GGT v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2025] NSWCATAD 240;

1. GGT lodged (as the Tribunal understands it) various applications for victims support under the Victims Act. These reasons only concern the six claims whereby GGT seeks administrative review. Any reference as to what the Commissioner did or did not accept in dealing with other unrelated claims is irrelevant to the consideration of the matters before the Tribunal for administrative review. The Tribunal is only aware of these other claims due to GGT's repeated reference to them in oral submissions during the protracted hearing of the matters whereby he referenced them to illustrate that there was an asserted inconsistency in the Commissioner's approach. Some handwritten notations on other material received as evidence also referenced these other matters.
2. In each of the claims the delegate of the Commissioner (the assessor) in the first instance found that the evidence was insufficient to establish that GGT was the victim of an act of violence. On Internal Review the senior assessor (as delegate) reached the same conclusion in each of these six applications for a recognition payment as a form of victims support and dismissed the claims.

Summary of the six claims from the submitted applications:

1. Below is a summary of the alleged violent conduct perpetrated against GGT.

(1) 2024/00260006 (NCAT) 515475 (Victims Services)

(a) In late March 2017 the applicant was sexually assaulted by a man in his 50's at a Motel in Bass Hill in NSW where a sexual act was performed on the applicant without his consent for up to a minute before the applicant could push away and escape.

(2) 2024/00095643 (NCAT) 478265 (Victims Services)

(a) In August 2022 at John Moroney Correctional Centre whilst on remand the applicant was assaulted by his cell-mate who grabbed him by the neck and choked him threatening him.

(3) 2024/00095635 (NCAT) 474510 (Victims Services)

(a) In July 2022 whilst on remand at Silverwater Correctional Centre the applicant was left in a four-out cell with two other inmates while the fourth inmate was transferred to Hospital. At this time the two other inmates assaulted and beat the applicant because they had a misunderstanding of the circumstances of the crime that the applicant was on remand awaiting trial.

(4) 2024/00095633 (NCAT) 471031 (Victims Services)

(a) In January 2022 the applicant was assaulted by a person outside his residence. When called outside by the assailant and told to get in the assailant's motor vehicle the assailant punched the applicant in the eye and tried to choke him with the seat belt before the applicant escaped.

(5) 2024/00095631 (NCAT) 476964 (Victims Services)

(a) In September 2022 at John Moroney Correctional Centre whilst on remand the applicant was assaulted by a new inmate who moved into his cell when the applicant who was trying to sleep asked him to 'keep the noise down'. The assailant punched the applicant in the face.

(6) 2024/00095645 (NCAT) 474531 (Victims Services)

(a) In August 2022 at Silverwater Correctional Centre whilst on remand the applicant was accused by another inmate of stealing his wash bag with clothes. When the other inmate demanded to see where it (the missing wash bag) was inside the applicant's cell, the applicant was assaulted.

1. Because of the number of claims, and the approach taken by the Commissioner's delegates it is appropriate at this point to set out briefly the key elements of the scheme and how the matters have been decided prior to the applications for administrative review.

1. The Victims Rights and Support Act 2013 continues a longstanding scheme which provides eligibility criteria for victims of violent crime to receive support and assistance. Claimants are required to establish that they are a victim of an 'act of violence'. The relevant current provisions are set out in the following sections of the Victims Act:

(1) For the purposes of this Part, a victim of crime is a person who suffers harm as a direct result of an act committed, or apparently committed, by another person in the course of a criminal offence.

(2) A person suffers harm if, as a result of such an act:

(a) the person suffers actual physical bodily harm or psychological or psychiatric harm, or

(b) the person's property is deliberately taken, destroyed or damaged.

(3) If the person dies as a result of the act concerned, a member of the person's immediate family is also a victim of crime for the purposes of this Part.

(4) If a person dies as a result of the act concerned and there is more than one member of the person's immediate family, members of the immediate family may nominate a representative for the purposes of the Charter of Victims Rights.

(1) In this Act, act of violence means an act or series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons:

(a) that has apparently occurred in the course of the commission of an offence, and

(b) that has involved violent conduct against one or more persons, and

(c) that has resulted in injury or death to one or more of those persons.

2. For the avoidance of doubt, the reference to an offence in subsection (1) (a) extends to conduct of a person that would constitute an offence were it not for the fact that the person cannot, or might not, be held to be criminally responsible for the conduct because of the person's age or mental illness or impairment.

(3) For the purposes of this section, violent conduct extends to sexual assault and domestic violence.

(4) Except as provided by subsections (5) and (6), a series of related acts is two or more acts that are related because:

(a) they were committed against the same person, and

(b) in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner:

(i) they were committed at approximately the same time, or

(ii) they were committed over a period of time by the same person or group of persons, or

(iii) they were, for any other reason, related to each other.

(5) An act is not related to another act if, in the opinion of the Tribunal or the Commissioner, having regard to the particular circumstances of those acts, they ought not to be treated as related acts.

(6) An act is not related to any earlier act in respect of which support is given under this Act if it occurs after the support is given.

(7) For the purposes of this Act, a series of related acts, whether committed by one or more persons, constitutes a single act of violence.

(1) A primary victim of an act of violence is a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of that act.

(2) A primary victim of an act of violence extends to a person who is injured, or dies, as a direct result of:

(a) trying to prevent another person from committing that act, or

(b) trying to help or rescue another person against whom that act is being committed or has just been committed, or

(c) trying to arrest another person who is committing, or who has just committed, that act.

1. The Victims Act provides for a number of areas of support for victims of violent crime. These six reviews concern an area of support referred to as a recognition payment. Section 34 of the Victims Act defines the term Recognition payment.

recognition payment means a payment made in recognition of the trauma suffered by a victim of an act of violence.

1. Prior to accessing a recognition payment but after the initial 'act of violence' threshold is traversed, an applicant must also satisfy the criteria set out in s 39 of the Victims Act. This requires that the incident be reported to relevant entities who in certain ways must record information that would satisfy the section 19 criteria. Other than good administrative conduct principles and related matters these entities (Police, Hospitals, Health services, clinicians etc.) are not agents of an applicant for victims support, and the onus that the evidence falls into the strict criteria set out in s 19 (1) and s 39 of the Victims Act rests with an applicant for victims support or their agent.
2. This requirement is both in addition to establishing that they are the victim of an 'act of violence' but also complementary to those s 19 provisions. The section currently provides:

(1) An application for victims support is to be accompanied by such documentary evidence as may be required by the approved form.

(2) Without limiting subsection (1), the documentary evidence to be required:

(a) for an application for financial assistance for immediate needs under section 26 - is documentary evidence (such as a medical or police report or a report by an agency that provides support services to victims of crime) sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant's claim to be a victim of an act of violence, and

(b) for an application for financial assistance for economic loss under section 26 or 27 or for a recognition payment - is:

(i) a police report, or a report by a Government agency or any other agency that provides support services to victims of crime, sufficient to support, on the balance of probability, the applicant's claim to be a victim of an act of violence, and

(ii) a medical, dental or counselling report verifying that the applicant or child who is the primary victim concerned has actually been injured as a result of an act of violence.

1. These are preconditions under the Act which lead to a recognition payment and must be satisfied prior to an applicant accessing the benefits of the victims of crime scheme by way of a unconditional payment. Once an eligible victim (of an act of violence) has passed through the initial threshold, an assessment of the circumstances of the incident(s) and level of injury is carried out to determine the appropriate recognition payment.
2. Two other provisions of the Victims Act are relevant, being s 25 which requires the decision maker to determine whether a claimant is eligible to receive support, and s 44 which examines an applicant's conduct both at the time and subsequent to the Act of violence. These provisions provide broad discretion to the decision maker to have regard to whether there are any mitigating matters which would reduce or remove the provision of victims support as well as a broad discretion as to whether, having had regard to the matters, to apply those matters to the claim.
3. Section 44 provides:

44 Reasons for not approving the giving of victims support or for reducing amount of financial support or recognition payment

(1) In determining whether or not to approve the giving of victims support, and in determining the amount of financial support to be given or recognition payment to be made, the Commissioner must have regard to the following -

(a) for a victim of an act of violence or an act of modern slavery - any behaviour (including past criminal activity), attitude or disposition of the primary victim concerned that directly or indirectly contributed to the injury or death sustained by the victim,

(b) for a family victim of a road crime - any behaviour, including past criminal activity, attitude or disposition of the person who died as a result of the road crime that directly or indirectly contributed to the person's death,

(d) whether the victim participated in the commission of the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime, encouraged another person to commit the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime or otherwise gave assistance to any person by whom the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime was committed,

(e) whether the victim has failed to provide reasonable assistance to any person or body duly engaged in the investigation of the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime or in the arrest or prosecution of any person by whom the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime was committed or alleged to have been committed,

(f) whether the victim failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the extent of the injury sustained by the victim, such as seeking appropriate medical advice or treatment, as soon as practicable after the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime was committed,

(g) such other matters as the Commissioner considers relevant.

(3) In determining the matter referred to in subsection (1) (f) in the case of an act of violence or act of modern slavery involving sexual assault or domestic violence, the Commissioner must have regard to the nature of the relationship between the victim and the person or persons by whom the act of violence or act of modern slavery is alleged to have been committed.

(3A) In determining a matter referred to in subsection (1) or (2) in the case of an act of modern slavery, the Commissioner must have regard to the nature of the relationship between the victim and the person or persons by whom the act of modern slavery is alleged to have been committed.

(4) In determining the amount of financial support to be given or the recognition payment to be made to a person, the Commissioner must have regard to -

(a) any amount that has been paid to the person or that the person is entitled to be paid -

(i) by way of damages awarded in civil proceedings, or

(ii) under any other Act or law (including workers compensation), or

(iii) under any insurance or other agreement or arrangement, and

(b) any other amount that has been received by the person or that (in the opinion of the Commissioner) is likely to be received by the person,

in respect of the act of violence or act of modern slavery to which the application for financial support or a recognition payment relates.

(5) If the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant may be entitled to workers compensation (or payment in the nature of workers compensation) in respect of the act of violence or act of modern slavery to which the application relates, the Commissioner is to postpone the determination of the application until any entitlements to workers compensation have been determined.

(6) If the Commissioner is satisfied that the applicant may be entitled to payments under the police officer support scheme under the Police Act 1990, Part 9B in respect of the act of violence or act of modern slavery to which the application relates, the Commissioner is to postpone the determination of the application until any entitlements to those payments have been determined.

(6A) If the Commissioner is satisfied that an applicant for victims support, who is a family victim referred to in section 25 (2A), may be entitled to any damages under the Compensation to Relatives Act 1897, or any payment under the Motor Accident Injuries Act 2017, in respect of the act of violence or act of modern slavery to which the application relates, the Commissioner is to postpone the determination of the application until any entitlement to those damages or to that payment (as the case may be) has been determined.

(6B) To avoid doubt, subsections (5)-(6A) do not apply in relation to an application by a family victim of a road crime.

(7) The Commissioner may postpone the determination of a person's application pending the determination of another application for financial support or a recognition payment if the person has been convicted of an offence that is a relevant offence under section 58 in relation to that other application.

1. Under the Victims Act a decision maker must consider the above provisions as a minimum precondition to determining whether an act of violence has occurred and then what level of victims support if any is available to a claimant.

1. In all of the six applications before the Commissioner the initial decision maker appears to have accepted that GGT provided evidence describing an act of violence but was not satisfied that the totality of the material demonstrated that an act of violence occurred to the requisite standard (on the balance of probabilities). For reasons not clearly explained the assessor refers to having reviewed all of GGT's claims (apparently 23 in total). This raises an issue as to whether the assessor was determining all of GGT's claims, which may be the case. The following comments appear to show some level of anchor prejudice whereby the assessor opines that the 23 claims having: 'occurred between 24 June 2021 and February 2023. In this period (GGT's) conduct and behaviour have fallen well below community standards and expectations such that several of his applications involved incidents with which he was the offender and consequently charged and convicted. I consider this to cause significant deficits in (GGT's) general reliability and integrity'.
2. The final of those comments appears to question the veracity of GGT's evidence on the basis that he is not a credible person apparently because of his criminal antecedents.
3. Five of these applications were considered by the assessor who is quoted above. Another assessor determined claim 515475 (NCAT ref: 2024/00260006) but that assessor also refers to the 23 claims by GGT and states an opinion broadly similar to the one outlined above. Whilst these assessor's decisions are not the decisions under review (as an Internal Review was conducted in each matter), it is difficult to fathom the relevance or bearing of any other claim by an applicant - successful or otherwise, unless relevant to inform the decision maker of a medical issue when considering the extent of an injury and / or the organic causation of such injury.
4. In addition I observe that this relevantly only arises in respect of discrete aspects of Category C and Category D recognition payment considerations which refer to matters such as grievous bodily harm being present or not. In my view the only other relevance of a separate claim might arise in the context of when an applicant is submitted that multiple acts of violence are not a series of related acts and the decision maker needs to address those issues, or whether consideration of a duplicate application is relevant.
5. In respect of the Internal Review decisions which are the decisions under review, a similar mix of decision makers has occurred. In claim 51475 the Senior Assessor refers to: '24 applications for victims support, 23 of which include claims for recognition payments'. The Senior Assessor dismisses GGT's application concerning an assault / sexual assault in a motel room in Sydney (Bass Hill) on 29 March 2017 due to the following comments:

12. A (police) report was made for record keeping purposes and it is evident the matter has not been investigated.

14. For a number of these applications (GGT) has submitted Certificates of Injury prepared by Ms Ahmed (Forensic Psychologist). ... he did not disclose the incident this application relates to until 7 March 2024.

15. The specific impact of the sexual assault this application relates to, and how it has impacted (GGT) over time since this incident occurred has not been described.

21. I have considered the Certificate of Injury, which indicates that (GGT) disclosed the 2017 sexual assault to Ms Ahmed a day before submitting this application. In my view this disclosure appears to have been made for the purpose of making this application rather than because (GGT) was seeking treatment for injuries he suffered as a result of the incident.

23. I find that the evidence (GGT) has produced in support of his application has been prepared solely for the purpose of this application. It has not been tested or investigated and any specific injuries since the incident occurred have not been described.

24. While the conduct described is an offence involving violent conduct, the evidence does not enable me to be satisfied it is more probable than not it occurred as claimed, or that (GGT) suffered an injury as a result of the violence.

1. The other five applications before the Tribunal whilst dealt with on Internal Review by a separate delegate, all adopt a similar approach to the evidence in respect of reaching the outcome. This apparent global assessment of GGT commencing with the initial decisions is therefore carried through with the Internal Reviews.
2. In all of the decisions under review the decision makers determine that the evidence provided is not sufficient to enable a positive finding on the balance of probabilities to be made. As noted some other observations are made along the way including reference to the claims of GGT's which were not related to the decision under consideration other than by GGT also being the claimant.
3. On 12 March 2024 following three Internal Reviews conducted on 7 March 2024 and two conducted on 8 March 2024, GGT filed five administrative review applications with the Tribunal. (Reference: 2024/00095645, 2024/00095631, 2024/00095635, 2024/00095645 and 2024/00095633)
4. On 10 July 2024 following an Internal Review on 10 July 2024 GGT filed a further administrative review application (Reference: 2024/00260006).

1. There is no dispute that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear the matter. Section 51 of the Act provides for administrative review by the Tribunal.

51 Application to Tribunal for administrative review of decision concerning recognition payment

(1) An applicant for a recognition payment who is aggrieved by the decision of a decision maker in respect of the application may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a decision made by the Commissioner following an internal review under section 49 of the decision maker's decision with respect to the recognition payment.

(2) An applicant for a recognition payment who is aggrieved by the decision of the Commissioner in respect of the application may apply to the Tribunal for an administrative review under the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997 of a decision made by the Commissioner.

1. At the first directions listing of each matter the Tribunal noted that the six applications were lodged within the 28 day period provided for by the operation of s 55 of the Administrative Decisions Review Act 1997, (the ADR Act) and cl 23 and 24 of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal Rules 2014 following the making of the administratively reviewable decision.
2. The Tribunal's powers in relation to an application for administrative review are governed by s 63 of the ADR Act, which provides:

(1) In determining an application for an administrative review under this Act of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal is to decide what the correct and preferable decision is having regard to the material then before it, including the following:

(2) For this purpose, the Tribunal may exercise all of the functions that are conferred or imposed by any relevant legislation on the administrator who made the decision.

(3) In determining an application for the administrative review of an administratively reviewable decision, the Tribunal may decide:

(a) to affirm the administratively reviewable decision, or

(b) to vary the administratively reviewable decision, or

(c) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and make a decision in substitution for the administratively reviewable decision it set aside, or

(d) to set aside the administratively reviewable decision and remit the matter for reconsideration by the administrator in accordance with any directions or recommendations of the Tribunal.

1. The matters were heard over three sittings of the Tribunal. Prior to this there were four directions listings of the matters. These matters were drawn out in part due to GGT's failure to appear and subsequent orders. The Tribunal noted that during that process a Member recused themself from hearing GGT's applications.
2. On one prehearing listing some of GGT's claims were dismissed under s 55 (1) (c ) of the NCAT Act as GGT failed to appear at a listing event. These matters were subsequently successfully reinstated by the Tribunal on the application of GGT under s 55 (2) of the NCAT Act as GGT had provided a reasonable explanation for the failure to appear. In both the recusal and reinstatement determinations written reasons were not provided nor were they requested in accordance with s 62 of the NCAT Act.
3. The reason that GGT's cases took so long to be prepared for hearing and then once listed to eventually complete the hearing process was because GGT placed a significant number of demands and requirements on the Tribunal. These matters impacted the Tribunal's ability to comply with the guiding principle of the Tribunal under s 36 of the NCAT Act, to resolve matters in a just, quick and cheap manner.
4. The Tribunal Registry received a large number of calls and enquires where GGT wanted to debate matters outside of the control of Registry staff such as his telephone cutting out or not connecting, as well as the dismissal and recusal matters referred to above.
5. In addition, GGT placed a number of requirements or conditions on his engagement in the review process that he said were necessary to enable him to participate in the administrative review process. Whilst the Tribunal (in respect of listings and hearing dates) was responsive and accommodated GGT's requirements and adjustments such as a request that hearings not occur prior to 2:00pm as his health and psychosocial conditions meant that he could not rise from sleep prior to 11:00am and then travel to the Tribunal, GGT was not responsive to those arrangements and (a) never attended any of the substantive hearings in person as directed and agreed, and (b) was not always easy to contact via telephone or videoconference (VMR) mediums.
6. In my view these matters resulted in a less than ideal hearing process that was protracted, inefficient and impeded the Tribunal's ability to adhere to the guiding principle under s 36 of the NCAT Act. GGT was put on notice about these maters during the various sittings of the Tribunal. It was suggested to him on a number of occasions by me that by not attending - a matter GGT provided no real explanation for in respect of the arranged 2:00pm hearing times - and exacerbated by GGT's telephone connection routinely disconnecting after 60 minutes and time was lost reconnecting, that he was not really running his best possible case even though the Tribunal was doing it's best to allow GGT as a party to have a reasonable opportunity to be heard.
7. However, I am satisfied that GGT was provided a reasonable opportunity to be heard for the reasons outlined above. Any deficits in the approach to the hearing were clearly matters within GGT's control as he elected not to avail himself of the arrangements that the Tribunal made to facilitate his attendance in accordance with the medical evidence he tendered concerning the need for afternoon hearings in person.
8. Further, consistent with his oral submissions before the Tribunal GGT stated that there was no requirement or obligation on him and the entire requirement to act diligently and according to law rested with the Commissioner and later the Tribunal. His position seemed to be that having lodged his claims within time all other obligations fell to the respondent and the Tribunal. The Tribunal observes that an applicant in proceedings (represented or otherwise) has a number of duties to the Tribunal including to fully disclose all relevant matters (s-36 (3) of the NCAT Act) as well as to prosecute their case. Administrative review proceedings such as these claims, are contested matters before the Tribunal whereby GGT like any party, is required to meet the other side's arguments. If they meet the case sufficiently and the evidence can be positively applied to the legislation, they are likely to succeed. A failure to do that may result in a different outcome. The Tribunal makes these observations to place on record these matters and to show that whilst GGT ran the above argument repeatedly before the Tribunal, the Tribunal did not endorse such a view and made it clear to GGT on a number of occasions that it disagreed with this submission.

1. GGT filed his application for administrative review and a copy of the determinations with hand written notations / submissions in each matter. A letter from forensic psychologist Ahmed was also provided. GGT made extensive oral submissions about the Commissioner's approach in each of his claims during the hearing of the matters.
2. The respondent filed and served s-58 (ADR Act) documents and written submissions in each matter. As well as speaking to the submissions at hearing. A further bundle containing Police and Court / Justicelink records was also filed by the Commissioner in each matter.

1. At hearing the GGT made numerous submissions along the lines that the Respondent was prejudiced towards him and that they 'have a history of hatred and that was why they refused to pay'. GGT in this context wished to cross examine the legal representative for the Respondent, a request which the Tribunal rejected as it was not relevant to the consideration of the evidence and whether on administrative review the decisions of the respondent should be affirmed or set aside.
2. GGT submitted that many of the adverse findings made by the respondent were findings that were not open to them to make and there was an absence of medical evidence to support their views on causation of injuries or significant of injuries / symptoms being discounted.
3. In respect of the repeated refusals by the Respondent to make a finding that would result in a recognition payment, GGT submitted that at its most basic level he had provided what is required by the scheme, being a Police report, or a Government funded report and a medical report. The Tribunal observes that as set out at [10] and [13] above, the interplay between the evidence and requirements in s 19 of the Victims Act and s 39 whereby claimants are required to provide evidence and material in a certain form adhering to certain criteria, was a major issue in the hearing of the matters.
4. GGT referred to asserted views of the Respondent's decision makers which he said were applied to adversely impact his chances of success in recognition claims. Reference is made to consideration of his behaviour as an 'offender' whereby GGT said at hearing that the previous decision makers had referred to an incident where he says he neglected to pay for a lollipop at a retail premises when an act of violence against him subsequently occurred. He stated that minor issues which were discriminatory and established that the Commissioner and their delegates 'had it in for him' were evident. The Tribunal has no direct knowledge of any victims support matters other than the current claims to which these reasons relate. I therefore make no comment on how the Commissioner has applied the legislation to the evidence in other matters.
5. GGT also raised a number of peripheral matters at hearing. For completeness I summarise them as follows.
   • References to the relevance of GGT's criminal antecedents were raised during the hearing.
   • By referencing the other claims not before me, some dealt with positively and some being dismissed, GGT sought to illustrate inconsistencies, prejudices and decisions purportedly made in bad faith by the delegates. I make no findings about these matters because, (a) the matters are not before me and (b) I do not have access to all of the material that the delegates relied upon in those claims, and (c) what decisions the Respondent's delegates may or may not have made on claims other than the claims before me are in my view irrelevant.
   • It was submitted that matters alleged in Police records are not shown to be true. Reference was made again to a shoplifting matter where GGT said that he only pleaded guilty based on legal advice to be released from remand.
   • GGT regularly revisited this 'theme' that Victims Services had paid some of his claims so why not pay all of them if (in his view) the evidence was of equal calibre.
6. The Tribunal notes that GGT did not actively progress his cases in any great detail at hearing because of his focus or fixed position on the matters as set out in the above dot points, matters that he regularly returned to during somewhat rambling and discursive oral submissions. His position seemed to be that all of the evidence was before the Tribunal and it was a simple matter of the Tribunal doing its job.
7. It was explained to GGT a number of times at hearing that evidence satisfying s 39 of the Victims Act is a requirement, but not the total requirement to succeed in a claim. It was explained along the way that the statutory tests concerning 'act of violence' which is a threshold matter, needed to be established on evidence that suggested that it was more likely than not that the matter occurred in the manner stated. A claimant's evidence that is not tested as a starting point is of no greater weight than any other evidence not tested. The test is to determine whether evidence is credible, cogent and of probative value. After that what weight of any to give the evidence comes into play.
8. GGT submitted that he had provided expert evidence, had complied with s 39 and 'ticked all their boxes' in respect of the Sexual Assault Reporting Option (SARO) reports and that there was no basis to deny him the relevant recognition payments.
9. Suggestions that some aspects of his claims were open to question when the respondent submitted that in respect of the medical evidence the Tribunal must be satisfied of a causal link, were met with complaints that the Respondent was biased and prejudiced towards him and corrupt. After three half day hearings noting that GGT predominantly wanted to return to the associated themes concerning the Commissioner's attitude, and his general objection to the Commissioner's advocate putting any view contrary to his, I concluded the hearing of the matters.
10. I will now deal with the claims individually to the extent necessary having set out the context of the applications and the earlier refusals to grant recognition payments.

1. In this claim GGT stated that he was the victim of a sexual assault. He states that in late March 2017 he was sexually assaulted by a man in his 50's at a Motel in Bass Hill in NSW where a sexual act was performed on him without his consent for up to a minute before he could push the perpetrator away and escape.
2. As the earlier decision makers noted, the only evidence relied upon by GGT to establish the act of violence is the SARO Event Number E172236601 and the Certificate of Injury (COI). Ordinarily these matters might be sufficient to determine either way whether an act of violence occurred. In addition they would appear to discharge the requirements of s 39 of the Victims Act.
3. The main issue in respect of the medical evidence concerns provenance of injury. GGT has a number of active matters whereby he claims to have been the victim of an act of violence. Similar medical evidence is adduced for many of these claims, including the claims before the Tribunal.
4. A Certificate of Injury prepared by a Psychologist who first saw GGT in March 2024 concerning this act of violence was relied upon. This being seven years after the alleged incident. That Certificate indicates that GGT presented with various symptoms and currently presents with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Major Depressive Disorder and Generalise Anxiety Disorder. The difficulty with the medical evidence in this matter concerns the passage of time between the infliction of trauma and subsequent medical identification / diagnosis. Noting that the Courts of record have established that a medical / expert report must substantiate how it reaches the outcome that it concludes, on the face of the report, it is difficult to determine how the practitioner reaches their conclusion based on the content of the report and the lack of analysis of the injury sequelae.
5. The case of Makita v Sprowles [2005] NSWCA 305 sets out the proposition that the evidence in a report must be sufficient to satisfy the decision maker of the conclusions reached by the report writer. In my view the evidence of the COI does not sufficiently particularise and establish how the incident resulted in a finding of PTSD and other DSM V diagnosed disorders arising from the claimed brief but serious sexual assault seven years prior.
6. The Tribunal on a merits review is the finder of fact and is required to identify evidence to establish a particular matter. There is not sufficient evidence in my view to establish a causal connection between the act of violence and the identified injury. In order to determine whether the provisions of s 19 (1) (c ) are met the Tribunal (as finder of fact) needs to be satisfied to the civil standard that there is evidence that the injury arose as a direct result of the act of violence. The difficulty in reaching that position is due to a number of factors: (a) the Certificate of Injury fails to substantiate the conclusion that it reaches. This may be in part because of the other stressors and injuries that GGT has been diagnosed with by A Ahmed Forensic Psychologist. Those diagnosis relate to other claimed stressors (many of which are claimed acts of violence) some of which are subject to these reviews by the Tribunal. (b) The significant passage of time (seven years) between incident and diagnosis. This may well explain the limited nature of the material in the Certificate of Injury. There have been many intervening stressors (at least five being the remaining current claims before the Tribunal) which makes it difficult for the finder of fact to extract sufficient information from the minimal medical material to isolate a head of diagnosis to this particular incident.
7. Even if the Tribunal was satisfied of a causal link between the isolated incident and the presenting issue (in the context of the numerous other injuries discretely and distinctly attributable to separate acts of violence), and would be able to make a finding under s 19 of the Victims Act, there are further matters associated with this claim.
8. If the Tribunal was to find an act of violence, as noted above s 44 provides that the Tribunal in certain instances may disentitle a claimant to victims support or reduce the amount to be paid to a claimant by way of victims support. I note that the applicant knew his alleged perpetrator both before and after the incident of the claim. He refers to where he lives, the alleged offender's family as well as his social functioning such as which Licensed Clubs he attended and continues to attend. In this context it appears that GGT is well across the identity and whereabouts of the alleged offender.
9. Section 44 (e) of the Victims Act provides:

(e) whether the victim has failed to provide reasonable assistance to any person or body duly engaged in the investigation of the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime or in the arrest or prosecution of any person by whom the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime was committed or alleged to have been committed,

(f) whether the victim failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate the extent of the injury sustained by the victim, such as seeking appropriate medical advice or treatment, as soon as practicable after the act of violence, act of modern slavery or road crime was committed,

(g) such other matters as the Commissioner considers relevant.

1. In this claim GGT's SARO is the only Police material before me. As noted by the delegates that report was made the day prior to the clam being lodged with Victims Services. As the claim related to an alleged sexual assault it was open to GGT to lodge the claim beyond the ordinary two-year limitation period provided in the Victims Act. The import of this however is that the allegation is now deemed historical and would (in the absence of any admissions) be very difficult to investigate whereby the investigation could result in a positive recommendation as to whether there is sufficient evidence that a crime occurred. If GGT had reported the matter to Police within days or, weeks or even months of the incident in 2017 it may have been possible for evidence to be gathered at the Motel, the alleged perpetrator's motor vehicle and elsewhere. Because GGT has chosen to avail himself of the SARO process no further action would appear to have been taken. Even if he had attended on Police and made a statement, noting the passage of time this would still have potentially resulted in a no further action decision by Police. In my view the applicant has provided no explanation for the failure to provide Police contemporaneous to the alleged crime with details on the alleged offender and related matters sufficient for an active investigation to be commenced. No real cogent reason was provided as to why he chose not to take this course. Unlike his prison based claims, fear of the alleged offender was clearly not a relevant matter as he continued to have peripheral dealings with him and acknowledged him in passing over the years socially when in the community, potentially still to this day.
2. At hearing the issue of a delay and whether there was any sense of shame was a factor to which GGT advised that he had provided a SARO Police report and a medical Certificate of Injury. GGT submitted that the Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) arose separately from each trauma and each matter has 'contributed to the overall trauma'.

1. In written submissions the respondent maintained their position that on the balance of probabilities the Tribunal could not be satisfied that an act of violence occurred. Reference was made to Nguyen v Cosmopolitan Homes [2008] NSWCA 246 (Nguyen) where in the cases of FXJ v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 8 and GFF v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2024] NSWCATAD 115 the Tribunal referenced Nguyen. At 48' of FXJ the Tribunal observed:

48. In Nguyen, the Court of Appeal (McDougall J, Bell & McColl JJA agreeing) stated, relevantly:

Discharge of the burden of proof: the relevant principles

44 A number of cases, of high authority, insist that for a tribunal of fact to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, of the existence of a fact, it must feel an actual persuasion of the existence of that fact. See Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336. His Honour's statement was approved by the majority (Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ) in Helton v Allen [1940] HCA 20; (1940) 63 CLR 691 at 712.

45 Dixon CJ put the matter in different words, although to similar effect, in Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298 at 305 where his Honour said that "[t]he facts proved must form a reasonable basis for a definite conclusion affirmatively drawn of the truth of which the tribunal of fact may reasonably be satisfied". Although his Honour dissented in the outcome of that case, the words that I have quoted were cited with approval by the majority (Stephen, Mason, Aickin and Wilson JJ) in West v Government Insurance Office of NSW [1981] HCA 38; (1981) 148 CLR 62 at 66. See also Stephen J in Girlock (Sales) Pty Limited v Hurrell [1982] HCA 15; (1982) 149 CLR 155 at 161 - 162, and Mason J (with whom Brennan J agreed) in the same case at 168.

46 It is clear, in particular from West and Girlock, that the requirement for actual satisfaction as to the occurrence or existence of a fact is one of general application, and not limited to cases where the fact in question, if found, might reflect adversely on the character of a party or witness.

47 In Malec v JC Hutton Pty Limited (1990) 169 CLR 638 Deane, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said at 642-643:

A common law court determines on the balance of probabilities whether an event has occurred. If the probability of the event having occurred is greater than it not having occurred, the occurrence of the event is treated as certain; if the probability of it having occurred is less than it not having occurred, it is treated as not having occurred.

48 On analysis, I think, what their Honours said is not inconsistent with the requirement that the tribunal of fact be actually persuaded of the occurrence or existence of the fact before it can be found. On their Honours' approach, what is required is a determination of the respective probabilities of the event's having occurred or not occurred. There is nothing in that analysis to suggest that the determination in favour of probability of occurrence should not require some sense of actual persuasion...

1. The respondent noted that in the cases of BFV v Commissioner of Victims Rights [2014] NSWCATAD 170 and BYZ v Commissioner of Victims Rights the Tribunal observed that the onus is on an applicant to prove the allegations of an act of violence on the balance of probabilities. At [48] of BFV the Tribunal observed in respect of the former Act, (Victims Support and Rehabilitation Act 1996 (repealed)), which has the same statutory language and thresholds for establishing an act of violence, that:

48. The onus is on BFV to prove the allegations of act of violence on the balance of probabilities. While the onus on the appellant is the civil standard of the balance of probabilities the following statements of the High Court in Reifek v McElroy (1965) 112CLR 517 at 521-522 apply:

The difference between the criminal standard of proof and the civil standard of proof is no mere matter of words: it is a matter of critical substance. No matter how grave the fact which is to be found in a civil case, the mind has only to be reasonably satisfied and has not with respect to any matter in issue in such a proceeding to attain that degree of certainty which is indispensable to support a conviction upon a criminal charge.

I note that the above test was formulated in adversarial proceedings, unlike applications and appeals for awards of statutory compensation.

1. In this application it is difficult to establish that injury arose as a direct result of an act of violence. I am not satisfied that the medical evidence before me establishes that GGT sustained injury as a direct result of that act of violence. Even if I had found that the Certificate of Injury was sufficient to meet the terms of s 19 (1) (c ) and s 20 (1), that injury arose as direct result, I believe that in the other available evidence there would be grounds for either disentitling or reducing the amount of victims support in accordance with s 44 (e) and (g) of the Victims Act.
2. The significant delay in reporting the matter is not explained by GGT, who continued to at times engage and interact with the alleged perpetrator over the intervening years. This behaviour might have enlivened s 44 (f) of the Victims Act had I found that there was sufficient evidence to be satisfied that injury arose as a direct result of the asserted act of violence. Without making any finding on that point it is difficult to uncertain why GGT continued to interact with the alleged perpetrator if their conduct as alleged, was a direct basis and sequelae for his PTSD.
3. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary I might consider that the first two elements of s 19 (1) of the Victims Act were met. However I decline to do so on the basis that even on a cursory analysis there would be no utility in reaching that position and making any finding in the absence of any finding that injury arose as a result of this matter. GGT attributes an injury to the actions of the alleged offender. How this is so is never explained, especially in the context of continued interactions with the alleged offender without concern, heightened anxiety, or some evidence of ongoing coercion. GGT simply does not make out his case on this point. Whilst for more contemporaneous allegations it could be open to a Court or Tribunal as finder of fact to conclude that for those matters the medical evidence is sufficient, the current evidence on the 2017 allegation does not in my view meet the standard necessary to make a positive finding. Whilst the assault may have occurred the current state of the evidence does not persuade me that I can make a finding under s 19 (1) (c ) of the Victims Act.
4. At [85] of Makita Heydon JA as he was then, observed that:

85. In short, if evidence tendered as expert opinion evidence is to be admissible, it must be agreed or demonstrated that there is a field of "specialised knowledge"; there must be an identified aspect of that field in which the witness demonstrates that by reason of specified training, study or experience, the witness has become an expert; the opinion proffered must be "wholly or substantially based on the witness's expert knowledge"; so far as the opinion is based on facts "observed" by the expert, they must be identified and admissibly proved by the expert, and so far as the opinion is based on "assumed" or "accepted" facts, they must be identified and proved in some other way; it must be established that the facts on which the opinion is based form a proper foundation for it; and the opinion of an expert requires demonstration or examination of the scientific or other intellectual basis of the conclusions reached: that is, the expert's evidence must explain how the field of "specialised knowledge" in which the witness is expert by reason of "training, study or experience", and on which the opinion is "wholly or substantially based", applies to the facts assumed or observed so as to produce the opinion propounded. If all these matters are not made explicit, it is not possible to be sure whether the opinion is based wholly or substantially on the expert's specialised knowledge. If the court cannot be sure of that, the evidence is strictly speaking not admissible, and, so far as it is admissible, of diminished weight. And an attempt to make the basis of the opinion explicit may reveal that it is not based on specialised expert knowledge, but, to use Gleeson CJ's characterisation of the evidence in HG v R [1999] HCA 2; (1999) 197 CLR 414, on "a combination of speculation, inference, personal and second-hand views as to the credibility of the complainant, and a process of reasoning which went well beyond the field of expertise" (at [41]).

1. Applying these principles to the certificate of the Forensic Psychologist, and for the reasons outline above I am not satisfied that GGT has been injured as a direct result of the actions of the alleged perpetrator, on the available evidence. The Forensic Psychologist was not called by either party. As GGT relied on the purported finding in that report, then it was open to him to call the witness, which he did not. I gather those reasons are aligned with his misunderstanding that there was some obligation on the Respondent to 'disprove' his allegations in order for his claim not to succeed. As outlined above in some detail whilst GGT was in my view given more than sufficient assistance in putting his case and having his voice heard he maintained his position that in practice there was a reverse type onus whereby his claim(s) must succeed as long as he provided evidence which could not be disproved or challenged by the respondent.
2. As I am not satisfied that s 19 (1) (c ) of the Victims Act has been met, having regard to the available evidence and the language of s 20 (1) of the Victims Act, the decision of the respondent will be affirmed and this application dismissed.

1. GGT claims that in August 2022 at John Moroney Correctional Centre whilst on remand he was assaulted by his cell-mate who grabbed him by the neck and choked him threatening him.
2. As GGT was not a convicted inmate at the time of this assault in custody he is eligible to be considered for victims support, as he was on remand at the time. (s 24 (4) of the Victims Act).
3. GGT submits that the following incident occurred:

At about 8:00pm, after arriving to Pod A2 from Silverwater Correctional Complex, I was lying down on the bed to get some rest when my cell-mate started to walk up and down the cell in an anxious manner. I then told him to relax but he didn't answer and kept walking up and down. About 10 minutes later I told him that he was preventing me from getting some rest, so he grabbed me by the neck firmly and choked me saying: 'I need some space you f....ing dog'.

1. GGT met with Legal Aid in August 2023 and requested that they prepare a report of this (and other) incident(s) so that applications for victims support might be submitted.
2. A Forensic Psychologist prepared a Certificate of Injury for this (and other) claims, having first seen the clinician on 19 July 2023 where this incident was discussed on 25 July 2023. The clinician attributes GGT's level of PTSD, major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder to this and the other reported incidents. The Certificate is dated 10 October 2023.
3. The Respondent correctly observes that GGT did not provide any contemporaneous evidence including evidence that he reported the matter at the time and was medically treated as an inmate on remand. Nor is there any evidence in the material provided by the Respondent in the supporting evidence bundle filed 14 June 2024 (pages 1-27) of this incident. There is however evidence of a Certificate of Injury for this matter at page 48 of that bundle.
4. The clinician lists a number of symptoms arising from the incident. The symptoms and diagnosis for this matter (pages 47 and 48 of the bundle) and claim 2024/00095631 at pages 49 and 50, as well as claim 2024/00095635 at pages 53 and 54 of the bundle are in identical or near identical terms.
5. Whilst it would be open to me to find that in the available evidence GGT is the victim of an act of violence, I note that there is no evidence (other than GGT's assertions by way of his own submissions) that the matter was ever reported and action taken to investigate and examine what action if any should arise. In oral submissions during the Tribunal hearing GGT stated that for the prison based claims the 'delay in reporting was due to a fear of retribution'. Whilst the Tribunal might accept that evidence being relevant at the time, a failure to report the matter can disentitle a claimant under s 44 (1) (e), (f) and (g) of the Victims Act. Alternatively such a situation could reduce the amount of victims support provided under s 44 of the Victims Act.
6. GGT submitted at hearing that all that was required was for him to comply with s 39 of the Victims Act. On a strict reading that is one approach. Section 44 however identifies other approaches which indicate options or implied obligations on a claimant under the Scheme. The failure to make any report of this incident other than to a Legal Aid employee in the context of lodging victims support claims is submitted by GGT as satisfying the provisions of s 39 (2) (b) (i). The Respondent's delegates determined that such a report was not sufficient to satisfy them that on the balance of probabilities GGT's claim to be the victim of an act of violence. I disagree. In my view the report scant as it is sets out the assertion including that he was assaulted for making a reasonable request of another. That report (as is required) references choking which is evidence of an injury being described. The certificate of injury under s 39 (2) (b) (i) again, limited as it is, is evidence of injury verifying the matters set out in the criteria at s 19 (1) (c) of the Victims Act. Unlike the motel claim the evidence is much closer in time to the incident.
7. I find the account credible albeit scant on detail. This appears to in part arise as no Police report has been made and no scrutiny of the matter which would include the creation of further records and details of the matter, have arisen.
8. However noting that the applicant has chosen not to report the matter to Police, especially since he was released from prison and no longer was in a prison environment where retribution might be a live issue, is in my view relevant. Like the other prison matters of GGT the inability of the State to pursue and potentially prosecute this and the other custodial assaults is the sort of mischief that s 44 (e) and (g) seeks to address. Whilst it is true that s 44 (1) (b) has been amended since the Victims Act was introduced in 2013 removing a statutory basis to disentitle claimants due to a lack of Police reporting within a reasonable time, in my view there is still an implied requirement that in the absence of any compelling basis otherwise, (such as fear of retribution etc.), ultimately the obligation to eventually report the matter remains. It is for this reason that the decision maker has a wide discretion.
9. Whilst the reasons for not reporting the matter whilst in custody are understood and to the extent necessary accepted, the ongoing position that the assault is not recorded in a manner that could have been addressed upon release falls within the discretionary grounds of s 44 (g).
10. When these issues were raised during the protracted hearing of the claims GGT's position remained that he only need to provide the minimum necessary to result in a successful claim. Whilst the Victims Act no longer made it a strict requirement, likewise any relevant discretionary matter could be utilised by the decision maker as long as they believed it was relevant. GGT was on notice from both the prior decision makers and the Tribunal that a different approach may have resulted in a different outcome for him. Without revisiting those matters again, I note that GGT ran all of his claims from a position that the onus in these applications was on others, not himself as a claimant.
11. Having considered these matters, in my view a reduction by one third is appropriate in all of the circumstances, particularly noting that without the possibility of criminal proceedings against the assailant, the State is denied any recovery action to recoup the payments made from the Victims Fund by commencing restitution proceedings under Part 5 of the Victims Act.
12. I therefore find that the elements of s 19 and s 39 are met in that GGT is the victim of an act of violence. Applying s 44 (1) (g) I reduce the amount of victims support (payable by way of a recognition payment) by one third.
13. GGT is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.

1. GGT claims that in July 2022 whilst on remand at Silverwater Correctional Centre the applicant was left in a four-out cell with two other inmates while the fourth inmate was transferred to Hospital. At this time the two other inmates assaulted and beat the applicant because they had a misunderstanding of the circumstances of the crime that the applicant was on remand awaiting trial. (theft from an innocent victim who had a family to feed).
2. Again, as in claim 2024/00095643 as GGT was not a convicted inmate at the time of this assault in custody he is eligible to be considered for victims support, as he was on remand at the time. (s 24 (4) of the Victims Act).
3. GGT met with Legal Aid in August 2023 and requested that they prepare a report of this (and other) incident(s) so that applications for victims support might be submitted.
4. A Forensic Psychologist prepared a Certificate of Injury for this (and other) claims, having first seen the clinician on 19 July 2023 where this incident was discussed on 25 July 2023. The clinician attributes GGT's level of PTSD, major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder to this and the other reported incidents. The certificate of Injury is dated 10 October 2023.
5. The Respondent correctly observes that GGT did not provide any contemporaneous evidence including evidence that he reported the matter at the time and was medically treated as an inmate on remand. Nor is there any evidence in the material provided by the Respondent in the supporting evidence bundle filed 14 June 2024 (pages 1-27) of this incident. The only Police material provided in the bundle from the Respondent for July 2022 relates to three entries for stealing offences which are not related to this claim. There is however as noted above a Certificate of Injury for this matter at page 53 of that bundle.
6. The clinician lists a number of symptoms arising from the incident. The symptoms and diagnosis for this matter (pages 53 and 54 of the bundle) and the other claims are again in identical or near identical terms.
7. Whilst it would be open to me to find that in the available evidence GGT is the victim of an act of violence, again I note that there is no evidence (other than GGT's assertions by way of his own submissions) that the matter was ever reported and action taken to investigate and examine what action if any should arise. In oral submissions during the Tribunal hearing GGT stated that for the prison based claims the 'delay in reporting was due to a fear of retribution'. Whilst the Tribunal might accept that evidence being relevant at the time, a failure to report the matter can disentitle a claimant under s 44 (1) (e), (f) and (g) of the Victims Act. Alternatively such a situation could reduce the amount of victims support provided under s 44 of the Victims Act.
8. For the reasons outlined above and this in claim 2024/00095643, I determine that GGT was the victim of an act of violence, however for the same reasons as outlined in 2024/00095643 I determine under s 44 (1) (g) to reduce the amount of victims support that GGT is entitled to by one third.
9. I therefore find that the elements of s 19 and s 39 are met in that GGT is the victim of an act of violence. Applying s 44 (1) (g) I reduce the amount of victims support (payable by way of a recognition payment) by one third.
10. GGT is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.

1. GGT claims that in September 2022 at John Moroney Correctional Centre whilst on remand the applicant was assaulted by a new inmate who moved into his cell when the applicant who was trying to sleep asked him to 'keep the noise down'. The assailant punched the applicant in the face.
2. Like claims 2024/00095343, 2024/00095635 and 2024/00095645 as GGT was not a convicted inmate at the time of this assault in custody he is eligible to be considered for victims support, as he was on remand the time. (s 24 (4) of the Victims Act).
3. GGT met with Legal Aid in August 2023 and requested that they prepare a report of this (and other) incident(s) so that applications for victims support might be submitted.
4. A Forensic Psychologist prepared a Certificate of Injury for this (and other) claims, having first seen the clinician on 19 July 2023 where this incident was discussed on 25 July 2023. The clinician attributes GGT's level of PTSD, major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder to this and the other reported incidents. The certificate of Injury is dated 10 October 2023.
5. The Respondent correctly observes that GGT did not provide any contemporaneous evidence including evidence that he reported the matter at the time and was medically treated as an inmate on remand. Nor is there any evidence in the material provided by the Respondent in the supporting evidence bundle filed 14 June 2024 (pages 1-27) of this incident. The only Police material provided in the bundle from the Respondent for September 2022 relates to an entry whereby GGT was a person of interest in respect of an AVO which is not related to this claim. There is however as noted above a Certificate of Injury for this matter at page 25 and 26 of that bundle.
6. The clinician lists a number of symptoms arising from the incident. The symptoms and diagnosis for this matter (pages 25 and 26 of the bundle) and the other claims as outlined above. Like these other claims the injuries are described in identical or near identical terms.
7. Whilst it would be open to me to find that in the available evidence GGT is the victim of an act of violence, again I note that there is no evidence (other than GGT's assertions by way of his own submissions) that the matter was ever reported and action taken to investigate and examine what action if any should arise. In oral submissions during the Tribunal hearing GGT stated that for the prison based claims the 'delay in reporting was due to a fear of retribution'. Whilst the Tribunal might accept that evidence being relevant at the time, a failure to report the matter can disentitle a claimant under s 44 (1) (e), (f) and (g) of the Victims Act. Alternatively such a situation could reduce the amount of victims support provided under s 44 of the Victims Act.
8. For the reasons outlined above and this in claim 2024/00095631 I determine that GGT was the victim of an act of violence, however for the same reasons as outlined in 2024/00095643 I determine under s 44 (1) (g) to reduce the amount of victims support that GGT is entitled to by one third.
9. I therefore find that the elements of s 19 and s 39 are met in that GGT is the victim of an act of violence. Applying s 44 (1) (g) I reduce the amount of victims support (payable by way of a recognition payment) by one third.
10. GGT is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.

1. GGT claims that in August 2022 at Silverwater Correctional Centre whilst on remand the applicant was accused by another inmate of stealing his wash bag with clothes. When the other inmate demanded to see where it (the missing wash bag) was inside the applicant's cell the applicant was assaulted.
2. Like claims 2024/00095343, 2024/00095635 and 2024/00095631 as GGT was not a convicted inmate at the time of this assault in custody he is eligible to be considered for victims support, as he was on remand the time. (s 24 (4) of the Victims Act).
3. GGT met with Legal Aid in August 2023 and requested that they prepare a report of this (and other) incident(s) so that applications for victims support might be submitted. A report was prepared in September 2023.
4. A Forensic Psychologist prepared a Certificate of Injury for this (and other) claims, having first seen the clinician on 19 July 2023 where this incident was discussed on 25 July 2023. The clinician attributes GGT's level of PTSD, major depressive disorder and generalised anxiety disorder to this and the other reported incidents. The certificate of Injury is dated 10 October 2023.
5. The Respondent correctly observes that GGT did not provide any contemporaneous evidence including evidence that he reported the matter at the time and was medically treated as an inmate on remand. Nor is there any evidence in the material provided by the Respondent in the supporting evidence bundle filed 14 June 2024 (pages 1-27) of this incident.
6. I note that there is a significant discrepancy between the information contained in the certificate of injury and the report prepared by Legal Aid. The Certificate of Injury states:

He was in custody on remand at Silverwater Correctional Centre in Pod H16.

At 12pm he was approached in the Pod by an inmate of Arab-Ethnic background with an undercut and long hair on top. He accused (GGT) of stealing his wash bag including his clothes, and told him to show him where the wash bag is inside (GGT's) cell.

(GGT) walked him inside his cell and showed him that he hadn't stolen the wash bag. Despite this, he still bashed (GGT) inside his cell and nobody was there to help him.

1. However the version recorded on the other crucial piece of s 39 evidence, the Certificate of Injury is in my view significantly different. The Certificate refers to an incident whereby one cellmate accused GGT of stealing and they and another inmate bashed GGT. Reference is also made to a stabbing threat with a knife. I am unsure as to why this Certificate has been provided. It appears that there are multiple Certificates lodged on this claim, the reason why remains unclear. It may be that another barely completed Certificate does relate to this alleged sequence of events with reference to an inmate bashing GGT for stealing his wash bag.
2. Again like the claim concerning the Motel incident detailed above, it is extremely difficult to extrapolate the evidence of injury for the purposes of s 19 (1) (c ) of the Victims Act in order to be satisfied that an act of violence occurred. The three prison based claims above reach that threshold just barely, as like the Motel matter there is no extrapolation and identification of heads of damage and injury arising as a direct result of the act of violence, merely an assertion that it does. Like the claim concerning the Motel assault, due to the two references to stealing in the two certificates of injury, and the lack of any detail or engagement by the clinician other than a global catch all, I am not comfortably satisfied that there is sufficient evidence to establish that an act of violence occurred. If GGT ran his case in a more orthodox manner and potentially made the clinician available for cross-examination and explaining his evidence further at hearing, a different result might have arisen. However even if I was to find act of violence in all likelihood there would have been some reduction for a failure to provide details for investigating the matter once GGT was released.
3. As I am not sufficiently satisfied that there is evidence of an act of violence, particularly having regard to s 19 (1) (c) and the reasoning outlined in 2024/00260006, this application will be dismissed.

1. GGT claims that in January 2022 the applicant was assaulted by a person outside his residence. When called outside by the assailant and told to get in a motor vehicle the assailant punched the applicant in the eye and tried to choke him with the seat belt before the applicant escaped.
2. This matter unlike any of the other five claims before me was reported by GGT to Police. Whilst the report was made some 16 months after the incident GGT provides an explanation being that initially he was scared of the offender and later forgot about the matter. There is disputed evidence that because Police were apparently rude to him in following the matter up he did not fully cooperate with them.
3. The delegate observed that even though GGT claimed to be scared of the offender (as a reason for the delay) he was able to report other matters (the details of which are not before me) to Police concerning the same offender.
4. The delegate appears to have determined the claim based on the case of Dobbie v Commissioner Victims Rights [2018] NSWSC 1989 that causation of the injury is problematic resulting in no act of violence being established.
5. In respect of GGT's explanation as to why the matter did not go to Court, I accept that position as having some weight. Having dealt with GGT over the course of these matters he is an individual that has unrealistic expectations and can be aggressive and difficult to deal with. He also readily jumps to conclusions and tends to become elevated in his responses when things are not going his way. Why these matters are the case may have something to do with the psychological conditions that the clinician had diagnosed him with and which are outlined above. Alternatively there may be some other explanation.
6. In my view having regard to those matters I completely accept that Police might have elected not to pursue the matter, particularly noting the uncontroversial evidence provided by GGT that:

Please note the matter did not go to court because the police refused to take a statement from me to have (the offender) charged. They knocked on my door about 2 hours later in the morning, and were rude to me because I blamed them for not attending my house after I had phoned the triple 0 telling the operator that I need Police at my house immediately because someone was threatening to physically hurt me.

1. In my view the above matters add credence to the position that the assault involving the perpetrator 'H' his identity is known to parties, occurred. Noting GGT's antecedents and multiple claims, incarcerations and psychological functioning having regard to the beneficial nature of the legislation and the scheme as set out in Victims Compensation Fund Corporation v Brown [2003] HCA 54 (Brown) the discrepancy between the date on the piece of evidence produced as a photo is discounted. In any event the Certificate of Injury sets out the main head of damage that verifies injury.
2. The clinician observes that GGT is 'suddenly scarred for no reason' as well as 'feeling fearful', 'feeling tense / or feeling restless, low energy' and a number of other presentations.
3. In my view there is sufficient evidence to make a finding to the requisite standard that GGT was the victim of an act of violence and I so find.
4. However I will apply section 44 (1) (e) of the Victims Act due to the failure of GGT to provide reasonable assistance to Police. The reason given for the delay in reporting the matter to Police when he was able to report other contemporaneous matters is unsatisfactory. The explanation of being reminded by a video of the incident which he viewed, (initially apparently for entertainment) and only when he subsequently became upset about what happened from seeing the video, and that caused the report is having regard to the section, unsatisfactory. This sequence of events coupled with GGT's apparent criticism of Police for their delayed response resulted in a lack of assistance to Police.
5. I therefore having found act of violence determine that pursuant to s 44 (1) (e) rather than disentitle GGT to victims support, I reduce the amount that he will be entitled to.
6. I therefore find that the elements of s 19 and s 39 are met in that GGT is the victim of an act of violence. Applying s 44 (1) (e) I reduce the amount of victims support (payable by way of a recognition payment) by one third.
7. GGT is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.
8. On the successful claims I have only considered Category D recognition payments as being enlivened by the evidence. This is based on a consideration of the circumstances of the successful acts of violence based claims and the extent of injury. No evidence to the contrary was provided by GGT that would enable me to make any other finding on those claims.

1. For the reasons outlined above, the decision of the respondent will be set aside in four claims and will be affirmed in the other two claims. The import of this decision is that the respondent is to grant the applicant four recognition payments in the nature of Category D in the sum of $1,000.00 each after applying the s 44 deduction.

(1) In proceedings 2024/00260006 the decision of the respondent of 10 July 2024 is affirmed.

(2) In proceedings 2024/00095645 the decision of the respondent of 7 March 2024 is affirmed

(3) In proceedings 2024/00095643 the decision of the respondent of the decision of the respondent of 8 March 2024 is set aside. GGT is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.

(4) In proceedings 2024/00095635 the decision of the respondent of 7 March 2023 is set aside. GGF is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.

(5) In proceedings 2024/00095633 the decision of the respondent of 6 March 2024 is set aside. GGT is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.

(6) In proceedings 2024/00095631 the decision of the respondent of 7 March 2024 is set aside. GGT is approved a Category D recognition payment payable after applying s 44 in the sum of $1,000.00 only.

1. As a result of the decisions in the six claims above the applicant is to be provided with total recognition payments for the four successful claims providing a total payment in the amount of $4,000.00.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

25 September 2025 - Typographical error on coversheet