austlii:cth/ARTA/2026/495
General information, not legal advice.
ARTA
2026-04-02
Original judgment source is linked above.
(a) Documents contained in a 478-page Hearing Book lodged by the Respondent on 19 March 2026 (exhibit HB). > > (b) Oral evidence given by the applicant and his witnesses. > > (c) The oral submissions made on behalf of both parties.
s 501CA" (the Direction).
(1) Australia has a sovereign right to determine whether non-citizens who are of character concern are allowed to enter and/or remain in Australia. Being able to come to or remain in Australia is a privilege Australia confers on non-citizens in the expectation that they are, and have been, law-abiding, will respect important institutions, such as Australia's law enforcement framework, and will not cause or threaten harm to individuals or the Australian community.
(2) The safety of the Australian Community is the highest priority of the Australian Government.
(3) Non-citizens who engage or have engaged in criminal or other serious conduct should expect to be denied the privilege of coming to, or to forfeit the privilege of staying in, Australia.
(4) The Australian community expects that the Australian Government can and should refuse entry to non-citizens, or cancel their visas, if they engaged in conduct, in Australia or elsewhere, that raises serious character concerns. This expectation of the Australian community applies regardless of whether the non-citizen poses a measureable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
(5) Australia has a low tolerance of any criminal or other serious conduct by visa applicants or those holding a limited stay visa, or by other non-citizens who have been participating in, and contributing to, the Australian community only for a short period of time.
(6) With respect to decisions to refuse, cancel, and revoke cancellation of a visa, Australia may afford a higher level of tolerance of criminal or other serious conduct by non-citizens who have lived in the Australian community for most of their life, or from a very young age.
(7) Decision-makers must take into account the primary and other considerations relevant to the individual case. In some circumstances, the nature of the non-citizen's conduct, or the harm that would be caused if the conduct were to be repeated, may be so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation.
(8) The inherent nature of certain conduct such as family violence is so serious that even strong countervailing considerations may be insufficient to justify not cancelling or refusing the visa, or revoking a mandatory cancellation, even if the information available at the time of consideration suggests that the noncitizen does not pose a measureable risk of causing physical harm to the Australian community.
(1) Protection of the Australian community from criminal or other serious conduct;
(2) Whether the conduct engaged in constituted family violence;
(3) The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia;
(4) The best interests of minor children in Australia; and
a) the nature and seriousness of the non-citizen's conduct to date; and > > b) the risk to the Australian community should the non-citizen commit further offences or engage in other serious conduct.
Nature and seriousness of the applicant's conduct to date
'He wanted to put it in my throat but he couldn't. I moved my head and instead of my head, my throat, the glass went in my arm - into my arm.'
'I will kill you. You dating an Afghani man, I will kill you tonight. I will leave you, but you will never be with someone. I - I will kill you.'
12 This constitutes Charge 4, making a threat to kill.
At the end of December 2019, I was informed by one of my friends that he saw [AA] and my daughter at a Medical Centre. I was worried about my daughter so I asked my cousin who had a friendship with [AA] to give her a call and see if everything was okay and if I could see my daughter. My cousin spoke to her, and she told him that 'she is fine, and I do not let him see his daughter'.
After a few days, I couldn't get my daughter out of my head, and I was worried for her. On 3 January 2020, whilst under the influence of alcohol, I decided to go to [AA]'s house again in the hope of seeing my daughter through the window. When I arrived at the house, I could hear [BB] crying. Her cry triggered me and made me think of the incident that happened a few weeks after she was born, when she fell and got injured. I lost control and tried entering the house. I do not remember all the events of this incident due to my intoxication, but I remember breaking the living room window and entering the house and getting in a physical altercation with [AA] and her partner.
At that moment I lost my temper and was not thinking properly. I do not blame anyone but myself for my actions, and it is something I regret deeply. There is no excuse for my behaviour, and I know that I caused a lot of fear and pain to everyone. Once I left the property and processed what happened, I turned myself into police.
[40] I accept that you are in an extremely difficult position regarding your immigration status, and this may have been a factor in your decision to plead not guilty. However, you gave sworn evidence before the jury that you were not the person depicted on the CCTV footage lurking outside the premises. You denied that you were the offender.[26]
a) the nature of the harm to individuals or the Australian community should the non-citizen engage in further criminal or other serious conduct; and > > b) the likelihood of the non-citizen engaging in further criminal or other serious conduct, taking into account: > > 1. information and evidence on the risk of the noncitizen re-offending; and > 2. evidence of rehabilitation achieved by the time of the decision, giving weight to time spent in the community since their most recent offence (noting that decisions should not be delayed in order for rehabilitative courses to be undertaken) ...
Symptoms of depression, anxiety and trauma can fluctuate in intensity and frequency, however, are particularly prone to exacerbation under situations of extreme stress Individuals with PTSD in particular are more likely than those without a trauma history, to respond to situations disproportionately when their threat system is reactivated.
This is particularly relevant for [GFKG]; at the time of the offending he would have struggled to manage his overwhelming anxiety and distress due to his circumstances of being unable to see his daughter, and his alcohol intoxication would have further compromised his ability to think clearly, rationalize, and would have been prone to reacting impulsively to any stressors and in particular to any perceived threat or distress to his child.[51]
Protective factors that may mitigate [GFKG]'s risk of reoffending include his willingness to engage with mental health and support services as evidenced by his engagement in programs in custody and his requests to engage with prison psychiatric services (though this has not been possible), his demonstrated ability to abstain from alcohol in the past, support from his a number of prosocial supports in the community, lack of any association with antisocial peers, his genuine remorse for his actions, and the absence of violent ideation or an antisocial belief system. This is supported by [GFKG]'s absence of any criminal history or violence prior to the index offence.[58]
I am fully aware of the offending that occurred in 2020. I do not minimise any of it. We have discussed that incident in detail. I am a direct person and I have always felt able to ask him difficult questions, and he has never avoided them. [GFKG] accepts responsibility for what he did and has never offered excuses. He has told me plainly that there is no excuse for what happened, that he is deeply remorseful, and that it pains him that he is currently not able to have a relationship with his daughter. This is something he carries heavily.
In our conversations he now focuses on ways of coping with stress, on staying sober, and on the practical steps he needs to follow if he is released. His reflections are calm and grounded and he speaks about triggers and responses in a way that shows his insight and growth. These impressions are based on our daily contact over a long time, and on observing him in person during visits.
I have gained a strong understanding of [GFKG]'s daily routine and structure. He is remarkably disciplined. He never misses a day at the gym, even during extreme weather conditions. He attends the coffee club where he makes coffees for detainees and officers. He participates in sewing classes, where he sews and repairs clothing, and he attends cooking classes to expand his practical skills. I hear the way he respectfully communicates with both officers and other detainees. He offers support to detainees who are struggling, comforting them through conversation or by sharing the limited resources he has, including food. He also maintains very high standards of hygiene and self‑care. His room is always clean, his bed is made daily, he washes his clothes regularly, and he takes pride in his grooming, maintaining a tidy beard and cutting his own hair. [66]
...generally an entrenched pattern of deviant behaviour in which the individual has no regard for the rights of others, consistently engages in rule or law-breaking behaviour, and does not conform to society's expected standards of conduct. Further, antisocial individuals act impulsively, have no regard for the safety of themselves or others, and act in a reckless manner, as well as engage in antagonistic and manipulative behaviour to have their own needs met.[91]
Accordingly, the Tribunal places less weight on Ms Ferrari's assessment of the applicant's risk of further violent reoffending, on the basis that it has been unable to ask Ms Ferrari about the assumptions which underpinned her assessment of risk.
Conclusion on protection of the Australian community
Strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia
Best interests of minor children in Australia affected by the decision
non-refoulement obligations in respect of unlawful non-citizens, where relevant. 2. Generally, if a visa is cancelled, its former holder becomes an unlawful non-citizen immediately after cancellation. Under s 189 of the Act, the applicant must be detained and removed as soon as reasonably practicable under s 198.[130] However, s 197C of the Act provides that s 198 does not require or authorise a person's removal to a country if a 'protection finding' has been made for them. The respondent submits, and the Tribunal finds, that a delegate made a 'protection finding' in respect of the applicant when he was granted a TPV.[131] As a consequence s 198 does not require or authorise the applicant's removal to Iran: s 197C(3).[132] However, due to the applicant's mode of arrival, the applicant is barred from making any valid application for a further visa whilst in Australia without the intervention of the Minister: s 46A of the Act. 3. The applicant's representative submits that two sets of legal consequences will flow from a decision to refuse to grant the applicant the visa. * First, the applicant will be removed to a third country. In the present case, the applicant is likely to be removed to Nauru pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Australian and Nauruan Governments, establishing third-country reception arrangements under which Nauru agreed to provide 'long-term settlement visas' for up to 100 people in return for Australian funding commitments. Mr McLean submits that this outcome is a probable consequence of the decision, as Nauru has granted at least four Long Term Stay visas (LTSVs) pursuant to this agreement and at least one LTSV holder has already been removed from Australia to Nauru,[133] but notes that the arrangement is currently being challenged in the High Court, with the Court reserving its judgment.[134]
... Justice Flick's reasoning in Ali was adopted and applied by Logan J in Greene at [19] and by Farrell J in Turay at [40] ... Contrary to the applicant's submissions, I do not consider that the reasoning in this trio of cases is plainly wrong. Indeed, I consider that it is plainly correct. In my respectful view, it properly recognises the importance of the different stages of decision-making under the Act and the need to avoid speculation as to what might or might not occur in future decision-making ...
Irrespective of how the Applicant's future may unfold, the Tribunal accepts an adverse decision would be distressing for him and others he may be close to. This has the potential to adversely affect his mental health.
The balancing process is directed to determining whether there is "another reason" why the visa cancellation should be revoked. It requires an identification of the matters that may constitute "another reason" and bringing to bear the considerations that the Direction requires the Tribunal to take into account where relevant in determining whether or not the Tribunal is satisfied that there is another reason (or reasons) to revoke the visa cancellation. Some of the considerations set out in the Direction, where relevant, may weigh in favour of revocation, and so may constitute "another reason" capable of supporting the state of satisfaction required in order for revocation under s 501CA(4)(b)(ii) to occur. But whether they do qualify as a reason of that kind will need to be assessed in the context of different considerations set out in the Direction which may weigh against revocation, where relevant. That is why it is appropriate to describe it as a process of weighing and balancing. But to go beyond that to treat the Direction as mandating some sort of calculation of the net weight to be given to the considerations on each side is to lose sight of the ultimately evaluative nature of the statutory task.
(a) The protection of the Australian community against criminal and other serious conduct weighs significantly in favour of refusal. > > (b) The family violence committed by the non-citizen weighs significantly in favour of refusal. > > (c) The strength, nature and duration of ties to Australia weighs significantly against refusal. > > (d) The best interests of minor children weighs slightly against refusal. > > (e) The expectations of the Australian community weighs significantly in favour of refusal.
(f) The legal consequences of the decision weighs significantly against refusal. > > (g) The extent of impediments if removed weighs significantly against refusal.
M Baras-Miller of the Australian Government Solicitor
[2] Respondent's Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (RSFIC) at [3].
[4] HB 133 [21], 464-465, 471. The applicant's parents returned to Iran in November 2025 for medical treatment, but have been unable to return to Australia due to the outbreak of war in the region.
[15] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 at [7] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson).
[16] Applicant's statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions (ASFIC) at [9].
[19] The applicant's criminal history records that the applicant was found guilty of 2 charges of 'contravene family violence final intervention order' on 19 March 2020, for which no conviction was recorded. Pursuant to ss 85ZM, 85ZR(2) and 85ZS(1)(d) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) and s 8 of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic), the Tribunal must not take into account any findings of guilt made against the applicant or the fact he had been charged with the offences. Consistently with the decisions of WKBF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 465, Thornton v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 17 and Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 6, the Tribunal has not had regard to those offences.
[21] This name is a pseudonym used for AA in the Court's sentencing remarks.
[22] This name is a pseudonym used in the Court's sentencing remarks.
[23] This name is a pseudonym used in the Court's sentencing remarks.
[27] Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(iii) of the Direction.
[28] Paragraph 4.1(1) of the Direction.
[37] [2024] AATA 1782 (Cruckshank).
[41] Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(a)(i)-(iii) of the Direction.
[43] Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(d) of the Direction.
[44] Paragraphs 8.1.1(1)(e)-(f) of the Direction.
[45] Paragraph 8.1.1(1)(h) of the Direction.
[47] Paragraphs 8.1.1(1)(g) of the Direction.
[48] Paragraphs 8.1.1(1)(i) of the Direction.
[49] Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 673; (2014) 225 FCR 424 at [104] (Mortimer J), Hambledon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 7 at [43] (Kenny J).
[50] HB 144-145, [110]-[112], [115].
[59] HB 115-130, 252-253, 229-230 [11]-[16].
[66] HB 238-239 [4]-[5], 240 [14].
[74] ASFIC at [26]-[29], Applicant's reply at [4].
[87] Paragraph 8.1.2(2)(a) of the Direction.
[92] The Tribunal accepts that Ms Ferrari was aware that the applicant was subject to a FVIO at the time of the 3 January 2020 incident, as this was mentioned in the sentencing remarks included in the materials provided to Ms Ferrari. See HB 48 [2], HB 133 [18c].
[93] Paragraph 8.1.2(2)(b) of the Direction.
[94] Paragraph 8.1.2(1) of the Direction.
[98] At the hearing, the applicant clarified that he meant 2018, not 2017.
[99] At the hearing, the applicant clarified that his last contact with his daughter was in 2019.
[102] ASFIC at [39]-[41], Applicant's reply at [7].
[104] Paragraph 8.2(3)(1)-(b) of the Direction
[105] Paragraph 8.2(3)(c)(i)-(ii) of the Direction.
[106] Paragraph 8.2(3)(c)(iii) of the Direction.
[107] At the hearing the applicant's lawyer accepted that the applicant's parents hold Australian temporary visas and accordingly are not Australian citizens, permanent residents and/or have the right to remain in Australia indefinitely.
[108] HB 93-100, 107, 109, 114, 228-245, 471.
[112] Paragraph 8.3(1) of the Direction.
[113] Paragraph 8.3(2)(a) of the Direction.
[114] HB 231 [23]; Paragraph 8.3(2)(a)(ii) of the Direction.
[115] Paragraph 8.3(2)(b) of the Direction.
[116] Paragraph 8.3(2)(a)(i) of the Direction.
[118] HB 94-95 [9]-[10], 229 [7], ASFIC at [51], Paragraph 8.4(a) of the Direction.
[121] Paragraphs 8.4(4)(b)-(c), (g) of the Direction.
[122] Paragraphs 8.4(4)(b)-(c), (g)-(h) of the Direction.
[123] Paragraph 8.4(4)(e) of the Direction.
[124] Paragraphs 8.4(4)(d) of the Direction.
[126] FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185 at [66]- [67] (Charlesworth J), [91], [101] and [104] (Stewart J).
[127] FYBR at [77] (Charlesworth J): RCLN v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 876 (RCLN) at [56] (Horan J). Horan J's judgment was upheld on appeal in RCLN v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship [2025] FCAFC 113.
[129] Paragraph 8.5(2)(a) of the Direction.
[130] Paragraph 9.1(1) of the Direction.
[132] Also see paragraph 9.1.1(2) of the Direction.
[133] ASFIC at [76]-[77], Maani Truu, 'Fourth NZYQ member issued Nauruan visa as Labor steams ahead with deportation plan', ABC News (25 September 2025), available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-09-25/fourth-nauruan-visa-issued-to-nzyq/105817222; Maani Truu, 'First NZYQ cohort member deported to Nauru under opaque deal potentially worth billions', ABC News (28 October 2025), available at https://www.abc.net.au/news/2025-10-28/first-nzyq-member-deported-to-nauru/105919846
[134] TXCM v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship & Anor (S146/2025) (TXCM).
[136] ASFIC at [69]. At the hearing, the applicant acknowledged that the potential conditions and penalties did not include those imposed by s 76C and 76D of the Act, which were recently found to be unconstitutional by the High Court. See EGH19 v Commonwealth of Australia [2026] HCA 7.
[137] ASFIC at [71]- [72], [82].
[139] ASFIC at [81], [84], [109]; Applicant's reply at [15].
[140] ASFIC at [85]-[88], [92]-[94], [104]-[109]; Applicant's reply at [15], [18].
[141] ASFIC at [87]-[88], [95]-[103].
[142] ASFIC at [82], [88], [91], [120]-[124].
[145] ASFIC at [126]-[131] ; Applicant's reply at [17].
[147] Applicant's reply at [18], United Nations Human Rights Council, Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Nauru (30 October 2025), A/HRC/WG.6/51/NRU/2 at [55].
[150] Clause 3 of Schedule 3 to the Nauruan Regulations.
[153] BFMV v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 199.
[154] BNGP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 111; (2023) 298 FCR 609, [101] (Perry J, with Bromwich and Kennett JJ agreeing) (BNGP).
[155] DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1523 at [35] (DOB18).
[156] Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 650, at [28] and [33].
[158] Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80 at [7] (Kiefel CJ, Keane and Gleeson).
[161] Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v RXJT [2026] FCA 33 (RXJT) at [20].
[162] ASFIC at [134], [138]; Applicant's reply at [21].
[164] RXJT at [20], [50]-[51].
[166] ASFIC at [140], RSFIC at [67].
[167] CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138.
[168] Paragraphs 7(1) and 7(2) of the Direction. Emphasis added.
[170] [2018] FCA 594 at [23].
[171] Hands v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 267 FCR 628 at [3].
[172] Paragraph 5.2(7)-(8) of the Direction.
Ali v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 650
BFMV v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCAFC 199
BNGP v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 111; (2023) 298 FCR 609
CRNL v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCAFC 138
Cruckshank v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] AATA 1782
DOB18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2018] FCA 1523
EGH19 v Commonwealth of Australia [2026] HCA 7
FHHM v Minister for Immigration [2022] FCAFC 19
FYBR v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCAFC 185
Hambledon v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 7
Lesianawai v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] HCA 6
Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v RXJT [2026] FCA 33
Nathanson v Minister for Home Affairs [2022] HCA 26; (2022) 276 CLR 80
RCLN v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 876
Suleiman v Minister for Immigration [2018] FCA 594
Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2014] FCA 673
Thornton v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2023] HCA 17
VSYV and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Migration) [2026] ARTA 62
WKBF v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2024] FCA 465
(2022) 276 CLR 80
(2014) 225 FCR 424
(2023) 298 FCR 609
(2018) 267 FCR 628