts and circumstances from the Relevant Period which are now in issue.
The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and makes a decision in substitution that there is a newstart allowance debt totalling $7,382.16 for the period 25 March 2015 to 8 August 2017. The debt is recoverable by the Commonwealth.
[1] Commonwealth Ombudsman, Lessons in Lawfulness: Own motion investigation into Service Australia's and the Department of Social Services' response to the question of the lawfulness of income apportionment before 7 December 2020, August 2023.
[2] Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Technical Changes No 2) Bill 2025.
[3] Points 1068‑G7B, 1068‑G7C, 1068‑G8 and 1068‑G8A and section 1073 of the Social Security Act. These provisions are not relevant to the circumstances of this matter.
[4] Applicant's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions at paragraph 6.6.
[5] Annexure C to Applicant's Reply dated 14 May 2025.
[6] Respondent's Supplementary Submissions , paragraph 10.
[7] Respondent's SFIC at paragraphs 64-66; references to location in T documents omitted.
Chaplin v Secretary, Department of Social Services [2025] FCAFC 89
Davy and Secretary, Department of Employment and Workplace Relations [2007] AATA 1114
Dranichnikov v Centrelink [2003] FCAFC 133
Groth and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1995] FCA 1708; (1995) 40 ALD 541
Re Lumsden and Secretary, Department of Social Security [1986] AATA 228; (1986) 10 ALN N225
Secretary, Department of Social Security v Hales (1998) 82 FCR 154; [1998] FCA 219
Secretary, Department of Social Services and FTXB [2024] AATA 3021
Sekhon v Secretary, Department of Family and Community Services [2003] FCAFC 190; (2003) 132 FCR 126
(2003) 132 FCR 126
(1998) 82 FCR 154